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ELEMENTS 

JJJ 

MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE; 



OR, 



COURSE OF INSTRUCTION 



STRATEGY, FORTIFICATION, TACTICS OF BATTLES, &e.; 

EMBRACING 

THE DUTIES OF STAFF, INFANTRY, CAVALRY, 
ARTILLERY, AND ENGINEERS. 

ADAPTED TO THE USE OF 

VOLUNTEERS AND MILITIA. 

BY 

H. WAGER 'HALLECK, A. M., 

LIEUT. OF ENGINEERS, U. S. ARMY. 



NEW YORK: 
D. APPLETON & CO., 200 BROADWAY. 

PHILADELPHIA: 

G. S. APPLETON, 148 CHESNUT STREET. 

M DCCC XL VI. 



^l^ 



^ 



!B 



Entered, according to the Act of Congrej^s, in the year 1846, 

By D. APPLETON & COMPANY, 

In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the Southern 
District of New York. 



CONTENTS. 



Page 
Preface • • 5 

Chapter L iNTRODUCTiON.—Dr. Wayland's Arguments on the Justifiable- 

ness of War briefly examined 7 

II. Strategy. — General Divisions of the Art. — Rules for planning 
a Campaign. — Analysis of the Military Operations of Na- 
poleon 35 

III. Fortifications. — Their importance in the Defence of States 

proved by numerous Historical Examples 61 

IV. Logistics .—Subsistence. — Forage . — Marches. — Convoys.— Cas- 

trametation • 88 

V. Tactics. — The Twelve Orders of Battle, with Examples of 
each. — Different Formations of Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, 
and Engineers on the Field of Battle, with the Modes of 
bringing Troops into action 114 

VI. Military Polity. — The Means of National Defence best suited 

to the character and condition of a Country, with a brief Ac- 
count of those adopted by the several European Powers 135 

VII. Defence of our Sea-coast. — Brief Description of our Mari- 

time Fortifications, with an Examination of the several Con- 
tests that have taken place between Ships and Forts, inclu- 
ding the Attack on San Juan d'Ulloa, and on St. Jean 
d'Acre 155 

VIII. Our Northern Frontier Defences.— Brief Description of 
the Fortifications on the Frontier, and an analysis of our 
Northern Campaigns 210 

IX. Army Organization.— Staff and Administrative Corps. — ^Their 

History, Duties, Numbers, and Organization 235 

X. Army Organization, — Infantry and Cavalry. — Their History, 

Duties, Numbers, and Organization 256 

XI. Army Organization.— Artillery. — Its History and Organiza- 
tion, with a Brief Notice of the different kinds of Ordnance, 
the Manufacture of Projectiles, &c. 275 

XII. Army Organization. — Engineers. — Their History, Duties, and 
Organization, — with a Brief Discussion, showing their im- 
portance as a part of a modern Army Organization 300 



4 CONTENTS, 

PA6B 

Chap. XIII. Permanent Fortifications. Historical Notice of the progress 
of this Art. — Description of the several parts of a Fortress, 
and the various Methods of fortifying a Position 327 

XIV. Field Engineering. — Field Fortifications. — Military Communi- 
cations.— Military Bridges. — Sapping, Mining, and the Attack 
and Defence of a Fortified Place 342 

XV. Military Education.— Military Schools of France, Prussia, 
Austria, Russia, England, &c. — Washington's Reasons for 
establishing the West Point Academy.— Rules of Appoint- 
ment and Promotion in Foreign Services. — Absurdity and In- 
justice of our own System 378 

Explanation op Plates 409 



PREFACE. 



The following pages were hastily thrown together in 
the form of lectures, and delivered, during the past winter, 
before the Lowell Institute of Boston. They were writ- 
ten without the slightest intention of ever publishing them ; 
but several officers of militia, who heard them delivered, 
or afterwards read them in manuscript, desire their publi- 
cation, on the ground of their being useful to a class of 
officers now likely to be called into military service. It 
is with this view alone that they are placed in the hands 
of the printer. No pretension is made to originality in 
any part of the work ; the sole object having been to em- 
body, in a small compass, well established military princi- 
ples, and to illustrate these by reference to the events 
of past history, and the opinions and practice of the best 
generals. 

Small portions of two or three of the following chap- 
ters have already appeared, in articles furnished by the 
author to the New York and Democratic Reviews, and in 
a " Report on the Means of National Defence," published 
by order of Congress. 

H. W. H. 

May, 1846, 



ELEMENTS 



MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 



CHAPTER I. 

INTRODUCTION. 



Our distance from the old world, and the favorable cir- 
cumstances in which we have been placed with respect 
to the other nations of the new world, have made it so 
easy for our government to adhere to a pacific policy, that, 
in the sixty-two years that have elapsed since the ac- 
knowledgment of our national independence, we have en- 
joyed more than fifty-eight of general peace ; our Indian 
border wars have been too limited and local in their char- 
acter to seriously affect the other parts of the country, or 
to disturb the general conditions of peace. This fortunate 
state of things has done much to diffuse knowledge, pro- 
mote commerce, agriculture, and manufactures ; in fine, to 
increase the greatness of the nation and the happiness of 
the individual. Under these circumstances our people 
have grown up with habits and dispositions essentially 
pacific, and it is to be hoped that these feelings may not 
soon be changed. But in all communities opinions some- 
times run into extremes ; and there are not a few among 
us who, dazzled by the beneficial results of a long peace, 
have adopted the opinion that war in any case is not only 
useless, but actually immoral ; nay, more, that to engage 
in war is wicked in the highest degree, and even brutish. 



8 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

All modern ethical writers regard unjust war as not only 
immoral, but as one of the greatest of crimes — murder on 
a large scale. Such are all wars of mere ambition, en- 
gaged in for the purpose of extending regal power or 
national sovereignty ; wars of plunder, carried on from 
mercenary motives ; wars of propagandism, undertaken 
for the unrighteous end of compelling men to adopt certain 
religious or political opinions, whether from the alleged 
motives of " introducing a more orthodox religion," or of 
" extending the area of freedom." Such wars are held in 
just abhorrence by all moral and religious people : and 
this is believed to be the settled conviction of the great 
mass of our own citizens. 

But in addition to that respectable denomination of 
Christians who deny our right to use arms under any cir- 
cumstances, there are many religious enthusiasts in other 
communions who, from causes already noticed, have 
adopted the same theory, and hold all wars, even those in 
self-defence, as unlawful and immoral. This opinion has 
been, within the last few years, pressed on the public with 
great zeal and eloquence, and many able pens have been 
enlisted in its cause. One of the most popular, and by 
some regarded one of the most able writers on moral 
science, has adopted this view as the only one consonant 
with the principles of Christian morality. 

It has been deemed proper, in commencing a course of 
lectures on war, to make a few introductory remarks re- 
specting this question of its justifiableness. We know of no 
better way of doing this than to give on the one side the ob- 
jections to war as laid down in Dr. Wayland's Moral Phi- 
losophy, and on the other side the arguments by which 
other ethical writers have justified a resort to war. We do not 
select Dr. Wayland's work for the purpose of criticizing so 
distinguished an author ; but because he is almost the only 
writer on ethics who advocates these views, and because 



INTRODUCTION. 9 

the main arguments against war are here given in brief 
space, and in more moderate and temperate language than 
that used by most of his followers. I shall give his argu- 
ments in his own language. 

" I. All wars are contrary to the revealed will of God." 
It is said in reply, that if the Christian religion con- 
demns all wars, no matter how just the cause, or how ne- 
cessary for self-defence, we must expect to find in the 
Bible some direct prohibition of war, or at least a prohibi- 
tion fairly implied in other direct commandments. But 
the Bible nowhere prohibits war : in the Old Testament 
we find war and even conquest positively commanded, and 
although war was raging in the world in the time of Christ 
and his apostles, still they said not a word of its unlawful- 
ness and immorality. Moreover, the fathers of the church 
amply acknowledge the right of war, and directly assert, 
that when war is justly declared, the Christian may en- 
gage in it either by stratagem or open force. If it be of 
that highly wicked and immoral character which some 
have recently attributed to it, most assuredly it would be 
condemned in the Bible in terms the most positive and 
unequivocal. 

But it has been said that the use of the sword is either 
directly or typically forbidden to the Christian, by such 
passages as " Thou shalt not kill," (Deut. v. 17,) " I say 
unto you, that ye resist not evil : but whosoever shall 
smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also," 
(Matt. V. 39,) &c. If these passages are to be taken as 
literal commands, as fanatics and religious enthusiasts 
would have us believe, not only is war unlawful, but also 
all our penal statutes, the magistracy, and all the institu- 
tions of the state for the defence of individual rights, the 
protection of the innocent, and the punishment of the 
guilty. But if taken in conjunction with the whole Bible, 
we must infer that they are hyperbolical expressions, used 



10 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

to impress strongly on our minds the general principle of 
love and forgiveness, and that, so far as possible, v^^e over- 
come evil with good. Can any sober-minded man sup- 
pose, for a moment, that v^e are commanded to encou- 
rage the attacks of the vricked, by literally turning the 
left cheek when assaulted on the right, and thus in- 
duce the assailant to commit more wrong ? Shall we in- 
vite the thief and the robber to persevere in his depreda- 
tions, by literally giving him a cloak when he takes our 
coat; and the insolent and the oppressor to proceed in 
his path of crime, by going two miles with him if he bid 
us to go one ? 

Again, if the command, " Thou shalt not kill," is to be 
taken literally, it not only prohibits us from engaging in 
just war, and forbids the taking of human life by the 
state, as a punishment for crime ; it also forbids, says Dr. 
Leiber, our taking the life of any animal, and even ex- 
tends to the vegetable kingdom, — for undoubtedly plants 
have life, and are liable to violent death — to be killed. 
But Dr. Wayland concedes to individuals the right to 
take vegetable and animal life, and to society the right to 
punish murder by death. This passage undoubtedly 
means, thou shalt not unjustly kill, — thou shalt do no 
murder ; and so it is rendered in our prayer-books. It 
cannot have reference to war, for on almost the next page 
we find the Israelites commanded to go forth and smite 
the heathen nations, — to cast them out of the land, — to 
utterly destroy them, — to show them no mercy, &c. If 
these passages of the Bible are to be taken literally, there 
is no book which contains so many contradictions ; but if 
taken in connection with the spirit of other passages, we 
shall find that we are permitted to use force in preventing 
or punishing crime, whether in nations or in individuals ; 
but that we should combine love with justice, and free 
our hearts from all evil motives. 



INTRODUCTION. 11 

II. All wars are unjustifiable, because " God commands 
us to love every man, alien or citizen, Samaritan or Jew, 
as ourselves ; and the act neither of society nor of gov- 
ernment can render it our duty to violate this command." 

It is true that no act of society can make it our duty to 
violate any command of God : but is the above command 
to be taken literally, and as forbidding us to engage in 
just war ? Is it not rather intended to impress upon us, 
in a forcible manner, that mutual love is a great virtue ; 
that we should hate no one, not even a stranger nor an 
enemy, but should treat all with justice, mercy, and 
loving-kindness ? If the meaning attempted to be given 
to this command in the above quotation be the true one, it 
is antagonistical not only to just war, but to civil justice, 
to patriotism, and to the social and domestic affections. 

But are we bound to love all human beings alike ; that 
is, to the same degree ? Does the Bible, as a whole, in- 
culcate such doctrine ? On the contrary, Christ himself 
had his beloved disciple, — one whom he loved pre-emi- 
nently, and above all the others ; though he loved the 
others none the less on that account. We are bound to 
love our parents, our brothers, our families first, and above 
all other human beings ; but we do not, for this reason, 
love others any the less. A man is not only permitted to 
seek first the comfort and happiness of his own family, 
but if he neglect to do so, he is worse than an infidel. 
We are bound to protect our families against the attacks 
of others ; and, if necessary for the defence of their 
lives, we are permitted to take the life of the assailant ; 
nay more, we are bound to do so. But it does not follow 
that we hate him whom we thus destroy. On the con- 
trary, we may feel compassion, and even love for him. 
The magistrate sentences the murderer to suffer the pen- 
alty of the law ; and the sheriff carries the sentence into 
execution by taking, in due form, the life of the prisoner ; 



12 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

nevertheless, both the magistrate and the sheriff may have 
the kindest feelings towards him whom they thus deprive 
of life. 

So it is in the external affairs of the state. Next to 
my kindred and my neighbors do I love my countrymen. 
I love them more than I do foreigners, because my in- 
terests, my feelings, my happiness, my ties of friendship 
and affection, bind me to them more intimately than to the 
foreigner. I sympathize with the oppressed Greek, and 
the enslaved African, and willingly contribute to their 
relief, although their sufferings affect me very remotely ; 
but if my own countrymen become oppressed and en- 
slaved, nearer and dearer interests are affected, and pecu- 
liar duties spring from the ties and affections which God 
has formed. If my countrymen be oppressed, my neigh- 
bors and kindred will be made unhappy and suffering ; 
this I am bound to take all proper measures in my power 
to prevent. If the assailant cannot be persuaded by ar- 
gument to desist from his wicked intentions, I unite with 
my fellow-citizens in forcibly resisting his aggressions. 
In doing this I am actuated by no feelings of hatred to- 
wards the hostile forces ; I have in my heart no malice, 
no spirit of revenge ; I have no desire to harm indi- 
viduals, except so far as they are made the instruments 
of oppression. But as instruments of evil, I am bound 
to destroy their power to do harm. I do not shoot at my 
military enemy from hatred or revenge ; I fight against 
him because the paramount interests of my country can- 
not be secured without destroying the instrument by 
which they are assailed. I am prohibited from exercising 
any personal cruelty ; and after the battle, or as soon as 
the enemy is rendered harmless, he is to be treated with 
kindness, and to be taken care of equally with the wound- 
ed friend. All conduct to the contrary is regarded by 
civilized nations with disapprobation. 



INTRODUCTION. 13 

That war does not properly beget personal malignity, 
but that, on the contrary, the effects of mutual kindness 
and courtesy on the battle-field, frequently have a bene- 
ficial influence in the political events of after years, may 
be shown by innumerable examples in all history. Soult 
and Wellington were opposing generals in numerous bat- 
tles ; but when the former visited England in 1838, he 
was received by Wellington and the whole British nation 
with the highest marks of respect ; and the mutual warmth 
of feeling between these two distinguished men has con- 
tributed much to the continuance of friendly relations be- 
tween the two nations. And a few years ago, when we 
seemed brought, by our civil authorities, almost to the 
brink of war by the northeastern boundary difiiculties, the 
pacific arrangements concluded, through the intervention 
of General Scott, between the Governors of Maine and 
New Brunswick, were mainly due to ancient friendships 
contracted by officers of the contending armies during our 
last war with Great Britain. 

III. " It is granted that it would be better for man in 
general, if wars were abolished, and all means, both of 
offence and defence, abandoned. Now, this seems to me 
to admit, that this is the law under which God has created 
man. But this being admitted, the question seems to be 
at an end ; for God never places man under circumstances 
in which it is either wise, or necessary, or innocent, to 
violate his laws. Is it for the advantage of him who lives 
among a community of thieves, to steal ; or for one who 
lives among a community of liars, to lie ?" 

The fallacy of the above argument is so evident that it 
is scarcely necessary to point out its logical defects. 

My living among a community of thieves would not 
justify me in stealing, and certainly it would be no reason 
why I should neglect the security of my property. My 
living among murderers would not justify me in commit- 

2 



14 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

ting murder, and on the other hand it would be no reason 
why I should not fight in the defence of my family, if the 
arm of the law were unable to protect them. That other 
nations carry on unjust wars is no reason why we should 
do likewise, nor is it of itself any reason why we should 
neglect the means of self-defence. 

It may seem, to us short-sighted mortals, better that we 
were placed in a world where there were no wars, or 
murders, or thefts ; but God has seen fit to order it other- 
wise. Our duties and our relations to our fellow-men are 
made to suit the world as it is, and not such a world as 
we would make for ourselves. 

We live among thieves : we must therefore resort to 
force to protect our property — that is, to locks, and bars, 
and bolts ; we build walls thick and high between the 
robber and our merchandise. And more : we enact laws 
for his punishment, and employ civil officers to forcibly 
seize the guilty and inflict that degree of punishment 
necessary for the prevention of other thefts and robberies. 

We live among murderers : if neither the law nor the 
ordinary physical protections suffice for the defence of our 
own lives and the lives of our innocent friends, we forci- 
bly resist the murderer, even to his death, if need be. 
Moreover, to deter others from like crimes, we inflict the 
punishment of death upon him who has already taken 
life. 

These relations of individuals and of society are laid 
down by all ethical writers as in accordance with the 
strictest rules of Christian morality. Even Dr. Wayland 
considers it not only the right, but the duty of individuals 
and of society to resort to these means, and to enact these 
laws for self-protection. Let us extend the same course 
of reasoning to the relations of different societies. 

We live among nations who frequently wage unjust 
wars ; who. disregarding the rights of others, oppress, 



INTRODUCTION. 15 

and rob, and even murder their citizens, in order to reach 
some unrighteous end. As individuals, we build fences 
and walls for the protection of our grounds and our mer- 
chandise ; so, as a nation, we build ships and forts to 
protect our commerce, our harbors, and our cities. But 
the walls of our houses and stores are useless, unless 
made so strong and high that the robber cannot break 
through or scale them without great effort and personal 
danger ; so our national ships and forts would be utterly 
useless for protection, unless fully armed and equipped. 

Further : as individuals and as societies we employ 
civil officers for the protection of our property and lives, 
and, when necessary, arm them with the physical means 
of executing the laws, even though the employment of 
these means should cost human life. The prevention and 
punishment of crime causes much human suffering ; nev- 
ertheless the good of community requires that crime 
should be prevented and punished. So, as a nation, we 
employ military officers to man our ships and forts, to pro- 
tect our property and our persons, and to repel and punish 
those who seek to rob us of our life, liberty, and pursuit 
of happiness. National aggressions are far more terrible 
in their results than individual crime ; so also the means 
of prevention and punishment are far more stupendous, 
and the employment of these means causes a far greater 
amount of human suffering. This may be a good reason 
for greater caution in resorting to such means, but assuredly 
it is no argument against the moral right to use them. 
IV. War is unjustifiable because unnecessary : 
" 1st. The very fact that a nation relied solely upon the 
justice of its measures, and the benevolence of its con- 
duct, would do more than any thing else to prevent the 
occurrence of injury. The moral sentiment of every com- 
munity would rise in opposition to injury inflicted upon 
the just, the kind, and the merciful." 



16 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

The moral duty of nations in this respect is the same 
as that of individuals. Active benevolence and forbear- 
ance should be employed, so far as may be proper ; but 
there are points at which forbearance ceases to be a vir- 
tue. If we entirely forbear to punish the thief, the rob- 
ber, and the murderer, think you that crime will be dimin- 
ished? Reason and experience prove the contrary. 
Active benevolence and kindness should always attend 
just punishment, but they were never designed to prohibit 
it. The laws of God's universe are founded on justice as 
well as love. " The moral sentiment of every community 
rises in opposition to injury inflicted upon the just, the 
kind, and the merciful ;" but this fact does not entirely 
prevent wicked men from robbing and murdering innocent 
persons, and therefore wise and just laws require that 
criminals shall be punished, in order that those who are 
dead to all moral restraints may be deterred from crime 
through fear of punishment. 

"2d. But suppose the [national] injury to be done. I 
reply. The proper appeal for moral beings, upon moral 
questions, is not to physical force, but to the consciences 
of men. Let the wrong be set forth, but be set forth in 
the spirit of love ; and in this manner, if in any, will the 
consciences of men be aroused to justice." 

Argument, and " appeals to the consciences of men" 
should always be resorted to in preference to " physical 
force ;" but when they fail to deter the wicked, force 
must be employed. I may reason with the robber and 
the murderer, to persuade him to desist from his attempt 
to rob my house, and murder my family ; but if he refuse 
to listen to moral appeals, I employ physical force, — I 
call in the strong arm of the law to assist me ; and if no 
other means can be found to save innocent life that is as- 
sailed, the life of the assailant must be sacrificed. 

" If," says PufFendorf, " some one treads the laws of 



INTRODUCTION. 17 

peace under his feet, forming projects which tend to my 
ruin, he could not, without the highest degree of impu- 
dence, (impudentissime,) pretend that after this I should 
consider him as a sacred person, who ought not to be 
touched ; in other words, that I should betray myself, and 
abandon the care of my own preservation, in order to 
give way to the malice of a criminal, that he may act 
with impunity and with full liberty. On the contrary, 
since he shows himself unsociable towards me, and since 
he has placed himself in a position which does not per- 
mit me safely to practice towards him the duties of peace, 
I have only to think of preventing the danger which 
menaces me ; so that if I cannot do this without hurting 
him, he has to accuse himself only, since he has reduced 
me to this necessity." De Jure Nat. et Gent., lib. ii., ch. 
v., § 1 . This same course of reasoning is also applied 
to the duties of a nation towards its enemy in respect to 
war. 

" 3d. But suppose this method fail. Why, then, let us 
suffer the evil." 

This principle, if applied to its full extent, would, we 
believe, be subversive of all right, and soon place all 
power in the hands of the most evil and wicked men in 
the community. Reason with the nation that invades our 
soil, and tramples under foot our rights and liberties, and 
should it not desist, why, then, suffer the evil ! Reason 
with the murderer, and if he do not desist, why, then, 
suffer him to murder our wives and our children ! Reason 
with the robber and the defaulter, and if they will not 
listen, why, then, let them take our property ! We can- 
not appeal to the courts, for if their decisions be not re- 
spected, they employ force to compel obedience to their 
mandates. But Dr. Wayland considers the law of be- 
nevolence to forbid the use of force between men. He 
forgets this, it is true, in speaking of our duties towards 

2* 



18 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

our fellow-men of the same society, and even allows us to 
punish the murderer with death ; but towards the for- 
eigner he requires a greater forbearance and benevolence 
than towards our neighbor ; for if another nation send its 
armies to oppress, and rob, and murder us by the thou- 
sand, we have no right to employ physical force either to 
prevent or to punish them, though we may do so to pre- 
vent or punish a neighbor for an individual act of the 
same character. The greater the scale of crime, then, 
the less the necessity of resorting to physical force to 
prevent it ! 

" 4th. But it may be asked, what is to prevent repeated 
and continued aggression ? I answer, first, not instru- 
ments of destruction, but the moral principle which God 
has placed in the bosom of every man. I think that obe- 
dience to the law of God, on the part of the injured, is 
the surest preventive against the repetition of injury. I 
answer, secondly, suppose that acting in obedience to the 
law of benevolence will not prevent the repetition of in- 
jury, will acting on the principle of retaliation prevent 
it?" Again; "I believe aggression from a foreign nation to 
be the intimation from God that we are disobeying the 
law of benevolence, and that this is his mode of teaching 
nations their duty, in this respect, to each other. So that 
aggression seems to me in no manner to call for retalia- 
tion and injury, but rather to call for special kindness and 
good-will." 

This argument, if such it can be called, is equally ap- 
plicable to individual aggressions. We are bound to 
regard them as intimations of our want of benevolence, 
and to reward the aggressors for the intimations ! Is it 
true, that in this world the wicked only are oppressed, 
and that the good are always the prospered and happy ? 
Even suppose this true, and that I, as a sinful man, de- 
serve God's anger, is this any reason why I should not 



INTRODUCTION. 19 

resist the assassin, and seek to bring him to punish- 
ment? The whole of this argument of Dr. Wayland 
applies with much greater force to municipal courts than 
to war. 

V. " Let us suppose a nation to abandon all means 
both of offence and of defence, to lay aside all power of 
inflicting injury, and to rely for self-preservation solely 
upon the justice of its own conduct, and the moral effect 
which such a course of conduct would produce upon the 
consciences of men. * * * * How would such a 
nation be protected from external attack, and entire sub- 
jugation ? I answer, by adopting the law of benevolence, 
a nation would render such an event in the highest de- 
gree improbable. The causes of national war are, most 
commonly, the love of plunder and the love of glory. 
The first of these is rarely, if ever, sufficient to stimulate 
men to the ferocity necessary to war, unless when assisted 
by the second. And by adopting as the rule of our con- 
duct the law of benevolence, all motive arising from the 
second cause is taken away. There is not a nation in 
Europe that could be led on to war against a harmless, 
just, forgiving, and defenceless people." 

History teaches us that societies as well as individuals 
have been attacked again and again notwithstanding that 
they either would not or could not defend themselves. 
Did Mr. White, of Salem, escape his murderers any the 
more for being harmless and defenceless 1 Did the Qua- 
kers escape being attacked and himg by the ancienl New 
Englanders any the more because of their non-resisting 
principles ? Have the Jews escaped persecutions through- 
out Christendom any the more because of their imbecility 
and non-resistance for some centuries past ? Poland was 
comparatively harmless and defenceless when the three 
great European powers combined to attack and destroy 
the entire nation, dividing between themselves the Polish 



20 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

territory, and enslaving or driving into exile the Polish 
people. 

" Oh, bloodiest picture in the book of time, 
Sarmatia fell, unwept, without a crime !" 

We need not multiply examples under this head ; all history 
is filled with them. 

Let us to-morrow destroy our forts and ships of war, 
disband our army and navy, and apply the lighted torch 
to our military munitions and to our physical means of de- 
fence of every description ; let it be proclaimed to the 
world that we will rely solely upon the consciences of 
nations for justice, and that we have no longer either the 
will or the ability to defend ourselves against aggression. 
Think you that the African and Asiatic pirates would re- 
frain, any the more, from plundering our vessels trading to 
China, because we had adopted "the law of benevolence?" 
Would England be any the more likely to compromise her 
differences with us, or be any the more disposed to re- 
frain from impressing our seamen and from searching our 
merchant-ships ? Experience shows that an undefended 
state, known to suffer every thing, soon becomes the prey 
of all others, and history most abundantly proves the wis- 
dom and justice of the words of Washington — " If we 

DESIRE TO SECURE PEACE, IT MUST BE KNOWN THAT WE 
ARE AT ALL TIMES READY FOR WAR." 

But let us bring this case still nearer home. Let it be 
known to-morrow that the people of Boston or New York 
have adopted the strictly non-resisting principle, and that 
hereafter they will rely solely on the consciences of men 
for justice ; let it be proclaimed throughout the whole ex- 
tent of our Union, and throughout the world, that you have 
destroyed your jails and houses of correction, abolished 
your police and executive law officers, that courts may 
decide justice but will be allowed no force to compel re^ 



INTRODUCTION. 21 

sped to their decisions, that you will no longer employ 
walls, and bars, and locks, to secure your property and 
the virtue and lives of your children ; but that you w^ill 
trust solely for protection to " the law of active benevo- 
lence." Think you that the thieves, and robbers, and 
murderers of Philadelphia, and Baltimore, and New Or- 
leans, and the cities of the old world, will, on this ac- 
count, refrain from molesting the peace of New York and 
Boston, and that the wicked and abandoned men now in 
these cities, will be the more likely to turn from the evil 
of their ways ? 

Assuredly, if this " law of active benevolence," as Dr. 
Wayland denominates the rule of non-resistance, will 
prevent nations from attacking the harmless and defence- 
less, it will be still more likely to prevent individuals 
from the like aggressions ; for the moral sense is less 
active in communities than where the responsibility is 
individual and direct. 

Throughout this argument Dr. Wayland assumes that 
all wars are wars of aggression, waged for " plunder" or 
*' glory," or through " hatred" or " revenge," whereas 
such is far from being true. He indeed sometimes speaks 
of war as being ge7ierally of this character ; at others he 
speaks of it as being always undertaken either from a 
spirit of aggression or retaliation. Take either form of 
his argument, and the veriest schoolboy would pronounce 
it unsound : viz., 

All wars are undertaken either for aggression or retal- 
iation ; 

Aggression and retaliation are forbidden by God's laws ; 
— therefore. 

All wars are immoral and unjustifiable. 

Or, 

Wars are generally undertaken either for aggression or 
retaliation ; 



22 MILlTxVRY ART AND SCIENCE. 

Aggression and retaliation are forbidden by God's laws; 
— ^t-herefore, 

All wars are immoral and unjustifiable. 

VI. ^' Let any man reflect upon the amount of pecuniary 
expenditure, and the awful waste of human life, which the 
wars of the last hundred years have occasioned, and then 
we will ask him whether it be not evident, that the one- 
himdredth part of this expense and suffering, if employed 
in the honest effort to render mankind wiser and better, 
would, long before this time, have banished wars from 
the earth, and rendered the civilized world like the gar- 
den of Eden? If this be true, it will follow that the cul- 
tivation of a military spirit is injurious to a community, 
inasmuch as it aggravates the source of the evil, the cor- 
rupt passions of the human breast, by the very manner in 
wMch it attempts to correct the evil itself." 

Much has been said to show that war begets immo- 
rality, and that the cultivation of the military spirit has a 
corrupting influence on community. And members of the 
clergy and of the bar have not unfrequently so far for- 
gotten, if not truth and fact, at least the common cour- 
tesies and charities of life, as to attribute to the military 
profession an unequal share of immorality and crime. 
We are declared not only parasites on the body politic, 
but professed violaters of God's laws — men so degraded, 
though unconsciously, that " in the pursuit of justice we 
renounce the human character and assume that of the 
beasts ;" it is said that " murder, robbery, rape, arson, 
theft, if only plaited with the soldier's garb, go unwhipped 
of justice."* It has never been the habit of the military 
to retort these charges upon the other professions. We 
prefer to leave them unanswered. If demagogues on the 
" stump," or in the legislative halls, or in their Fourth-of- 

* Sumner's Oration. 



INTRODUCTION. 23 

July addresses, can find no fitter subjects " to point a 
moral or adorn a tale," we must be content to bear their 
misrepresentations and abuse. 

Unjust wars, as well as unjust litigation, are immoral 
in their efl'ects and also in their cause. But just wars 
and just litigation are not demoralizing. Suppose all 
wars and all courts of justice to be abolished, and the 
wicked nations as well as individuals to be suffered to 
commit injuries without opposition and without punish- 
ment ; would not immorality and unrighteousness increase 
rather than diminish ? Few events rouse and elevate the 
patriotism and public spirit of a nation so much as a just and 
patriotic war. It raises the tone of public morality, and 
destroys the sordid selfishness and degrading submissive- 
ness which so often result from a long-protracted peace. 
Such was the Dutch war of independence against the 
Spaniards ; such the German Avar against the aggressions 
of Louis XIV., and the French war against the coalition 
of 1792. But without looking abroad for illustration, we 
find ample proof in our own history. Can it be said that 
the wars of the American Revolution and of 1812, were 
demoralizing in their effects ? " Whence do Americans," 
says Dr. Lieber, " habitually take their best and purest 
examples of all that is connected with patriotism, public 
spirit, devotedness to common good, purity of motive and 
action, if not from the daring band of their patriots of the 
Revolution ?" 

The principal actors in the military events of the Revo- 
lution and of 1812, held, while living, high political offi- 
ces in the state, and the moral tone which they derived 
from these wars may be judged of by the character 
stamped on their administration of the government. These 
men have passed away, and their places have, for some 
time, been filled by men who take their moral tone from the 
relations of peace To the true believer in the efficacy 



24 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

of non-resistance, and in the demoralizing influence of all 
wars, how striking the contrast between these different 
periods in our political history ! How infinitely inferior 
to the rulers in later times were those, Avho, in the blind- 
ness of their infatuation, appealed to physical force, rather 
than surrender their life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness ! 
Let us trace out this contrast : — 

In the earlier ages of our republic, and under the rule 
of those whose moral character had been corrupted by 
war, party spirit ran higher and Avas less pure than at 
later periods in our history. The object of the principal 
leaders of the great political parties was then to render 
the opinions of the opposite party odious : now, their only 
object is to sustain their own opinions by argument. 
Then, each party claimed to itself an exclusive love of 
country, and stigmatized the other as aliens and the natu- 
ral enemies of the state : now, they both practise great 
forbearance, love, and charity, towards political opponents. 
Then, men obtained place through intrigue and corruption, 
and a universal scramble for the loaves and fishes of of- 
fice on the one side, and a universal political proscription 
on the other, were regarded as the natural results of an 
election : now, this disgusting strife for office has ceased ; 
men no longer seek place, but wait, like Cincinnatus, to 
be called from their ploughs ; and none are proscribed for 
opinion's sake. Then, in electing men to office the most 
important social and constitutional principles were forgot- 
ten or violated : now, we have the august spectacle of a 
nation choosing its rulers under the guidance of strict 
moral principle. Then, the halls of congress were fre- 
quently filled with demagogues, and tiplers, and the small 
men of community : now, the ablest and best of the coun- 
try are always sought for as representatives. Then, the 
magnates of party were the mere timid, temporizing slaves 
of expediency, looking, not to the justice and wisdom of 



INTRODUCTION. 25 

their measures, but to their probable popularity with their 
sneaking train of followers : now, they rely for respect 
and support upon the judgment of the honest and enlight- 
ened. Then, the rank and file of party were mere politi- 
cal hirelings, who sold their manhood for place, who 
reviled and glorified, and shouted huzzas and whispered 
calumnies, just as they were bidden ; they could fawn 
upon those who dispensed political patronage with a 
cringing servility that would shame the courtiers of Louis 
XIV., or the parasites and hirelings of Walpole : now, all 
political partisans, deriving their moral tone from the piping 
times of peace, are pure, disinterested patriots, who, like 
the Roman farmer, take office with great reluctance, and 
resign it again as soon as the state can spare their ser- 
vices. Then, prize-fighters, and blacklegs, and gamblers, 
having formed themselves into political clubs, were court- 
ed by men high in authority, and rewarded for their dirty 
and corrupting partisan services by offices of trust and 
responsibility : now, no man clothed with authority would 
dare to insult the moral sense of community by receiving 
such characters in the national councils, or by bestowing 
public offices upon these corrupt and loathsome dregs of 
society. 

Such, the advocates of non-resistance would persuade 
us, are the legitimate results in this country of war on the 
one hand and of a long-protracted peace on the other. 
But there are men of less vivid imaginations, and, per- 
haps, of visions less distorted by fanatical zeal, who fail 
to perceive these results, and who even think they see 
the reverse of all this. These men cannot perceive any 
thing in the lives of Washington, Hamilton, and Knox, to 
show that they were the less virtuous because they had 
borne arms in their country's service : they even fail to 
perceive the injurious efTects of the cultivation of a mili- 
tary spirit on the military students of West Point, whose 

3 



26 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

graduates, they think, will compare favorably in moral 
character with the graduates of Yale and Cambridge. 
Nay, more, some even go so far as to say that our army, 
as a body, is no less moral than the corresponding classes 
in civil life ; that our common soldiers are as seldom 
guilty of riots, thefts, robberies, and murders, as similarly 
educated men engaged in other pursuits ; that our military 
officers are not inferior in moral character to our civil 
officers, and that, as a class, they will compare favorably 
with any other class of professional men — with lawyers, 
for example. In justification of these opinions — which 
may, perhaps, be deemed singularly erroneous — they say, 
that in the many millions of public money expended during 
the last forty years, by military officers, for the army, for 
military defences, and for internal improvements, but a 
single graduate of West Point has proved a defaulter, even 
to the smallest sum, and that it is exceedingly rare to see 
an officer of the army brought into court for violating the 
laws. 

But even suppose it true that armies necessarily diffuse 
immorality through community, is it not equally true that 
habitual submission to the injustice, plunder, and insult 
of foreign conquerors would tend still more to degrade 
and demoralize any people ? 

With regard to " pecuniary expenditures" required in 
military defence, many absurd as well as false statements 
have been put forth. With respect to our own country, 
the entire amounts expended, under the head of war de- 
partment, whether for Indian pensions, for the purchase 
of Indian lands, the construction of government roads, the 
improvement of rivers and harbors, the building of break- 
waters and sea-walls, for the preservation of property, the 
surveying of public lands, &c., &c. ; in fine, every ex- 
penditure made by officers of the army, under the war 
department, is put down as "expenses for military de- 



INTRODUCTION. 27 

fence." Similar misstatements are made with respe\t to 
foreign countries : for example, the new fortifications bf 
Paris are said to have already cost from fifty to seventy- 
five millions of dollars, and as much more is said to be re- 
quired to complete them. Indeed, we have seen the whole 
estimated cost of those works stated at two hundred and 
forty millions of dollars, or twelve hundred millions of 
francs ! The facts are these : the works, when done, 
will have cost about twenty-eight millions. We had the 
pleasure of examining them not long since, in company 
with several of the engineer oflicers employed on the 
works. They were then three-fourths done, and had 
cost about twenty millions. We were assured by these offi- 
cers that the fortifications proper would be completed for 
somewhat less than the original estimate of twenty-eight 
millions. Had we time to enter into details, other examples 
of exaggeration and misrepresentation could be given. 

But it is not to be denied that wars and the means of 
military defence have cost vast amounts of money. So 
also have litigation and the means deemed requisite for 
maintaining justice between individuals. It has been 
estimated that we have in this country, at the present 
time, thirty thousand lawyers, without including petti- 
foggers. Allowing each of these to cost the country the 
average sum of one thousand dollars, and we have the 
annual cost to the country, for lawyers, thirty millions of 
dollars. Add to this the cost of legislative halls and legis- 
lators for making laws ; of court-houses, jails, police- 
ofl[ices, judges of the different courts, marshals, sheriffs, 
justices of the peace, constables, clerks, witnesses, &c., 
employed to apply and enforce the laws when made ; the 
personal loss of time of the different plaintiffs and defend- 
ants, the individual anxiety and suffering produced by 
litigation ; add all these together, and I doubt not the re- 
sult for a single year will somewhat astonish these modem 



28 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

economists. But if all the expenditures of this nature 
that have been made for the last fifty years, in this indi- 
vidual " war of hate," be added together, we have no doubt 
a very fruitful text might be obtained for preaching a cru- 
sade against law and lawyers ! But could any sane man 
be found to say that, on account of the cost of maintaining 
them, all laws and lawyers are useless and should be 
abolished ? 

If, therefore, these vast sums of money are deemed 
necessary to secure justice between individuals of the 
same nation, can we expect that the means of international 
justice can be maintained without expenditures commen- 
surate with the object in view ? If we cannot rely exclu- 
sively upon the " law of active benevolence" for main- 
taining justice between brothers of the same country, can 
we hope that, in the present state of the world, strangers 
and foreigners will be more ready to comply with its re- 
quisitions ? 

The length of the preceding remarks admonishes us 
to greater brevity in the further discussion of this subject. 

It is objected to war, that men being rational beings, 
should contend with one another by argument, and not by 
force, as do the brutes. 

To this it is answered, that force properly begins only 
where argument ends. If he who has wronged me can- 
not be persuaded to make restitution, I apply to the court, 
— that is, to legal force, — to compel him to do me justice. 
So nations ought to resort to military force only w^hen all 
other means fail to prevent aggression and injury. 

But war often fails to procure redress of grievances, or 
to prevent repeated and continued aggression. 

So does a resort to civil force ; but such a resort is 
none the less proper and just on that account. 

But in war the innocent party is sometimes the sufferer, 
while the guilty triumph. 



INTRODUCTION. 29 

So it often is in civil life : God, for some wise purpose, 
sometimes permits the wicked to triumph for a season. 

But in all wars one party must be in the wrong, and 
frequently the war is unjust on both sides. 

So in suits at law, one party is necessarily wrong, and 
frequently both resort to the civil tribunals in hopes of 
attaining unrighteous ends. 

But nations do not resort to tribunals, like individuals, 
to settle their differences. 

For the reason that it is believed a tribunal of this 
character — a congress of nations, as it has been called, 
— would be more productive of evil than of good. By 
such an arrangement the old and powerful European 
monarchies would acquire the authority to interfere in 
the domestic affairs of the weaker powers. We see the 
effects of establishing such a tribunal in the so-called 
Holy Alliance, whose influence is regarded by the friends 
of liberty as little less dangerous than the Holy Inqui- 
sition. Moreover, such a tribunal would not prevent war, 
for military force would still be resorted to to enforce its 
decisions. For these and other reasons, it is deemed 
better and safer to rely on the present system of Inter- 
national Law. Under this system, and in this country, a 
resort to the arbitrament of war is not the result of im- 
pulse and passion, — a yielding to the mere " bestial pro- 
pensities" of our nature ; it is a deliberate and solemn 
act of the legislative power, — of the representatives of 
the national mind, convened as the high council of the 
people. It is this power which must determine when all 
just and honorable means have been resorted to to obtain 
national justice, and when a resort to military force is 
requisite and proper. If this decision be necessarily un- 
christian and barbarous, such, also, should we expect 
to be the character of other laws passed by the same 
body, and under the same circmnstances. A declaration 

3* 



30 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

of war, m this country, is a law of the land, made by a 
deliberative body, under the high sanction of the consti- 
tution. It is true that such a lav/ may be unjust and 
wrong, but we can scarcely agree that it will necessarily 
be so. The distinction between war, as thus duly de- 
clared, and " international Lynch-law" is too evident to 
need comment. 

But it is said that the benefits of war are more than 
counterbalanced by the evils it entails, and that, " most 
commonly, the very means by which we repel a des- 
potism from abroad, only establishes over us a military 
despotism at home." 

Much has been said and written about military des- 
potism ; but we think he who studies history thoroughly, 
will not fail to prefer a military despotism to a des- 
potism of mere politicians. The governments of Alex- 
ander and Charlemagne were infinitely preferable to 
those of the petty civil tyrants who preceded and fol- 
lowed them ; and there is no one so blinded by prejudice 
as to say that the reign of Napoleon was no better than 
that of Robespierre, Danton, and the other "lawyers" 
who preceded him, or of the Bourbons, for whom he was 
dethroned. 

" Caesar," says a distinguished senator of our own 
country, " was rightfully killed for conspiring against his 
country ; but it was not he that destroyed the liberties of 
Rome. That work was done by the profligate politicians 
without him, and before his time ; and his death did not 
restore the republic. There were no more elections : 
rotten politicians had destroyed them ; and the nephew 
of Csesar, as heir to his imcle, succeeded to the empire 
on the principle of hereditary succession. 

" And here History appears in her grand and instruc- 
tive character, as Philosophy teaching by example : and 
let us not be senseless to her warning voice. Superficial 



INTRODUCTION. 31 

readers believe it was the military men who destroyed 
the Roman republic ! No such thing ! It was the poli- 
ticians who did it ! — factious, corrupt, intriguing politi- 
cians — destroying public virtue in their mad pursuit after 
office — destroying their rivals by crime — deceiving and 
debauching the people for votes — and bringing elections 
into contempt by the frauds and violence with which they 
were conducted. From the time of the Gracchi there 
were no elections that could bear the name. Confederate 
and rotten politicians bought and sold the consulship. 
Intrigue and the dagger disposed of rivals. Fraud, vio- 
lence, bribes, terror, and the plunder of the public trea- 
sury commanded votes. The people had no choice ; and 
long before the time of Caesar, nothing remained of re- 
publican government but the name and the abuse. Read 
Plutarch. In the * Life of Caesar,' and not three pages 
before the crossing of the Rubicon, he paints the ruined 
state of the elections, — shows that all elective government 
was gone, — that the hereditary form had become a neces- 
sary relief from the contests of the corrupt, — and that in 
choosing between Pompey and Caesar, many preferred 
Pompey, not because they thought him republican, but 
because they thought^ he would make the milder king. 
Even arms were but a small part of Caesar's reliance, 
when he crossed the Rubicon. Gold, still more than the 
sword, was his dependence ; and he sent forward the ac- 
cumulated treasures of plundered Gaul, to be poured into 
the laps of rotten politicians. There was no longer a 
popular government ; and in takmg all power himself, he 
only took advantage of the state of things which profli- 
gate politicians had produced. In this he was culpable, 
and paid the forfeit with his life. But in contemplating 
his fate, let us never forget that the politicians had under- 
mined and destroyed the republic, before he came to 
seize and to master it." 



32 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

We could point to numerous instances, where the ben- 
efits of war have more than compensated for the evils 
which attended it ; benefits not only to the generations 
who engaged in it, but also to their descendants for long 
ages. Had Rome adopted the non-resistance principle 
when Hannibal was at her gates, we should now be in 
the night of African ignorance and barbarism, instead of 
enjoying the benefits of Roman learning and Roman civ- 
ilization. Had France adopted this principle when the 
allied armies invaded her territories in 1792, her fate had 
followed that of Poland. Had our ancestors adopted this 
principle in 1776, what now had been, think you, the 
character and condition of our country 1 

Dr. Lieber's remarks on this point are peculiarly just 
and apposite. " The continued efforts," says he, " requi- 
site for a nation to protect themselves against the ever- 
repeated attacks of a predatory foe, may be infinitely 
greater than the evils entailed by a single and energetic 
war, which forever secures peace from that side. Nor 
will it be denied, I suppose, that Niebuhr is right when 
he observes, that the advantage to Rome of having con- 
quered Sicily, as to power and national vigor, was unde- 
niable. But even if it were not .so, are there no other 
advantages to be secured 1 No human mind is vast 
enough to comprehend in one glance, nor is any human 
life long enough to follow out consecutively, all the im- 
measurable blessings and the unspeakable good which 
have resolved to mankind from the ever-memorable vic- 
tories of little Greece over the rolling masses of servile 
Asia, which were nigh sweeping over Europe like the 
high tides of a swollen sea, carrying its choking sand 
over all the germs of civilization, liberty, and taste, and 
nearly all that is good and noble. Think what we should 
have been had Europe become an Asiatic province, and 
the Eastern principles of power and stagnation should 



INTRODUCTION. 38 

have become deeply infused into her population, so that 
no process ever after could have thrown it out again ! 
Has no advantage resulted from the Hebrews declining 
any longer to be ground in the dust, and ultimately anni- 
hilated, at least mentally so, by stifling servitude, and the 
wars which followed their resolution ? The Netherlands 
war of independence has had a penetrating and decided 
effect upon modern history, and, in the eye of all who 
value the most substantial 'parts and elementary ideas of 
modern and civil liberty, a highly advantageous one, both 
directly and through Great Britain. Wars have frequently 
been, in the hands of Providence, the means of dissemi- 
nating civilization, if carried on by a civilized people — as 
in the case of Alexander, whose wars had a most decided 
effect upon the intercourse of men and extension of civili- 
zation — or of rousing and reuniting people who had fallen 
into lethargy, if attacked by less civilized and numerous 
hordes. Frequently we find in history that the ruder and 
victorious tribe is made to recover as it were civilization, 
already on the wane with a refined nation. Paradoxical 
as it may seem at first glance, it is, nevertheless, amply 
proved by history, that the closest contact and consequent 
exchange of thought and produce and enlargement of 
knowledge, between two otherwise severed nations, is 
frequently produced by war. War is a struggle, a state 
of suffering; but as such, at times, only that struggling 
process without which — in proportion to the good to be 
obtained, or, as would be a better expression for many 
cases, to the good that is to be borne — no great and essen- 
tial good falls ever to the share of man. Suffering, merely 
as suffering, is not an evil. Our religion, philosophy, 
every day's experience, prove it. No material rejoicing 
brightens up a mother's eve without the anxiety of la- 
bor." 

One word more, and we must leave this subject. It 



34 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

has been said by some that the duties of patriotism are 
less binding upon us than upon our ancestors ; that, what- 
ever may have been the practice in years that are past, 
the present generation can in no manner bear arms in 
their country's cause, such a course being not only dis- 
honorable, but in the eye of the Christian, wicked, and 
even infamous ! It is believed, however, that such are 
not the general opinions and sentiments of the religious 
people of this country. Our 'forefathers lighted the fires 
of Religion and Patriotism at the same altar ; it is be- 
lieved that their descendants have not allowed either to 
be extinguished, but that both still burn, and will continue 
to burn, with a purer and brighter flame. Our forefathers 
were not the less mindful of their duty to their God, be- 
cause they also faithfully served their country. If we are 
called upon to excel them in works of charity, of benev- 
olence, and of Christian virtue, let it not be said of us 
that we have forgotten the virtue of patriotism.* 

* For further discussion of this subject the reader is referred to 
Lieber's Pohtical Ethics, Part II., book vii. chap. 3 ; Paley's Moral and 
Political Philosophy ; Legare's Report of June 13, 1838, in the House 
of Representatives ; Mackintosh's History of the Revolution of 1688, 
chap. X. ; Bynkershock ; Vatel ; PufFendorf ; Clausevritz ; and most 
other vv^riters on international law and the laws of war. 

Dr. Waylaud's view of the question is advocated with much zeal by 
Dymond in his Inquiry into the Accordancy of War with the Princi- 
ples of Christianity ; Jay's Peace and War ; Judd's Sermon on Peace 
and War ; Peabody's Address, &c. ; Cone's Tract on What is the Use 
of the Navy ? Sumner's True Grandeur of Nations. 



STRATEGY. 85 



CHAPTER II. 

STRATEGY. 

War has been defined, " A contest between nations and 
states carried on by force." But this definition is by some 
considered defective, inasmuch as it would exclude all 
civil wars. 

When war is commenced by attacking a nation in peace, 
it is called offensive, and when undertaken to repel invasion, 
or the attacks of an enemy, it is called defensive, A war 
may be essentially defensive even where we begin it, if 
intended to prevent an attack or invasion which is under 
preparation. Besides this general division of war, mili- 
tary writers have made numerous others, such as — 

Wars of intervention, in which one state interferes in 
favor of another. This intervention may either have re- 
spect to the internal or to the external affairs of a nation. 
The interference of Russia in the affairs of Poland, of 
England in the government of India, Austria and the 
allied powers in the affairs of France during the Revolu- 
tion and under the empire, are examples under the first 
head. The intervention of the Elector Maurice of Sax- 
ony against Charles Y., of King William against Louis 
XIV., in 1688, of Russia and France in the seven years' 
war, of Russia again between France and Austria, in 
1805, and between France and Prussia, in 1806, are ex- 
amples under the second head Most liberal publicists 
consider intervention in the internal affairs of nations as 
indefensible ; but the principle is supported by the advo- 
cates of the old monarchies of Europe. 

Wars of insurrection to gain or to regain liberty ; M 



36 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

was the case with the Americans in 1776, and the modern 
Greeks in 1821. 

Wars of independence from foreign dictation and control, 
as the wars of Poland against Russia, of the Netherlands 
against Spain, of France against the several coalitions of 
the allied powers, of the Spanish Peninsula against France, 
and of China and India against England. The American 
war of 1812 partook largely of this character, and some 
judicious historians have denominated it the war of Inde- 
pendence, as distinguished from the war of the Revolution. 

Wars of opinion f like those which the Yendeans have 
sustained in support of the Bourbons, and those France 
has sustained against the allies, as also those of propa- 
gandism, waged against the smaller European states by 
the republican hordes of the French Revolution. To this 
class also belong — 

Religious wars, like those of Islamism, of the crusades, 
and of the Reformation. 

Wars of conquest, like those of the Romans in Gaul, of 
the English in India, of the French in Egypt and Africa, 
and of the Russians in Circassia. 

National wars, in which the great body of the people 
of a state engage, like those of the Swiss against Austria 
and the Duke of Burgundy, of the Catalans in 1712, of 
the Americans against England, of the Dutch against 
Phillip II., and of the Poles and Circassians against 
Russia. 

Civil wars, where one portion of the state fights against 
the other, as the war of the Roses in England, of the 
league in France, of the Guelphs and Ghibelines in Italy, 
and of the factions in Mexico and South America. 

It is not the present intention to enter into any discus- 
sion of these different kinds of war, but rather to consider 
the general subject, and to discuss such general principles 
and rules as may be applicable to all wars. 



STRATEGY. 37 

War in its most extensive sense may be regarded both 
as a science and an art. It is a science so far as it inves- 
tigates general principles and institutes an analysis of 
military operations ; and an art v^hen considered with, re- 
ference to the practical rules for conducting campaigns, 
sieges, battles, &c. So is engineering a science so far 
as it investigates the general principles of fortification, 
and also artillery, in analyzing the principles of gunnery ; 
but both are arts when considered w^ith reference to the 
practical rules for the construction, attack, and defence 
of forts, or for the use of cannon. 

This distinction has not always been observed by wri- 
ters on this subject, and some have asserted that strategy 
is the science^ and tactics the art of war. This is evi- 
dently mistaking the general distinction between science, 
which investigates principles, and art, which forms prac- 
tical rules. 

In popular language, however, it is usual to speak of 
the military art when we refer to the general subject of 
war, and of the military sciences when we wish to call 
attention more particularly to the scientific principles upon 
which the art is founded. We shall here consider the 
military art in this general sense, as including the entire 
subject of war. 

As thus defined, the military art may be divided into 
four distinct branches, viz.: 1st. Strategy; 2d. Fortifica- 
tion, or Engineering; 3d. Logistics; 4th. Tactics. Sev- 
eral general treatises on this art add another branch, 
called The Policy of War, or the relations of war with 
the affairs of state. 

Strategy is defined to be the art of directing masses on 
decisive points, or the hostile movements of armies be- 
yond the range of each other's cannon. Engineering em- 
braces all dispositions made to enable troops to resist a 
superior force the longest time possible ; and also the 

4 



38 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

means resorted to by the opposing army to overcome 
these material obstacles. Logistics embraces the prac- 
tical details of moving and supplying armies. Tactics is 
the art of bringing troops into action, or of moving them 
in the presence of an enemy, that is, within his view, and 
within the reach of his artillery. All these are most in- 
timately connected. A fault in tactics may occasion the 
loss of strategic lines ; the best combined manoeuvres on 
the field of battle may lead to no decisive results, when 
the position, or the direction of the operation is not strat- 
egic ; sometimes not only battles, but entire campaigns, 
are lost through neglect of the engineer's art, or faults in 
his dispositions ; again, armies would be of little use with- 
out the requisite means of locomotion and of subsistence. 
I. Strategy regards the theatre of war, rather than the 
field of battle. It selects the important points in this 
theatre, and the lines of communication by which they 
may be reached ; it forms the plan and arranges the gen- 
eral operations of a campaign ; but it leaves it to the 
engineers to overcome material obstacles and to erect 
new ones ; it leaves to logistics the means of supporting 
armies and of moving them on the chosen lines ; and to 
tactics, the particular dispositions for battle, when the ar- 
mies have reached the destined points. It is well to 
keep in mind these distinctions, which may be rendered 
still more obvious by a few illustrations. The point 
where several lines of communications either intersect 
or meet, and the centre of an arc which is occupied by 
the enemy, are strategic points ; but tactics would reject 
a position equally accessible on all sides, especially with 
its flanks exposed to attack. Sempronius at Trebbia and 
Varro at Cannae, so placed their armies that the Cartha- 
genians attacked them, at the same time, in front, on the 
flanks, and in rear ; the Roman consuls were defeated : 
but the central strategic position of Napoleon at Rivoli 



STRATEGY. 39 

was eminently successful. At the battle of Austerlitz the 
allies had projected a strategic movement to their left, in 
order to cut off Napoleon's right from Vienna ; Weyrother 
afterwards changed his plans, and executed a correspond- 
ing tactical movement. By the former there had been 
some chance of success, but the latter exposed him to 
inevitable destruction. The little fort of Koenigsten, 
from its advantageous position, was more useful to the 
French, in 1813, than the vast works of Dresden. The 
little fort of Bard, with its handful of men, was near de- 
feating the operations of Napoleon in 1800, by holding in 
check his entire army ; whereas, on the other hand, the 
ill-advised lines of Ticino, in 1706, caused an army of 
78,000 French to be defeated by only 40,000 men under 
Prince Eugene of Savoy. 

War, as has already been said, may be either offensive 
or defensive. If the attacking army be directed against 
an entire state, it becomes a war of invasion. If only a 
province, or a military position, or an army, be attacked, 
it is simply regarded as taking the initiative in offensive 
movements. 

Offensive war is ordinarily most advantageous in its 
moral and political influence. It is waged on a foreign 
soil, and therefore spares the country of the attacking 
force ; it augments its own resources at the same time 
that it diminishes those of the enemy ; it adds to the 
moral courage of its own army, while it disheartens its 
opponents. A war of invasion may, however, have also 
its disadvantages. Its lines of operation may become too 
deep, which is always hazardous in an enemy's country. 
All the natural and artificial obstacles, such as mountains, 
rivers, defiles, fortifications, &c., are favorable for de- 
fence, but difl[icult to be overcome by the invader. The 
local authorities and inhabitants oppose, instead of fa- 
cilitating his operations ; and if patriotism animate the 



40 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

defensive army to fight for the independence of its threat- 
ened country, the war may become long and bloody. But 
if a political diversion be made in favor of the invading 
force, and its operations be attended with success, it 
strikes the enemy at the heart, paralyzes all his military 
energies, and deprives him of his military resources, thus 
promptly terminating the contest. Regarded simply as 
the initiative of movements, the offensive is almost always 
the preferable one, as it enables the general to choose his 
lines for moving and concentrating his masses on the de- 
cisive point. 

The first and most important rule in offensive war is, to 
keep your forces as much concentrated as possible. This 
will not only prevent misfortune, but secure victory, — 
since, by its necessary operation, you possess the power 
of throwing your whole force upon any exposed point of 
your enemy's position. 

To this general rule some Avriters have laid down the 
following exceptions : — 

1st. When the food and forage of the neighborhood in 
which you act have been exhausted and destroyed, and 
your magazines are, from any cause, unable to supply the 
deficiency, one of two things must be done ; either you 
must go to places where these articles abound, or you 
must draw from them your supplies by detachments. The 
former is rarely compatible with your plan, and neces- 
sarily retards its execution ; and hence the preference 
which is generally given to the latter. 

2d. When reinforcements are about to join you, and 
this can only be effected by a march through a country 
actually occupied by hostile corps, or liable to be so oc- 
cupied, you must again waive the general rule, and risk 
one party for the security of the other ; or, (which may 
be better,) make such movements with your main body as 
shall accomplish your object. 



STRATEGY. 41 

3d. When you have complete evidence of the actual, 
or probable insurrection in your favor, of a town or prov- 
ince of your enemy, or of a division of his army, you 
must support this inclination by strong detachments, or by 
movements of your main body. Napoleon's operations 
in Italy, in 1796-7, furnish examples of what is here 
meant. 

4th. When, by dispatching a detachment, you may be 
able to intercept a convoy, or reinforcement, coming to 
the aid of your enemy. 

These are apparent rather than real exceptions to the 
rule of concentration. This rule does not require that 
all the army should occupy the same position. Far from it. 
Concentration requires the main body to be in immediate 
and supporting reach : small detachments, for temporary 
and important objects, like those mentioned, are perfectly 
legitimate, and in accordance with correct principles. 
Napoleon's position in Spain will serve as an illustration. 
A hand, placed on the map of that country, will represent 
the position of the invading forces. When opened, the 
fingers will represent the several detachments, thrown 
out on important strategic lines, and which could readily 
be drawn in, as in closing the hand, upon the principal 
and central mass, preparatory to striking some important 
blow. 

" If, as we have seen, it be the first great rule for an 
army acting on the offensive principle, to keep its forces 
concentrated, it is, no doubt, the second,' ^o keep them fully 
employed. Is it your intention to seize a particular prov- 
ince of your enemy 1 to penetrate to his capital ? or to 
cut him off from his supplies 1 Whatever measure be 
necessary to open your route to these objects must be 
promptly taken ; and if you mean to subsist yourself at 
his expense, your movements must be more rapid than 
his. Give him time to breathe, — and above all, give him 

4* 



42 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

time to rest, and your project is blasted ; his forages will 
be completed, and his magazines filled and secured. The 
roads of approach will be obstructed, bridges destroyed, 
and strong points everywhere taken and defended. You 
will, in fact, like Burgoyne, in 1777, reduce yourself to 
the necessity of bleeding at every step, without equiva- 
lent or use. 

" Such cannot be the fate of a commander who, know- 
ing all the value of acting on the offensive, shakes, by 
the vigor and address of his first movements, the moral 
as well as physical force of his enemy, — who, selecting 
his own time, and place, and mode of attack, confounds 
his antagonist by enterprises equally hardy and unex- 
pected, — and who at last leaves to him only the alterna- 
tive of resistance without hope, or of flying without re- 
sistance." 

The British army, in the war of the American Revo- 
lution, must have been most wretchedly ignorant of these 
leading maxims for conducting offensive war. Instead of 
concentrating their forces on some decisive point, and 
then destroying the main body of our army by repeated 
and well-directed blows, they scattered their forces over 
an immense extent of country, and became too weak to 
act with decision and effect on any one point. On the 
other hand, this policy enabled us to call out and disci- 
pline our scattered and ill-provided forces. 

The main object in defensive war is, to protect the 
menaced territory, to retard the enemy's progress, to mul- 
tiply obstacles in his way, to guard the vital points of the 
country, and — at the favorable moment, when the enemy 
becomes enfeebled by detachments, losses, privations, 
and fatigue — to assume the offensive, and drive him from 
the country. This combination of the defensive and 
offensive has many advantages. The enemy, being 
forced to take the defensive in his turn, loses much of 



STRATEGY. 43 

the moral superiority due to successful offensive opera- 
tions. There are numerous instances of this kind of 
war, " the defensive-offensive," as it is sometimes called, 
to be found in history. The last four campaigns of Fred- 
erick the Great of Prussia, are examples which may 
serve as models. Wellington played a similar part in the 
Spanish peninsula. 

To merely remain in a defensive attitude, yielding grad- 
ually to the advances of the enemy, without any effort to 
regain such positions or provinces as may have fallen into 
his power, or to inflict on him some fatal and decisive 
blow on the first favorable opportunity ; such a system is 
always within the reach of ignorance, stupidity, and cow- 
ardice ; but such is far from being the true Fabian system 
of defensive war. 

" Instead of finding security only in flight ; instead of 
habitually refusing to look the enemy in the face ; instead 
of leaving his march undisturbed ; instead of abandoning, 
without contest, points strong by nature or by art ; — instead 
of all this, the true war of defence seeks every occasion 
to meet the enemy, and loses none by which it can annoy 
or defeat him ; it is always awake ; it is constantly in 
motion, and never unprepared for either attack or defence. 
When not employed in efforts of courage or address, it 
incessantly yields itself to those of labor and science. In 
its front it breaks up roads or breaks down bridges ; while 
it erects or repairs those in its rear: it forms abbatis, 
raises batteries, fortifies passes, or intrenches encamp- 
ments ; and to the system of deprivation adds all the ac- 
tivity, stratagem, and boldness of la petite guerre. Divi- 
ding itself into detachments, it multiplies its own attacks 
and the alarms of the enemy. Collecting itself at a single 
point, it obstructs his progress for days, and sometimes 
for weeks together. Does it even abandon the avenues 
it is destined to defend? It is but for the purpose of 



44 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

shielding them more securely, by the attack of his hospi- 
tals, magazines, convoys, or reinforcements. In a word, 
by adopting the maxim, that the enemy must he made to pay 
for whatever he gains, it disputes with him every inch of 
ground, and if at last it yields to him a victory, it is of 
that kind which calls forth only his sighs." 

In discussing the subject of strategy, certain technical 
terms are employed, such as theatre of war ; theatre of 
operations ; base of operations, or the line from which 
operations start ; objective points, or points to which the 
operations are directed ; line of operations, or the line 
along which an army moves ; key points, or points which 
it is important for the defensive army to secure ; line of 
defence, or the line which it is important to defend at all 
hazards : and in general, strategic points, strategic lines, 
strategic positions, Sfc. As these terms are very generally 
used in military books, it may be well to make ourselves 
thoroughly acquainted with their import. After defining 
these terms and explaining their meaning and application, 
it is deemed best to illustrate their use by reference to 
well-known and striking historical examples. 

The theatre of a war embraces not only the territory of 
the two belligerent powers, but also that of their allies, 
and of such secondary powers as, through fear or interest, 
may be drawn into the contest. With maritime nations it 
also embraces the seas, and sometimes crosses to another 
continent. Some of the wars between France and Eng- 
land embraced the two hemispheres. 

The theatre of operations, however, is of a more limited 
character, and should not be confounded with the theatre 
of war. In general, it includes only the territory which 
an army seeks, on the one hand, to defend, and on the 
other, to invade. If two or more armies be directed to- 
wards the same object, though by different lines, their 
combined operations are included in the same theatre; 



STRATEGY. 45 

but if each acts independently of the others, and seeks 
distinct and separate objects, each must have its own in- 
dependent theatre of operations. 

A war between France and Austria may embrace all 
Italy and Germany, but the theatre of operations may be 
limited to only a portion of these countries. Should the 
Oregon question lead to hostilities between the United 
States and England, the theatre of war would embrace 
the greater part of North America and the two oceans, 
but the theatre of operations would probably be limited to 
Canada and our northern frontier, with naval descents 
upon our maritime cities. 

The first point to be attended to in a plan of military 
operation is to select a good base. Many circumstances 
influence this selection, such as mountains, rivers, roads, 
forests, cities, fortifications, military depjts, means of sub- 
sistence, &c. If the frontier of a state contain strong 
natural or artificial barriers, it may serve not only as a 
good base for offensive operations, but also as an excellent 
line of defence against invasion. A single frontier line 
may, however, be penetrated by the enemy, and in that 
case a second or third base further in the interior becomes 
indispensable for a good defence. 

A French army carrying on military operations against 
Germany would make the Rhine its first base ; but if driven 
from this it would form a second base on the Meuse or 
Moselle, a third on the Seine, and a fourth on the Loire ; 
or, when driven from the first base, it would take others 
perpendicular to the front of defence, either to the right, 
on Befort and Besancon, or to the left, on Mezieres and 
Sedan. If acting offensively against Prussia and Russia, 
the Rhine and the Main would form the first base, the 
Elbe and the Oder the second, the Vistula the third, the 
Nieman the fourth, and the Dwina and the Dnieper the 
fifth. 



46 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

A French army operating against Spain would have the 
Pyrenees for its first base ; the line of the Ebro for a 
second, resting its Avings on the gulf of Gascony and the 
Mediterranean. If from this position it advance its left, 
possessing itself of the kingdom of Valencia, the line of the 
Sierra d'E Stellas becomes its third base of operations 
against the centre of Spain. 

A base may be parallel, oblique, or perpendicular to 
our line of operations, or to the enemy's line of defence. 
Some prefer one plan and some another; the best authori- 
ties, however, think the oblique or perpendicular more 
advantageous than the parallel ; but we are not often at 
liberty to choose between these, for other considerations 
usually determine the selection. 

In 1806, the French forces first moved perpendicular 
to their base on the Main, but afterwards effected a change 
of front, and moved on a line oblique or nearly parallel to 
this base. They had pursued the same plan of operations 
in the Seven Years' War. The Russians, in 1812, based 
perpendicularly on the Oka and the Kalouga, and extended 
their flank march on Wiozma and Krasnoi ; in 1813, the 
allies, based perpendicularly on Bohemia, succeeded in 
paralyzing Napoleon's on the Elbe. 

An American army moving by Lake Champlain, would 
be based perpendicular on the great line of communica- 
tion between Boston and Buffalo ; if moving from the New 
England states on Quebec and Montreal, the line of oper- 
ations would be oblique ; and if moving from the Niagara 
frontier by Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence, the line 
would be nearly parallel both to our base and to the ene- 
my's line of defence — an operation, under the circum- 
stances, exceedingly objectionable. 

Any point in the theatre of operations which gives to 
the possessor an advantage over his opponent, is regarded 
as strategic. Their geographical position and political 



STRATEGY. 47 

and military character, give them a greater or less influ- 
ence in directing the campaign. These points are occu- 
pied by the defensive army, and attacked by the offensive ; 
if on or near the base, they become the key points for the 
•former, and the objective points for the latter.* There are 
also between these two a greater or less number of strate- 
gic points, which have an important though inferior influ- 
ence upon the result of the war. 

The first object of the French in attacking Belgium, is 
to gain possession of the Meuse, as this position would 
give them a decided advantage in any ulterior operations. 
In attacking southern Germany, the course of the Danube 
offers a series of points which exercise an important in- 
fluence on the war. For northern Germany, Leipsic and 
the country bordering on the Saale and the Elbe, are ob- 
jects often fiercely contested by the French and other bel- 
ligerent powers. In a war between this country and 
England, Montreal and the points on the St. Lawrence 
between Montreal and Quebec, would become objects of 
the highest importance, and their possession would prob- 
ably determine the result of the war. 

The capital of a state, from its political importance 
as well as its military influence, is almost always a deci- 
sive strategic point, and its capture is therefore frequently 
the object of an entire campaign. The possession of 
Genoa, Turin, Alexandria, Milan, &c., in 1798, both 
from their political and military importance, had a decided 
influence upon the results of the war in these several 
states. In the same way Venice, Rome, and Naples, in 
1797, Vienna, in the campaigns of 1805 and 1809, Berlin, 

* It may be well to remark that a strategic point is not necessarily a 
geometrical point ; an entire province, or a considerable portion of a 
geographical frontier, is, in military language, sometimes denominated 
a point. In the same way, strategic lines, instead of being mathemati- 
cal lines, are frequently many miles in width. 



48 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

in 1806, Madrid, in 1808, and Paris, in 1814 and 1815. 
If Hannibal had captured the capital immediately after the 
battle of Cannae, he would thus have destroyed the Roman 
power. The taking of Washington, in 1814, had little or 
no influence on the war, for the place was then of no im- 
portance in itself, and was a mere nominal capital. It, 
however, greatly influenced our reputation abroad, and re- 
quired many brilliant successes to wash the blot from our 
national escutcheon. 

Lines of defence in strategy are either permanent or 
temporary. The great military frontiers of a state, espe- 
cially when strengthened by natural and artificial obsta- 
cles, such as chains of mountains, rivers, lines of for- 
tresses, &c., are regarded as permanent lines of defence. 
The Alpine range between France and Piedmont, with its 
fortified passes ; the Rhine, the Oder, and the Elbe, with 
their strongly-fortified places ; the Pyrenees, with Bay- 
onne at one extremity and Perpignon at the other ; the 
triple range of fortresses on the Belgian frontier — are all 
permanent lines of defence. The St. Lawrence river is 
a permanent line of defence for Canada ; and the line of 
lake Champlain, the upper St. Lawrence, and the lakes, 
for the United States. 

Temporary lines of defence are such as are taken up 
merely for the campaign. Napoleon's position in Saxony, 
in 1813 ; the line of the allies in Belgium, in 1815 ; the 
line of the Marne, in 1814, are examples of temporary 
lines of defence. 

It will be seen from these remarks that lines of defence 
are not necessarily bases of operation. 

Strategic positions are such as are taken up during the 
operations of a war, either by a corps cVarmee or grand de- 
tachment, for the purpose of checking or observing an 
opposing force ; they are named thus to distinguish them 
from tactical positions or fields of battle. The positions 



STRATEGY. 49 

of Napoleon at Rivoli, Verona, and Legnano, in 1796 and 
1797, to watch the Adige ; his positions on the Passarge, 
in 1807, and in Saxony and Silesia in front of his line of 
defence, in 1813; and Massena's positions on the Albis, 
along the Limmat and the Aar, in 1799, are examples 
under this head. 

Before proceeding further it may be well to illustrate 
the strategic relations of lines and positions by the use of 
diagrams. 

(Fig. 1.) The army at A covers the whole of the 
ground in rear of the line DC perpendicular to the line 
AB, the position of the enemy being at B. 

(Fig. 2.) A J being equal to BJ, A will still cover ev- 
ery thing in rear of DC. 

(Fig. 3.) If the army A is obliged to cover the point «, 
the army B will cover all the space without the circle 
whose radius is oB ; and of course A continues to cover 
the point a so long as it remains within this circle «B. 

A line of operations embraces that portion of the theatre 
of war which an army or corps d'armee passes over in at- 
taining its object ; \he front of operations is the front form- 
ed by the army as it advances on this line. 

When an army acts as a single mass, without forming 
independent corps, the line it follows is denominated a 
simple line of operations. 

If two or more corps act in an isolated manner, but 
against the same opposing force, they are said to follow 
double or multiple lines. 

The lines by which Moreau and Jourdan entered Ger- 
many in 1796, were double lines ; but Napoleon's advance 
by Bamberg and Gera, in 1806, although moving in seven 
distinct corps d'armee, formed but a single line of opera- 
tions. 

Interior lines of operations are those followed by an 
army which operates between the enemy's lines in such 



50 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

a way as to be able to concentrate his forces on one of 
these lines before the other can be brought to its assist- 
ance. For example, Napoleon's line of operations in 
1814, between the Marne and the Seine, where he man- 
CEUvred with so much skill and success against the im- 
mensely superior forces of the allies. 

Exterior lines present the opposite results ; they are 
those which an army will form in moving on the extremi- 
ties of the opposing masses. For example, the lines of the 
Marne and the Seine, followed by the army of Silesia and 
the grand Austro-Russian army, in the campaign of 1814. 
Burgoyne's line of operations, in 1777, was double and 
exterior. 

Concentric lines are such as start from distant points, and 
are directed towards the same object, either in the rear or 
in advance of their base. 

If a mass leaves a single point and separates into sev- 
eral distinct corps, taking divergent directions, it is said 
to pursue eccentric lines. 

Lines are said to be deep, when the end to be attained 
is very distant from the base. 

The lines followed by a secondary or auxiliary force 
are denominated secondary lines. 

The lines pursued by the army of the Sombre-et-Meuse 
in 1796, and by Bagration in 1812, were secondary lines, 
as the former were merely secondary to the army of the 
Rhine, and the latter to that of Barclay. 

Accidental lines are those which result from a change 
in the primitive plan of campaign, which give a new direc- 
tion to the operations. These are of rare occurrence, 
but they sometimes lead to important results. 

The direction given to a line of operations depends not 
only on the geographical situation of the country, but also 
on the positions occupied by the enemy. The general 
plan of campaign is frequently determined on previous to 



STRATEGY. 51 

beginning operations, but the choice of lines and positions 
must ordinarily result from the ulterior events of the war, 
and be made by the general as these events occur. 

As a general rule, a line of operations should be directed 
upon the centre, or one of the extremities of the enemy's line 
of defence ; unless our forces be infinitely superior in num- 
ber, it would be absurd to act against the front and ex- 
tremities at the same time. 

If the configuration of the theatre of operations be fa- 
vorable to a movement against the extremity of the ene- 
my's line of defence, this direction maybe best calculated 
to lead to important results. (Fig. 4.) 

In 1800 the army of the Rhine was directed against 
the extreme left of the line of the Black Forest ; the army 
of reserve was directed by the St. Bernard and Milan on 
the extreme right and rear of Melas's line of defence : both 
operations were most eminently successful. (Fig. 5.) 

It may be well to remark that it is not enough merely 
to gain the extremity and rear of the enemy, for in that 
case it may be possible for him to throw himself on our 
communications and place us in the very dilemma in 
which we had hoped to involve him. To avoid this dan- 
ger it is necessary to give such a direction to the line of 
operations that our army shall preserve its communica- 
tions and be able to reach its base. 

Thus, if Napoleon, in 1800, after crossing the Alps, 
had marched by Turin on Alexandria and received battle 
at Marengo, without having first secured Lombardy and 
the left of the Po, his own line of retreat would have 
been completely cut off by Melas ; whereas, by the direc- 
tion which he gave to his line of operations he had, in 
case of reverse, every means for reaching either the Var 
or the Valois. (Fig. 6.) Again, in 1806, if he had march- 
ed directly from Gera to Leipsic, he would have been cut 
off from his base on the Rhine ; whereas, by turning from 



52 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

Gera towards Weimar, he not only cut off the Prussians 
from the Elbe, but at the same time secured to himself 
the roads of Saalfield, Schleitz, and HofF, thus rendering 
perfectly safe his communications in his rear. (Fig. 7.) 

We have said that the configuration of the ground and 
the position of the hostile forces may sometimes render it 
advisable to direct our line of operations against the ex- 
tremity of the enemy's line of defence ; but, as a general 
rule, a central direction will lead to more important re- 
sults. This severs the enemy's means of resistance, and 
enables the assailant to strike, with the mass of his force, 
upon the dissevered and partially paralyzed members of 
the hostile body. (Fig. 8.) 

Such a plan of operations enabled Napoleon, in the 
Italian campaigns of 1796 and 1797, to pierce and destroy, 
with a small force, the large and successive armies which 
Austria sent against him. In 1805 his operations were 
both interior and central: in 1808 they were most em- 
inently central : in 1809, by the central operations in the 
vicinity of Ratisbonne, he defeated the large and almost 
victorious army of the Archduke Charles : in 1814, from 
his central position between the Marne and Seine, with 
only seventy thousand men against a force of more than 
two hundred thousand, he gained numerous victories, and 
barely failed of complete success. Again in 1815, with 
an army of only one hundred and twenty thousand men 
against an allied force of two hundred and twenty thou- 
sand, by his central advance on Charleroi and Ligny, he 
gained a most decided advantage over the enemy — an ad- 
vantage lost by the eccentric movement of Grouchy : and 
even in 1813, his central position at Dresden would have 
secured him m.ost decisive advantages, had not the faults 
of his lieutenants lost these advantages in the disasters of 
Kulm and the Rosbach. 

For the same frontier it is objectionable to form more 



STRATEGY. 53 

than one army ; grand detachments and corps of observa- 
tion may frequently be used with advantage, but double or 
multiple lines of operation are far less favorable than one 
simple line. It may however sometimes occur that the 
position of the enemy's forces will be such as to make 
this operation the preferable one. In that case, interior 
lines should always be adopted, unless we have a vast 
superiority in number. Double exterior lines, with corps 
several days' march asunder, must be fatal, if the enemy, 
whether acting on single or double interior lines, take ad- 
vantage of his position to concentrate his masses succes- 
sively against our isolated forces. The Roman armies 
under the consuls Flaminius and Servilius opposed Han- 
nibal on exterior lines, the one by Florence and Arrezzio, 
and the other by Modena and Ariminum. Hannibal turned 
the position of Flaminius and attacked the Roman armies 
separately, gaining a complete and decisive victory. Such 
also was the character of the operations of the French in 
1795, under Pichegru and Jourdan ; they met with a 
bloody and decisive defeat. Again in 1796, the French 
armies under Jourdan and Moreau, pursued exterior lines ; 
the Archduke Charles, from his interior position, succeed- 
ed in defeating both the opposing generals, and forcing 
them to retreat. If the two armies united had pursued a 
single line, the republican flag had been carried in tri- 
umph to Vienna. 

Converging lines of operation are preferable, under 
most circumstances, to diverging lines. Care should be 
taken, however, that the point of meeting be such that it 
may not be taken as a strategic position by the enemy, 
and our own forces be destroyed in detail, before they 
can effect a junction. In 1797 the main body of the 
Austrians, under iVlvinzi, advanced against Napoleon, on 
three separate lines, intending to concentrate at Rivoli, 
and then attack the French in mass ; but Napoleon took 

5* 



54 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

his Strategic position at Rivoli, and overthrew the en- 
emy's corps as they successively appeared. In the same 
way the Archduke Charles took an interior position, be- 
tween Moreau and Jourdan, in 1796, and prevented them 
from concentrating their forces on a single point. Wurm- 
ser and Quasdanowich attempted to concentrate their 
forces on the Mincio, by moving on the opposite shores 
of Lake Garda ; but Napoleon took an interior position 
and destroyed them. In 1815 Blucher and Wellington, 
from their interior position, prevented the junction of 
Napoleon and Grouchy. 

Diverging lines may be employed with advantage 
against an enemy immediately after a successful battle 
or strategic manoeuvre ; for by this means we separate 
the enemy's forces, and disperse them ; and if occasion 
should require it, may again concentrate our forces by 
converging lines. Such was the manoeuvre of Frederick 
the Great, in 1757, w^hich produced the battles of Ros- 
bach and Leuthen ; such also was the manoeuvre of Na- 
poleon at Donawert in 1805, at Jena in 1806, and at Rat- 
isbonin 1809. 

Interior lines of operations, when properly conducted, 
have almost invariably led to success : indeed every in- 
stance of failure may be clearly traced to great unskilful- 
ness in their execution, or to other extraneous circum- 
stances of the campaign. There mxay, however, be cases 
where it will be preferable to direct our forces on the 
enemy's flank ; the geographical character of the theatre 
of war, the position of other collateral forces, &c., ren- 
dering such a direction necessary. But as a general 
rule, interior and central lines, for an army of moderate 
forces, will lead to decisive results. 

Napoleon's Italian campaigns in 1796 and 1797, the 
campaign of the Archduke Charles in 1796, Napoleon's 
campaigns of 1805 and 1809 against Austria, and of 



STRATEGY. 56 

1806 and 1807 against Prussia and Russia, of 1808 in 
Spain, his manoeuvres in 1814, between the battle of Bri- 
enne and that of Paris, and his operations previous to the 
battle of Ligny in 1815, are all brilliant examples under 
this head. 

To change the line of operations, in the middle of a 
campaign, and follov^ accidental lines, is always a delicate 
affair, and can only be resorted to by a general of great 
skill, and with disciplined troops. In such a case it may 
be attended with important results. It was one of Na- 
poleon's maxims, that " a line of operations, when once 
chosen, should never be abandoned." This maxim, how- 
ever, must sometimes be disregarded by an army of un- 
disciplined troops, in order to avoid entire destruction ; 
but the total abandonment of a line of operations is al- 
ways attended with great loss, and should be regarded as 
a mere choice of evils. A regular army can always 
avoid this result, by changing the direction of its line ; 
thus frequently gaining superior advantages in the new 
theatre of action. If the plan of this change be the re- 
sult of a good coup d^ceil, and it be skilfully executed, the 
rear of the operating army will be secure from the en- 
emy ; and moreover, he will be left in doubt respecting 
its weak points. But such is the uncertainty of this 
manoeuvre, that it is very rarely taken by the best troops, 
unless actually forced upon them. If the army be of in- 
congruous materials, generally a change of direction will 
be less advantageous than to entirely abandon the line, 
and save as many as possible of the troops for some new 
plan of operations. (Maxim 20.) If, however, the undis- 
ciplined army be sustained by fortifications, it can take 
up the accidental line of operations in the same manner, 
and with the same probability of success, as is done by a 
regular force. 

We have examples of accidental lines in the operations 



56 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

of the king of Prussia, after the battle of Hohenkirchen, 
and of Washington, in New-Jersey, after the action of 
Princeton. This is one of the finest in military history. 
Napoleon had projected a change in his line of opera- 
tions, in case he lost the battle of Austerlitz ; but victory 
rendered its execution unnecessary. Again in 1814 he 
had planned an entire change of operations ; but the 
want of co-operation of the forces under Mortier and 
Marmont forced him to abandon a plan w^hich, if properly 
executed, had probably defeated the allies. Jomini pro- 
nounced it one of the most brilliant of his military career. 
Having explained the principal terms used in strategy, 
let us trace out the successive operations of war in their 
usual strategic relations. 

We will suppose war to be declared, and the army to be 
just entering upon a campaign. The political and military 
authorities of the state determine upon the nature of the 
war, and select the theatre of its enterprises. The chief 
selects certain points, on or near the borders of the seat 
of war, Avhere his troops are to be assembled, and his 
materiel collected. These points, together, form his base 
of operations. He now selects some point, within the 
theatre of the war, as the first object of his enterprises, 
and chooses the line of operations most advantageous for 
reaching this objective point. The temporary positions 
taken on this line become strategic positions, and the line 
in his rear, a line of defence. When he arrives in the 
vicinity of his first object, and the enemy begins to oppose 
his enterprises, he must force this enemy to retreat, either 
by an attack or by manoeuvres. For this purpose he 
temporarily adopts certain lines of manoeuvre, which may 
deviate from his general line of operations. The ulterior 
events of the campaign may possibly cause him to make 
these new, or accidental lines, his lines of operations. 
The approach of hostile forces may cause him to detach 



STRATEGY. 57 

secondary corps on secondary lines ; or to divide his 
army, and pursue double or multiple lines. The primi- 
tive object may also be relinquished, and new ones pro- 
posed, with new lines and new plans of operations. As 
he advances far from his primitive base, he forms new 
depots and lines of magazines. He may encounter nat- 
ural and artificial obstacles. To cross large rivers in the 
face of an enemy is a hazardous operation ; and he re- 
quires all the art of the engineer in constructing bridges, 
and securing a safe passage for his army. If a fortified 
place is to be taken, he will detach a siege corps, and 
either continue his march with the main army, or take a 
strategic position to cover this siege. Thus Napoleon, 
in 1796, with an army of only 50,000 combatants, could 
not venture to penetrate into Austria, with Mantua and 
its garrison of 25,000 men in his rear, and an Austrian 
force of 40,000 before him. But in 1806 the great supe- 
riority of his army enabled him to detach forces to be- 
siege the principal fortresses of Silesia, and still to con- 
tinue his operations with his principal forces. The chief 
of the army may meet the enemy under circumstances 
such as to induce or compel him to give battle. If he 
should be victorious, the enemy must be pursued and 
harassed to the uttermost. If he should be defeated, he 
must form the best plan, and provide the best means of 
retreat. If possible, he must take shelter in some line 
of fortifications, and prepare to resume the offensive. 
Lines of retrenchment and temporary works may some- 
times serve him as a sufficient protection. Finally, when 
the unfavorable season compels him to suspend his oper- 
ations, he will go into winter cantonments, and prepare 
for a new campaign. 

Such are the ordinary operations of war : its relations 
to strategy must be evident, even to the most superficial 
leader. 



58 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

Not unfrequently the results of a campaign depend more 
upon the strategic operations of an army, than upon its 
victories gained in actual combat. Tactics, or movements 
within the range of the enemy's cannon, is therefore sub- 
ordinate to the choice of positions : if the field of battle be 
properly chosen, success will be decisive, and the loss 
of the battle not disastrous ; whereas, if selected without 
reference to the principles of the science, the victory, if 
gained, might be barren, and defeat, if suffered, totally 
fatal : thus demonstrating the truth of Napoleon's maxim, 
that success is oftener due to the genius of the general, 
and to the nature of the theatre of war, than to the number 
and bravery of the soldiers. (Maxim 17, 18.) 

We have a striking illustration of this in the French 
army of the Danube, which, from the left wing of General 
Kray, marched rapidly through Switzerland to the right 
extremity of the Austrian line, " and by this movement 
alone conquered all the country between the Rhine and 
Danube without pulling a trigger." 

Again, in 1805, the army of Mack was completely para- 
lyzed, and the main body forced to surrender, at Ulm, 
without a single important battle. In 1806, the Prussians 
were essentially defeated even before the battle of Jena. 
The operations about Heilesberg, in 1807, the advance 
upon Madrid, in 1808, the manoeuvres about Ratisbon, in 
1809, the operations of the French in 1814, and the first 
part of the campaign of 1815, against vastly superior 
numbers, are all familiar proofs of the truth of the maxim. 

Strategy may therefore be regarded as the most impor- 
tant, though least understood, of all the branches of the 
military art.* 

* Strateg^^ may be learned from didactic works or from general mili- 
tary histories. There are very few good elementary works on this 
branch of the military art. The general treatises of the Archduke 



STRATEGY. 59 

Charles, and of General Wagner, in German, (the former has been 
translated into French,) are considered as the best. The discussions 
of Jomini on this subject in his great work on the mihtary art, are ex- 
ceedingly valuable ; also the writings of Rocquancourt, Jacquinot de 
Presle, and Gay de Vernon. The last of these has been translated 
into English, but the translation is exceedingly inaccurate. The 
military histories of Lloyd, TemplehofF, Jomini, the Archduke Charles, 
Grimoard, Gravert, Souchet, St. Cyr, Beauvais, Laverne, Stutter- 
heim, Wagner, Kausler, Gourgaud and Montholon, Foy, Mathieu 
Dumas, S^gur, Pelet, Koch, Clausewitz, and Thiers, may be read 
with great advantage. Napier's History of the Peninsular War is the 
only English History that is of any value as a military work : it is a 
most excellent book. Alison's great History of Europe is utterly 
worthless to the military man ; the author is ignorant of the first prin- 
ciples of the military art, and nearly every page is filled with the 
grossest blunders. 

We subjoin the titles of a few of the best works that treat of strategy, 
either directly or in connection with military history. 

Principes de la Strategies ^c, par le Prince Charles, traduit de 
I'Allemand, 3 vols, in 8vo. This is a work of great merit. The tech- 
nical terms, however, are very loosely employed. 

Precis de VArt de la Guerre, par le Baron Jomini. His chapter 
on strategy embodies the principles of this branch of the art. 

Ch'undsdtze der Strategic, Von Wagner. 

Cours Elementaire d'Art et d^Histoire Militaire, par Rocquan- 
court. This work contains much valuable information connected with 
the history of the art of war ; but it is far too diffuse and ill-arranged 
for an elementary book. 

Cours d^Art et d'Histoire Militaire, par Jacquinot de Presle. This 
work is especially designed for cavalry officers, and the other branches 
of military service are but very briefly discussed. 

De Vernon's Treatise on the Science of War and Fortification con- 
tains much valuable information ; but, as an elementary book, it has 
the same objections as that of Rocquancourt. 

History of the Seven Years'" War, by Lloyd and TemplehofF. The 
military writings of Lloyd and TemplehofF are valuable as connected 
with the history of strategy ; but many of the principles laid down by 
these writers are now regarded as erroneous. 

Mhnoires de Napoleon. The Memoirs of Napoleon, as dictated by 
himself to Gourgaud and Montholon, have been translated into Eng- 
lish. It is hardly necessary to remark that they contain all the gnen 



60 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

eral principles of military art and science. No military man should 
fail to study them thoroughly. The matter is so condensed, and impor- 
tant principles are embodied in so few words, that they are not easily 
understood by the ordinary reader, and probably will never be popular 
with the multitude. 

Essai general de Tactique, par Guibert. A work very popular in 
its day, but now far less valuable than the writings already mentioned. 

Ausfuhrliche Beschreihung der Schlacht des Pirmasens, von 
Gravert. Regarded by military men as a valuable historical fragment. 

Mefnoires sur les Campagnes en Espagne. Souchet. 

Memoiresde Gouvion St. Cyr. 

Statistique de la Guerre, par Reveroni St. Cyr. 

Premiere Campagnes de la Revolutionf par Grimoard. 

Victoires et Conquetes. Beauvais. 

Campagnes de Suwarrow, Laverne. 

Histoire de la Guerre de la Peninsule. Foy. 

Precis des Evenements Militaires. Mathieu Dumas. 

Histoire de Napoleon et de la Grande Armee en 1812. S^gur. 

Memoir es sur la Guerre de 1809. Pelet. 

La Campagne de 1814. Koch. 

Vom Kriege — Die Feldzugge, ^c, Clausewitz. 

La Revolution, le Consulat et V Empire. Thiers. 

Memoir es sur la Guerre de 1812 — sur la Campagne du Vice-roi 
en Italie, en 1813 et 1814 ; Histoire de la Guerre en Allemagne en 
1814 ; Histoire des Campagnes de 1814 et 1815, en France. Vau- 
doncourt. 

Essai sur VArt Militaire, ^c. Carion — Nisas. 

Histoire de V Expedition en Russie en 1812. Chambray. 

War in Spain, Portugal, and the South of France. John Jones. 

Peninsular War. Napier. 

Notices of the War of 1812. Armstrong 

All the above are works of merit ; but none are more valuable to 
the military man than the military histories of Jomlni and Kausler, 
with their splendid diagrams and maps. 



FORTIFICATIONS. 61 



CHAPTER III. 

FORTIFICATIONS. 

Fortifications, or engineering, may be considered with 
reference to the defence of states and the grand operation 
of armies ; or with reference to the details of the con- 
struction, and attack, and defence of forts, and the influ- 
ence of field-works on the tactical manoeuvres of armies. 
It is proposed to speak here only of its general character, 
as a branch of the military art, without entering into any 
professional discussion of details. 

The connection of fortification and strategy may be con- 
sidered under two distinct heads : 1st, the choice of sites 
for constructing fortresses for defence ; 2d, their influence 
in offensive operations, and the determination of the ques- 
tion whether they can be passed with safety, or whether 
the attacking force will be under the necessity of be- 
sieging them. 

The centre and extremities of a base of operations should 
always be secured either by natural or artificial obstacles. 
This base is generally chosen so that fortifications will 
be necessary for strengthening only a part of the line. 
But if a frontier, like the side of France towards Belgium, 
be destitute of natural obstacles, the artificial means of 
defence must be proportionally increased. Great care 
should be taken that permanent fortifications be made 
only on such places as may favor military operations. If 
otherwise, the troops detached from the active army for 
garrisoning them, will only tend to weaken this force 
without any corresponding advantages. In this way, for- 
tifications may become actually injurious to defence, A 

6 



62 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

number of the European fortresses which were built be- 
fore the subject of strategy w^as properly understood, are 
now regarded as utterly useless, from their ill-advised po- 
sitions. 

Whether a fortress may be safely passed with merely 
blockading or observing it, depends very much upon the 
nature of the Avar, and the numbers and position of the 
defensive army. The allies, in 1814, invading France 
with a million of soldiers, assisted by the political diver- 
sion of factions and Bourbonists within the kingdom, and 
treason in the frontier fortresses, and even in the ranks 
of Napoleon's army, could conduct their military opera- 
tions on a very different plan from that which would be 
adopted by either Austria, Prussia, Russia, England, Spain, 
Portugal, Holland, Italy, and the German powers, if singly 
waging war with the French. Napoleon sometimes de- 
tached a corps to observe a fortress which threatened his 
line of operations or of manoeuvre ; at others, he delayed 
his advance till the place could be reduced. 

" An army," says Jomini, " may sometimes penetrate 
between places on an open frontier, to attack the enemy's 
forces in the field, taking care at the same time to observe 
these places ; but no invading anuy can cross a great 
river, like the Danube, the Rhine, or the Elbe, without 
reducing at least one of the fortresses on that river, so as 
to secure a line of retreat ; but being in possession of such' 
a place, it can continue the offensive, while its materiel de 
siege successively reduces the other places." 

In case the main army is obliged to remain and cover 
the besieging corps, it should take some central position, 
where it can command all the avenues of approach, and 
fall with vigor on the enemy, should he attempt to raise 
the siege. Napoleon's operations before Mantua, in 1796, 
offer the finest model for imitation. 

The old system of intrenched camps and Imes of con- 



FORTIFICATIONS. 63 

travallation is unsuited to the spirit of modern warfare. 
In ancient times, and more particularly in the middle 
ages, too much importance was attached to tactical posi- 
tions, and not enough to strategic points and lines. This 
gave to fortifications a character that never properly be- 
longed to them. From the middle ages down to the pe- 
riod of the French Revolution, wars were carried on 
mainly by the system of positions — one party confining 
their operations to the security of certain important places, 
while the other directed their whole attention to the siege 
and capture of these places. But Carnot and Napoleon 
changed this system, at the same time with the system 
of tactics, or rather, returned from it to the old and true 
system of strategic operations. Some men, looking merely 
at the fact that a change was made, but without examining 
the character of that change, have rushed headlong to the 
conclusion that fortified places are now utterly useless in 
war, military success depending entirely upon a good sys- 
tem of marches. 

On this subject, General Jomini, the great military his- 
torian of the wars of the French Revolution, remarks that 
'' we should depend entirelyupon neither organized masses, 
nor upon material obstacles, whether natural or artificial. 
To follow exclusively either of these systems would be 
equally absurd. The true science of war consists in 
choosing a just medium between the two extremes. The 
wars of Napoleon demonstrated the great truth, that dis- 
tance can protect no country from invasion, but that a 
state, to be secure, must have a good system of fortresses, 
and a good system of military reserves and military insti- 
tutions." 

In all military operations time is of vast importance. 
If a single division of an army can be retarded for a few 
hours only, it not unfrequently decides the fate of the 
campaign. Had the approach of Blucher been delayed 



64 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

for a few Lours, Napoleon must have been victorious at 
the battle of Waterloo. An equilibrium can seldom be 
sustained for more than six or seven hours between 
forces on the field of battle ; but in this instance, the 
state of the ground rendered the movements so slow as 
to prolong the battle for about tv/elve hours ; thus ena- 
bling the allies to effect a concentration in time to save 
Wellington. 

Many of Napoleon's brilliant victories resulted from 
merely bringing troops to bear suddenly upon some de- 
cisive point. Rivoli in 1796-7, Marengo in 1800, Ulm 
in 1805, Jena in 1806, Ratisbon in 1809, Brienne in 
1814, and Ligny in 1815, are familiar examples. But this 
concentration of forces, even with a regular army, cannot 
be calculated on by the general with any degree of cer- 
tainty, unless his communications are perfectly secure. 
And this difficulty is very much increased where the 
troops are new and undisciplined. When a country like 
ours is invaded, large numbers of such troops must sud- 
denly be called into the field. Not knowing the designs 
of the invaders, much time will be lost in marches and 
coimtermarches ; and if there be no safe places of resort 
the operations must be indecisive and insecure. 

To a defensive army fortifications are valuable as 
points of repose, upon which the troops, if beaten, may 
fall back, and shelter their sick and wounded, collect 
their scattered forces, repair their materials, and draAV 
together a new supply of stores and provisions ; and as 
rallying points, where new troops may be assembled with 
safety, and the army, in a few days, be prepared to again 
meet the enemy in the open field. Without these de- 
fences, undisciplined and inexperienced armies, when 
once routed, can seldom be rallied again, except with 
great losses. But when supported by forts, they can se- 
lect their opportunity for fighting, and offer or refuse 



FORTIFICATIONS. 65 

battle according to tlie probability of success ; and, hav- 
ing a safe place of retreat, they are far less influenced by 
fear in the actual conflict. 

The enemy, on the other hand, being compelled either 
to besiege or observe these works, his army will be sep- 
arated from its magazines, its strength and efficiency 
diminished by detachments, and his whole force exposed 
to the horrors of partisan warfare. It has therefore been 
estimated by the best military writers, that an army sup- 
ported by a judicious system of fortifications, can repel a 
land force six times as large as itself. 

Every government should prepare, in time of peace, its 
most prominent and durable means of defence. By se- 
curing in a permanent manner its important points, it w^ill 
enable a small force to retain possession of these places 
against a greatly superior army, for a considerable length 
of time. This serves the same purpose as a battle gain- 
ed ; for, in the beginning of a war of invasion, the 
economy of time is of the utmost importance to the de- 
fensive party, enabling it to organize and prepare the 
great military resources of the state. 

In all mountainous frontiers, or sides of states border- 
ing on large rivers, or chains of lakes, there will neces- 
sarily be but few points by which an invader can pene- 
trate into the interior of the country. Let us suppose 
that, for a frontier of moderate extent, there are five 
passes, or avenues through which the enemy may ap- 
proach the interior. To effectually defend these ap- 
proaches against the invading army will require, for each, 
an army of ten thousand men. Not being able to decide 
positively on the plans of the enemy, all these communi- 
cations must be defended at the same time. This re- 
quires a defending army of fifty thousand men. Let us 
now suppose each of these passes to be fortified in such 
a way, that one thousand men will be able to hold the 

6* 



66 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

enemy in check, and force him to resort to the operations 
of a siege ; or, at least, to retard his advance till an 
active army can be organized in the interior, and pre- 
pared to meet him in the field. We here see that five 
thousand men, by means of fortifications, can accomplish 
the same defensive object as fifty thousand men without 
these artificial means of security. 

But let us enter a little more into the details of frontier 
defences, and examine the character of the several sys- 
tems v^hich have been successively proposed or adopted. 
Frontiers are divided into four distinct classes, according 
as the state may be open on one or more sides, or bound- 
ed by mountains, large rivers and lakes, or by the sea. 

An open frontier is the most difficult of defence ; and 
while there exists a perfect uniformity among military 
men upon the vast importance of fortifying such a fron- 
tier, there is an equal diversity of opinion respecting the 
best manner of arranging these works. We shall here 
mention three general systems of arranging forts for the 
defence of an open country, each of which has been ad- 
vocated at different times, and afterwards received vari- 
ous modifications and additions. These three systems 
comprise the main features of all others worthy of much 
consideration. They are : — 

1st. The system of continuous lines, proposed by Mont- 
alembert. 

2d. A system of three lines of detached works, strongly 
recommended by D'Arcon and others. 

3d. A system proposed by Yauban, and advocated by 
Rogniat, consisting of lines of very strong works, placed 
at considerable distances from each other and covering 
large intrenched camps. 

The first of these systems was proposed in 1790, and 
for a time attracted considerable notice in France, but 
has long since been discarded, as being utterly incompat- 



FORTIFICATIONS. 67 

ible with the principles of the military art. A writer, 
however, of some pretensions in this country, recom- 
' mends its adoption for the defence of Baltimore and the 
shores of the Chesapeake. The same author would dis- 
pense entirely with our present system of fortifications 
on the sea-coast, and substitute in their place wooden 
Martello towers ! This would be very much like build- 
ing 120 gun ships at Pittsburg and Memphis, for the de- 
fence of the Ohio and the Mississippi rivers, and sending 
out duck-boats to meet the enemy on the Atlantic ! 

In the second system, the works on the extreme fron- 
tier are to be placed about thirty or forty miles apart, and 
those of the second and third lines respectively thirty or 
forty miles in rear of the first and second lines, and op- 
posite the intervals. 

In the third system, first recommended by Vauban and 
more recently by Rogniat, the works are to be arranged in 
the same manner as in that of D'Arcon, but the distance be- 
tween them is to be from seventy to one hundred miles, and 
each fort arranged for covering a large intrenched camp. 

Either of these last two systems is well suited to the 
defence of an open frontier. The former is applied to 
the side of France towards Belgium, and the latter, with 
certain modifications, to the defence of Western Ger- 
many. The first line of fortifications on the northern 
frontier of France consists of Dunkirk, Lille, Valen- 
ciennes, Conde, Quesnoy, Rocroi, Charlemont, Mezieres, 
and Sedan ; the second line, of Calais, Andres, St. Omer, 
Bethune, Arras, Douai, Chambrai, Landrecies, and Aves- 
nes ; the third line, of Boulogne, Montreuil, Hesdin, Abbe- 
» ville, Amiens, Bapaume, Peronne, Ham, and Laon. 

For mountainous frontiers it is deemed necessary to 
secure all the important passes with small redoubts or 
military works, and to defend with strong forts the grand 
interior strategic points on which these communications 



68 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

are directed. For a froPxtier of moderate extent there 
may be some six or eight gorges in the mountains by 
which an army might penetrate ; but it will always be 
found that these roads concentrate on two or three points 
in the great valleys below. Take, for example, the fron- 
tier of France towards Switzerland and Italy. The passes 
of the mountains are secured by the little works of Fort 
L'Ecluse, Fort Pierre-chatel, Fort Barraux, Briancon, 
Mont Dauphin, Colmars, Entrevaux, and Antibes ; while 
Besancon, Grenoble, and Toulon, form a second line ; 
and Lyons a grand central depot. 

Where a great river or chain of lakes forms the boun- 
dary of a state, the system of defence will be much the 
same as that of an open land frontier, the works of the 
first line being made to secure the great bridges or ferries 
by which the enemy might effect a passage ; those of the 
second line, to cover the passes of the highlands that 
generally approach more or less near the great water- 
course ; and those of the third line, far enough in rear to 
protect the great internal communications of the country. 
Let us take, for example, the side of France bordering on 
the Rhine. Wissembourg and Lauterbourg, Fort Louis, 
Haguenau, Strasbourg, Schelstadt, Neuf-Brisach, and Hu- 
neguen, cover the several passages of the river ; while 
Bitche, Phalsbourg, and Befort form a second line ; Tliion- 
ville, Metz, and Toul, a third line ; and Verdun a grand 
central depjt. 

The following are the principal objects proposed to be 
accomplished by fortifications on a sea-coast. 

1st. To close all important harbors to an enemy, and 
secure them to the navy of the country. 

2d. To prevent the enemy from forming an establish- 
ment on our shores, from which, by his naval superiority, 
he might destroy our commerce and keep the whole fron- 
tier in continual alarm. 



FORTIFICATIONS. 69 

3d. To cover our great cities against a maritime attack 
and bombardment. 

4th. To cover our ship-yards and great naval depots. 

5th. To prevent, as much as possible, the great ave- 
nues of interior navigation from being blockaded by naval 
means at their entrance into the ocean. 

6th. To give to our navy facilities for protecting our 
coast trade from the enemy's ships of war, and our inter- 
nal communications, w^hich lie near the coast, from mari- 
time descents. 

Let us notice hov^ France has attempted to accomplish 
this object. The Mediterranean frontier has Fort Quarre, 
Fort St. Marguerite, St. Tropez, Brigancon, the forts of 
Point Man, of I'Ertissac, and of Langoustier, Toulon, St. 
Nicholas, Castle of If, Marseilles, Tour de Boue, Aigues- 
Montes, Fort St. Louis, Fort Brescou, Narbonne, Cha- 
teau de Salces, Perpignan, Collioure, Fort St. Elme, and 
Port Vendre. Toulon is the great naval depot for this 
frontier, and Marseilles the great commercial port. Both 
are well secured by strong fortifications. The Atlantic 
frontier has Bayonne ; the forts of Royan, Grave, Medoc, 
Pate, &c., on the Gironde ; Rochefort, with the forts of 
Chapus, Lapin, Aix, Oleron, &c., to cover the roadstead; 
La Rochelle, with the forts of the Isle of Re ; Sables, 
with the forts of St. Nicholas, and Des Moulines, Isle 
Dieu, Belle Isle, Fort du Pilier, Mindin, Yille Martin ; 
Quiberon, with Fort Penthievre ; L'Orient, with its harbor 
defences ; Fort Cigogne ; Brest, with its harbor defences ; 
St. Malo, with Forts Cezembre, La Canchee, L'Anse du 
Verger, and Des Rimains ; Cherbourg, with its defensive 
forts and batteries ; Havre, Dieppe, Boulogne, Calais, and 
Dunkirk. Cherbourg, Brest, and Rochefort, are great 
naval depots ; and Havre, Nantes, and Bordeaux, the 
principal commercial ports. Many of the works above 
enumerated are small in extent and antiquated in their 



70 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

construction, and some of them quite old and dilapidated , 
nevertheless, they have heretofore been found sufficient 
for the defence of the naval depots and commercial sea- 
ports of France against the superior naval forces of her 
neighbor. 

Omitting for the present all discussion of seacoast de- 
fences, let us examine more particularly the character 
and influence of fortifications on land frontiers. 

All military writers agree that fortifications have here- 
tofore exerted a great, and frequently a decisive, influence 
on the operations of a war. Those of France are fre- 
quently referred to as proofs of this influence. But, while 
all are disposed to allow that these works contributed 
much in former times to the defence of states, yet some 
have said that modern improvements in the mode of at- 
tack have rendered forts far less valuable than formerly. 

Such, however, is not the case. Improvements in the 
mode of attack have not kept pace with the facilities of 
locomotion ; and, although fortifications do not now usually 
sustain a siege of as many days as in former times, still, 
as compared with the relative lengths of campaigns in 
ancient and modern wars, the proportional length of sieges 
is now even greater than fonnerly. When the same is 
accomplished in a campaign of seven weeks as was for- 
merly done in a war of seven years, it is not necessary 
that fortified places should hold out a very long time. A 
place that can sustain a siege of a month is now deemed 
sufficiently strong for ordinary campaigns ; for by the end ^ 
of that time the defensive army will either be destroyed, 
or be able to come to its succor. In either case a longer 
defence would not be required. 

A reference to the most important sieges of the last 
century or two will show that forts are, on an average, 
capable of sustaining a siege for more than that length of 
time. 



FORTIFICATIONS. 71 

Lille, in 1708, held the allies in clieck for a whole 
year; and again, in 1792, compelled the Austrians to 
raise the siege after an unsuccessful attack of fifteen days. 

Antwerp, in 1585, sustained a siege of fourteen months 
against greatly superior forces ; in 1814 Carnot defended 
the citadel of this place for four months, and until an ar- 
mistice had been concluded between the contending par- 
ties ; in 1832, it sustained, with a garrison of only 4,500 
men and 145 pieces of ordnance, a siege of twenty-five 
days, against a force of 55,000 men and 223 cannon. 

Namur, near the end of the seventeenth century, sus- 
tained a siege often weeks. 

Ismail, in 1790, sustained a siege of more than two 
months against the Russians. 

Maestricht, in 1793, sustained a siege of nearly two 
weeks ; and again, in 1794, sustained a blockade and 
siege of nearly two months. 

Magdeburg, in the thirty years' war, resisted the army 
of Wallenstein for seven months; and in 1813-14, al- 
though garrisoned by only 4,000 men, it for a long time 
resisted the overwhelming forces of the allies. 

Dantzic, at the same time, sustained a siege against 
superior forces for more than nine months. 

Landau, in 1793, sustained a siege of nine months. 

Valenciennes and Mayence, in 1793, each sustained a 
siege of about three months. 

Charleroi, Fort Yauban, and L'Ecluse, in 1794, each 
sustained a siege of about thirty days. 

Quesnoy, in 1794, sustained a siege of about three 
weeks. 

Rosas, in 1795, sustained a siege of some seventy days. 

Mantua, in 1796-7, protected from invasion, for eight 
months, the Tyrol and the heart of the Austrian mon- 
archy. 

Kehl and Huninguen, in 1796, sheltered Moreau for 



72 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

three months against all the efforts of the Archduke 
Charles. 

St. Jean d'Acre, in 1799, sustained a siege of sixty 
days of open trench. 

Ulm, in 1800, held Moreau in check for more than a 
month. 

Genoa, in 1800, sustained a blockade of sixty and a 
siege of forty days. 

Saragossa in 1808 sustained a close siege of near two 
months ; and in 1809 it was again besieged for two 
months. 

Rosas in 1808 sustained a siege of thirty days. 

Gerona in 1809 sustained a siege and blockade of 
seven months, nearly four of them being of open trench. 

Mequinenza (a very small work) in 1810 sustained a 
siege of more than two weeks. 

Astorga in 1810 sustained a siege of thirty days; 
twenty-four being of open trench. 

Lerida in 1810 sustained a siege of thirty days, two 
weeks being of open trench. 

Ciudad Rodrigo in 1810 sustained a siege of two 
months. 

Almeida in 1810 sustained a siege of more than a 
month. 

Tortosa in 1810 sustained a siege of six months. 

Tarragona in 1811 sustained a siege of nearly two 
months. 

Badajos in 1811 sustained a siege of more than forty 
days open trench. 

Lerida in 1811 sustained a siege of two weeks open 
trench. 

Saguntum in 1811 sustained a siege of a month. 

Valencia in 1811-12 sustained a siege of two months. 

Ciudad Rodrigo in 1812 sustained a blockade of seve- 
ral months, and a close siege of two weeks. 



FORTIFICATIONS. 73 

Badajos in 1812 sustained twenty-one days of open 
trenches. 

Burgos in 1812 sustained thirty-three days of open 
trenches. 

St. Sebastian in 1813 sustained a siege and blockade 
of nearly three months, with fifty-nine days of open 
trenches. 

Pampeluna in 1813 sustained a siege of more than 
four months, 

Monzon in 1813-14 also sustained a siege of more 
than four months. 

This list might be increased with numerous other ex- 
amples, to show that even poorly fortified towns are 
capable of defending themselves, on an average, for more 
than a month. These examples, be it remembered, are 
nearly all taken from a period of history since any mate- 
rial improvements have been made in the art of attack. 
Since the time of Yauban the improvements in attack 
have not kept pace with the increased means of defence. 
Moreover, these examples are taken from the sieges of 
towns defended mainly by old and antiquated works, and 
entirely incapable of offering the same resistance as de- 
tached fortifications, with all the modern improvements. 

The value of fortifications, as land defences, is suf- 
ficiently proved by showing their general capability of 
resisting an invader, even for a limited period ; thus af- 
fording us time and opportunity to provide other means 
of security. But it must not be inferred that forts be- 
sieged en regie will necessarily fall after so many days. 
Such is far from being the case. The besieged have 
usually great advantages over the besiegers ; and unless 
the latter are vastly superior in number, or the work is of 
a very inferior character, or the garrison is destitute of 
the requisite means and energy to resist an attack, they 
will not be taken. 



II 



74 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

Mezieres was not taken in 1520 ; nor Marseilles in 
1524 ; nor Peronne in 1536 ; nor Landrecies in 1543 ; 
nor Metz in 1552 ; nor Montauban in 1621 ; nor Lerida 
in 1647; nor Maestricht in 1676; nor Vienna in 1529, 
and again in 1683 ; nor Turin in 1706 ; nor Conde in 
1744 ; nor Lille in 1792 ; nor Landau in 1793 ; nor Ulru 
in 1800; nor Saragossa in 1808; nor Burgos in 1812. 
This list might be extended almost indefinitely with the 
names of places that could be reduced neither by force 
nor by starvation. 

But, as has already been noticed, some have asserted 
that fortifications have become of little comparative im- 
portance, under the new system of warfare introduced 
during the wars of the French Revolution. On this sub- 
ject let us consult the opinions of the best military judges 
of the present century. 

Napoleon says of fortifications, " they are an excellent 
means of retarding, fettering, enfeebling, and disquieting 
a conquering foe." 

" The possession of strategic points," says the Arch- 
duke Charles, " is decisive in military operations ; and 
the most efficacious means should, therefore, be employed 
to defend points whose preservation is the country'^'s safe- 
guard. This object is accomplished by fortifications, in- 
asmuch as they can resist, for a given time, with a small 
number of troops, every effort of a much larger force ; 
fortifications should, therefore, be regarded as the basis 
of a good system of defence." " It should be a maxini .. 
of state policy in every country, to fortify, in time of ji 
peace, all such points, and to arrange them with great} 
care, so that they can be defended by a small number of 
troops. For the enemy, knowing the difficulty of getting 
possession of these works, will look twice before he in- 
volves himself in a war." " Establishments which can 
secure strategic advantages are not the works of a mo- 



FORTIFICATIONS. 75 

ment ; they require time and labor. He who has the 
direction of the military forces of a state, should, in time 
of peace, prepare for war." " The proper application or 
neglect of these principles will decide the safety or the 
ruin of the state." " Fortifications arrest the enemy in 
the pursuit of his object, and direct his movements on 
less important points ; — he must either force these for- 
tified lines, or else hazard enterprises upon lines which 
offer only disadvantages. In fine, a country secured by 
a system of defences truly strategic, has no cause to fear 
either the invasion or the yoke of the enemy ; for he can 
advance to the interior of the country only through great 
trouble and ruinous efforts. Of course, lines of fortifica- 
tions thus arranged cannot shelter a state against all re- 
verses ; but these reverses will not, in this case, be 
attended by total ruin ; for they cannot take from the 
state the means nor the time for collecting new forces ; 
nor can they ever reduce it to the cruel alternative of 
submission or destruction." 

" Fortifications," says Jomini, " fulfil two objects of 
capital importance, — 1st. The protection of the frontiers; 
and 2d. Assisting the operations of the army in the field." 
" Every part of the frontiers of a state should be secured 
by one or two great places of refuge, secondary places, 
and even small posts for facilitating the active operations 
of the armies. Cities girt with walls and slight ditches 
may often be of great utility in the interior of a country, 
as places of deposite, where stores, magazines, hospitals, 
&c., may be sheltered from the incursions of the enemy's 
light troops. These works are more especially valuable 
where such stores, in order not to weaken the regular 
army by detachments, are intrusted to the care of raw 
and militia forces." It is not supposed that any system 
of fortifications can hermetically close a frontier ; " but, 
although they of themselves can rarely present an abso- 



76 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

lute obstacle to the advance of the hostile army, yet it is 
indisputable that they straiten its movements, change the 
direction of its marches, and force it into detachments ; 
while, on the contrary, they afford all the opposite advan- 
tages to the defensive army ; they protect its marches, 
favor its debouches, cover its magazines, its flanks, and 
its movements, and finally furnish it with a place of 
refuge in time of need." 

These opinions were uttered, be it remembered, long 
since the period at which modern military quacks date the 
downfall of fortifications as inland defences, by men, too, 
who were not engineers, and consequently had no profes- 
sional predilections in favor of fortifications. The Arch- 
duke Charles, as a general, knew no rival but Napoleon, 
and General Jomini is universally regarded as the first 
military historian of the age. The truth of their remarks 
on fortifications is most fully confirmed by the military 
histories of Germany and France. 

For a long period previous to the Thirty Years' War, its 
strong castles and fortified cities secured the German em- 
pire from attacks from abroad, except on its extensive 
frontier, which was frequently assailed, but no enemy was 
able to penetrate to the interior till a want of union among 
its own princes opened its strongholds to the Swedish 
conqueror ; nor then, did the cautious Gustavus Adolphus 
venture far into its territories till he had obtained posses- 
sion of all the military Avorks that might endanger his re- 
treat. 

Again, in the Seven Years' AVar, when the French neg- 
lected to secure their foothold in Germany, by placing in 
a state of defence the fortifications that fell into their 
power, the first defeat rendered their ground untenable, 
and threw them from the Elbe back upon the Rhine and 
the Mayne. They afterwards took the precaution to for- 
tify their positions, and to secure their magazines under 






FORTIFICATIONS. 7T 

shelter of strong places, and, consequently, were enabled 
to maintain themselves in the hostile country till the end 
of the war, notwithstanding the inefficiency of their gen- 
erals, the great reverses they sustained in the field, the 
skill and perseverance of the enemy they were contending 
with, and the weak and vacillating character of the cabi- 
net that directed them. 

But this system of defence was not so carefully main- 
tained in the latter part of the eighteenth century, for at 
the beginning of the French Revolution, says Jomini, 
" Germany had too few fortifications ; they were generally 
of a poor character, and improperly located." France, on 
the contrary, was well fortified : and although without 
armies, and torn in pieces by domestic factions, (we here 
use the language of the Archduke,) " she sustained her- 
self against all Europe ; and this was because her govern^ 
ment, since the reign of Louis XIII. ^ had continually la- 
bored to put her frontiers into a defensive condition agreeably 
to the principles of strategy ; starting from such a system 
for a basis, she subdued every country on the continent 
that was not thus fortified ; and this reason alone will ex- 
plain how her generals sometimes succeeded in destroy- 
ing an army, and even an entire state, merely by a strate- 
gic success." 

This may be illustrated by reference to particular cam- 
paigns. In 1792, when the Duke of Brunswick invaded 
France, she had no armies competent to her defence. 
Their numbers upon paper were somewhat formidable, it 
is true, but the license of the Revolution had so loosened 
the bonds of discipline as to eflfect an almost complete 
disorganization. " It seemed, at this period," says the 
historian, " as if the operations of the French generals 
were dependent upon the absence of their enemies : the 
moment they appeared, the operations were precipitately 

abandoned." But France had on her eastern frontier a 

•7# 



78 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

triple line of good fortresses, although her miserable sol- 
diery were incapable of properly defending them. The 
several works of the first and second lines fell, one after 
another, before the slow operations of a Prussian siege, 
and the Duke of Brunswick was already advancing upon 
the third, when Dumourier, with only twenty-five thousand 
men, threw himself into this line, and by a well-conducted 
war of positions, placing his raw and unsteady forces be- 
hind unassailable intrenchments, succeeded in repelling a 
disciplined army nearly four times as numerous as his 
own. Had no other obstacle than the French troops been 
interposed between Paris and the Prussians, all agree that 
France must have fallen. 

In the campaign of 1793, the French army in Flanders 
were beaten in almost every engagement, and their forces 
reduced to less than one half the number of the allies. 
The French general turned traitor to his country, and the 
National Guards deserted their colors and returned to 
France. The only hope of the Republicans, at this crisis, 
was Vauban's line of Flemish fortresses. These alone 
saved France. The strongholds of Lille, Conde, Valen- 
ciennes, Quesnoy, Landrecies, &c., held the Austrians in 
check till the French could raise new forces and reorganize 
their army. " The important breathing-time which the 
sieges of these fortresses," says an English historian, 
" afforded to the French, and the immense advantage .' 
which they derived from the new levies Avhich they re- I 
ceived, and fresh organization which they acquired during f 
that important period, is a signal proof of the vital impor- 
tance of fortresses in contributing to national defence. 
Napoleon has not hesitated to ascribe to the three months j 
thus gained the salvation of France. It is to be constantly 
recollected that the Republican armies were then totally 
unable to keep the field ; that behind the frontier fortresses 
there was neither a defensive position, nor a corps to re- 



FORTIFICATIONS. 79 

inforce them ; and that if driven from their vicinity, the 
capital was taken and the war conchided." 

In the following year, 1794, when France had com- 
pleted her vast armaments, and, in her tm*n, had become 
the invading power, the enemy had no fortified towns to 
check the progress of the Republican armies ; which, 
based on strong works of defence, in a few weeks over- 
ran Flanders, and drove the allies beyond the Rhine. 

In the campaign of 1796, when the army of Moreau 
had been forced into a precipitate retreat by the admira- 
ble strategic operations of the Archduke Charles, the 
French forces owed their safety to the fortifications on 
the Rhine, These works arrested the enemy's pursuit 
and obliged him to resort to the tedious operations of 
sieges ; and the reduction of the French advanced posts 
alone, Kehl and Huninguen, poorly as they were defended, 
employed all the resources of the Austrian army, and the 
skill of their engineers, from early in October till late in 
February. Kehl was at first assaulted by a force four 
times as numerous as the garrison ; if the enemy had 
succeeded, he would have cut off Moreau's retreat, and 
destroyed his army. Fortunately the place was strong 
enough to resist all assaults ; and Moreau, basing himself 
on the fortresses of Alsace, his right covered by Hunin- 
guen, Neuf-Brisach, and Befort, and his left by the iron 
barrier of the Netherlands, effectually checked the waves 
of Austrian success. 

Let us now turn to the campaigns of Napoleon. In his 
first campaign in Italy, 1796, the general was directed 
" to seize the forts of Savona, compel the senate to furnish 
him with pecuniary supplies, and to surrender the keys of 
Gavi, a fortress perched on the rocky height commanding 
tl;ie pass of the Bocchetta." Setting out from Savona, he 
crossed the mountains at a weak point between the Alps 
and the Apennines, and succeeded in piercing the enemy's 



£ 



80 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

line of defence. The king of Sardinia, jealous of Aus- 
trian influence, had refused to permit the Austrian army 
to garrison his line of fortifications. Napoleon, profiting 
by his victorious attitude, the mutual jealousy of Austria 
and Sardinia, and the intrigues of his diplomatists, soon 
gained possession of these important works. " These 
Sardinian fortresses j^ he wrote to the Directory, " at once 
put the Republicans in possession of the keys of the Penin- 
sula^ Basing himself on Coni, Mondovi, Ceva, Gavi, 
and Alessandria, with Tortosa as his depot of magazines, 
he advanced against Lombardy. Now basing himself on 
the Adda and Po, with the fortress of Pizzighettone as the 
depot of his magazines, he advanced upon the line of the 
Adige. Pechiera became his next depot, and he now had 
four fortresses in echelon between him and his first depot 
of magazines ; and, after the fall of Mantua, basing him- 
self on the Po, he advanced against the States of the 
Church, making Ferrara and then Ancona, his places of 
depot. 

From the solid basis of the fortresses of Piedmont and 
Lombardy, " he was enabled to turn his undivided atten- 
tion to the destruction of the Austrians, and thus commence, 
with some security, that great career of conquest which 
he already meditated in the imperial dominions." In this 
campaign of 1797, after securing his base, he fortified 
Palma-Nuova, Osapo, &c., repaired the old fortifications 
of Klagenfurth, and, as he advanced, established, to use 
his own words, " a good point d^appui at every five or six 
marches." 

Afterwards, when the Austrians had nearly wrested 
Italy from the weak grasp of Napoleon's successors, the 
French saved their army in the fortress of Genoa and be- 
hind the line of the Var, which had been fortified with 
care in 1794-5. Numerous attempts were made to force 
this line, the advanced post of Fort Montauban being sev- 



FORTIFICATIONS. 81 

eral times assaulted by numerous forces. But the Aus- 
trian columns recoiled from its murderous fire of grape 
and musketry, which swept off great numbers at every 
discharge. Again the assault was renewed with a vast 
superiority of numbers, and again " the brave men who 
headed the column almost perished at the foot of the in- 
trenchment ; and, after sustaining a heavy loss, they were 
compelled to abandon the enterprise. 

While the forces on the Var thus stayed the waves of 
Austrian success, Massena, in the fortifications of Genoa, 
sustained a blockade of sixty, and a siege of forty days, 
against an army five times as large as his own ; and 
when forced to yield to the stern demands of famine, he 
almost dictated to the enemy the terms of the treaty. 
These two defences held in check the elite of the Aus- 
trian forces, while the French reserve crossed the Alps, 
seized the important points of the country, and cut ofif 
the Austrian line of retreat. " But even after the victory 
of Marengo," says Napoleon, " I did not consider the 
whole of Italy reconquered, until all the fortified places 
between me and the Mincio should be occupied by my 
troops. I gave Melas permission to return to Mantua, on 
condition of his surrendering all these fortresses." 

He now directed Chasseloup de Laubat and his en- 
gineers to repair and remodel the fortifications of Verona, 
Legnano, Pechiera, Mantua, the line of the Adda, Milan, 
Alessandria,* Roco d'Aufo, Genoa, and several smaller 
works ; thus forming a quadruple line of defence against 
Austrian aggression in Italy. These works were of great 
service to the French in 1805, enabling Massena with 
fifty thousand men to hold in check the Archduke Charles 
iwith more than ninety thousand, while Napoleon's grand 

* More than twenty millions of money were appropriated for this 
place alone. 



82 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

army, starting from the solid base of the Rhine, traversed 
Germany and seized upon the capital of Austria. 

The neglect of the Prussians to place their country in 
a state of military defence, previous to declaring v^ar 
against Napoleon in 1806, had a most disastrous influ- 
ence upon the campaign. Napoleon, on the other hand, 
occupied and secured all the important military positions 
which he had captured in the preceding campaign. " The 
Prussians," said he, " made no preparations for putting 
into a state of defence the fortifications on their first line, 
not even those Mdthin a few marches of our cantonments. 
While I was piling up bastion upon bastion at Kehl, Cas- 
sel, and Wesel, they did not plant a single palisade at 
Magdeburg, nor put in battery a single cannon at Span- 
dau." The works on the three great lines of the Oder, 
the Elbe, and the Weser, had they been properly re- 
paired, garrisoned, and defended, were sufficient to have 
held in check the French, even after the great victory of 
Jena, till the newly-organized forces, acting in concert 
with the Russian army, could re-establish the Prussian 
monarchy in its ancient greatness. Profiting by the 
neglect of the Prussians, Napoleon seized upon the great 
defensive works of the country, which, to his great joy, 
were readily surrendered into his hands by the old and 
inefficient generals who commanded them ; and French 
garrisons were almost immediately established in the for- 
tresses of Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, Magdeburg, Spandau, 
Hameln, Nieubourg, &c. " Spandau," said he in the 
19th Bulletin, "is an inestimable acquisition. In our 
hands it could sustain two months of operations. But 
such was the general confusion, that the Prussians had 
not even armed its batteries." The possession of these 
fortifications inclined the scale at Eylau. All the histo- 
rians of the war notice their influence on the campaigns 
of Friedland and Tilsit. 



FORTIFICATIONS. 83 

These Prussian fortresses were retained by Napoleon 
at the treaty of Tilsit. The campaign of 1809 proved 
the wisdom of this policy, as they effectually prevented 
Prussia from joining Austria in rekindling the flames of 
war. And again in 1813, these works might have pro- 
duced a decided influence on the campaign, had not the 
political perfidy of Austria, and the treason of the French 
generals, prevented Napoleon from profiting by the ad- 
vantages of his position. 

The influence of the fortifications of Spain upon the 
Peninsular campaigns has often been alluded to by his- 
torians. Those works which had been given up to Na- 
poleon previous to the opening of hostilities, contributed 
very much to the success of his arms ; while those which 
had been retained by Spain and her allies contributed in 
an equal degree to fetter and embarrass his operations. 
Some of these, like Saragossa, Tarragona, Gerona, Tor- 
tosa, &c. &c., with their broken walls and defective ar- 
maments, kept the enemy in check for months ; and, by 
compelling the French to resort to the tedious operations 
of sieges, did much to weaken the French power in the 
Peninsula. 

The influence of the fortifications of the French fron- 
tiers in furnishing a secure basis for the successful oper- 
ations of Napoleon into the enemy's territory, has al- 
ready been noticed. If these fortresses of France, after 
the disasters of 1812 and '13, failed to save the nation, 
the cause must be sought for in the peculiar features of 
the invasion itself, rather than any lack of military influ- 
ence in the French defences. As has been already re- 
marked, a million of disciplined men, under consummate 
leaders, were here assailing a single state, impoverished 
by the fatal war in Russia, — torn in pieces by political 
factions, — deserted by its sworn allies, — its fortresses 
basely betrayed into the enemy's hands, and its military 



84 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

power paralyzed by the treason of generals with their 
entire armies. Its only hope was in the fortresses which 
had remained faithful ; and Napoleon said at St. Helena, 
that if he had collected together the garrisons of these 
few fortresses and retired to the Rhine, he could have 
crushed the allies even after their entrance into Paris. 
But political considerations prevented the operation. 

Again in 1815, Napoleon, even after the defeat of Wa- 
terloo, possessed lines of defence sufficiently strong to 
resist all attempts at invasion. But again the want of 
co-operation on the part of the government at Paris, and 
the treason of his own generals, forced his second abdica- 
tion. If he had retained the command of the army, and 
the nation had seconded his efforts, the allies would never 
have reached Paris. But the new government presented 
the disgraceful spectacle of opening the way for the ene- 
mies of their country. " France," said Napoleon, " will 
eternally reproach the ministry with having forced her 
whole people to pass under the Caudine-forks, by order- 
ing the disbanding of an army that had for twenty-five 
years been its country's glory, and hy giving up to our as- 
tonished enemies our still invincible fortresses.''^ 

History fully supports Napoleon's opinion of the great 
danger of penetrating far into a hostile country to attack 
the capital, even when that capital is without fortifications. 
The fatal effects of such an advance, without properly se- 
curing the means of retreat, is exemplified by his own 
campaign of 1812, in Russia. If, after the fall of Smo- 
lensk, he had fortified that place and Yitepsk, which by 
their position closed the narrow passage comprised be- 
tween the Dnieper and the Dwina, he might in all proba- 
bility, on the following spring, have been able to seize 
upon Moscow and St. Petersburg. But leaving the hos- 
tile army of Tschkokoff in his rear, he pushed on to Mos- 
cow, and when the conflagration of that city cut off his 



FORTIFICATIONS. Sff' 

hopes of winter quarters-there, and the premature rigor 
of the season destroyed the horses of his artillery and 
provision-trains, retreat became impossible, and the awful 
fate of his immense army was closed by scenes of horror 
to which there is scarcely a parallel in history. This 
point might be still further illustrated by the Russian cam- 
paign of Charles XII., in 1708-9, the fatal advance of the 
French army on Lisbon, in the Peninsular war, and other 
examples of the same character. 

Even single works sometimes effect the object of lines 
of fortifications, and frustrate the operations of an entire 
army. Thus, Lille suspended for a whole year the oper- 
ations of Prince Eugene and Marlborough ; the siege of 
Landrecies gave Villars an opportunity of changing the 
fortunes of the war; Pavia, in 1525, lost France her 
monarch, the flower of her nobility, and her Italian con- 
quests ; Metz, in 1552, arrested the entire power of 
Charles V., and saved France from destruction ; Prague, 
in 1757, brought the greatest warrior of his age to the 
brink of ruin; St. Jean d'Acre, in 1799, stopped the suc- 
cessful career of Napoleon; Burgos, in 1812, saved the 
beaten army of Portugal, enabled them to collect their 
scattered forces, and regain the ascendancy ; Strasburg 
has often been the bulwark of the French against Ger- 
many, saving France from invasion, and perhaps subjuga- 
tion. 

In nearly the language of Napoleon, (Memoirs, vol. IX.,) 
If Vienna had been fortified in 1805, the battle of Ulm 
would not have decided the fate of the war. Again, in 
1809, if this capital had been fortified, it would have en- 
abled the Archduke Charles, after the disaster of Eckmuhl, 
by a forced retreat on the left of the Danube, to form a 
junction with the forces of General Hiller and the Arch- 
duke John. 

If Berlin had been fortified in 1806, the army routed at 

8 



86 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

Jena would have rallied there and been joined by the 
Russians. If Madrid had been strongly fortified in 1808, 
the French army, after the victories of Espinosa, Tudela, 
Burgos, and Sommo-Sierra, would not have marched to- 
wards that capital, leaving in rear of Salamanca and Yal- 
ladolid, both the English army of General Moore and the 
Spanish army of Romana. If Moscow had been fortified 
in 1812, its conflagration would have been avoided, for, 
with strong defensive works, and the army of Kutusofif 
encamped on its ramparts, its capture would have been 
impossible. 

Had not Constantinople been well fortified, the empire 
of Constantine must have terminated in the year 700, 
whereas the standard of the Prophet was not planted 
there until 1440. This capital was therefore indebted to 
its walls for eight hundred years of existence. During 
this period it was besieged fifty-three times, but only one 
of these sieges was successful. The French and Vene- 
tians took it, but not without a very severe contest. 

Paris has often owed its safety to its walls. In 885 
the Normans besieged it for two years without efiect. In 
1358 the Dauphin besieged it in vain. In 1359 Edward, 
king of England, encamped at Montrouge, devastated the 
country to its walls, but recoiled from before it, and re- 
tired to Chartres. In 1429 it repulsed the attack of 
Charles VII. In 1464 the Count of Charlerois surrounded 
the city, but was unsuccessful in his attacks. In 1472 it 
repulsed the army of the Duke of Bourgone, who had al- 
ready ravaged its precincts. In 1536, when attacked by 
Charles V., it again owed its safety to its walls. In 1588 
and 1589 it repulsed the armies of Henry HI. and Henry 
IV. In 1636 and several succeeding years the inhabitants 
of Paris owed their safety to its walls. If this capital 
had been strongly fortified in 1814 and 1815, the allied 
armies would not have dared to attempt its investment. 



FORTIFICATIONS. 87 

But it is deemed unnecessary to further specify exam- 
ples ; the whole history of modern warfare is one con- 
tinued proof of the importance of fortifications as a 
means of national defence, and as an auxiliary in offen- 
sive military operations. Our illustrations have been 
mostly drawn from European wars, but our own brief 
history, as will be shown hereafter, is not without its 
proofs. 

The use and importance of field-fortifications, intrench- 
ed camps, &c., as well as the class of military works 
called coast-defences, will be discussed hereafter.* 

* The use of fortifications in the defence of states is discussed by 
Ternay, Vauban, Cormontaigne, Napoleon, the Archduke Charles, 
Jomini, Fallot, and, incidentally, by most of the military historians of 
the wars of the French Revolution. The names of such standard 
works as give the detailed arrangements of fortifications will be men- 
tiohed hereafter. 

tioned hereafter. 



88 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 



CHAPTER lY. 

LOGISTICS. 

III. We have defined logistics to be that branch of the 
military art which embraces all the practical details of 
moving and supplying armies. The term is derived from 
the title of a French general officer, [major-general des 
logis,) who was fonnerly charged with directing the 
marches, encampments, and lodging of the troops. It 
has been still further extended by recent military writers, 
and many of them now regard logistics as a distinct and 
important branch of the art. 

We shall here consider logistics as including the mili- 
tary duties ordinarily attributed to the pay, subsistence, 
clothing, medical, hospital, and transportation depart- 
ments ; in fine, of all the civil and civico-military corps 
of the army. We shall therefore discuss under this head, 
the preparation of all the necessary materials for fitting 
out troops for a campaign and for putting them in motion ; 
the regulating of marches, convoys, the means of trans- 
port for provisions, hospitals, munitions, and supplies of 
all kinds ; the preparation and protection of magazines ; 
the laying out of camps and cantonments ; in fine, every 
thing connected with preparing, moving, and guarding the 
impedimenta of an army. 

The officers connected with this branch of service 
must consult with the engineers in every thing relating 
to the defence of their depots, magazines, camps, canton- 
ments, communications, and the passage of rivers, and in 
all that relates to their connection with the attack and 
defence of places : but in all that relates to strategy and 



LOGISTICS. 89 

tactics they must receive instructions directly from the 
chief of the staff of the army, who will have the general 
direction of every thing connected with logistics. Before 
commencing the operations of the campaign, or beginning 
the execution of the plans decided upon at head-quarters, 
this officer should satisfy himself respecting the condition 
of the various materials belonging to the different depart- 
ments of the army ; — the horses and horse equipments, 
carriages, caissons, ponton and artillery equipages, siege 
equipages, moveable hospitals, engineer and artillery uten- 
sils, clothing, and munitions of all kinds ; he must supply 
whatever may be wanting, and provide means for the 
transportation of every thing. 

Subsistence. — The art of subsisting troops during active 
operations in a hostile country, is one of the most diffi- 
cult subjects connected with war ; and it is a question 
well worthy of study, both for the statesman and the war- 
rior, how Darius and Xerxes, Philip and Alexander, in 
ancient times — and the Greek emperors and the barba- 
rians — and, later still, the crusaders of the middle ages, 
contrived to support the immense masses of men which 
they led to war. 

Csesar has said that war should be made to support 
war ; and some modern generals have acted upon this 
principle to the extreme of supporting their armies en- 
tirely at the expense of the country passed over. Others 
have adopted either in part or entirely the principle of 
regular magazines. 

Louis XIV. and Frederick II. fought mostly on their 
own frontiers, and followed the system of regular depots 
and supplies. But the revolutionary armies of France 
made war without magazines, subsisting, sometimes on 
the inhabitants, sometimes by requisitions levied on the 
country passed over, and at others by pillage and maraud- 
ing. Napoleon found little difficulty in supporting an 

8* 



90 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

army of a hundred or a hundred and twenty thousand men 
in Italy, Suabia, and on the rich borders of the Rhine and 
the Danube ; but in Spain, Poland, and Russia, the sub- 
ject of subsistence became one of extreme embarrass- 
ment. 

All depots of provisions and other supplies for an army 
are denominated magazines ; these are divided into prin- 
cipal, secondary, and provisional. The first are usually on 
the base of operations ; the second, on the line of opera- 
tions ; and the last in the immediate vicinity of the troops, 
and contain supplies for a few days only. 

The system of magazines is objected to by some, be- 
cause it fetters the movements of an army, and makes its 
military operations subordinate to the means of supply. 
Moreover, as the movements of an army must be so ar- 
ranged as to cover these magazines, their establishment 
at given points reveals to the enemy our plan of cam- 
paign. 

On the other hand, the system of requisitions, either for 
immediate supplies or for secondary magazines, gives far 
greater velocity and impetuosity to an active army; and 
if it be so regulated as to repress pillage, and be levied 
with uniformity and moderation, it may be relied on with 
safety in well-cultivated countries; but in more barren 
and less populous districts, an army without magazines, 
especially in case of a prolonged stay or a forced retreat, 
will be exposed to great suffering and loss, if not to total 
destruction. 

Before commencing a campaign the general should 
make himself acquainted with all the resources of the 
country to be passed over — determine the amount of sup- 
plies which it may be necessary to take with him, and 
the amount that can be obtained by requisitions; these 
requisitions being levied in a uniform and legal manner, 
and through the existing local authorities. 



LOGISTICS. 91 

In great wars of invasion it is sometimes impracticable, 
at least for a time, to provide for the immense forces 
placed on foot, by any regular system of magazines or of 
ordinary requisitions : in such cases their subsistence is 
entirely intrusted to the troops themselves, who levy con- 
tributions wherever they pass. The inevitable conse- 
quences of this system are universal pillage and a total 
relaxation of discipline ; the loss of private property and 
the violation of individual rights, are followed by the 
massacre of all straggling parties, and the ordinary peace- 
ful and non-combatant inhabitants are converted into bit- 
ter and implacable enemies. 

In this connection the war in the Spanish peninsula is 
well worthy of study. At the beginning of this war Na- 
poleon had to choose between methodical operations, with 
provisions carried in the train of his army, or purchased 
of the inhabitants and regularly paid for ; and irregular 
warfare, with forced requisitions — war being made to sup- 
port war. The question was thoroughly discussed. 

On the one hand, by sacrificing three or four millions 
of francs from the French treasury, he would have been 
able to support his troops without requisitions, would have 
maintained good order and discipline in his armies, and 
by the distribution of this money among a people poor 
and interested, he would have made many partisans. He 
could then have offered them, with a firm and just hand, 
the olive or the sword. But then the drafts upon the 
French treasury, had the war been a protracted one, 
would have been enormous for the support of an army of 
200,000 men in Spain. Moreover, the hostile and insur- 
rectionary state of the local authorities rendered regular 
and legal requisitions almost impossible ; and the want 
of navigable rivers, good roads, and suitable transport, 
rendered problematical the possibility of moving a suffi- 
cient quantity of stores in an insurrectionary country. 



92 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

Besides, no great detachments could have been made to 
regulate the administration of the provinces, or to pursue 
the insurgent corps into the fastnesses of the mountains. 
In fine, by this system, he v^^ould have effected a military 
occupation of Spain without its subjugation. 

On the other hand, by marching rapidly against all or- 
ganized masses, living from day to day upon the local re- 
sources of the country, as he had done in Italy, sparing 
his reserves for the occupation and pacification of the 
conquered provinces ; this mode promised more prompt 
and decisive results than the other. Napoleon, therefore, 
determined to adopt it for his active masses, employing 
the system of magazines and regular requisitions so far as 
practicable. In favorable parts of the country, Soult and 
Souchet, with smaller armies, succeeded in obtaining in 
this way regular supplies for a considerable length of 
time, but the others lived mainly by forced requisitions 
levied as necessity required. This sometimes gave place 
to great excesses, but these were principally the faults 
of subordinate officers who tolerated them, rather than 
of Napoleon, who punished such breaches of discipline, 
when they were known to him, with great severity. He 
afterwards declared that, " had he succeeded he would 
have indemnified the great mass of the Spanish people for 
their losses, by the sale of the hoarded wealth of the 
clergy, which would have rendered the church less pow- 
erful, and caused a more just division of property ; thus 
the evil of the war would have been forgotten in the 
happy triumph of public and private interest over the in- 
terest of an ambitious and exclusive clergy." 

The following maxims on subsistence have the sanction 
of the best military writers : 

1st. Regular magazines should be formed, so far as 
practicable, for the supplies of an army ; the levying of 
requisitions being resorted to only where the nature of 



LOGISTICS. 93 

the war, and the requisite rapidity of marches, render 
these absolutely necessary to success. 

2d. Depots should be formed in places strengthened by 
nature or art, defended by small corps, or garrisons, and 
situat<^.d in positions least liable to attack. 

3d. All great depots should be placed on navigable 
rivers, canals, railways, or practical roads, communicating 
with the line of operations, so that they may be transported 
with ease and rapidity, as the army advances on this line. 

4th. An army should never be without a supply for ten 
or fifteen days, otherwise the best chances of war may 
be lost, and the army exposed to great inconveniences. 
TemplehofF says that the great Frederick, in the cam- 
paign of 1757, always carried in the Prussian provision- 
train bread for six, and flour for nine days, and was there- 
fore never at a loss for means to subsist his forces, in 
undertaking any sudden and decisive operation. The 
Roman soldier usually carried with him provisions for fif- 
teen days. Napoleon says, " Experience has proved that 
an army ought to carry with it a month's provisions, ten 
days' food being carried by the men and baggage-horses 
and a supply for twenty days by the train of wagons ; so 
that at least four hundred and eighty wagons would be 
required for an army of forty thousand men ; two hundred 
and forty being regularly organized, and two hundred and 
forty being obtained by requisition. For this purpose 
there would be a battalion of three companies for the mili- 
tary stores of each division, each company having its estab- 
lishment for forty wagons, twenty being furnished by the 
commissariat, and twenty obtained by requisition. This 
gives for each division one hundred and twenty wagons, 
and for each army, four hundred and eighty. Each bat- 
talion for a provision-train should have two hundred and 
ten men." 

5th. An army, while actually in motion, can find tern- 



94 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

porary resources, unless in a sterile country, or one al- 
ready ravaged by war, or at the season of the year when 
the old crops are nearly exhausted and the new ones not 
ready for harvest ; but, even supposing the army may in 
this way be partially or wholly supplied, while in motion, 
it nevertheless frequently happens that it may remain for 
some days in position, (as the French at Austerlitz and 
Ulm;) a supply of hard bread for some ten days will 
therefore be important to subsist the army till a regular 
commissariat can be established. 

6th. " Supplies of bread and biscuit," says Napoleon, 
" are no more essential to modern armies than to the Ro- 
mans ; flour, rice, and pulse, may be substituted in marches 
without the troops suffering any harm. It is an error to 
suppose that the generals of antiquity did not pay great 
attention to their magazines ; it may be seen in Csesar's 
Commentaries, how much he was occupied with this care 
in his several campaigns. The ancients knew how to 
avoid being slaves to any system of supplies, or to being 
obliged to depend on the purveyors ; but all the great 
captains well understood the art of subsistence." 

Forage is a military term applied to food of any kind for 
horses or cattle, — as grass, hay, corn, oats, &c.; and also 
to the operation of collecting such food. Forage is of two 
kinds, green and dry ; the former being collected directly 
from the meadows and harvest-fields, and the latter from 
the bams and granaries of the farmers, or the storehouses 
of the dealers. 

The animals connected with an army may be subsisted by 
regular magazines, by forced requisitions, or by authorized 
foraging."^ As has already been remarked, it is not always 
politic, or even possible, to provide regular magazines for the 
entire supplies of an army during the active operations of a 

* This term is sometimes, though improperly, applied to the opera- 
tion of forcibly collecting food for the troops. 



LOGISTICS. 96 

campaign. On account of the great expense and difficulty of 
transporting forage, the general of an army is more fre- 
quently under the necessity of resorting to requisitions, or 
forced contributions as they are called, and to foraging, 
for the subsistence of his animals, than to provide food for 
his men. Nor are requisitions and foragings for this ob- 
ject so objectionable as in the other case, being far less 
likely to produce general want and distress among the 
non-combatant inhabitants. 

The commanding officer of troops should always use his 
best endeavors to obtain his forage by purchase of the in- 
habitants, or by requisitions on the local authorities ; and 
even where these means are impracticable, the foraging 
parties should be strictly directed to make their levies 
with uniformity and due moderation. Accurate accounts 
should be kept of the kinds and quantities of all produce 
and other property taken, so that it may be regularly dis- 
tributed and accounted for. Under no circumstances 
should individuals be permitted to appropriate to them- 
selves more than their pro rata allowance Foraging par- 
ties may sometimes attain their object in a peaceful man- 
ner, by representing to the inhabitants the nature of their 
instructions and the necessity of obtaining immediate sup- 
plies. Even where no recompense is proposed, it may 
be well to offer certificates to the effect that such arti- 
cles have been taken for the use of the army. These 
certificates, even when of no value in themselves, fre- 
quently tend to appease excited passions and allay insur- 
rections. In defensive war, carried on in one's own coun- 
try, it is often necessary to seize upon private property and 
appropriate it to the public ser\dce : in all such cases the 
certificates of the foraging officers become proofs of indi- 
vidual claims against the government. 

No foraging party should ever be sent out till after the 
country has been properly reconnoitred. A good military 



96 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

escort and vanguard should always accompany and pre- 
cede the foragers, for protection against the enemy's light 
cavalry and an insurgent militia. Trustworthy troops must 
be placed in the villages and hamlets of the country to be 
foraged, in order to prevent the foragers from engaging in 
irregular and unauthorized pillage. Officers of the staff 
and administrative corps are sent with the party to see to 
the proper execution of the orders, and to report any irreg- 
ularities on the part of the troops. In case any corps en- 
gage in unauthorized pillage, due restitution should be 
made to the inhabitants, and the expense of such restitu- 
tion deducted from the pay and allowances of the corps 
by whom such excess is committed. A few examples of 
this kind of justice will soon restore discipline to the ar- 
my, and pacify the inhabitants of the country occupied. 

Experience is the best guide in estimating the amount 
of hay or grain that may be taken from a given field : the 
produce of an acre is, of course, very different for different 
soils and climates. In distributing the burdens to the sev- 
eral pack-horses and wagons employed in conveying the 
forage to the army, it is important for the foraging officers 
to know the relative weight and bulk of each article. 

Ordinary pressed hay in this country will average 
about 12 lbs. per cubic foot. 



Wheat . . . weighs 
Rye .... 
Maize or Indian corn " 
Barley .... " 
Oats . '. . . " 



60 lbs. per bushel. 
56 " " 

56 " " 

50 "' *' 

35 " « 



Meal, tlour, and ground feed of all kinds, are purchased 
by the pound. 

As it would be exceedingly dangerous to send forward 
the regular train of the army for the conveyance of forage 
collected by these foraging parties, the country wagons 



LOGISTICS. 97 

and pack-horses are usually pressed into service for this 
purpose. 

Troops of horse are sometimes sent into the vicinity of 
meadows and grain-fields for temporary subsistence : in 
such cases the horses and cattle may be farmed in the 
neighborhood, and the grass and grain issued in regular ra- 
tions, immediately as taken from the field ; but in no case 
should the animals be turned out to pasture. 

In a country like ours, where large bodies of new and 
irregular forces are to be suddenly called into the field in 
case of war, it is important to establish very rigid rules in 
relation to forage and subsistence ; otherwise the opera- 
tions of such troops must be attended with great waste of 
public and private property, the want of means of subsist- 
ence, the consequent pillage of the inhabitants, and a 
general relaxation of discipline. Regular troops are far 
less liable to such excesses than inexperienced and un- 
disciplined forces. 

Marches, — Marches are of two kinds : 1 st. Route marches, 
— 2d. Marches within reach of the enemy. The former be- 
long to the domain of strategy ; the latter to that of tactics ; 
both, however, are connected with logistics in every thing 
that concerns the means of their execution. 

When an army is moving on a line of operations, it 
should be in as many columns as the facility of subsist- 
ence, celerity of movement, the nature of the roads, &c., 
may require. Large columns cannot move with the same 
rapidity as smaller ones, nor can they be so readily sub- 
sisted. But when an army is within striking distance of 
the enemy, concentratign becomes more important than 
celerity, and the forces must be kept in mass, or at least 
within supporting distances of each other. We find only 
two instances in the Seven Years' War, in which Frederick 
attempted attacks by several columns at considerable dis- 
tances from each other ; and in both these instances (at 

9 



98 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

Torgau and at Namiest, against Laudon, during the siege 
of Olmutz) he was unsuccessful. His usual mode was to 
bring his columns near together as he approached the 
enemy, and to form his troops into line at the moment of 
attack. Such was his order of march at Prague, Kollin, 
Rosbach, Leuthen, Zornsdorf, and Kunersdorf. The 
following is one of Frederick's orders respecting marches, 
(October 2d, 1760.) 

" The army will, as usual, march in three columns by 
lines. The first column will consist of the first line ; the 
second, of the second line ; and the third, of the reserve. 
The wagons, and hospital wagons, of regiments, will fol- 
low their corps. The batteries of heavy calibre will fol- 
low the infantry brigades to which they are assigned. On 
passing woods, the regiments of cavalry will march be- 
tween two infantry corps. 

" Each column will have a vanguard of one light battal- 
ion and ten squadrons of hussars or dragoons. They will 
be preceded by three wagons carrying plank-bridges. 
The rear-guard is charged with taking up these bridges 
after the army has defiled over them. 

" The parks will be divided among the columns, to 
avoid the embarrassment resulting from a great many 
wagons being together in a body. 

" If any thing should happen to the second and third 
columns, the king will be instantly apprized of it ; he will 
be found at the head of the first column. Should any 
thing occur to the rear-guard, the same will be instantly 
communicated to Lieutenant-general Zeithen, who will be 
with the rear-guard of the first column. 

"The officers will take care that the soldiers march 
with equal step, and that they do not stray to the right or 
left, and thus uselessly fatigue themselves and lose their 
distances. 

" When orders are given to form the line, the wagons 



LOGISTICS. 99 

will file out of the columns to the left, and will march to 
be parked," &c. 

The position of the baggage, when near the enemy, 
will depend on the nature of the march. If the march be 
to the front, it will be in rear of the column ; if the march 
be by the flank, and the enemy be on the outer flank, the 
baggage will be on the inner one, most remote from danger ; 
if the march be in retreat, the baggage will be in advance 
of the army. In either case it should be strongly guarded. 

It was in direct violation of this rule that General Hull, 
in the campaign of 1812, on reaching the Miami of the 
Lake, (Maumee,) embarked his baggage, stores, sick, con- 
valescent, and " even the instructions of his government 
and the returns of his army," on board the Cuyahoga 
packet, and dispatched them for Detroit, while the army, 
with the same destination, resumed its march by land. 
The result of thus sending his baggage, stores, official 
papers, &c., without a guard, and on the jlank nearest the 
enemy, was just what might have been anticipated : — in 
attempting to pass the British post of Maiden the whole 
detachment was attacked and captured, " by a subaltern 
and six men, in a small and open boat." 

To prevent a surprise, detachments of light troops should 
be always thrown out in front, on the flanks, and in rear 
of the column, denominated from their position, Advanced- 
Guard, Flankers, and Rear-Guard. These scan the coun- 
try which is to be passed over by the column, watch the 
enemy's motions, and give notice of his approach in time 
to allow the main force to choose a suitable field of battle, 
and to pass from the order of march to that of combat. 
The strength and composition of these detachments de- 
pend upon the nature of the ground, and the character 
and position of the enemy. In case of an attack they 
retire slowly, and on joining the main body, take their 
assigned position in the line of battle. 



100 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

In an open country the order of march presents but 
little difficulty ; but in a broken country, and especially in 
the vicinity of the enemy, a march cannot be conducted 
with too many precautions. Before engaging in a defile 
it should be thoroughly examined, and sufficient detach- 
ments sent out to cover the main body from attack while 
effecting the passage. A neglect of these precautions has 
sometimes led to the most terrible disasters. 

In military operations very much depends upon the 
rapidity of marches. The Roman infantry, in Scipio's 
campaigns in Africa, frequently marched a distance of 
twenty miles in five hours, each soldier carrying from fifty 
to eighty pounds of baggage. Septimius Severus, Gibbon 
states, marched from Vienna to Rome, a distance of eight 
hundred miles, in forty days. Caesar marched from Rome 
to the Sierra-Morena, in Spain, a distance of four hundred 
and fifty leagues, in twenty -three days ! 

Napoleon excelled all modern generals in the celerity 
of his movements. Others have made for a single day 
as extraordinary marches as the French, but for general 
activity during a campaign they have no rivals in modem 
history. A few examples of the rapidity of their move- 
ments may not be without interest. 

In 1797 a part of Napoleon's army left Verona after 
having fought the battle of St. Michaels, on the 13th of 
January, then marched all night upon Rivoli, fought in 
the mountains on the 14th, returned to Mantua on the 
loth, and defeated the army of Provera on the morning of 
the 16th, — thus, in less than four days, having marched 
near fifty leagues, fought three battles, and captured more 
than twenty thousand prisoners ! Well might he write to 
the Directory that his soldiers had surpassed the much 
vaunted rapidity of Caesar's legions. 

In the campaign of 1800, Macdonald, wishing to pre- 
vent the escape of Loudon, in a single day marched forty 



LOGISTICS, 101 

miles, crossing rivers, and climbing mountains and gla- 
ciers. 

In 1805 the grand French army broke up their camp at 
Boulogne, in the early part of September, and in two 
weeks reached their allotted posts on the Rhine, averag- 
ing daily from twenty-five to thirty miles. 

During the same campaign the French infantry, pursu- 
ing the Archduke Ferdinand in his retreat from Ulm, 
marched thirty miles a day in dreadful weather, and over 
roads almost impassable for artillery. 

Again, in the campaign of 1806, the French infantry 
pursued the Prussians at the rate of from twenty-five to 
thirty miles per day. 

In 1808 the advanced posts of Napoleon's army pursued 
Sir John Moore's army at the rate of twenty-five miles a 
day, in the midst of winter. Napoleon transported an 
army of fifty thousand men from Madrid to Astorga with 
nearly the same rapidity, marching through deep snows, 
across high mountains, and rivers swollen by the winter 
rains. The activity, perseverance, and endurance of his 
troops, during these ten days' march, are scarcely equalled 
in history. 

In 1812, the activity of the French forces under Clau- 
sel was truly extraordinary. After almost unheard-of 
efforts at the battle of Salamanca, he retreated forty miles 
in a little more than twelve hours ! 

In 1814, Napoleon's army marched at the rate of ten 
leagues a day, besides fighting a battle every twenty-four 
hours. Wishing to form a junction with other troops, for 
the succor of Paris, he marched his army the distance of 
seventy-five miles in thirty-six hours ; the cavalry march- 
ing night and day, and the infantry travelling en poste. 

On his return from Elba, in 1815, his guards marched 
fifty miles the first day after landing ; reached Grenoblo 
through a rough and mountainous country, a distance of 

9* 



102 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

two hundred miles, in six days, and reached Paris, a dis- 
tance of six hundred miles, in less than twenty days ! 

The marches of the allied powers, during the wars of 
the French Revolution, w^ere much less rapid than those 
of the armies of Napoleon. Nevertheless, for a single 
day the English and Spaniards have made some of the 
most extraordinary marches on record. 

In 1 809, on the day of the battle of Talavera, General 
Crawford, fearing that Wellington w^as hard pressed, made 
a forced march with three thousand men the distance of 
sixty-two miles in twenty-six hours ! 

The Spanish regiment of Romana, in their march from 
Jutland to Spain, marched the extraordinary distance of 
fifty miles in twenty-one hours. 

Cavalry, for a single day, will march a greater distance 
than infantry ; but for a campaign of several months the 
infantry will march over the most ground. In the Russian 
campaign of Napoleon, his cavalry failed to keep pace 
with the infantry in his forced march on Moskwa. But 
in the short campaigns of 1805 and 1806, the cavalry of 
Murat displayed the most wonderful activity, and effected 
more extraordinary results than any mounted troops of 
modern ages. 

The English cavalry, however, have made one or two 
short marches with a rapidity truly extraordinary. 

In 1803 Wellington's cavalry in India marched the dis- 
tance of sixty miles in thirty-two hours. 

But the march of the English cavalry under Lord Lake, 
before the battle of Furruckabad, is, if we can trust the 
English accounts, still more extraordinary than any thing 
recorded of the Romans or the French — it is said that he 
marched seventy miles in twenty-four hours ! ! ! 

As a general rule, troops marching for many days in 
succession will move at the rate of from fifteen to twenty 
miles per day. In forced marches, or in pursuit of a fly- 



LOGISTICS. 103 

ing enemy, they will average from twenty to twenty-five 
miles per day. And for only two or three days in succes- 
sion, with favorable roads, thirty miles per day may be 
calculated on. Marches beyond this are unusual, and, 
when they do occur, are the result of extraordinary cir- 
cumstances. 

Convoy. — A convoy consists of provisions, military mu- 
nitions, &c., sent from one point to another, under the 
charge of a detachment of troops, called an escort. When 
regular depjts and magazines are established, with proper 
relations to the line of operations, convoys requiring par- 
ticular escorts are seldom necessary, because the position 
of the army will cover the space over which the magazines 
are to be moved. But in the immediate vicinity of the en- 
emy, or in a country whose inhabitants are hostile or in- 
surrectionary, precautions of this kind should always be 
resorted to. 

The size and composition of the escort must depend 
upon the nature of the country and the imminence of the 
danger. The ground to be passed over should be previ- 
ously reconnoitred, and the line of march be taken up only 
after the most satisfactory reports. When once put in mo- 
tion, the convoy should be thoroughly hemmed in by flank- 
ers, to give warning to the escort of the approach of the 
enemy. Small parties of cavalry are detached on all sides, 
but particularly in advance. The main body of the escort 
is concentrated on the most exposed point of the convoy, 
while the other sides are guarded by subdivisions. In 
case of an attack by a large party, the baggage wagons 
may be formed into a kind of defensive field-work, which, 
with one or two pieces of light artillery, can in this way 
resist a pretty strong eflbrt to destroy or carry away the 
convoy. 

As a general rule, it is better to supply the wants of an 
army by small successive convoys than by periodical and 



104 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

large ones. Even should some of the former be captured, 
their loss would not be materially felt ; but a large period- 
ical convoy offers so great a temptation to the enterprise 
of the enemy, and is so difficult to escort, that he will ven- 
ture much to destroy it, and its loss may frustrate our plans 
of a siege or of an important military operation. If the 
Prussian army, when besieging Olmutz, had observed this 
rule, the capture of a convoy would not have forced them 
to raise the siege and to retreat. 

Napoleon estimates that an army of 100,000 men in po- 
sition will require the daily arrival of from four to five hun- 
dred wagon loads of provisions. 

The difficulty of moving provisions, baggage, &c., in a 
retreat, is always very great, and the very best generals 
have frequently failed on this point. Indeed, the best con- 
certed measures will sometimes fail, amid the confusion 
and disorder consequent upon a retreat with an able and 
active enemy in pursuit. In such a case, the loss of the 
provision-trains in a sterile or unfriendly country may lead 
to the most terrible disasters. We will allude to two ex- 
amples of this kind : the retreat of the English from Spain 
in 1809, and that of the French from Russia in 1812. 

When Sir John Moore saw that a retreat had become 
necessary to save his army from entire destruction, he di- 
rected all the baggage and stores to be taken to the rear, 
and every possible arrangement to be made for their pres- 
ervation and for the regular supplies of the army. But the 
want of discipline in his troops, and more especially the 
want of a proper engineer organization to prepare the re- 
quisite means for facilitating his own marches, and impe- 
ding the enemy's pursuit, prevented his plans from being 
fully carried into execution. Much suffering and great 
losses were consequently inflicted upon his troops ; a large 
portion of his baggage and military stores was captured, 
and even the treasure of his army, amounting to some 



LOGISTICS. 105 

200,000 dollars, was abandoned through the ignorance and 
carelessness of the escorting officer. 

In Napoleon's march into Russia, his plans had been so 
admirably combined, that from Mentz to Moscow not a sin- 
gle estafette or convoy, it is said, was carried off in this 
campaign ; nor was there a day passed without his re- 
ceiving intelligence from France. When the retreat was 
begun, (after the burning of Moscow,) he had six lines 
of magazines in his rear ; the 1st, at Smolensk, ten days' 
march from Moscow ; those of the 2d line at Minsk and 
Wilna, eight marches from Smolensk ; those of the 3d line at 
Kowno, Grodno, and Bialystok ; those of the 4th line at 
Elbing, Marienwerder, Thorn, Plock, Modlin, and War- 
saw ; those of the 5th line at Dantzic, Bamberg, and Po- 
sen ; those of the 6th line at Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau. 
When the army left Moscow it carried with it provisions 
sufficient for twenty days, and an abundance of ammuni- 
tion, each piece of artillery being supplied with three 
hundred and fifty rounds ; but the premature cold weather 
destroyed thirty thousand horses in less than three days, 
thus leaving the trains without the means of transportation 
or suitable escorts for their protection : the horrible suf- 
ferings of the returning army now surpassed all descrip- 
tion. 

The officer selected to escort convoys should be a man 
of great prudence, activity, and energy, for frequently very 
much depends upon the safe and timely arrival of the pro- 
visions and military stores which he may have in charge. 

Castrametation. — Castrametation is, strictly speaking, 
the art of laying out and disposing to advantage the sev- 
eral parts of the camp of an army. The term is some- 
times more extensively used to include all the means for 
lodging and sheltering the soldiers during a campaign, and 
all the arrangements for cooking, <&;c., either in the field 
or in winter quarters. A camp, whether composed of tent^ 



106 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

or barracks, or merely places assigned for bivouacking, 
must be divided and arranged in such a way that the sev- 
eral divisions shall be disposed as they are intended to be 
drawn up in order of battle ; so that, on any sudden alarm, 
the troops can pass from it promptly, and form their line 
of battle without confusion. Suitable places must also bo 
assigned for cooking, for baggage, and for provisions, mil- 
itary stores, and ammunitions. 

The extent of the color front of a camp depends much 
on the character of the ground and the means of defence, 
but as a general rule, it should never exceed the position 
which the army would occupy in the line of battle. The 
different arms should be encamped in the same order as 
that of battle ; this order of course depending on the na- 
ture of the battle-ground. A coi^ps d'armee is composed 
of battalions of infantry, squadrons of cavalr}", batteries of 
artillery, and companies of engineer troops, and the art of 
encampments consists in arranging each of these ele- 
ments so as to satisfy the prescribed conditions. 

The choice of ground for a camp must be governed, 
1st, by the general rules respecting military positions, 
and, 2d, by other rules peculiar to themselves, for they 
may be variously arranged in a manner more or less suit- 
able on the same position. 

That the ground be suitable for defence, is the first and 
highest consideration. 

It should also be commodious and dry : moist ground in 
the vicinity of swamps and stagnant waters, would endan- 
ger the health of the army : for the same reason it should 
not be subject to overflow or to become marshy by heavy 
rains, and the melting of snow. 

The proximity of good roads, canals, or navigable 
streams, is important for furnishing the soldiers with all 
the necessaries of life. 

The proximity of woods is also desirable for furnishing 



LOGISTICS. 107 

firewood, materials for huts, for repairs of military equip- 
ments, for works of defence, &c. 

Good water within a convenient distance, is also an es- 
sential element in the choice of ground for a camp ; with- 
out this the soldiers' health is soon undermined. The 
proximity of running streams is also important for the pur- 
poses of washing and bathing, and for carrying off* the 
filth of the camp. 

The camp should not be so placed as to be enfiladed or 
commanded by any point within long cannon range ; if 
bordering on a river or smaller stream, there should be 
space enough between them to form in order of battle ; 
the communications in rear should offer the means of re- 
treating in case of necessity, but should not afford facilities 
to the enemy to make his attack on that side. 

If the camp is to be occupied for a considerable length 
of time, as for cantonments or winter-quarters, the greater 
must be the care in selecting its position and in the ar- 
rangement for the health and comfort of the soldiers. In 
the latter case, (of winter-quarters,) the engineer's art 
should always be called in play to form intrenchments, 
lines of abattis, inundations, &c., to render the position 
as difficult of access to the enemy as possible. 

A bivouac is the most simple kind of camp. It consists 
merely of lines of fires, and huts for the officers and sol- 
diers. These huts may be made of straw, of wood ob- 
tained from the forest, or by dismantling houses and other 
buildings in the vicinity of the camp, and stripping them 
of their timbers, doors, floors, &c. Troops may be kept 
in bivouac for a few days, when in the vicinity of the en- 
emy, but the exposure of the soldier in ordinary bivouacs, 
especially in the rainy seasons or in a rigorous climate, 
is exceedingly destructive of human life, and moreover 
leads to much distress to the inhabitants of the country 
occupied, in the destruction of their dwellings and the 



108 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

most common necessaries of life. If the position is to 
be occupied for any length of time, the huts should be ar- 
ranged like tents, according to a regular system, and made 
comfortable for the troops. Such should always be the 
system adopted in camps of practice or manoeuvre, in can- 
tonments, winter-quarters, or in intrenched positions. 

We have adopted in our service the system of encamp- 
ing in tents. These may do very well under the ordinary 
circumstances ; but in the active operations of a campaign 
they are exceedingly objectionable, as greatly encumber- 
ing the baggage-trains. It would seem preferable to re- 
sort to bivouacs for the temporary camp of a single night, 
and to construct a regular system of huts where a position 
is to be occupied for any length of time. This may be 
regarded as a general rule, but in certain countries and 
climates, the tent becomes almost indispensable. 

Napoleon's views on this subject are certainly interest- 
ing, if not decisive of the question : " Tents," says he, 
" are not wholesome. It is better for the soldier to bi- 
vouac, because he can sleep with his feet towards the 
fire ; he may shelter himself from the wind with a few 
boards or a little straw. The ground upon which he lies 
will be rapidly dried in the vicinity of the fire. Tents 
are necessary for the superior officers, who have occasion 
to read and consult maps, and who ought to be ordered 
never to sleep in a house — a fatal abuse, which has given 
rise to so many disasters. All the European nations have 
so far followed the example of the French as to discard 
their tents ; and if they be still used in camps of mere pa- 
rade, it is because they are economical, sparing woods, 
thatched roofs, and villages. The shade of a tree, against 
the heat of the sun, and any sorry shelter whatever, against 
the rain, are preferable to tents. The carriage of the 
tents for each battalion would load five horses, who would 
be much better employed in carrying provisions. Tents 



LOGISTICS. 109 

are a subject of observation for the enemies' spies and 
officers of the staff: they give them an insight into your 
numbers, and the position that you occupy ; and this in- 
convenience occurs every day, and every instant in the 
day. An army ranged in two or three lines of bivouac is 
only to be perceived at a distance by the smoke, which 
the enemy may mistake for the vapor of the atmosphere. 
It is impossible to count the number of fires ; it is easy, 
however, to count the number of tents, and to trace out 
the position that they occupy." 

The guarding of camps is a very important matter, and 
requires much attention. 

The camp-guard consists of one or two rows of senti- 
nels placed around the camp, and relieved at regular in- 
tervals. The number of rows of sentinels, and the dis- 
tance between each man, will depend upon the character 
of the ground and the degree of danger apprehended. 

Detachments of infantry and cavalry, denominated pic- 
quets, are also thrown out in front and on the flanks, which, 
in connection with the camp-guards, serve to keep good 
order and discipline in and around the camp, to prevent 
desertions, intercept reconnoitering parties, and to give 
timely notice of the enemy's approach. 

Still larger detachments, denominated grand-guards, are 
posted in the surrounding villages, farm-houses, or small 
field-works, which they occupy as outposts, and from which 
they can watch the movements of the enemy, and prevent 
any attempts to surprise the camp. They detach patrols, 
videttes, and sentries, to furnish timely notice of danger. 
They should never be so far from the camp as to be be- 
yond succor in case of sudden attack. Outposts, when 
too far advanced, are sometimes destroyed without being 
able to give notice of the enemy's approach. 

In encamping troops in winter-quarters, it is sometimes 
necessary to scatter them over a considerable extent of 

10 



110 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

ground, in order to facilitate their subsistence. In such 
a case, the arrangement of guards requires the utmost 
care. A chain of advanced posts should be placed several 
miles' distance from the line of camp ; these posts should 
be supported by other and larger detachments in their 
rear, and concentrated on fewer points ; and the vrhole 
country around should be continually reconnoitered by 
patrols of cavalry. 

The manner in which Napoleon quartered and wintered 
his army on the Passarge, in 1806-7, furnishes a useful 
lesson to military men, both in the matters of encampment 
and subsistence. An immense army of men were here 
quartered and subsisted, in a most rigorous climate, with 
a not over fertile soil, in the midst of hostile nations, and 
in the very face of a most powerful enemy. 

A Roman army invariably encamped in the same order, 
its troops being always drawn up in the same battle array. 
A Roman staff-officer who marked out an encampment, 
performed nothing more than a mechanical operation ; he 
had no occasion for much genius or experience. The 
form of the camps was a square. In later times, they 
sometimes, in imitation of the Greeks, made them circular, 
or adapted them to the ground. The camp was always 
surrounded with a ditch and rampart, and divided into two 
parts by a broad street, and into subdivisions by cross- 
streets and alleys. Each tent was calculated to hold ten 
privates and a petty officer. 

In the middle ages, the form of the camp did not differ 
very essentially from that of the Romans, the variation 
consisting principally in the interior arrangements, these 
arrangements being made to correspond to the existing 
mode of forming a line of battle. The details of this sys- 
tem may be found in the military work of Machiavelli. 

The art of fixing a camp in modem times is the same 
as taking up a line of battle on the same position. Of 



LOGISTICS. Ill 

course all the projectile machines must be in play and 
favorably placed. The position must neither be com- 
manded, out-fronted, nor surrounded ; but on the contrary 
ought, as far as possible, to command and out-front the 
enemy's position. But even in the same position there 
are numerous modes of arranging an encampment, or of 
forming a line of battle, and to select the best of these 
modes requires great experience, coup d'ceil, and genius. 
In relation to this point Napoleon makes the following 
remarks : — 

" Ought an army to be confined to one single encamp- 
ment, or ought it to form as many as it has corps or di- 
visions ? At what distance ought the vanguard and the 
flankers to be encamped ? What frontage and what depth 
ought to be given to the camp ? Where should the caval- 
ry, the artillery, and the carriages be distributed ? Should 
the army be ranged in battle array, in several lines ? and 
if it should, what space should there be between those 
lines ? Should the cavalry be in reserve behind the in- 
fantry, or should it be placed upon the wings ? As every 
piece has sufficient ammunition for keeping up its fire 
twenty-four hours, should all the artillery be brought into 
action at the beginning of the engagement, or should half 
of it be kept in reserve ? 

" The solution of these questions depends on the follow- 
ing circumstances : — 1st. On the number of troops, and 
the numbers of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, of which 
the army is composed. 2d. On the relation subsisting 
between the two armies. 3d. On the quality of the troops. 
4th. On the end in view. 5th. On the nature of the field. 
And 6th. On the position occupied by the enemy, and on 
the character of the general who commands them. Noth- 
ing absolute either can or ought to be prescribed on this 
head. In modem warfare there is no natural order of 
battle. 



112 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

" The duty to be performed by the commander of an 
army is more difficult in modem armies, than it was in 
those of the ancients. It is also certain that his influence 
is more efficacious in deciding battles. In the ancient 
armies the general-in-chief, at a distance of eighty or a 
hundred toises from the enemy, was in no danger ; and 
yet he was conveniently placed, so as to have an oppor- 
tunity of directing to advantage all the movements of his 
forces. In modern armies, a general-in-chief, though re- 
moved four or five hundred toises, finds himself in the 
midst of the fire of the enemy's batteries, and is very 
much exposed ; and still he is so distant that several 
movements of the enemy escape him. In every engage- 
ment he is occasionally obliged to approach within reach 
of small- arms. The efi"ect of modern arms is much in- 
fluenced by the situation in which they are placed. A 
battery of guns, with a great range and a commanding 
position that takes the enemy obliquely, may be decisive 
of a victory. Modern fields of battle are much more ex- 
tended than those of the ancients, whence it becomes 
necessary to study operations on a large scale. A much 
greater degree of experience and military genius is re- 
quisite for the direction of a modem army than was ne- 
cessary for an ancient one." 

Figure 9 represents a camp (on favorable ground) of a 
grand-division of an army, composed of two brigades or 
twelve battalions of infantry, twelve squadrons of cavalry, 
five batteries of artillery, and three companies of engi- 
neers. 

Figure 10 represents the details of a camp of a bat- 
talion of infantry composed of eight companies. 

Figure 11 is the camp of a squadron of cavalry. 

Figure 12 is the camp of two batteries of foot artillery, 
or two companies of foot engineers. 

Figure 13 is the camp of two batteries of mounted ar- 



LOGISTICS. 113 

tillery, or two companies of mounted sappers and pon- 
toniers. 

On undulating or broken ground the arrangement and 
order of the general camp, as well as the details of the 
encampment of each arm, would admit of much variation.'* 

* There are many valuable remarks on the various subjects com- 
prised under the head of logistics, in the works of Jomini, Grimoard, 
Thiebault, Boutourlin, Guibert, Laroche Amyon, Bousmard, Ternay, 
Vauchelle, Odier, Audouin, Bardin, Chemevrieres, Daznan, Ballyet, 
Dremaux, Dupre d'Aulnay, Morin, and in the published regulations 
and orders of the English army. 

10* 



114 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 



CHAPTER V. 

TACTICS. 

IV. Tactics. — We have defined tactics to be the art 
of bringing troops into action, or of moving them in the 
presence of the enemy ; — that is, w^ithin his view, and 
within the reach of his artillery. This branch of the 
military art has usually been divided into two parts : 1st. 
Grand Tactics, or the tactics of battles ; and 2d. Elemen- 
tary Tactics, or tactics of instruction.* 

A battle is a general action between armies. If only a 
small portion of the forces are engaged it is usually de- 
nominated a combat^ an affair, an action, a skirmish, &c., 
according to the character of the conflict. The art of 
combining and conducting battles of all descriptions has 
been designated by the name of Grand Tactics. 

Battles may be arranged into three classes ; 1st. De- 

* " It does not come within the view of this work to say any thing of 
the merely mechanical part of the art ; because it must be taken for 
granted, that every man who accepts the command of an army 
knows at least the alphabet of his trade. If he does not, (unless his 
enemy be as ignorant as himself,) defeat and infamy await him. 
Without understanding perfectly what are called the evolutions, how 
is it possible that a general can give to his own army that order of 
battle which shall be most provident and skilful in each particular 
case in which he may be placed ? How know which of these evolu- 
tions the enemy employs against him ? and, of course, how decide on 
a counter-movement which may be necessary to secure victory or 
avoid defeat? The man who shall take the command of an army 
without perfectly understanding this elementary branch, is no less 
presumptuous than he who should pretend to teach Greek without 
knowing even his letters. If we have such generals, let them, for 
their own sakes, if not for their country's, put themselves immediately 
to school." 



TACTICS. 115 

fensive battles, or those given in a chosen position by an 
army waiting the attack of the enemy. 2d. Offensive 
battles, or those made by an army which attacks the en- 
emy in position. 3d. The mixed or unforeseen battles, 
given by two armies meeting while on the march. 

I. When an army awaits the attack, it takes its posi- 
tion and forms its line of battle according to the nature of 
the ground and the supposed character and strength of 
the enemy's forces. Such is usually the case when an 
army wishes to cover a siege, protect a capital, guard 
depots of provisions and military stores, or some import- 
ant strategic point. The general relations of positions 
with strategy and engineering have already been consid- 
ered ; we will now discuss merely their relations to bat- 
tles. 

The first condition to be satisfied by a tactical position 
is, that its debouches shall be more favorable for falling 
on the enemy when he has approached to the desired 
point, than those which the enemy can have for attacking 
our line of battle. 2d. The artillery should have its full 
effect upon all the avenues of approach. 3d. We should 
have good ground for manoeuvring our own troops un- 
seen, if possible, by the enemy. 4th. We should have a 
full view of the enemy's manoeuvres as he advances to 
the attack. 5th. We should have the flanks of our line 
well protected by natural or artificial obstacles. 6th. We 
should have some means of effecting a retreat without 
exposing our army to destruction. 

It is very seldom that all these conditions can be satis- 
fied at the same time ; and sometimes the very means of 
satisfying one, may be in direct violation of another. A 
river, a forest, or a mountain, which secures a flank of a 
line of battle, may become an obstacle to a retreat, should 
the defensive forces be thrown back upon that wing. 
Again, the position may be difficult of attack in front or 



1 1 6 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

on the wings, and at the same time unfavorable for re- 
treat. Such was Wellington's position at Waterloo. The 
park of Hougomont, the hamlet of Haye Sainte, and the 
marshy rivulet of Papelotte, were serious obstacles against 
the attacking force ; but the marshy forest of Soignies in 
rear, with but a single road, cut off all hope of retreat. 

II. According to the strategic relations of the contend- 
ing forces in a campaign, will it be determined whether 
we are to await the enemy, or to seek him out and attack 
him wherever he may be found. We may sometimes be 
obliged to make the attack at all hazards, for the purpose 
of preventing the junction of two corps, or to cut off 
forces that may be separated from the main body by a 
river, &c. As a general rule the attacking force has a 
moral superiority over the defensive, but this advantage 
is frequently more than counterbalanced by other condi- 
tions. 

The main thing in an offensive battle is to seize upon 
the decisive point of the field. This point is determined 
by the configuration of the ground, the position of the 
contending forces, the strategic object of the battle ; or, 
by a combination of these. For example, when one wing 
of the enemy rests on a height that commands the re- 
mainder of his line, this would seem the decisive point to 
be attacked, for its occupation w^ould secure the greatest 
advantages ; but this point may be so very difficult of ac- 
cess, or be so related to the strategic object as to render 
its attack out of the question. Thus it was at the battle 
of Bautzen : the left of the allies rested on the mountains 
of Bohemia, which were difficult of attack, but favorable 
for defence ; moreover, their only line of retreat was on 
the right, which thus became the point of attack for the 
French, although the topographical and tactical key of the 
field was on the left. 

III. It frequently happens in modern warfare that bat- 



TACTICS. 117 

ties result from the meeting of armies in motion, both 
parties acting on the ofTensiA^e. Indeed, an army that is 
occupying a defensive position may, on the approach of 
the enemy, advance to meet him while on the march. 
Battles of this kind may partake of the mixed character 
of offensive and defensive actions, or they may be of the 
nature of a surprise to both armies. To this class belong 
the battles of Rosbach, Eylau, Lutzen, Luzzara, Abens- 
berg, &c. 

Surprises were much more common in ancient than in 
modern times, for the noise of musketry and the roar of 
artillery, belonging to the posts or wings assailed, will 
prevent any general surprise of an army. Moreover, the 
division into separate masses, or corps d'armee, will ne- 
cessarily confine the surprise to a part, at most, of the 
forces employed. Nevertheless, in the change given to 
military terms, a surprise may now mean only an unex- 
pected combination of manoeuvres for an attack, rather 
than an actual falling upon troops unguarded or asleep. 
In this sense Marengo, Lutzen, Eylau, &c. are numbered 
with surprises. Benningsen's attack on Murat at Zaran- 
tin in 1812 was a true surprise, resulting from the gross 
negligence and carelessness of the king of Naples. 

An order of battle is the particular disposition given to 
the troops for a determined manoeuvre on the field of bat- 
tle. A line of battle is the general name applied to troops 
drawn up in their usual order of exercise, without any 
determined manoeuvre ; it may apply to defensive posi- 
tions, or to offensive operations, where no definitive object 
has been decided on. Military writers lay down twelve 
orders of battle, viz.: 1st. The simple parallel order; 
2d. The parallel order with a crotchet ; 3d. The parallel 
order reinforced on one or both wings ; 4th. The parallel 
order reinforced on the centre ; 5th. The simple oblique 
order ; 6th. The oblique order reinforced on the assailing 



118 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

wing ; 7th. The perpendicular order on one or both wings; 
8th. The concave order; 9th. The convex order; 10th. 
The order by echelon on one or both wings ; 11th. The 
order by echelon on the centre ; 12th. The combined or- 
ders of attack on the centre and one wing at the same 
time. 

(Figure 14.)* The simple parallel order is the worst pos- 
sible disposition for a battle, for the two parties here fight 
with equal chances, and the combat must continue till ac- 
cident, superior numbers, or mere physical strength de- 
cides the day ; skill can have little or no influence in 
such a contest. 

(Figure 15.) The parallel order with a crotchet on 
the flank, is sometimes used in a defensive position, and 
also in the ofl'ensive with the crotchet thrown forward. 
Malplaquet, Nordlingen, Prague, and Kolin, are examples 
of this order. Wellington, at Waterloo, formed the paral- 
lel order wdth the retired crotchet on the right flank. 

(Figure 16.) A line of battle parallel to the enemy's, 
if strongly reinforced on one point, is according to cor- 
rect principles, and may in certain cases secure the vic- 
tory ; but it has many inconveniences. The weak part 
of the line being too near the enemy, may, notwithstand- 
ing its eflbrts to the contrary, become engaged, and run 
the risk of a defeat, and thereby counterbalance the ad- 
vantages gained by the strong point. Moreover, the rein- 
forced part of the line will not be able to profit by its 
success by taking the enemy's line in flank and rear, 
without endangering its connection with the rest of the 
line. 

* In the plans, B is the army in position, and A the attacking force 
arranged according to the different orders of battle. To simplify the 
drawings, a single line represents the position of an army, whereas, in 
practice, troops are usually drawn up in three lines. Each figure re- 
presents a grand division of twelve battalions. 



TACTICS. 119 

(Figure 17) represents the parallel order reinforced on 
the centre. The same remarks are applicable to this as to 
the preceding. 

These two orders were frequently used by the ancients ; 
as at the battle of Zama, for example ; and sometimes by 
modern generals. Turenne employed one of them at Ens- 
heim. 

(Figure 18) is the simple oblique order. 

(Figure 19) is the oblique order, with the attacking wing 
reinforced. This last is better suited for an inferior army 
in attacking a superior, for it enables it to carry the mass 
of its force on a single point of the enemy's line, while the 
weak wing is not only out of reach of immediate attack, 
but also holds the remainder of the enemy's line in check 
by acting as a reserve ready to be concentrated on the fa- 
vorable point as occasion may require. 

The most distinguished examples under this order are 
the battles of Leuctra and Mantinea, under the celebrated 
Epaminondas ; Leuthen, under Frederick ; the Pyramids, 
Marengo, and Jena, under Napoleon. 

(Figure 20.) An army may be perpendicular upon a flank 
at the beginning of a battle, as was the army of Frederick 
at Rosbach, and the Russian army at Kunersdorflf; but 
this order must soon change to the oblique. An attack 
upon both wings can only be made when the attacking 
force is vastly superior. At Eylau, Napoleon made a per- 
pendicular attack on one wing at the same time that he 
sought to pierce the enemy's centre. 

(Figure 21.) The concave order may be used with ad- 
vantage in certain cases, and in particular localities. Han- 
nibal employed it at the battle of Cannae, the English at 
Crecy and Azincourt, and the Austrians at Essling, in 
1809. 

(Figure 22.) The convex order is sometimes formed to 
cover a defile, to attack a concave line, or to oppose an 



120 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

attack before or after the passage of a river. The Ro- 
mans formed this order at the battle of Cosilinum ; the 
French at Ramilies in 1706, at Fleurus in 1794, at Ess- 
ling in 1809, and at the second and third days of Leipsic 
in 1813, and at Brienne in 1814. 

(Figure 23.) The order by echelon on one wing maybe 
frequently employed with advantage ; but if the echelon be 
made on both wings, there is the same objection to its use as 
to the perpendicular order on both wings. At Dresden, Na- 
poleon attacked both wings at the same time ; this is the 
only instance in his whole histor}^ of a similar attack, and 
this was owing to peculiar circumstances in the ground 
and in the position of his troops. 

(Figure 24.) The echelon order on the centre alone may 
be employed with success against an army fonued in a 
thin or too extended line of battle, for it would be pretty 
certain to penetrate and break the line. 

The echelon order possesses in general very great ad- 
vantages. The several corps composing the army may 
manoeuvre separately, and consequently with greater ease. 
Each echelon covers the flank of that which precedes it ; 
and all may be combined towards a single object, and ex- 
tended with the necessar}^ ensemble. At the battle of the 
Pyramids, Napoleon formed the oblique order in echelon 
by squares. Portions of his forces were arranged in eche- 
lon in some of his other battles. 

(Figure 25.) The combined order in columns on the 
centre and one extremity at the same time, is better suited 
than either of the preceding for attacking a strong contig- 
uous line. Napoleon employed this order at Wagram, 
Ligny, Bautzen, Borodino, and Waterloo. 

It is impossible to lay down, as a general rule, which 
of these orders of battle should be employed, or that either 
should be exclusively followed throughout the whole bat- 
tle. The question must be decided by the general him- 



TACTICS. 121 

self on the ground, where all the circumstances may be 
duly weighed. An order well suited to one position might 
be the worst possible in another. Tactics is in this re- 
spect the very reverse of strategy — the latter being subject 
to more rigid and invariable rules. 

But whatever the plan adopted by the attacking force, 
it should seek to dislodge the enemy, either by piercing 
or turning his line. If it can conceal its real intentions, 
and deceive him respecting the true point of attack, suc- 
cess will be more certain and decisive. A turning ma- 
noeuvre may frequently be employed with advantage at the 
same time with the main attack on the line. The opera- 
tions of Davoust at Wagram, and Richepanse at Hohen- 
linden, are good examples under this head. The ma- 
noeuvre is, however, a difficult one, and unless executed 
with skill, may lead to disasters like the turning manoeuvres 
of the Austrians at Rivoli and Austerlitz, and of the French 
under Jourdan at Stackach, and under Marmont at Sala- 
manca. 

We will now discuss the particular manner of arranging 
the troops on the line of battle, or the manner of employ- 
ing each arm, without entering, however, much into the 
detailed tactics of formation and instruction, 

We shall begin with infantry, as the most important arm 
on the battle-field. 

There are four difi'erent ways of forming infantry for 
battle : 1st, as tirailleurs, or light troops ; 2d, in deployed 
lines ; 3d, in lines of battalions, ployed on the central di- 
vision of each battalion, or formed in squares ; 4th, in deep 
masses. 

These different modes of formation are reduced to four 
separate systems : 1st, the thin formation of two deployed 
lines ; 2d, a line of battalions in columns of attack on the 
centre, or in squares by battalions ; 3d, a combination of 
these two, or the first line deployed, and the second in 

11 



122 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

columns of attack ; and 4th, the deep formation of heavy- 
columns of several battalions. The tirailleurs are merely 
accessories to the main forces, and are employed to fill 
up intervals, to protect the march of the columns, to an- 
noy the enemy, and to manoeuvre on the flanks. 

1st. Formerly the line of battle for infantry was very gen- 
erally that of two deployed lines of troops, as shown in Fig. 
26. But reason and experience have demonstrated that 
infantry in this thin or light order can only move very 
slowly ; that in attempting rapid movements it breaks and 
exhibits great and dangerous undulations, and would be 
easily pierced through by troops of a deeper order. Hence 
it is that the light formation is only proper when the in- 
fantry is to make use of its nre, and to remain almost sta- 
tionary. 

2d. If the formation of a line of battalions in columns 
of attack be employed, the depth and mobility will depend 
upon the organization or habitual formation of this arm. 

In our service a battalion is supposed to be composed 
of ten companies, each formed in three ranks. The two 
flank companies are designed for tirailleurs. This would 
give a column of four divisions, and consequently twelve 
files deep ; and as only two of these files could employ 
their fire, there would be much too large a portion of non- 
combatants exposed to the enemy's artillery. In practice, 
however, we employ the two-rank formation, which, if the 
flank companies be detached, would give a column of at- 
tack eight files in depth, which is not objectionable. If, 
however, the flank companies should be present in the 
battalion, the depth of the column would still be ten files. 

In the French service, each battalion is composed of 
four divisions, formed in either two or three ranks. The 
two-rank formation is the one habitually employed. If all 
the companies be present, and the formation in three ranks, 
the depth of column will be twelve files ; if in two ranks. 



TACTICS. 123 

the depth will be eight files. If the flank companies be 
detached, the depth of column will be, for three ranks nine 
files, and for two ranks six files. (Figs. 27 and 28.) 

In the Russian service each battalion has four divisions 
of three ranks each. But the third rank is employed as 
tirailleurs, which gives a depth of column of eight files. 
The employment of the third rank for tirailleurs is deemed 
objectionable on account of the difficulty of rallying them 
on the column. For this reason, the best authorities pre- 
fer detaching an entire division of two companies. 

The formation of squares is exceedingly eflfective in an 
open country, and against an enemy who is superior in 
cavalry. Formerly very large squares were employed, 
but they are now formed either by regiment or by battal- 
ion. The former are deemed best for the defensive, and 
the latter for offensive movements. The manner of ar- 
ranging these is shown in Figure 29. 

3d. The mixed system, or the combination of the two 
preceding, has sometimes been employed with success. 
Napoleon used this formation at Tagliamento, and the 
Russians at Eylau. Each regiment was composed of 
three battalions, the first being deployed in line, and the 
other two formed in columns of attack by division in rear 
of the two extremities, as shown in Fig. 30. It may in 
some cases be better to place the second and third bat- 
talions in line with the first, and on the two extremities of 
this battalion, in order to prolong the line of fire. The 
centre of the line of each regiment would be less strong, 
however, than when the two battalions by column are 
placed in rear of the other which is deployed. This 
mixed system of formation has many advocates, and in 
certain situations may be employed with great advantage. 

4th. The deep order of heavy columns of several bat- 
talions is objectionable as an habitual formation for battle, 
inasmuch as it exposes large masses of men to the ravages 



124 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

of artillery, and diminishes the mobility and impulsion of 
an attack without adding greatly to its force. Macdonald 
led a column of this kind at the battle of Wagram with 
complete success, although he experienced enormous 
losses. But Ney's heavy columns of attack at Waterloo 
failed of success, and suffered terribly from the concentric 
fire of the enemy's batteries. 

Whenever deep columns are employed, Jomini recom- 
mends that the grand-division of twelve battalions should 
have one battalion on each flank, (Fig. 31,) marching by 
files, in order to protect its flanks from the enemy's at- 
tacks. Without this defence a column of twelve bat- 
talions deep becomes an inert mass, greatly exposed to be 
thrown into disorder or broken, as was the column of Fon- 
tenoy, and the Macedonian phalanx by Paulus Emillus. 
A grand-division is sometimes arranged in two columns 
by brigade, as is represented in Figure 32. These are less 
heavy than a single column of grand-division by battalion, 
but are subject to nearly the same objections. 

All offensive operations on the field of battle require 
mobility, solidity, and impulsion ; while, on the other hand, 
all defensive operations should combine solidity with the 
greatest possible amount ofjire. 

Troops in motion can make but little use of their fire- 
arms, whatever may be their formation. If in very large 
masses, they move slower and are more exposed ; but the 
moral effect of these large moveable columns is such, that 
they frequently carry positions without ever employing 
their fire. The French columns usually succeeded against 
the Austrian and Prussian infantry, but the English in- 
fantry could not so easily be driven from their ground ; 
they also employed their fire to greater advantage, as was 
shown at Talavera, Busaco, Fuente de Honore, Albuera, 
and Waterloo. The smaller columns and the mixed for- 
mation were always most successful against such troops. 



TACTICS, 126 

From these remarks we must conclude — 1st, That the 
very thin as well as the very deep formation is objec- 
tionable under ordinary circumstances, and can seldom be 
employed with safety. 

2d. That the attack by battalions in columns by division 
is the best for carrying a position ; the column should, 
however, be diminished in depth as much as possible, in 
order both to increase its own fire and to diminish its ex- 
posure to the fire of the enemy ; moreover, it should be 
well covered by tirailleurs and supported by cavalry. 

3d. That the mixed formation of the first line deployed 
and the second in columns of battalion by division is the 
best for defence. 

4th. That either of the last two may be employed in 
the offensive or defensive, according to the nature of the 
ground, the character of the general, and the character 
and position of the troops. Squares are always good 
against cavalry. 

Troops should be habituated to all these formations, and 
accustomed to pass rapidly from one to another in the 
daytime or at night. None, however, but disciplined 
troops can do this : hence the great superiority of regulars 
on the field of battle, where skilful manoeuvres frequently 
effect more than the most undaunted courage. 

The arm next in importance on the battle-field is cav- 
alry. The principal merit of this arm consists in its velo- 
city and mohility. Cavalry has little solidity, and cannot 
of itself defend any position against infantry ; but in con- 
nection with the other arms, it is indispensable for begin- 
ning a battle, for completing a victory, and for reaping 
its full advantage by pursuing and destroying the beaten 
foe. 

There are four diflferent modes of forming cavalry, the 
same as for infantry : 1st, in deployed lines ; 2d, a line of 
regiments in column of attack on the centre ; 3d, the 
11* 



126 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

mixed formation ; and 4th, the deep formation of several 
columns. 

1st. The thin formation was deemed objectionable for 
infantry, on account of its liability to be penetrated by 
cavalry. The same objection does not hold so forcibly 
with respect to this latter arm ; but full lines are deemed 
less advantageous than lines deployed checker-wise or in 
echelon. In either case the distance between the lines 
should be sufficient to prevent the second line from com- 
ing in contact with the first, in case the latter receives a 
slight check. This distance need not be so great in lines 
deployed checker-wise, as when they are full, or in ech- 
elon. 

2d. The second system of formation, that is, a line of 
columns of attack on the central division for infantry, is 
by battalion, but for cavalry, by regiment. If the regiment 
is composed of eight squadrons, the column will contain 
four lines, two squadrons forming a division ; but if com- 
posed of only six squadrons, the column will contain only 
three lines, and consequently will be six files in depth. 
In either case the distance between the lines should be 
that of a demi-squadron, when the troops are drawn up in 
battle array ; but when charging, the divisions may close 
to a less distance. 

3d. In forming a grand division of two brigades, by the 
third or mixed system, two regiments may be deployed 
in the first line, and three formed in columns of attack in 
rear of the flanks and centre, as is shown in Fig. 33, the 
sixth being held in reserve. This formation is deemed a 
good one. 

4th. The fourth system, of deep columns of cavalry, is 
entirely unsuited for the charge, and this formation can 
only be employed for troops drawn up in reserve. 

The flanks of lines or columns of cavalry are always 
much exposed, and squadrons should therefore be formed 



TACTICS. 127 

in echelon on the right and left, and a little in rear of the 
main bod)^, in order to protect the flanks from the attacks 
of the enemy's horse. Irregular cavalry is usually em- 
ployed for this purpose. 

In the formation of a grand division in line of battle, 
care should be taken not to give too great an extent to the 
command of the generals of brigade. If the formation be 
in two lines, neither brigade should form an entire line, 
but each should form a wing of the division, two regiments 
of the same brigade being placed in rear of each other. 
This rule is an important one, and should never be ne- 
glected. 

It may also be laid down as a maxim, in the formation 
of cavalry on the battle-field, that the first line after the 
charge, even if most successful, may require reforming in 
rear of the second line, and that this last should be pre- 
pared to act in the front line after the first onset. The 
success of the battle frequently depends upon the charge 
of the final reserve of cavalry on the flanks of lines already 
engaged. 

It is on account of this frequent manoeuvring of the cav- 
alry on the battle-field, its reforming for repeated charges, 
that great bodies deployed in full lines are principally ob- 
jected to. They cannot be handled with the facility and 
rapidity of columns of regiments by divisions. The at- 
tack of Nansouty's cavalry, formed in this way, on the 
Prussian cavalry, deployed in advance of Chateau-Thierry, 
in 1814, is a good proof of this. 

Cavalry may be brought to a charge — 1st, in columns ; 
2d, in line ; and 3d, in route, or at random, (d la dehan- 
dade.) These may also be varied by charging either at a 
trot or a gallop. All these modes have been employed 
with success. In a regular charge in line the lance offers 
great advantages ; in the melee the sabre is the best weap- 
on ; hence some military writers have proposed arming 



128 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

the front rank with lances, and the second with sabres. 
The pistol and the carabine are useless in the charge, but 
may sometimes be employed with advantage against con- 
voys, outposts, and light cavalry ; to fire the carabine with 
any effect, the troop must be at a halt. In all charges in 
line, especially against cavalry, the fast trot is deemed 
preferable to the gallop, on account of the difficulty of 
keeping up the alignment when the speed is increased. 
Lances are utterly useless in a mtlee, and in employing 
troops armed in this way, it is of the greatest importance 
to keep them in order and in line. In charging with the 
sabre against artillery the gallop may sometimes be em- 
ployed, for velocity here may be more important than force. 

We will now consider the formation and use of artillery 
on the field of battle. It may be laid down as a funda- 
mental principle, that the fire of artillery should be di- 
rected on that part of the enemy's line which we design 
to pierce ; for this fire will not only weaken this point, 
but will also aid the attack of the cavalry and infantry 
when the principal efforts are directed towards the in- 
tended point. 

In the defence, the artillery is usually distributed through- 
out the whole line, on ground favorable for its fire ; but 
the reserve should be so placed that it can easily be 
brought to bear on the point where the enemy will be 
most likely to direct his principal attack. 

Artillery placed on a plain, or with ground slightly in- 
clined in front, and using the point-blank or ricochet fire, 
is the most effective ; very high points are unfavorable. 
If possible, the concentric fire should be employed against 
the enemy's columns of attack. The position of the Eng- 
lish artillery on the field of Waterloo, and the use of the 
concentric fire, furnishes one of the best examples for the 
disposition of this arm to be found in moderm military 
history. 



TACTICS. 189 

The proper use of artillery on the battle-field is against 
the enemy's infantry and cavalry, consequently only a 
small part of it should be employed to respond to the fire 
of the enemy's batteries ; not more than one third at most 
can be spared for this object. 

If possible, batteries should be established so as to take 
the enemy's line in flank, either by an oblique or enfilading 
fire. A direct fire against columns of attack, with a few 
light pieces thrown out to take it in flank at the same time, 
will always be advantageous. A direct and flank fire was 
employed with success by Kleist against the column of 
Ney at the battle of Bautzen ; the French marshal was 
forced to change his direction. 

Batteries should always be well secured on the flanks, 
and constantly sustained by infantry or cavalry. If at- 
tacked by cavalry, the artillery should keep up its fire as 
long as possible, first with ball, and then with grape when 
the enemy arrives within a suitable distance. The same 
rule will apply to attacks of infantry, except that the fire 
of solid shot at a great distance is much less eflective than 
against mounted troops. 

The engineer troops are employed on the field of battle 
principally by detachments, acting as auxiliaries to the 
other arms. Each regiment -of infantry should have a de- 
tachment of sappers armed with axes to act as pioneers, 
for the removal of obstacles that may impede its advance. 
These sappers are of the utmost importance, for without 
them an entire column might be checked and thrown into 
confusion by impediments which a few sappers with their 
axes would remove in a very short time. Detachments of 
engineer troops must also act in concert with the cavalry 
and artillery for the same purpose as above. In establish' 
ing the batteries of artillery, in opening roads for their ma- 
noeuvres, and in arranging material obstacles for their de- 
fence, the axes, picks, and shovels of the sappers are of 



130 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

infinite value. Field-works, bridges, and bridge-defences, 
frequently have a decisive influence upon the result of a 
battle, but as these are usually arranged previous to the ac- 
tion, they will be discussed in another place. In the at- 
tack and defence of these field-works, the engineer troops 
play a distinguished part. The consideration of this part 
of the subject, though perhaps properly belonging to 
the tactics of battles, will also be postponed to another 
occasion. 

We will now discuss the employment of the combined 
arms on the field of battle. 

Before the French Revolution, all the infantry, formed 
by regiments and brigades, was united in a single body 
and drawn up in two lines. The cavalry was placed on 
the two flanks, and the artillery distributed along the en- 
tire line. In moving by wings, they formed four columns, 
two of cavalry and two of infantry : in moving by a flank, 
they formed only two very long colunms ; the cavalry, 
however, sometimes formed a third and separate column 
in flank movements, but this disposition was rarely made. 

The French Revolution introduced the system of grand 
divisions composed of the four arms combined ; each di- 
vision moved separately and independently of the other. 
In the wars of the Empire, Napoleon united two or more 
of these divisions into a corps d'armee, which formed a 
wing, the centre, or reserve of his grand army. In addition 
to these divisions and corps d''armee, he had large reserves 
of cavalry and artillery, which were employed as distinct 
and separate anns. 

If the forces be sufficiently numerous to fight by corps 
d^armee^ each corps should have its own reserve, inde- 
pendent of the general reserve of the army. Again, if the 
forces be so small as to act by grand divisions only, each 
division should then have its separate reserve. 

An army, whether composed of separate corps or of 



TACTICS. 131 

grand divisions, usually forms, on the jfield of battle, a cen- 
tre, two wings, and a reserve. Each corps or division 
acts by itself, with its infantry, cavalry, artillery, and en- 
gineer troops. The reserve of cavalry may be formed in 
rear of the centre or one of the wings. In small forces 
of fifty or sixty thousand men, the cavalry may act with 
advantage on the wings, in the manner of the ancients. 
If the reserve of this arm be large enough to form three 
separate bodies, it may itself Yery properly be formed into 
a centre and wings. If it be formed into two columns 
only, they may be placed in rear of the openings between 
the centre and the wings of the main force. The reserve 
of artillery is employed either to reinforce the centre or 
a wing, and in the defensive is frequently distributed 
throughout the whole line of battle. In offensive opera- 
tions, it may be well to concentrate as much fire as possi- 
ble on the intended point of attack. The mounted artil- 
lery either acts in concert with the cavalry, or is used to 
reinforce that arm ; the light- foot acts with the infantry, 
and the batteries of heavy calibre are distributed along 
the line, or concentrated on some important point where 
their fire may be most eflectual. They reach the enemy's 
forces at a distance, and arrest the impulsion of his attack. 
They may also be employed to draw the fire of his artil- 
lery ; but their movements are too slow and difficult for a 
reserve. 

The order of succession in which the different arms 
are engaged in a battle, depends upon the nature of the 
ground and other accidental circumstances, and cannot be 
determined by any fixed rules. The following, however, 
is most frequently employed, and in ordinary cases may 
be deemed good. 

The attack is first opened by a cannonade ; light troops 
are sent forward to annoy the enemy, and, if possible, to 
pick off his artillerists. The main body then advances in 



188 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

two lines : the first displays itself in line as it arrives 
nearly within the range of grape-shot; the second line re- 
mains in columns of attack formed of battalions by division, 
at a distance from the first sufficient to be beyond the 
reach of the enemy's musketry, but near enough to sup- 
port the first line, or to cover it, if driven back. The 
artillery, in the mean time, concentrates its fire on some 
weak point. to open a way for the reserve, which rushes 
into the opening and takes the enemy in flank and rear. 
The cavalry charges at the opportune moment on the 
flank of the enemy's columns or penetrates an opening in 
his line, and cutting to pieces his staggered troops, forces 
them into retreat, and completes the victory. During this 
time the whole line of the enemy should be kept occupied, 
so as to prevent fresh troops from being concentrated on 
the threatened point. 

The following maxims on battles may be studied with 
advantage: — 1st. General battles are not to be fought but 
imder the occurrence of one of the following circum- 
stances : when you are, from any cause, decidedly supe- 
rior to the enemy ; when he is on the point of receiving 
reinforcements, which will materially effect your relative 
strength ; when, if not beaten or checked, he will deprive 
you of supplies or reinforcements, necessary to the con- 
tinuance or success of your operations ; and, generally, 
when the advantage of winning the battle will be greater 
than the disadvantage of losing it. 

2d. Whatever may be your reason for risking a general 
battle, you ought to regard as indispensable preliminaries, 
— a thorough knowledge of the ground on which you are to 
act ; an ample supply of ammunition ; the most perfect 
order in your fire-arms ; hospital dep5ts regularly estab- 
lished, with surgeons, nurses, dressings, &c., sufficient 
for the accommodation of the wounded ; points of ren- 
dezvous established and known to the commanders of 



TACTICS. 133 

corps ; and an entire possession of the passes in your 
own rear. 

3d. The battle being fought and won, the victory must 
be followed up with as much alacrity and vigor, as though 
nothing had been gained, — a maxim very difficult of ob- 
servance, (from the momentary disobedience which per- 
vades all troops flushed with conquest,) but with which 
an able general will never dispense. No one knew better 
the use of this maxim than Napoleon, and no one was a 
more strict and habitual observer of it. 

4th. The battle being fought and lost, it is your first 
duty to do away the moral effect of defeat, — the want of 
that self-respect and self-confidence, which are its imme- 
diate followers, and which, so long as they last, are the 
most powerful auxiliaries of your enemy. It is scarcely 
necessary to remark that, to efifect this object, — to re- 
inspire a beaten army with hope, and to reassure it of 
victory, — we must not turn our backs on an enemy, without 
sometimes presenting to him our front also ; — we must not 
confide our safety to mere flight, but adopt such measures 
as shall convince him that though wounded and overpow- 
ered, we are neither disabled nor dismayed ; and that we 
still possess enough both of strength and spirit to punish 
his faults, should he commit any. Do you operate in a 
covered or mountainous country? — avail yourself of its 
ridges and woods ; for by doing so you will best evade 
the pressure of his cavalry. Have you defiles or villages 
to pass ? — seize the heads of these, defend them obsti- 
nately, and make a show of fighting another battle. In a 
word, let no error of your enemy, nor any favorable inci- 
dent of the ground, escape your notice or your use. It is 
by these means that your enemy is checked, and your 
troops inspirited ; and it was by these that Frederick 
balanced his surprise at Hohenkirchen, and the defeat of 
his plans before Olmutz. The movement of our own 

12 



134 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

Washington, after losing the battle of Brandywine, was 
of this character. He hastily recrossed the Schuylkill 
with the professed intention of seeking the enemy and 
renewing the combat, which was apparently prevented 
only by a heavy and incessant fall of rain. A rumor was 
now raised that the enemy, while refusing his left wing, 
was rapidly advancing upon his right, to intercept our 
passage of the river, and thus gain possession of Phil- 
adelphia. This report justified a retreat, which drew 
from the General repeated assurances, that in quitting his 
present position and giving to his march a retrograde di- 
rection, it was not his object to avoid, but to follow and 
to fight the enemy. This movement, though no battle 
ensued, had the effect of restoring the confidence as well 
of the people as of the army.* 

* There are innumerable works in almost every language on ele- 
mentary tactics ; very few persons, however, care to read any thing 
further than the manuals used in our own service. Our system of 
infantry, cavalry, and artillery tactics is generally taken from the 
French ; and also the course of engineer instruction, so far as matured, 
for sappers, miners, and pontoniers, is based on the French manuals 
for the varied duties of this arm. 

On Grand Tactics, or Tactics of Battles, the military and historical 
writings of General Jomini abound in most valuable instructions. Na- 
poleon's memoirs, and the writings of Rocquancourt, Hoyer, Decker, 
OkounefF, Rogniat, Jocquinot-de-Presle, Guibert, Duhesme, Gas- 
Bendi, Warnery, Baron Bohan, Lindneau, Maiseroy, Miller, and Ter- 
nay, are considered as bemg among the best authorities. 



MILITARY POLITY. 135 



CHAPTER VI. 

MILITARY POLITY AND THE MEANS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE. 

Military Polity, — In deciding upon a resort to arms, 
statesmen are guided by certain general rules which have 
been tacitly adopted in the intercourse of nations : so also 
both statesmen and generals are bound by rules similarly 
adopted for the conduct of hostile forces while actually 
engaged in military operations. 

In all differences between nations, each state has a right 
to decide for itself upon the nature of its means of redress 
for injuries received. Previous to declaring open and 
public war, it may resort to some other forcible means of 
redress, short of actual war. These are : — 

1st. Laying an embargo upon the property of the of- 
fending nation. 

2d. Taking forcible possession of the territory or prop- 
erty in dispute. 

3d. Resorting to some direct measure of retaliation. 

4th. Making reprisals upon the persons and things of 
the offending nation. 

It is not the present purpose to discuss these several 
means of redress, nor even to enter into any examination 
of the rights and laws of public war, when actually de- 
clared ; it is intended to consider here merely such mili- 
tary combinations as are resorted to by the state in prep- 
aration for defence, or in carrying on the actual operations 
of a war. 

In commencing hostilities against any other power, we 
must evidently take into consideration all the political and 



136 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

physical circumstances of the people with whom we are 
to contend : we must regard their general character for 
courage and love of country ; their attachment to their 
government and political institutions ; the character of their 
rulers and their generals ; the numbers, organization, and 
discipline of their armies ; and particularly the relations 
between the civil and military authorities in the state, for 
if the latter be made entirely subordinate, we may very 
safely calculate on erroneous combinations. We must 
also regard their passive means of resistance, such as 
their system of fortifications, their military materials and 
munitions, their statistics of agriculture, commerce, and 
manufactures, and especially the geographical position and 
physical features of their country. No government can 
neglect, with impunity, these considerations in its prepar- 
ations for war, or in its manner of conducting military 
operations. 

Napoleon's system of carrying on war against the weak, 
effeminate, and disorganized Italians required many modi- 
fications when directed against the great military power 
of Russia. Moreover, the combinations of Eylau and 
Friedland were inapplicable to the contest with the mad- 
dened guerrillas of Minos, animated by the combined 
passions of hatred, patriotism, and religious enthusiasm. 

Military power may be regarded either as absolute or 
relative : the absolute force of a state depending on the 
number of its inhabitants and the extent of its revenues ; 
the relative force, on its geographical and political posi- 
tion, the character of its people, and the nature of its 
government. Its military preparations should evidently 
be in proportion to its resources. Wealth constitutes both 
the apprehension and the incentive to invasion. Where 
two or more states have equal means of war, with incen- 
tives very unequal, an equilibrium cannot exist ; for dan- 
ger and temptation are no longer opposed to each other. 



MILITARY POLITY. 137 

The preparation of states may, therefore, be equal with- 
out being equivalent, and the smaller of the two may be 
most liable to be drawn into a war without the means of 
sustaining it. 

The numerical relation between the entire population 
of a state, and the armed forces which it can maintain, 
must evidently vary with the wealth and pursuits of the 
people. Adam Smith thinks that a country purely agri- 
cultural may, at certain seasons, furnish for war one-fifth, 
or even in case of necessity one-fourth, of its entire popu- 
lation. A commercial or manufacturing coimtry would be 
unable to furnish any thing like so numerous a military 
force. On this account small agricultural states are some- 
times able to bring into the field much larger armies than 
their more powerful neighbors. During the Seven Years' 
War, Frederick supported an army equal to one-twentieth 
of the entire Prussian population, and at the close of this 
memorable contest one-sixth of the males capable of bear- 
ing arms had actually perished on the field of battle. 

But the number of troops that may be brought into the 
field in times of great emergency is, of course, much 
greater than can be supported during a long war, or as a 
part of a permanent military establishment. Montesquieu 
estimates that modern nations are capable of supporting, 
without endangering their power, a permanent military 
force of about one-hundredth part of their population. 
This ratio differs but little from that of the present mili- 
tary establishments of the great European powers. 

Great Britain, with a population of about twenty-five 
millions, and a general budget of $250,000,000, supports 
a military and naval force of about 150,000 effective and 
100,000 non-efiective men, 250,000 in all, at an annual 
expense of from seventy to eighty millions of dollars. 

Russia, with a population of about seventy millions, 
supports an active army of 632,000 men, with an im- 

12* 



138 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

mense reserve, at an expense of about $65,000,000, out 
of a general budget of $90,000,000 ; that is, the expense 
of her military establishment is to her whole budget as 7 
to 10. 

Austria, with a population of thirty-five millions, has an 
organized peace establishment of 370,000, (about 250,000 
in active service,) and a reserve of 260,000, at an ex- 
pense of $36,000,000, out of a general budget of 
$100,000,000. 

Prussia, with a population of about fifteen millions, has 
from 100,000 to 120,000 men in arms, with a reserve of 
200,000, at an annual expense of more than $18,000,000, 
out of a general budget of about $38,000,000. 

France, with a population of near thirty-five millions, 
supports a permanent establishment of about 350,000 
men, at an expense of seventy or eighty millions of dol- 
lars, out of a total budget of $280,000,000. France has 
long supported a permanent military force of from one- 
hundredth to one hundred-and-tenth of her population, at 
an expense of from one-fourth to one-fifth of her whole 
budget. The following table, copied from the " Specta- 
teur Militaire," shows the state of the army at six differ- 
ent periods between 1788 and 1842. It omits, of course, 
the extraordinary levies of the wars of the Revolution 
and of the Empire. 



MILITARY POLITY. 

Table, 



139 



Dates. 


Population. 


Budget. 


Army. 




Of State. 


Of the Ar- 
my. 


Peace 
Estab. 


War 
Estab. 


Remarks. 


1788 
1814 
1823 

1830 
1840 
1842 


24,000,000 
28,000,000 
31,000,000 

32,000,000 
34,000,000 
35,000,000 


Livres. 
500,000,000 

Francs. 
800,000,000 

900,000,000 

1,000,000,000 
1,170,000,000 
1,200,000,000 


Livres. 
100,000,000 

Francs. 
180,000,000 

200,000,000 

220,000,000 
242,000,000 
285,000,000 


Men. 
180,000 

255,000 
280,000 

312,000 
312,000 
370,000 


Men. 
360,000 

340,000 
390,000 

500,000 
520,000 


5 Ordinance 
\ of 1814. 
( Report of 

< Minister 
I of War. 

( Rei)ort of 

< Minister 
( of War. 

$ Budget of 
I 1840. 
( Estimated 

< Expenses 
( of 1842. 



From these data we see that the great European powers 
at the present day maintain, in time of peace, military es- 
tablishments equal to about one-hundredth part of their 
entire population. 

The geographical position of a country also greatly in- 
fluences the degree and character of its military prepar- 
ation. It may be bordered on one or more sides by 
mountains and other obstacles calculated to diminish the 
probability of invasion ; or the whole frontier may be wide 
open to an attack : the interior may be of such a nature as 
to furnish security to its own army, and yet be fatal to the 
enemy should he occupy it ; or it may furnish him advan- 
tages far superior to his own country. It may be an island 
in the sea, and consequently exposed only to maritime de- 
scents — events of rare occurrence in modern times. 

Again, a nation may be placed between others who are 
interested in its security, their mutual jealousy preventing 
the molestation of the weaker neighbor. On the other 
hand, its political institutions may be such as to compel 



140 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

the Others to unite in attacking it in order to secure them- 
selves. The republics of Switzerland could remain un- 
molested in the midst of powerful monarchies ; but revolu- 
tionary France brought upon herself the armies of all 
Europe. 

Climate has also some influence upon military charac- 
ter, but this influence is far less than that of education and 
discipline. Northern nations are said to be naturally more 
phlegmatic and sluggish than those of warmer climates ; 
and yet the armies of Gustavus Adolphus, Charles XII., 
and Suwarrow, have shown themselves suflSciently active 
and impetuous, while the Greeks, Romans, and Spaniards, 
in the times of their glory, were patient, disciplined, and 
indefatigable, notwithstanding the reputed fickleness of 
ardent temperaments. 

For any nation to postpone the making of military prep- 
arations till such time as they are actually required in 
defence, is to waste the public money, and endanger the 
public safety. The closing of an avenue of approach, the 
security of a single road or river, or even the strategic 
movement of a small body of troops, often effects, in the 
beginning, w4iat afterwards cannot be accomplished by 
large fortifications, and the most formidable armies. Had 
a small army in 1812, with a well-fortified depjt on Lake 
Champlain, penetrated into Canada, and cut ofl' all rein- 
forcements and supplies by way of Quebec, that country 
would inevitably have fallen into our possession. In the 
winter of 1806-7, Napoleon crossed the Vistula, and ad- 
vanced even to the walls of Konigsberg, with the x\us- 
trians in his rear, and the whole power of Russia before 
him. If Austria had pushed forward one hundred thou- 
sand men from Bohemia, on the Oder, she would, in all 
probability, says the best of military judges, Jomini, have 
struck a fatal blow to the operations of Napoleon, and his 
army must have been exceedingly fortunate even to regain 



MILITARY POLITY. 141 

the Rhine. But Austria preferred remaining neutral till 
she could increase her army to four hundred thousand men. 
She then took the offensive, and was beaten ; whereas, 
with one hundred thousand men brought into action at the 
favorable moment, she might, most probably, have decided 
the fate of Europe. 

" Defensive war," says Napoleon, " does not preclude 
attack, any more than offensive war is exclusive of de- 
fence," for frequently the best way to counteract the ene- 
my's operations, and prevent his conquests, is, at the very 
outset of the war, to invade and cripple him. But this 
can never be attempted with raw troops, ill supplied with 
the munitions of war, and unsupported by fortifications. 
Such-invasions must necessarily fail. Experience in the 
wars of the French revolution has demonstrated this ; and 
even our own short history is not without its proof. In 
1812, the conquest of Canada was determined on some 
time before the declaration of war ; an undisciplined army, 
without preparation or apparent plan, was actually put in 
motion, eighteen days previous to this declaration, for the 
Canadian peninsula. With a disciplined army of the same 
numbers, with an efficient and skilful leader, directed 
against the vital point of the British possessions at a time 
when the whole military force of the provinces did not 
exceed three thousand men, how different had been the 
result ! 

While, therefore, the permanent defences of a nation 
must be subordinate to its resources, position, and charac- 
ter, they can in no case be dispensed with. No matter 
how extensive or important the temporary means that 
may be developed as necessity requires, there must be 
some force kept in a constant state of efficiency, in order 
to impart life and stability to the system. The one can 
never properly replace the other ; for while the formej 
constitutes the basis, the latter must form the main body 



142 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

of the military edifice, which, by its strength and durabili- 
ty, will offer shelter and protection to the nation ; or, if 
the architecture and materials be defective, crush and de- 
stroy it in its fall. 

The permanent means of military defence employed by 
modern nations, are — 

1st. An army; 2d. A navy ; 3d. Fortifications. 

The first two of these could hardly be called permanent, 
if we were to regard their personnel; but looking upon 
them as institutions or organizations, they present all the 
characteristics of durability. They are sometimes sub- 
jected to very great and radical changes ; by the hot-house 
nursing of designing ambition or rash legislation, they 
may become overgrown and dangerous, or the storms of 
popular delusion may overthrow and apparently sweep 
them away. But they will immediately spring up again 
in some form or other, so deeply are they rooted in the 
organization of political institutions. 

Its army and navy should always be kept within the 
limits of a nation's wants ; but pity for the country which 
reduces them in number or support so as to degrade their 
character or endanger their organization. " A govern- 
ment," says one of the best historians of the age, *' which 
neglects its army, under whatever pretext, is a govern- 
ment culpable in the eyes of posterity, for it is preparing 
humiliations for its flag and its country, instead of laying 
the foundation for its glory." 

One of our own distinguished cabinet ministers remarks, 
that the history of our relations with the Indian tribes from 
the beginning to the present hour, is one continued proof 
of the necessity of maintaining an efficient military force 
in time of peace, and that the treatment we received for a 
long series of years from European powers, was a most 
humiliating illustration of the folly of attempting to dis- 
pense with these means of defence. 



MILITARY POLITY. 143 

" Twice," says he, " we were compelled to maintain, 
by open war, our quarrel with the principal aggressors. 
After many years of forbearance and negotiation, our 
claims in other cases were at length amicably settled ; 
but in one of the most noted of these cases, it was not 
without much delay and imminent hazard of war that the 
execution of the treaty was finally enforced. No one ac- 
quainted with these portions of our history, can hesitate 
to ascribe much of the wantonness and duration of the 
wrongs we endured, to a knowledge on the part of our 
assailants of the scantiness and inefficiency of our military 
and naval force. 

" If," said Mr. Calhoun, " disregarding the sound dic- 
tates of reason and experience, we, in peace, neglect our 
military establishment, we must, with a powerful and skil- 
ful enemy, be exposed to the most distressing calamities." 

These remarks were made in opposition to the reduc- 
tion of our military establishment, in 1821, below the 
standard of thirteen thousand. Nevertheless, the force 
was reduced to about six or seven thousand ; and we were 
soon made to feel the consequences. It is stated, in a re- 
port of high authority, that if there had been two regi- 
ments available near St. Louis, in 1832, the war with 
Black Hawk would have been easily avoided ; and that it 
cannot be doubted that the scenes of devastation and sav- 
age warfare which overspread the Floridas for nearly 
seven years would also have been avoided, and some 
thirty millions have been saved the country, if two regi- 
ments had been available at the beginning of that con- 
flict.* 

* We may now add to these remarks, that if our government had 
occupied the country between the Nueces and the Rio Grande with a 
well-organized army of twelve thousand men, war with Mexico might 
have been avoided ; but to push forward upon Matamoras a small 
force of only two thousand, in the very face of a large Mexican army 



144 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

We must, in this country, if we heed either the dictates 
of reason or experience, maintain in time of peace a skele- 
ton military and naval force, capable of being greatly ex- 
panded, in the event of danger, by the addition of new- 
troops. 

Much energy and enterprise will always be imparted to 
an army or navy by the addition of new forces. The 
strength thus acquired is sometimes in even a far greater 
ratio than the increase of numbers. But it must be re- 
membered that these new elements are, of themselves, far 
inferior to the old ones in discipline, steady courage, and 
perseverance. No general can rely on the accuracy of 
their movements in the operations of a campaign, and 
they are exceedingly apt to fail him at the critical moment 
on the field of battle. The same holds true with respect 
to sailors inexperienced in the discipline and duties of a 
man-of-war. There is this difference, however : an army 
usually obtains its recruits from men totally unacquainted 
with military life, while a navy, in case of sudden in- 
crease, is mainly supplied from the merchant marine with 
professional sailors, who, though unacquainted with the 
use of artillery, &c., on ship-board, are familiar with all 
the other duties of sea life, and not unused to discipline. 
Moreover, raw seamen and marines, from being under the 
immediate eye of their officers in time of action, and Avith- 
out the possibility of escape, fight much better than troops 
of the same character on land. If years are requisite to 
make a good sailor, surely an equal length of time is 
necessary to perfect the soldier ; and no less skill, prac- 
tice, and professional study are required for the proper 
direction of armies than for the management of fleets. 

was holding out to them the strongest inducements to attack us. The 
temporary economy of a few thousands in reducing our military estab- 
lishment to a mere handful of men, again results in a necessary ex- 
penditure of many millions of dollars and a large sacrifice of humau life. 



MILITARY POLITY. 146 

But some have said that even these skeletons of mili- 
tary and naval forces are entirely superfluous, and that a 
brave and patriotic people will make as good a defence 
against invasion as the most disciplined and experienced. 
Such views are frequently urged in the halls of congress, 
and some have even attempted to confirm them by histori- 
cal examples. 

There are instances, it is true, where disorganized and 
frantic masses, animated by patriotic enthusiasm, have 
gained the most brilliant victories. Here, however, ex- 
traordinary circumstances supplied the place of order, and 
produced an equilibrium between forces that otherwise 
would have been very unequal ; but in almost every in- 
stance of this kind, the loss of the undisciplined army has 
been unnecessarily great, human life being substituted for 
skill and order. But victory, even with such a drawback, 
cannot often attend the banners of newly raised and disor- 
derly forces. If the captam and crew of a steamship knew 
nothing of navigation, and had never been at sea, and the 
engineer was totally unacquainted with his profession, 
could we expect the ship to cross the Atlantic in safety, 
and reach her destined port ? Would we trust our lives 
and the honor of our country to their care ? Would we 
not say to them, " First make yourselves acquainted with 
the principles of your profession, the use of the compass, 
and the means of determining whether you direct your 
course upon a ledge of rocks or into a safe harbor ?" War 
is not, as some seem to suppose, a mere game of chance. 
Its principles constitute one of the most intricate of mod- 
ern sciences ; and the general who understands the art of 
rightly applying its rules, and possesses the means of car- 
rying out its precepts, may be morally certain of success. 

History furnishes abundant proofs of the impolicy of re- 
lying upon undisciplined forces in the open field. Almost 
every page of Napier's classic History of the Peninsular 

13 



146 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

War contains striking examples of the useless waste of 
human life and property by the Spanish militia ; while, 
with one quarter as many regulars, at a small fractional 
part of the actual expense, the French might have been 
expelled at the outset, or have been driven, at any time 
afterwards, from the Peninsula. 

At the beginning of the French Revolution the regular 
army was abolished, and the citizen-soldiery, who were 
established on the 14th of July, 1789, relied on exclusively 
for the national defence. "But these three millions of 
national guards," says Jomini, "though good supporters of 
the decrees of the assembly, w^ere nevertheless useless for 
reinforcing the anny beyond the frontiers, and utterly in- 
capable of defending their own firesides." Yet no one can 
question their individual bravery and patriotism ; for, when 
reorganized, disciplined, and properly directed, they put 
to flight the best troops in Europe. At the first outbreak 
of this revolution, the privileged classes of other countries, 
upholding crumbling institutions and rotten dynasties, 
rushed forth against the maddened hordes of French de- 
mocracy. The popular power, springing upward by its 
own elasticity when the weight of political oppression was 
removed, soon became too wild and reckless to establish 
itself on any sure basis, or even to provide for its own pro- 
tection. If the attacks of the enervated enemies of France 
were weak, so also were her own efforts feeble to resist 
these attacks. The republican armies repelled the ill- 
planned and ill-conducted invasion by the Duke of Bruns- 
wick ; but it was by the substitution of human life for prep- 
aration, system, and skill ; enthusiasm supplied the place 
of discipline ; robbery produced military stores ; and the 
dead bodies of her citizens formed epaulements against the 
enemy. Yet this was but the strength of weakness ; the 
aimless struggle of a broken and disjointed government; 
and the new revolutionary power was fast sinking away 



MILITARY POLITY. 147 

before the combined opposition of Europe, when the gi-eat 
genius of Napoleon, with a strong arm and iron rule, seiz- 
ing upon the scattered fragments, and binding them to- 
gether into one consolidated mass, made France victorious, 
and seated himself on the throne of empire. 

No people in the world ever exhibited a more general 
and enthusiastic patriotism than the Americans during the 
war of our own Revolution. And yet our army received, 
even at that time, but little support from irregular and 
militia forces in the open field. Washington's opinions 
on this subject furnish so striking a contrast to the con- 
gressional speeches of modern political demagogues, who, 
with boastful swaggers, would fain persuade us that we 
require no organization or discipline to meet the veteran 
troops of Europe in the open field, and who would hurry 
us, without preparation, into war with the strongest mili- 
tary powers of the world — so striking is the contrast be- 
tween the assertions of these men and the letters and re- 
ports of Washington, that it may be well for the cool and 
dispassionate lover of truth to occasionally refresh his 
memory by reference to the writings of Washington. 
The following brief extracts are from his letters to the 
President of Congress, December, 1776 : 

" The saving in the article of clothing, provisions, and 
a thousand other things, by having nothing to do with the 
militia, unless in cases of extraordinary exigency, and 
such as could not be expected in the common course of 
events, would amply support a large army, which, well 
officered, would be daily improving, instead of continuing 
a destructive, expensive, and disorderly mob. In my 
opinion, if any dependence is placed on the militia another 
year, Congress will be deceived. When danger is a little 
removed from them they will not turn out at all. When 
it comes home to them, the well-affected, instead of flying 
to arms to defend themselves, are busily employed in re- 



148 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

moving their families and effects ; while the disaffected 
are concerting measures to make their submission, and 
spread terror and dismay all around, to induce others to 
follow their example. Daily experience and abundant 
proofs warrant this information. Short enlistments, and a 
mistaken dependence upon our militia, have been the ori- 
gin of all our misfortunes, and the great accumulation of 
our debt. The militia come in, you cannot tell how ; go, 
you cannot tell when ; and act, you cannot tell where ; 
consume your provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave 
you at last, at a critical moment." 

These remarks of Washington will not be found too se- 
vere if we remember the conduct of our militia in the open 
field at Princeton, Savannah River, Camden, Guilford 
Court-House, &c., in the war of the Revolution ; the 
great cost of the Avar of 1812 as compared with its milita- 
ry results ; the refusal of the New England militia to 
march beyond the lines of their own states, and of the 
New-York militia to cross the Niagara and secure a vic- 
tory already won ; or the disgraceful flight of the Southern 
militia from the field of Bladensburg. 

But there is another side to this picture. If our militia 
have frequently failed to maintain their ground when drawn 
up in the open field, we can point with pride to their brave and 
successful defence of Charleston, Mobile, New Orleans, 
Fort JVPHenry, Stonington, Niagara, Plattsburg, in proof 
of what may be accomplished by militia in connection with 
fortifications. 

These examples from our history must fully demonstrate 
the great value of a militia when properly employed as a de- 
fence against invasion, and ought to silence the sneers of 
those who would abolish this arm of defence as utterly use- 
less. In the open field militia cannot in general be manoeu- 
vred to advantage ; whereas, in the defence of fortified places, 
their superior intelligence and activity not unfrequently ren- 



MEANS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE. 149 

der them even more valuable than regulars. And in reading 
the severe strictures of Washington, Greene, Morgan, and 
others, upon our militia, it must be remembered that they 
were at that time entirely destitute of important works of 
defence ; and the experience of all other nations, as well 
as our own, has abundantly shown that a newly-raised 
force cannot cope, in the open fields with one subordinate 
and disciplined. Here science must determine the contest. 
Habits of strict obedience, and of simultaneous and united 
action, are indispensable to carry out what the higher 
principles of the military profession require. New and 
undisciplined forces are often confounded at the evolutions, 
and strategic and tactical combinations of a regular army, 
and lose all confidence in their leaders and in themselves. 
But, when placed behind a breastwork, they even over- 
rate their security. They can then coolly look upon the 
approaching columns, and, unmoved by glittering armor 
and bristling bayonets, will exert all their skill in the use 
of their weapons. The superior accuracy of aim which 
the American has obtained by practice from his early 
youth, has enabled our militia to gain, under the protection 
of military works, victories as brilliant as the most veteran 
troops. The moral courage necessary to await an attack 
behind a parapet, is at least equal to that exerted in the 
open field, where movements generally determine the vic- 
tory. To watch the approach of an enemy, to see him 
move up and display his massive columns, his long array 
of military equipments, his fascines and scaling-ladders, 
his instruments of attack, and the professional skill with 
which he wields them, to hear the thunder of his batteries, 
spreading death all around, and to repel, hand to hand, 
those tremendous assaults, which stand out in all their 
horrible relief upon the canvass of modern warfare, re- 
quires a heart at least as brave as the professional war- 
rior exhibits in the pitched battle. 

13* 



150 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

But we must not forget that to call this force into the 
open field, — to take the mechanic from his shop, the mer- 
chant from his counter, the farmer from his plough, — will 
necessarily be attended with an immense sacrifice of 
human life. The lives lost on the battle-field are not the 
only ones ; militia, being unaccustomed to exposure, and 
unable to supply their own wants with certainty and regu- 
larity, contract diseases which occasion in every cam- 
paign a most frightful mortality. 

There is also a vast difference in the cost of support- 
ing regulars and militia forces. The cost of a regular 
army of twenty thousand men for a campaign of six 
months, in this country, has been estimated, from data in 
the War-office, at a hundred and fifty dollars per man ; 
while the cost of a militia force, under the same circum- 
stances, making allowance for the difference in the ex- 
penses from sickness, waste of camp-furniture, equip- 
ments, &c., will be two hundred and fifty dollars per 
man. But in short campaigns, and in irregular warfare, 
like the expedition against Black Hawk and his Indians 
in the Northwest, and during the hostilities in Florida, 
" the expenses of the militia,*' says Mr. Secretary Spen- 
cer, in a report to congress in 1842, " invariably exceed 
those of regulars by at least three hundred per centP It is 
further stated that ^'' fifty -jive thousand militia were called 
into service during the Black Hawk and Florida wars, 
and that thirty millions of dollars have been expended in 
these conflicts /" When it is remembered that during these 
border wars our whole regular army did not exceed 
twelve or thirteen thousand men, it will not be difficult to 
perceive why our military establishment was so enor- 
mously expensive. Large sums were paid to sedentary 
militia who never rendered the slightest service. Again, 
during our late war with Great Britain, of less than three 
years' duration, two hundred and eighty thousand muskets 



MEANS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE. 151 

were lost, — the average cost of which is stated at twelve 
dollars, — making an aggregate loss, in muskets alone, of 
three millions and tlirce hundred and sixty thousand dollars, 
during a service of about two years and a half; — result- 
ing mainly from that neglect and waste of public property 
which almost invariably attends the movements of newly- 
raised and inexperienced forces. Facts like these should 
awaken us to the necessity of reorganizing and disci- 
plining our militia. General Knox, when Secretary of 
War, General Harrison while in the senate, and Mr. 
Poinsett in 1841, each furnished plans for effecting this 
purpose, but the whole subject has been passed by with 
neglect. 

Permanent fortifications differ in many of their features 
from either of the two preceding elements of national 
defence. They are passive in their nature, yet possess 
all the conservative properties of an army or navy, and 
through these two contribute largely to the active opera- 
tions of a campaign. When once constructed they re- 
quire but very little expenditure for their support. In time 
of peace they withdraw no valuable citizens from the 
useful occupations of life. Of themselves they can never 
exert an influence corrupting to public morals, or danger- 
ous to public liberty ; but as the means of preserving 
peace, and as obstacles to an invader, their influence and 
power are immense. While contributing to the economi- 
cal support of a peace establishment, by furnisliing drill- 
grounds, parades, quarters, &c. ; and to its efficiency still 
more, by affording facilities both to the regulars and mi- 
litia for that species of artillery practice so necessary in 
the defence of water frontiers ; they also serve as safe 
depots of arms and the immense quantity of materials and 
military munitions so indispensable in modern warfare. 
These munitions usually require much time, skill, and 
expense in their construction, and it is of vast import- 



152 MILITARY AUT AND SCIENCE, 

ance that they should be preserved with the utmost 
care. 

Maritime arsenals and depots of naval and military 
stores on the sea-coast are more particularly exposed to 
capture and destruction. Here an enemy can approach 
by stealth, striking some sudden and fatal blow before 
any effectual resistance can be organized. But in addi- 
tion to the security afforded by harbor fortifications to 
public property of the highest military value, they also 
serve to protect the merchant shipping, and the vast 
amount of private wealth which a commercial people al- 
ways collect at these points. They furnish safe retreats, 
and the means of repair for public vessels injured in bat- 
tle, or by storms, and to merchantmen a refuge from the 
dangers of sea, or the threats of hostile fleets. Moreover, 
they greatly facilitate our naval attacks upon the enemy's 
shipping ; and if he attempt a descent, their well-directed 
fire will repel his squadrons from our harbors, and force 
his troops to land at some distant and unfavorable position. 

The three means of permanent defence which have 
been mentioned, are, of course, intended to accomplish 
the same general object ; but each has its distinct and 
proper sphere of action, and neither can be regarded as 
antagonistical to the others. Any undue increase of one, 
at the expense of the other two, must necessarily be fol- 
lowed by a corresponding diminution of national strength. 
We must not infer, however, that all must be maintained 
upon the same footing. The position of the country and 
the character of the people must determine this. 

England, from her insular position and the extent of 
her commerce, must maintain a large navy ; a large army 
is also necessary for the defence of her ovm coasts and 
the protection of her colonial possessions. Her men-of- 
war secure a safe passage for her merchant-vessels, and 
transport her troops in safety through all seas, and thus 



MEANS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE. 153 

contribute much to the acquisition and security of colonial 
territory. The military forces of the British empire 
amount to about one hundred and fifty thousand men, and 
the naval forces to about seven hundred vessels of war,* 
carrying in all some fifteen thousand guns and forty thou- 
sand men. France has less commerce, and but few colo- 
nial possessions. She has a great extent of seacoast, but 
her fortifications secure it from maritime descents ; her 
only accessible points are on the land frontiers. Her 
army and navy, therefore, constitute her principal means 
of defence. Her army numbers some three hundred and 
fifty thousand men, and her navy about three hundred and 
fifty vessels,* carrying about nine thousand guns and thirty 
thousand men. Russia, Austria, Prussia, Sweden, and 
other continental powers, have but little commerce to be 
protected, while their extensive frontiers are greatly ex- 
posed to land attacks : their fortifications and armies, 
therefore, constitute their principal means of defence. 
But for the protection of their own seas from the inroads 
of their powerful maritime neighbor, Russia and Austria 
support naval establishments of a limited extent. Russia 
has, in all, some one hundred and eighty vessels of war, 
and Austria not quite half that number.* 

The United States possess no colonies ; but they have 
a seacoast of more than three thousand miles, with numer- 
ous bays, estuaries, and navigable rivers, which expose 
our most populous cities to maritime attacks. The north- 
ern land frontier is two thousand miles in extent, and in 
the west our territory borders upon the British and Mexi- 
can possessions for many thousand miles more. Within 
these limits there are numerous tribes of Indians, who re- 
quire the watchful care of armed forces to keep them at 
peace among themselves as well as with us. Our author- 

* These numbers include all vessels of war, whether in commission, 
building, or in ordinary. 



154 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

ized military establishment amounts to 7,590 men, and 
our naval establishment consists of seventy-seven vessels 
of all classes, carrying 2,345 guns, and 8,724 men.* 
This is certainly a very small military and naval force for 
the defence of so extended and populous a country, espe- 
cially one whose political institutions and rapidly-increas- 
ing power expose it to the distrust and jealousy of most 
other nations. 

The fortifications for the defence of our sea-coast and 
land frontiers will be discussed hereafter. f 

* Since these pages were put in the hands of the printer, the above 
numbers have been nearly doubled, this increase having been made 
with special reference to the present war with Mexico. 

t Jomini's work on the Military Art contains many valuable re- 
marks on this subject of Military Polity : also the writings of Clause- 
witz, Dupin, Lloyd, Chambray, Tranchant de Laverne, and Rud- 
torfer. Several of these questions are also discussed in Rocquancourt, 
Carion-Nisas, De Vernon, and other writers on military history. The 
several European Annuaires Militaires, or Army Registers, and the 
French and German military periodicals, contain much valuable mat- 
ter connected with military statistics. 



SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 155 



CHAPTER VII. 

SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 

The principal attacks which we have had to sustain, 
either as colonies or states, from civilized foes, have come 
from Canada. As colonies we were continually encoun- 
tering difficulties and dangers from the French posses- 
sions. In the war of the Revolution, it being one of na- 
tional emancipation, the military operations were more 
general throughout the several states ; but in the war of 
1812 the attacks were confined to the northern frontier 
and a few exposed points along the coast. In these two 
contests with Great Britain, Boston, New York, Philadel- 
phia, Baltimore, Washington, Charleston, Savannah, Mo- 
bile, and New Orleans, being within reach of the British 
naval power, and offering the dazzling attraction of rich 
booty, have each been subjected to powerful assaults. 

Similar attacks will undoubtedly be made in any future 
war with England. An attempt at permanent lodgment 
would be based either on Canada or a servile insurrection 
in the southern states. The former project, in a military 
point of view, offers the greatest advantages, but most 
probably the latter would also be resorted to for effecting 
a diversion, if nothing more. But for inflicting upon us a 
sudden and severe injury by the destruction of large 
amounts of public and private property, our seaport towns 
offer inducements not likely to be disregarded. This 
mode of warfare, barbarous though it be, will certainly at- 
tend a conflict with any great maritime power. How 



156 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

can we best prepare in time of peace to repel these 
attacks ? 

Immediately after the war of 1812 a joint commission 
of our most distinguished military and naval officers was 
formed, to devise a system of defensive works, to be erect- 
ed in time of peace for the security of the most important 
and the most exposed points on our sea-coast. It may be 
well here to point out, in very general terms, the positions 
and character of these works, mentioning only such as 
have been completed, or are now in course of construction, 
and such as are intended to be buih as soon as Congress 
shall grant the requisite funds. There are other works 
projected for some future period, but as they do not belong 
to the class required for immediate use, they will not be 
referred to. 

MAINE. 

Beginning at the northeastern extremity of our coast, 
we have, for Eastport and Wiscasset, projected works 
estimated to carry about fifty guns. Nothing has yet 
been done to these works. 

Next Portland, with works carrying about forty or fifty 
guns, and Fort Penobscot and batteries, carrying about 
one hundred and fifty guns. These are only partly built. 

NEW HAMPSHIRE. 

Defences of Portsmouth and the vicinity, about two 
hundred guns. These works are also only partly built. 

MASSACHUSETTS. 

Projected works east of Boston, carrying about sixty 
guns. These are not yet commenced. 

Works for defence of Boston Harbor carry about five 
hundred guns. These are nearly three-quarters completed. 
Those of New Bedford harbor carry fifty guns : not yet begun. 



SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 167 



RHODE ISLAND. 



Newport harbor, — works carry about five hundred guns, 
nearly completed. 



CONNECTICUT. 



New London harbor, New Haven, and the Connecticut 
river. The first of these nearly completed ; the two latter 
not yet begun. 



NEW YORK. 



The works projected for the defence of New York har- 
bor are estimated to carry about one thousand guns. These 
works are not yet one-half constructed. 



PENNSYLVANIA. 

The works projected for the defence of the Delaware 
Bay and Philadelphia will carry about one hundred and 
fifty guns. They are not one-quarter built. 

MARYLAND AND VIRGINIA. 

Baltimore and Annapolis — these works will carry some 
two hundred and fifty guns. The works for the Chesa- 
peake Bay will carry about six hundred guns ; and those 
for the Potomac river about eighty guns. These are more 
than one-half completed. 

NORTH CAROLINA. 

The works at Beaufort and Smithville carry about one 
hundred and fifty guns. They are essentially completed. 

SOUTH CAROLINA. 

The works for the defence of Charleston carry some 
two hundred guns. They are one-half constructed. 

14 



158 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 



GEORGIA. 



The defences of Savannah carry about two hundred guns, 
and are nearly three-quarters finished. 



FLORIDA. 



The works projected for the defence of St. Augustine, 
Key West, Tortugas, and Pensacola will carry some eight 
or nine hundred guns. Those at St. Augustine and Pen- 
sacola are essentially completed, but those at Key West 
and Tortugas are barely begim. 



ALABAMA. 

The works for the defence of Mobile will carry about one 
hundred and sixty guns. These are nearly constructed. 

LOUISIANA. 

The works for the defence of New Orleans w411 carry 
some two hundred and fifty or three hundred guns ; they 
are nearly completed. 

The works north of the Chesapeake cost about three 
thousand dollars per gun ; those south of that point about 
six thousand dollars per gun. This difference in cost is 
due in part to the character of the soil on which the forti- 
fications are built, and in part to the high prices paid in 
the south for materials and workmanship. 

Having pointed out the character and condition of our 
system of sea-coast defences, let us briefly examine how 
far these works may be relied on as a means of security 
against a maritime descent. 

To come to a proper conclusion on this subject, let us 
first examine the three or four great maritime descents at- 
tempted by the English during the wars of the French Rev= 
olution ; a period at which the great naval superiority of 



SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 159 

England over other nations, gave her the title of mistress 
of the seas. Let us notice what have been the results of 
the several attempts made by this power at maritime inva- 
sions, and the means by which such attacks have been 
repelled. 

In 1795, a maritime expedition was fitted out against 
Quiberon, at an expense of eight millions of dollars. 
This port of the French coast had then a naval defence 
of near thirty sail, carrying about sixteen hundred guns. 
Lord Bridport attacked it with fourteen sail of the line, 
five frigates, and some smaller vessels, about fifteen hun- 
dred guns in all, captured a portion of the fleet, and forced 
the remainder to take shelter under the guns of the forti- 
fications of L'Orient. The French naval defence being 
destroyed, the British now entered Quiberon without op- 
position. This bay is said by Brenton, in his British 
Naval History, to be " the finest on the coast of France, 
or perhaps in the world, for landing an army." Besides 
these natural advantages in favor of the English, the in- 
habitants of the surrounding country were in open insur- 
rection, ready to receive the invaders with open arms. A 
body of ten thousand troops were landed, and clothing, 
arms, &c., furnished to as many more royalist troops ; but 
the combined forces failed in their attack upon St. Barbe, 
and General Hoche, from his intrenchments, with seven 
thousand men, held in check a body of eighteen thousand, 
penned up, without defences, in the narrow peninsula. 
Reinforced by a new debarkation, the allies again at- 
tempted to advance, but were soon defeated, and ultimate- 
ly almost entirely destroyed. 

In 1799, the English and Russians made a descent up- 
on Holland with fourteen ships of the line and ten frig- 
ates, carrying about eleven hundred guns and a great num- 
ber of transports, with an army of thirty-six thousand men. 
The Dutch naval defences consisted of eight ships of the 



160 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

line, three fifty-four gun ships, eight forty-eight gun ships, 
and eight smaller frigates, carrying in all about twelve hun- 
dred guns ; but this force contributed little or nothing to 
the defence, and was soon forced to hoist the hostile flag. 
The defensive army was at first only twelve thousand, but 
the Republicans afterwards increased it to twenty-two 
thousand, and finally to twenty-eight thousand men. But 
notwithstanding this immense naval and military superior- 
ity, and the co-operation of the Orange party in assisting 
the landing of their troops, the allies failed to get posses- 
sion of a single strong place ; and after a loss of six thou- 
sand men, were compelled to capitulate. " Such," says 
Alison, " was the disastrous issue of the greatest expedi- 
tion which had yet sailed from the British harbors during 
the war." 

In 1801, Nelson, with three ships of the line, two frig- 
ates, and thirty-five smaller vessels, made a desperate at- 
tack upon the harbor of Boulogne, but was repulsed with 
severe loss. 

Passing over some unimportant attacks, we come to the 
descent upon the Scheldt, or as it is commonly called, the 
Walcheren expedition, in 1809. This expedition, though 
a failure, has often been referred to as proving the expe- 
diency of maritime descents. The following is a brief 
narrative of this expedition : — 

Napoleon had projected vast fortifications, dock-yards, 
and naval arsenals at Flushing and Antwerp for the pro- 
tection of a maritime force in the Scheldt. But no sooner 
was the execution of this project begun, than the English 
fitted out an expedition to seize upon the defences of the 
Scheldt, and capture or destroy the naval force. Flush- 
ing, at the mouth of the river, was but ill-secured, and 
Antwerp, some sixty or seventy miles further up the river, 
was entirely defenceless ; the rampart was unarmed with 
cannon, dilapidated, and tottering, and its garrison consisted 



SEACOAST DEFENCES. 161 

of only about two hundred invalids and recruits. Napo- 
leon's regular army was employed on the Danube and in 
the Peninsula. The British attacking force consisted of 
thirty-seven ships of the line, twenty-three frigates, thirty- 
three sloops of war, twenty-eight gun, mortar, and bomb 
vessels, thirty-six smaller vessels, eighty-two gun-boats, in- 
numerable transports, with over forty thousand troops, and 
an immense artillery train ; making in all, says the English 
historian, " an hundred thousand combatants." A landing 
w^as made upon the island of Walcheren, and siege laid to 
Flushing, which place was not reduced till eighteen days 
after the landing ; the attack upon the water was made by 
seven or eight ships of the line, and a large flotilla of bomb 
vessels, but produced no effect. The channel at the mouth 
of the river was too broad to be defended by the works of 
Flushing, and the main portion of the fleet passed out of 
reach of the guns, and ascended the Scheldt part way up 
to Antwerp. But in the mean time, the fortifications of 
that place had been repaired, and, after a fruitless opera- 
tion of a whole month in the river, the English were 
gradually forced to retreat to Walcheren, and finally to 
evacuate their entire conquest. 

The cost of the expedition was immense, both in treas- 
ure and in life. It was certainly very poorly managed. 
But we cannot help noticing the superior value of fortifi- 
cations as a defence against such descents. They did 
much to retard the operations of the enemy till a defensive 
army could be raised. The works of Flushing were never 
intended to close up the Scheldt, and of course could not 
intercept the passage of shipping ; but they were not re- 
duced by the English naval force, as has sometimes been 
alleged. Col. Mitchel, of the English service, says that 
the fleet " kept up so tremendous a fire upon the batteries, 
that the French officers who had been present at Auster- 
litz and Jena, declared that the cannonade in these battles 

14* 



162 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

had been a mere jeu dbenfans in comparison. Yet what 
was the effect produced on the defences of the place by 
this hre, so formidable, to judge by the sound alone ? 
The writer can answer the question with some accuracy, 
for he went along the entire sea-line the very day after 
the capitulation, and found no part of the parapet injured 
so as to be of the slightest consequence, and only one sol- 
itary gun dismounted, evidently by the bursting of a shell, 
and which could not, of course, have been thro^^m from the 
line of battle ships, but must have been thrown from the 
land batteries."* 

But it may be said that although great naval descents 
on a hostile coast are almost always unsuccessful, never- 
theless a direct naval attack upon a single fortified posi- 
tion will be attended with mxore favorable results ; and 
that our seaport towns, however fortified, will be exposed 
to bombardment and destruction by the enemy's fleets. 
In other words, that in a direct contest between ships and 
forts the former will have at least an equal chance of 
success. 

Let us suppose a fair trial of this relative strength. 
The fort is to be properly constructed and in good repair ; 
its guns in a position to be used with effect ; its garrison 
skilful and efficient; its commander capable and brave. 
The ship is of the very best character, and in perfect 
order ; the crew disciplined and courageous ; its com- 
mander skilful and adroit ; the wind, and tide, and sea — 
all as could be desired.f The numbers of the garrison 
and crew are to be no more than requisite, wdth no unne- 
cessary exposure of human life to swell the lists of the 
slain. The issue of this contest, unless attended with 

* The batteries constructed in the siege of this place were armed 
with fifty-two heavy guns and mortars. 

t These conditions for a battery are easily satisfied, but for the ship, 
are partly dependent on the elements, and seldom to be wholly attained 



SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 163 

extraordinary and easily distinguishable circumstances, 
would be a fair test of their relative strength. 

What result should we anticipate from the nature of the 
contending forces ? The ship, under the circumstances 
we have supposed, can choose her point of attack, select- 
ing the one she may deem the most vulnerable ; but she 
herself is everywhere vulnerable ; her men and guns are 
much concentrated, and consequently much exposed. 
But in the fort the guns and men are more distributed, a 
fort with an interior area of several acres not having a 
garrison as large as the crew of a seventy-four-gim ship. 
All parts of the vessel are liable to injury ; while the fort 
offers but a small mark, — the opening of the embrasures, 
a small part of the carriage, and now and then a head or 
arm raised above the parapet, — the ratio of exposed sur- 
faces being not less than twenty to one. In the vessel the 
guns are fired from an oscillating deck, and the balls go 
at random ; in the fort the guns are fired from an immove- 
able platform, and the balls reach their object with uner- 
ring aim. There is always more or less motion in the 
water, so that the ship's guns, though accurately pointed 
at one moment, at the next will be thrown entirely away 
from the object, even when the motion is too slight to be 
otherwise noticed ; whereas in the battery the guns will 
be fired just as they are pointed ; and the motion of the 
vessel will merely vary to the extent oi a few inches the 
spot in which the shot is received. In the fort the men 
and guns are behind impenetrable walls of stone and 
earth ; in the vessel they are behind frail bulwarks, 
whose splinters are equally destructive with the shot. 
The fort is incombustible ; while the ship may readily 
be set on fire by incendiary projectiles. The ship has 
many points exposed that may be called vital points. By 
losing her rudder, or portions of her rigging, or of her 
spars, she may become unmanageable, and unable to use 



164 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

her strength ; she may receive shots under water, and be 
liable to sink ; she may receive hot shot, and be set on 
fire : these damages are in addition to those of having her 
guns dismounted and her people killed by shots that pierce 
her sides and scatter splinters from her timbers ; while 
the risks of the battery are confined to those mentioned 
above — namely, the risk that the gun, the carriage, or the 
men may be struck. 

The opinions of military writers, and the facts of his- 
tory, fully accord with these deductions of theory. Some 
few individuals mistaking, or misstating, the facts of a few 
recent trials, assert that modern improvements in the naval 
service have so far outstripped the progress in the art of 
land defence, that a floating force is now abundantly able 
to cope, upon equal terms, with a land battery. Ignorant 
and superficial persons, hearing merely that certain forts 
had recently yielded to a naval force, and taking no trou- 
ble to learn the real facts of the case, have paraded them 
before the public as proofs positive of a new era in mili- 
tary science. This conclusion, however groundless and 
absurd, has received credit merely from its novelty. Let 
us examine the several trials of strength which have taken 
place between ships and forts within the last fifty years, 
and see what have been the results. 

In 1792 a considerable French squadron attacked Ca- 
gliari, whose fortifications were at that time so dilapidated 
and weak, as scarcely to deserve the name of defences. 
Nevertheless, the French fleet, after a bombardment of 
three days, was most signally defeated and obliged to 
retire. 

In 1794 two British ships, "the Fortitude of seventy- 
four, and the Juno frigate of thirty-two g-uns," attacked a 
small town in the bay of Martello, Corsica, which was 
armed with one gim in barbette, and a garrison of thirty 
men. After a bombardment of two and a half hours, these 



SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 165 

ships were forced to haul off with considerable damage 
and loss of life. The little tower had received no injury, 
and its garrison were unharmed. Here were one hundred 
and six guns afloat against one on shore ; and yet the latter 
was successful. 

In 1797 Nelson attacked the little inefficient batteries 
of Santa Crux, in Teneriffe, with eight vessels carrying 
four hundred guns. But notwithstanding his great supe- 
riority in numbers, skill, and bravery, he was repelled 
with the loss of two hundred and fifty men, while the gar- 
rison received little or no damage. A single ball from 
the land battery, striking the side of one of his vessels, 
instantly sunk her with near a hundred seamen and ma- 
rines ! 

In 1798, a French flotilla of fifty-two brigs and gunboats, 
manned with near seven thousand men, attacked a little 
English redoubt on the island of Marcou, which was arm- 
ed with two thirty-two-pounders, two six-pounders, four 
four-pounders, and two carronades, and garrisoned with 
two hundred and fifty men. Notwithstanding this great 
disparity of numbers, the little redoubt sunk seven of the 
enemy's brigs and gunboats, captured another, and forced 
the remainder to retreat with great loss ; while the garri- 
son had but one man killed and three wounded. 

In 1801, the French, with three frigates and six thou- 
sand men, attacked the poorly-constructed works of Porto 
Ferrairo, whose defensive force was a motley garrison of 
fifteen hundred Corsicans, Tuscans, and English. Here 
the attacking force wsisfour times as great as that of the 
garrison ; nevertheless they were unsuccessful after several 
bombardments and a siege of five months. 

In July of the same year, 1801, Admiral Saumarez, 
with an English fleet of six ships of the line and two 
smaller vessels, carrying in all five hundred and two guns, 
attacked the Spanish and French defences of Algesiras. 



166 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

Supposing the floating forces of the contending parties to 
be equal, gun for gun, (which is certainly a very fair es- 
timate for the attacking force, considering the circum- 
stances of the case,) we have a French land-battery of 
only twelve guns opposed by an English floating force of 
one hundred and ninety-six guns. Notwithstanding this 
inequality of nearly seventeen to one, the little battery 
compelled the superior naval force to retreat with great 
loss. 

Shortly after this, the French and Spanish fleets at- 
tacked the same English squadron with a force of nearly 
three to one, but met with a most signal defeat ; whereas 
with a land-battery of only one to seventeen, the same 
party had been victorious. What proof can be more de- 
cisive of the superiority of guns on shore over those 
afloat ! 

In 1803 the English garrison of Diamond Rock, near 
Port Royal Bay, with only one hundred men and some fif- 
teen guns, repelled a French squadron of two seventy- 
four-gun ships, a frigate, and a brig, assisted by a land 
attack of two hundred troops. There was not a single 
man killed or wounded in the redoubt, while the French 
lost fifty men ! The place was afterwards reduced by 
famine. 

In 1806 a French battery on Cape Licosa, of only two 
guns and a garrison of twenty-five men, resisted the at- 
tacks of a British eighty-gun ship and two frigates. The 
carriage of one of the land-guns failed on the second 
shot, so that, in fact, only one of them was available dur- 
ing the action. Here was a single piece of ordnance and 
a garrison of twenty-five men, opposed to a naval force of 
over one hundred and fifty guns and about thirteen hundred 
men. And what eff'ects were produced by this strange 
combat ? The attacking force lost thirty-seven men killed 
and wounded, the eighty-gun ship was much disabled, I 



SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 167 

while the fort and garrison escaped entirely unhamied ! 
What could not be effected by force was afterwards ob- 
tained by negotiation. 

In 1808 a French land-battery of only three guns, near 
Fort Trinidad, drove off an English seventy-four- gun 
ship, and a bomb-vessel. 

In 1813 Leghorn, whose defences were of a very me- 
diocre character, and whose garrison at that time was ex- 
ceedingly weak, was attacked by an English squadron of 
six ships, carrying over three hundred guns, and a land 
force of one thousand troops. The whole attempt was a 
perfect failure. 

"In 1814, when the English advanced against Ant- 
werp," says Colonel Mitchell, an English historian, " Fort 
Frederick, a small work of only two guns, was establish- 
ed in a bend of the Polder Dyke, at some distance below 
Lillo. The armament was a long eighteen-pounder and 
a five and a half inch howitzer. From this post the 
French determined to dislodge the English, and an eighty- 
gun ship dropped down with the tide and anchored near 
the Flanders shore, about six hundred yards from the 
British battery. By her position she was secured from 
the fire of the eighteen-pounder, and exposed to that of 
the howitzer only. As soon as every thing was made 
tight her broadside was opened ; and if noise and smoke 
were alone sufficient to ensure success in war, as so 
many of the moderns seem to think, the result of this 
strange contest would not have been long doubtful, for the 
thunder of the French artillery actually made the earth 
to shake again ; but though the earth shook, the single 
British howitzer was neither dismounted nor silenced ; 
and though the artillerymen could not, perfectly exposed 
as they were, stand to their gun while the iron hail was 
striking thick and fast around, yet no sooner did the en- 
emy's fire slacken for a moment than they sprang to their 



168 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

post, ready to return at least one shot for eighty. This 
extraordinary combat lasted from seven o'clock in the 
morning till near twelve at noon, when the French ship, 
having had forty-one men killed and wounded, her com- 
mander being in the list of the latter, and having besides 
sustained serious damage in her hull and rigging, return- 
ed to Antwerp without effecting any thing whatever. The 
howitzer was not dismounted, the fort was not injured, — 
there being in fact nothing to injure, — and the British had 
only one man killed and two wounded." 

It is unnecessary to further specify examples from the 
wars of the French Revolution ; the whole history of 
these wars is one continued proof of the superiority of 
fortifications as a maritime frontier defence. The sea- 
coast of France is almost within stone's throw* of the 
principal British naval depots ; here were large towns and 
harbors, filled with the rich commerce of the world, ofter- 
ing the dazzling attraction of rich booty. The French 
navy was at this time utterly incompetent to their defence : 
while England supported a maritime force at an annual 
expense of near ninety millions of dollars. Her largest 
fleets were continually cruising within sight of these sea- 
ports, and not unfrequently attempting to cut out their 
shipping. " At this period," says one of her naval histori- 
ans, " the naval force of Britain, so multiplied and so ex- 
pert from long practice, had acquired an intimate know- 
ledge of their (the French) harbors, their bays and creeks ; 
her officers knew the depth of water, and the resistance 
likely to be met with in every situation." On the other 
hand, these harbors and towns were frequently stripped of 
their garrisons by the necessities of distant wars, being 
left with no other defence than their fortifications and 
militia. And yet, notwithstanding all this, they escaped 

* Only eighteen and a half miles across the Channel at the narrow- 
est place. 



SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 169 

unharmed during the entire contest. They were frequent- 
ly attacked, and in some instances the most desperate ef- 
forts were made to effect a permanent lodgment ; but in 
no case was the success at all commensurate with the ex- 
pense of life and treasure sacrificed, and no permanent 
hold was made on either the maritime frontiers of France 
or her allies. This certainly was owing to no inferiority 
of skill and bravery on the part of the British navy, as the 
battles of Aboukir and Trafalgar, and the almost total an- 
nihilation of the French marine, have but too plainly pro- 
ven. Why then did these places escape ? We know of 
no other reason, than that they were fortified ; and that the 
French knew how to defend their fortifications. The 
British maritime expeditions to Quiberon, Holland, Bou- 
logne, the Scheldt, Constantinople, Buenos Ayres, &c., 
sufficiently prove the ill-success, and the waste of life and 
treasure with which they must always be attended. But 
when her naval power was applied to the destruction of 
the enemy's marine, and in transporting her land forces to 
solid bases of operations on the soil of her allies, in Por- 
tugal and Belgium, the fall of Napoleon crowned the glory 
of their achievements. 

Let us now examine the several British naval attacks 
on our own forts, in the wars of the Revolution and of 1812. 

In 1776 Sir Peter Parker, with a British fleet of nine 
vessels, carrying about two hundred and seventy* guns, 
attacked Fort Moultrie, in Charleston harbor, which was 
then armed with only twenty-six guns, and garrisoned by 
only three hundred and seventy-five regulars and a few 
militia. In this contest the British were entirely defeated, 
and lost, in killed and wounded, two hundred and five men, 
while their whole two hundred and seventy guns killed 
and wounded only thirty-two men in the fort. Of this 

* These vessels rated two hundred and fifty-four guns, but the num- 
ber actually carried is stated to have been two hundred and seventy. 

15 



170 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

trial of strength, which was certainly a fair one, Cooper, 
in his Naval History, says : — " It goes fully to prove the 
important military position that ships cannot withstand 
forts, when the latter are properly armed, constructed, and 
garrisoned. General Moultrie says only thirty rounds 
from the battery were fired, and was of opinion that the 
want of powder alone prevented the Americans from de- 
stroying the men-of-war." 

In 1814 a British fleet of four vessels, carrying ninety- 
two guns, attacked Fort Boyer, a small redoubt, located 
on a point of land commanding the passage from the Gulf 
into the bay of Mobile. This redoubt was garrisoned by 
only one hundred and twenty combatants, officers in- 
cluded ; and its armament was but twenty small pieces of 
cannon, some of which were almost entirely useless, and 
most of them poorly mounted " in batteries hastily thrown 
up, and leaving the gumiers uncovered from the knee up- 
ward," while the enemy's land force, acting in concert 
with the ships, consisted of twenty artillerists with a bat- 
tery of two guns, and seven hundred and thirty marines, 
Indians, and negroes. His ships carried five hundred and 
ninety men in all. This immense disparity of numbers 
and strength did not allow to the British military and na- 
val commanders the slightest apprehension " that four 
British ships, carrying ninety-two guns, and a land force 
somewhat exceeding seven hundred combatants, could 
fail in reducing a small work mounting only twenty short 
carronades, and defended by a little more than a hundred 
men, unprovided alike with furnaces for heating shot, or 
casements to cover themselves from rockets and shells." 
Nevertheless, the enemy was completely repulsed ; one of 
his largest ships was entirely destroyed, and 85 men were 
killed and wounded on board the other ; while our loss 
was only eight or nine. Here a naval force of five to one 
was repelled by the land-battery. 



SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 171 

Again, in 1814, a barbette battery of one four-pounder 
and two eighteen-pounder guns at Stouington, repelled a 
British fleet of one hundred and thirty-four guns. During 
the engagement the Americans exhausted their ammuni- 
tion, and spiked their eighteen-pounders, and only one of 
them was afterwards used. Two of the enemy's ships, 
carrying one hundred and twelve guus^ were engaged du- 
ring the whole time of attack, and during much of this 
time bombarded the town from a position beyond reach of 
the land-battery. They were entirely too far off for the 
four-pounder gun to be of any use. Supposing the two 
eighteen-pounders to have been employed during the whole 
action, and also all the guns of the fleet, one eighteen- 
pounder on land must have been more than equivalent to 
sixty-seven guns afloat, for the ships were so much injured 
as to render it necessary for them to withdraw. The 
British loss was twenty killed, and more than fifty wound- 
ed. Ours was only two killed and six wounded.* 

The fleet sent to the attack of Baltimore, in 1814, con- 
sisted of forty sail, the largest of which were ships of the 
line, carrying an army of over six thousand combatants. 
The troops were landed at North Point, while sixteen of 
the bomb-vessels and frigates approached within reach of 
Fort McHenry, and commenced a bombardment which 
lasted twenty-five hours. During this attack, the enemy 
threw " fifteen hundred shells, four hundred of which ex- 
ploded within the walls of the fort, but without making 
any impression on either the strength of the work or the 
garrison," and the British were compelled to retire with 
much loss. 

In 1815, a squadron of British ships, stationed ofl" the 
mouths of the Mississippi, for the purpose of a blockade, 
ascended the river as high as Fort St. Philip, which is a 

* Perkins says two killed and six wounded. Holmes says six 
wounded, but makes no mention of any killed. 



172 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

small work capable of an armament of only twenty guns 
in all. A heavy fke of shot and shells was continued with 
but few and short pauses for nine days and nights, but 
making no impression either on the fort or garrison, they 
retreated to their former position at the mouth of the river. 

There is but a single instance in the war of 1812, where 
the enemy's vessels succeeded in reducing a fort ; and 
this has sometimes been alluded to, by persons ignorant of 
the real facts of the case, as a proof against the ability of 
our fortifications to resist naval attacks. Even if it were 
a case of decided failure, would this single exception be 
sufficient to overthrow the weight of evidence on the other 
side ? We allude to the reduction of the so-called Fort 
Washington by the British fleet that ascended the Poto- 
mac in 1814, to assist in the disgraceful and barbarous 
operation of burning the capitol and destroying the archives 
of the nation. Fort Washington was a very small and 
inefficient work, incorrectly planned by an incompetent 
French engineer ; only a small part of the fort was then 
built, and it has not yet been completed. The portion 
constructed was never, until very recently, properly pre- 
pared for receiving its armament, and at the time of attack 
could not possibly have held out a long time. But no de- 
fence whatever was made. Capt. Gordon, with a squad- 
ron of eight sail, carrying one hundred and seventy-three 
guns, under orders *' to ascend the river as high as Fort 
Washington, and try upon it the experiment of a bombard- 
ment," approached that fort, and, upon firing a single shell, 
which did no injury to either the fort or the garrison, the 
latter deserted the works, and rapidly retreated. The 
commanding officer was immediately dismissed for his 
cowardice. An English naval officer, who was one of the 
expedition, in speaking of the retreat of the garrison, says : 
" We were at loss to account for such an extraordinary 



SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 173 

Step. The position was good, and the capture would have 
cost us at least fifty men, and more, had it been properly 
defended ; besides, an unfavorable wind and many other 
chances were in their favor," &c. The fleet ascended 
the river to Alexandria, but learning soon afterwards that 
batteries were preparing at White House and Indian Head 
to cut off its retreat, it retired, in much haste, but not 
without injury. 

Some have. also pretended to find in modem European 
history a few examples contradictory of the relative pow- 
er which we have here assigned to ships and forts. 
Overlooking the numerous and well-authenticated exam- 
ples, where forts of small dimensions and of small arma- 
ment have repelled large fleets, they would draw their 
conclusions from the four or five instances where fleets 
have gained (as was at first supposed) a somewhat doubt- 
ful victory over forts. But a careful and critical examin- 
ation of the facts in these cases, will show that even these 
are no exceptions to the general rule of the superiority of 
guns ashore over guns afloat. 

The only instances where it has ever been pretended 
by writers of any note, that ships have gained advan- 
tage, are those of the attack on Copenhagen in 1801 ; the 
passage of the Dardanelles, in 1807; the attack on Al- 
giers, in 1816 ; the attack on San Juan d'Ulloa, in 1838 ; 
and the attack on St. Jean d'Acre, in 1840. 

Let us examine these examples a little in detail : — 

Copenhagen, — The British fleet sent to attack Copen- 
hagen, in 1801, consisted of fifty-two sail, eighteen of 
them being line-of-battle ships, four frigates, &c. They 
sailed from Yarmouth roads on the 12th of March, passed 
the Sound on the 30th, and attacked and defeated the 
Danish line on the 2d of April. 

The Sound between Cronenberg and the Swedish coast 
is about two and a half miles wide, (vide Fig. 34.) The 
15* 



174 MILITARY ART AISD SCIENCE. 

batteries of Cronenberg and Elsinore were lined with one 
hundred pieces of cannon and mortars ; but the Swedish 
battery had been much neglected, and then mounted only 
six guns. Nevertheless, the British admiral, to avoid the 
damage his squadron would have to sustain in the passage 
of this wide channel, defended by a force scarcely supe- 
rior to a single one of his ships, preferred to attempt the 
difficult passage of the Belt ; but after a few of his light 
vessels, acting as scouts, had run on rocks, he returned to 
the Sound. 

He then tried to negotiate a peaceful passage, threaten- 
ing, however, a declaration of war if his vessels should 
be fired upon. It must be remembered that at this time 
England was at peace with both Denmark and Sweden, 
and that no just cause of war existed. Hence, the ad- 
miral inferred that the commanders of these batteries 
would be loath to involve their countries in a war with so 
formidable a power as England, by commencing hostili- 
ties, when only a free passage was asked. The Danish 
commander replied, that he should not permit a fleet to 
pass his post, whose object and destination were unknown 
to him. He fired upon them, as he was bound to do by 
long-existing commercial regulations, and not as an act of 
hostility against the English. The Swedes, on the con- 
trary, remained neutral, and allowed the British vessels to 
lie near by for several days without firing upon them. 
Seeing this friendly disposition of the Swedes, the fleet 
neared their coast, and passed out of the reach of the 
Danish batteries, which opened a fire of balls and shells ; 
but all of them fell more than two hundred yards short 
of the fleet, which escaped without the loss of a single 
man. 

The Swedes excused their treachery by the plea that 
it would have been impossible to construct batteries at 
that season, and that, even had it been possible, Denmark 



SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 175 

would not have consented to tlieir doing so, for fear that 
Sweden would renew her old claim to one half of the rich 
duties levied by Denmark on all ships passing the strait. 
There may have been some grounds for the last excuse ; 
but the true reason for their conduct was the fear of get- 
ting involved in a war with England. Napoleon says 
that, even at that season, a few days would have been 
sufficient for placing a hundred guns in battery, and that 
Sweden had much more time than was requisite. And 
with a hundred guns on each side of the channel, served 
with skill and energy, the fleet must necessarily have sus- 
tained so much damage as to render it unfit to attack 
Copenhagen. 

On this passage, we remark : — 

1st. The whole number of guns and mortars in the forts 
of the Sound amounted to only one hundred and six, while 
the fleet carried over seventeen hundred guns ; and yet, 
with this immense superiority of more than sixteen to one, 
the British admiral preferred the dangerous passage of the 
Belt to encountering the fire of these land-batteries. 

2d. By negotiations, and threatening the vengeance of 
England, he persuaded the small Swedish battery to re- 
main silent and allow the fleet to pass near that shore, out 
of reach of Cronenberg and Elsinore. 

3d. It is the opinion of Napoleon and the best English 
writers, that if the Swedish battery had been put in order, 
and acted in concert with the Danish works, they might 
have so damaged the fleet as to render it incapable of any 
serious attempt on Copenhagen. 

We now proceed to consider the circumstances attend- 
ing the attack and defence of Copenhagen itself. The 
only side of the town exposed to the attack of heavy ship- 
ping is the northern, where there lies a shoal extending 
out a considerable distance, leaving only a very narrow 
approach to the heart of the city, (Fig. 35.) On the most 



176 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. ^ 

advanced part of this shoal are the Crown-batteries, car 
rying in all eighty-eight guns.* The entrance into the 
Baltic between Copenhagen and Salthom, is divided into 
two channels by a bank, called the Middle Ground, which 
is situated directly opposite Copenhagen. To defend the 
entrance on the left of the Crown-batteries, they placed 
near the mouth of the channel four ships of the line, one 
frigate, and two sloops, carrying in all three hundred and 
fifty-eight guns. To secure the port and city from bom- 
bardment from the King's Channel, • (that between the 
Middle Ground and town,) a line of floating defences were 
moored near the edge of the shoal, and manned princi- 
pally by volunteers. This line consisted of old hulls of 
vessels, block-ships, prames, rafts, &c., carrying in all six 
hundred and twenty-eight guns — a force strong enough to 
prevent the approach of bomb-vessels and gunboats, (the 
purpose for which it was intended,) but utterly incapable 
of contending with first-rate ships of war ; but these the 
Danes thought would be deterred from approaching by the 
difficulties of navigation. These difficulties were cer- 
tainly very great ; and Nelson said, beforehand, that " the 
wind which might carry him in would most probably not 
bring out a crippled ship." Had the Danes supposed it 
possible for Nelson to approach with his large vessels, 
the line of floating defences would have been formed 
nearer Copenhagen, the right supported by batteries raised 
on the isle of Amack. " In that case," says Napoleon, 
" it is probable that Nelson would have failed in his 
attack ; for it would have been impossible for him to pass 
between the line and shore thus lined with cannon." As 
it was, the line was too extended for strength, and its right 
too far advanced to receive assistance from the battery of 

* Some writers say only sixty-eight or seventy ; but the English 
writers generally say eighty-eight. A few, (apparently to increase 
the brilliancy of the victory,) make this nmnber still greater. 



SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 177 

Amack. A part of the fleet remained as a reserve, under 
Admiral Parker, while the others, under Nelson, advanced 
to the King's Channel. This attacking force consisted 
of eight ships of the line and thirty-six smaller vessels, 
carrying in all eleven hundred guns, (without including 
those in the six gun-brigs, whose armament is not given.) 
One of the seventy-four-gun ships could not be brought 
into action, and two others grounded ; but. Lord Nelson 
says, " although not in the situation assigned them, yet 
they were so placed as to be of great service." This 
force was concentrated upon a 'part of the Danish line of 
floating defences, the whole of which was not only infe- 
rior to it by three hundred and eighty-two guns, but so 
situated as to be beyond the reach of succor, and without 
a chance of escape. The result was w^hat might have 
been expected. Every vessel of the right and centre of 
this outer Danish line was taken or destroyed, except one 
or two small ones, which cut and run under protection of 
the fortifications. The left of the line, being supported 
by the Crown-battery, remained unbroken. A division 
of frigates, in hopes of providing an adequate substitute 
for the ships intended to attack the batteries, ventured to 
engage them, but " it suffered considerable loss, and, in 
spite of all its eflbrts, was obliged to relinquish this enter- 
prise, and sheer off"." 

The Danish vessels lying in the entrance of the chan- 
nel which leads to the city, were not attacked, and took 
no material part in the contest. They are to be reckoned 
in the defence on the same grounds that the British ships 
of the reserve should be included in the attacking force. 
Nor was any use made of the guns on shore, for the ene- 
my did not advance far enough to be within their range. 

The Crown-battery was behind the Danish line, and 
mainly masked by it. A part only of its guns could be 
used in support of the left of this line, and in repelling the 



178 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

direct attacks of the frigates, which it did most effectually. 
But we now come to a new feature in this battle. As 
the Danish line of floating defences fell into the hands of 
the English, the range of the Crown-battery enlarged, and 
its power was felt. Nelson saw the danger to which his 
fleet was exposed, and, being at last convinced of the 
prudence of the admiral's signal for retreat, " made up his 
mind to weigh anchor and retire from the engagement." 
To retreat, however, from his present position, was ex- 
ceedingly difficult and dangerous. He therefore deter- 
mined to endeavor to effect an armistice, and dispatched 
the following letter to the prince-regent : 

" Lord Nelson has directions to spare Denmark when 
no longer resisting ; but if the firing is continued on the 
part of Denmark, Lord Nelson must be obliged to set on 
fire all the floating batteries he has taken, without the 
power to save the brave Danes who have defended them." 

This produced an armistice, and hostilities had hardly 
ceased, when three of the English ships, including that 
in which Nelson himself was, struck upon the bank. 
" They were in the jaws of destruction, and would never 
have escaped if the batteries had continued their fire. 
They therefore owed their safety to this armistice." A 
convention was soon signed, by which every thing was 
left in statu quo, and the fleet of Admiral Parker allowed 
to proceed into the Baltic. Edward Baines, the able 
English historian of the wars of the French Revolution, 
in speaking of Nelson's request for an armistice, says : 
" This letter, which exhibited a happy union of policy and 
courage, was written at a moment when Lord Nelson per- 
ceived that, in consequence of the unfavorable state of the 
wind, the admiral was not likely to get up to aid the enter- 
prise ; that the principal batteries of the enemy, and the 
ships at the mouth of the harbor, were yet untouched ; that 
two of his own division had grounded, and others were 



SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 179 

likely to share the same fate." Campbell says these bat- 
teries and ships " were still unconquered. Two of his [Nel- 
son's] own vessels were grounded and exposed to a heavy 
fire ; others, if the battle continued, might be exposed to 
a similar fate, while he found it would be scarcely prac- 
ticable to bring off the prizes under the fire of the bat- 
teries." 

With respect to the fortifications of the town, a chroni- 
cler of the times says they were of no service while the 
action lasted. " They began to fire when the enemy took 
possession of the abandoned ships, but it was at the same 
time the parley appeared." The Danish commander, 
speaking of the general contest between the two lines, 
says : " The Crown-battery did not come at all into action." 
An English writer says distinctly : " The works (fortifi- 
cations) of Copenhagen were absolutely untouched at the 
close of the action." Colonel Mitchel, the English his- 
torian, says : " Lord Nelson never fired a shot at the town 
or fortifications of Copenhagen ; he destroyed a line of 
block-ships, prames, and floating batteries that defended 
the sea approach to the town ; and the Crown Prince, . 
seeing his capital exposed, was willing to finish by armi- 
stice a war, the object of which was neither very popular 
nor well understood. What the result of the action be- 
tween Copenhagen and the British fleet might ultimately 
have been, is therefore altogether uncertain. The Bom- 
bardment OF Copenhagen by Nelson, as it is generally 
styled, is therefore, like most other oracular phrases of the 
day, a mere combination of words, without the slightest 
meaning." 

The British lost in killed and wounded nine hundred 
and forty-three men ; and the loss of the Danes, accord- 
ing to their own account, which is confirmed by the French, 
was but very little higher. The English, however, say it 
amounted to sixteen or eighteen hundred ; but let the loss 



180 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

be what it may, it was almost exclusively confined to the 
floating defences, and can in no way determine the rela- 
tive accuracy of aim of the guns ashore and guns afloat. 

The facts and testimony we have adduced, prove incon- 
te stably — 

1st. That of the fleet of fifty-two sail and seventeen 
hundred guns sent by the English to the attack upon Co- 
penhagen, two ships carrying one hundred and forty-eight 
guns were grounded or wrecked ; seven ships of the line, 
and thirty-six smaller vessels, carrying over one thousand 
guns, were actually brought into the action ; while the re- 
mainder were held as a reserve to act upon the first fa- 
vorable opportunity. 

2d. That the Danish line of floating defences, con- 
sisting mostly of hulls, sloops, rafts, &c., carried only six 
hundred and twenty-eight guns of all descriptions ; that 
the fixed batteries supporting this line did not carry over 
eight)^ or ninety guns at most ; and that both these land 
and floating batteries were mostly manned and the guns 
served by volunteers. 

3d. That the fixed batteries in the system of defence 
were either so completely masked, or so far distant, as to 
be useless during the contest between the fleet and float- 
ing force. 

4th. That the few guns of these batteries which were 
Tendered available by the position of the flxOating de- 
fences, repelled, with little or no loss to themselves, and 
some injury to the enemy, a vastly superior force of fri- 
gates which attacked them. 

5th. That the line of floating defences was conquered 
and mostly destroyed, while the fixed batteries were unin- 
jured. 

6th. That the fortifications of the city and of Amack 
island were not attacked, and had no part in the contest. 

7th. That, as soon as the Crown-batteries were un- 



SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 181 

masked and began to act, Nelson prepared to retreat, but, 
on account of the difficulty of doing so, he opened a par- 
ley, threatening, with a cruelty unworthy of the most bar- 
barous ages, that, unless the batteries ceased their fire upon 
his ships, he would burn all the floating defences with the 
Danish prisoners in his possession ; and that this armistice 
was concluded just in time to save his own ships from 
destruction. 

8th. That, consequently, the battle of Copenhagen can- 
not be regarded as a contest between ships and forts, or a 
triumph of ships over forts : that, so far as the guns on 
shore were engaged, they showed a vast superiority over 
those afloat — a superiority known and confessed by the 
English themselves. 

Constantinople. — The channel of the Dardanelles is 
about twelve leagues long, three miles wide at its en- 
trance, and about three-quarters of a mile at its narrowest 
point. Its principal defences are the outer and inner cas- 
tles of Europe and Asia, and the castles of Sestos and 
Abydos. Constantinople stands about one hundred miles 
from its entrance into the Sea of Marmora, and at nearly 
the opposite extremity of this sea. The defences of the 
channel had been allowed to go to decay ; but few guns 
were mounted, and the forts were but partially garrisoned. 
In Constantinople not a gun was mounted, and no prepar- 
ations for defence were made ; indeed, previous to the 
approach of the fleet, the Turks had not determined 
whether to side with the English or the French, and even 
then the French ambassador had the greatest difficulty in 
persuading them to resist the demands of Duckforth. 

The British fleet consisted of six sail of the line, two 
frigates, two sloops, and several bomb-vessels, carrying 
eight hundred and eighteen guns, (besides those in the 
bomb-ships.) Admiral Duckforth sailed through the Dar- 
danelles on the 19th of February, 1807, with little or no 

16 



182 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

opposition. This being a Turkish festival day, the sol- 
diers of the scanty garrison were enjoying the festivities 
of the occasion, and none were left to serve the few guns 
of the forts which had been prepared for defence. But 
while the admiral was waiting on the Sea of Marmora for 
the result of negotiations, or for a favorable wind to make 
the attack upon Constantinople, the fortifications of this 
city were put in order, and the Turks actively employed, 
under French engineers and artillery officers, in repair- 
ing the defences of the Straits. Campbell, in his Naval 
History, says : — " Admiral Duckforth now fully perceived 
the critical situation in which he was placed. He might, 
indeed, succeed, should the weather become favorable, in 
bombarding Constantinople ; hut unless the homhardment 
should prove completely successful in forcing the Turks to 
pacific terms^ the injury he might do to the city would not 
compensate for the damage which his fieet must necessarily 
sustain. With this damaged and crippled fieet ^ he must re- 
pass the Dardanelles, now rendered infinitely stronger than 
they were when he came through themT 

Under these circumstances the admiral determined to 
retreat ; and on the 3d of April escaped through the Dar- 
danelles, steering midway of the channel, with a favora- 
ble and strong current. " This escape, however," says 
Baines, " was only from destruction, but by no means 
from serious loss and injury. * * =^ * In what in- 
stance in the whole course of our naval warfare, have 
ships received equal damage in so short a time as in this 
extraordinary enterprise ?" In detailing the extent of this 
damage, we will take the ships in the order they descend- 
ed. The first had her wheel carried away, and her hull 
much damaged, but escaped with the loss of only three 
men. A stone shot penetrated the second, between the 
poop and quarter deck, badly injured the mizzen-mast, car- 
ried away the wheel, and did other serious damage, killing 



SEA-COAST- DEFENCES. 183 

and wounding twenty men. Two shot struck the third, car- 
rying away her shrouds and injuring her masts ; loss in 
killed and wounded, thirty. The fourth had her mainmast 
destroyed, with a loss of sixteen. The fifth had a large shot, 
six feet eight inches in circumference, enter her lower 
deck ; loss fifty-five. The sixth, not injured. The seventh, a 
good deal damaged, with a loss of seventeen. The eighth 
had no loss. The ninth was so much injured that, " had 
there been a necessity for hauling the wind on the oppo- 
site tack, she must have gone down :" her loss was eight. 
The tenth lost twelve. The eleventh was much injured, 
with a loss of eight — making a total loss in repassing the 
Dardanelles, of one hundred and sixty-seven ; and in the 
whole expedition two hundred and eighty-one, exclusive 
of two hundred and fifty men who perished in the burning 
of the Ajax. 

Such was the effect produced on the British fleet, sail- 
ing with a favorable wind and strong current past the half- 
armed and half-manned forts of the Dardanelles. Duck- 
forth himself says, that "had he remained before Constan- 
tinople much longer — till the forts had been completely put 
in order — no return would have been open to him, and the 
unavoidable sacrifice of the squadron must have been the 
consequence." Scarcely had the fleet cleared the Straits, 
before it (the fleet) was reinforced with eight sail of the 
line ; but, even with this vast increase of strength, the 
English did not venture to renew the contest. They had 
effected a most fortunate escape. General Jomini says 
that if the defence had been conducted by a more enter- 
prising and experienced people, the expedition would 
have cost the English their whole squadron. 

Great as was the damage done to the fleet, the forts them- 
selves were uninjured. The English say their own fire did 
no execution, the shot in all probability not even striking 
their objects — " the rapid change of position, occasioned 



184 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

by a fair wind and current, preventing the certainty of 
aim." The state of the batteries when the fleet first pass- 
ed, is thus described in James's Naval History : " Some 
of them were dilapidated, and others but partially mount- 
ed and poorly manned." And Alison says : " They had 
been allowed to fall into disrepair. The castles of Europe 
and Asia, indeed, stood in frowning majesty, to assert the 
dominion of the Crescent at the narrowest part of the pas- 
sage, but their ramparts were antiquated, their guns in 
part dismounted, and such as remained, though of enor- 
mous calibre, little calculated to answer the rapidity and 
precision of an English broadside." 

Much has been said because the fortifications of the Dar- 
danelles did not hermetically seal that channel, (an object 
they were never expected to accomplish, even had they 
been well armed and well served ;) but it is forgotten, or 
entirely overlooked, that twelve Turkish line-of -battle- 
ships, two of them three-deckers, with nine frigates, were with 
their sails bent and in apparent readiness, filled with troops, 
and lying within the line of fortifications ; and yet this naval 
force effected little or nothing against the invaders. It is 
scarcely ever mentioned, being regarded of little conse- 
quence as a means of defence ; and yet the number of its 
guns and the expense of its construction and support, could 
hardly have fallen short of the incomplete and half-armed 
forts, some of which were as ancient as the reign of Amurath ! 

Algiers. — The following narrative of the attack on Al- 
giers, in 1816, is drawn from the reports of the English 
and Dutch admirals, and other official and authentic Eng- 
lish papers. 

The attack was made by the combined fleets, consist- 
ing of ^Ye sail of the line, eighteen or twenty frigates and 
smaller vessels, besides five bomb-vessels and several 
rocket-boats, carrying in all about one thousand guns. 
The armament of some of the smaller vessels is not given, 



SEACOAST DEFENCES. 185 

but the guns of those whose armaments are known, amount 
to over nine hundred. The harbor and defences of Al- 
giers had been previously surveyed by Captain Warde, 
royal navy, under Lord Exmouth's direction ; and the 
number of the combined fleet was arranged according to 
the information given in this survey — just so many ships, 
and no more, being taken, as could be employed to ad- 
vantage against the city, without being needlessly ex- 
posed. Moreover, the men and officers had been selected 
and exercised with reference to this particular attack. 

From the survey of Captain Warde, and the accompa- 
nying map, it appears that the armament of all the fortifi- 
cations of Algiers and the vicinity, counting the water 
fronts and the parts that could flank the shore, was only 
two hundred and eighty-four guns of various sizes and 
descriptions, including mortars. But not near all of these 
could act upon the fleet as it lay. Other English accounts 
state the number of guns actually opposed to the fleet at 
from two hundred and twenty to two hundred and thirty. 
Some of these were in small and distant batteries, whereas 
nearly all the fleet was concentrated on the mole-head 
works. (Fig. 36.) Supposing only one broadside of the 
ships to have been engaged, the ratio of the forces, as ex- 
pressed by the number of guns, must have been about as 
5 to 2. This is a favorable supposition for the ships ; for 
we know that several of them, from their position and a 
change of anchorage, brought both broadsides to bear ; 
moreover, at no one time could all the guns of the water 
fronts of the batteries bear on the attacking ships. The 
Algerine shipping in the harbor was considerable, includ- 
ing several vessels of war, but no use was made of them 
in defence, and nearly all were burnt. The attacking 
ships commanded some of the batteries, and almost imme- 
diately dismounted their guns. The walls of the case- 
mated works were so thin as to be very soon battered 

16* 



186 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

down. Most of the Algerine guns were badly mounted, 
and many of them were useless after the first fire. They 
had no furnaces for heating shot, and, as "they loaded 
their guns with loose powder, put in with a ladle," they 
could not possibly have used hot shot, even had they con- 
structed furnaces. The ships approached the forts, and 
many of them anchored in their intended position, without 
a shot being fired from the batteries. The action com- 
menced at a quarter before three, and did not entirely 
cease till half-past eleven. The ships then took advan- 
tage of the land breeze, and, by warping and towing off, 
were able to get under sail and come to anchor beyond 
reach of the land-batteries. Negotiations were again 
opened, and the Dey surrendered the Christian slaves and 
yielded to the terms of the treaty. 

During the contest, the fleet " fired nearly one hundred 
and eighteen tons of powder, and fifty thousand shot, 
(weighing more than five hundred tons of iron,) besides 
nine hundred and sixty thirteen and ten-inch shells, 
(thrown by the bomb-vessels,) and the shells and rockets 
from the flotilla." The vessels were considerably crip- 
pled, and their loss in killed and wounded amounted to 
eight hundred and eighty-three. The land batteries were 
much injured, and a large part of their guns dismounted. 
Their loss is not known ; the English confess they could 
obtain no account of it, but suppose it to have been very 
great. This seems more than probable ; for, besides those 
actually employed in the defence, large numbers of people 
crowded into the forts to witness the contest. So great 
was this curiosity, that, when the action commenced, the 
parapets were covered with the multitude gazing at the 
manoeuvres of the ships. To avoid so imnecessary and 
indiscriminate a slaughter. Lord Exmouth (showing a 
humanity that does him great credit) motioned with his 
hand to the ignorant wretches to retire to some place of 



SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 187 

safety. This loss of life in the batteries, the burning of 
the buildings within the town and about the mole, the en- 
tire destruction of their fleet and merchant vessels an- 
chored within the mole and in the harbor, had a depress- 
ing effect upon the inhabitants, and probably did more than 
the injuries received by the batteries in securing an honor- 
able conclusion to the treaty. We know very well that 
these batteries, though much injured, were not silenced 
when Lord Exmouth took advantage of the land breeze 
and sailed beyond their reach. The ships retired — 1st, 
because they had become much injured, and their ammuni- 
nition nearly exhausted ; 2d, in order to escape from a 
position so hazardous in case of a storm ; and 3d, to get 
beyond the reach of the Algerine batteries. Lord Ex- 
mouth himself gives these as his reasons for the retreat, 
and says, " the land wind saved me many a gallant fellow." 
And Vice-admiral Von de Capellan, in his report of the 
battle, gives the same opinion : " in this retreat^'' says he, 
" which, from wantof wind and the damage suffered in the 
rigging, was very slow, the ships had still to suffer much 
from the new-opened and redoubled fire of the enemy^s bat- 
teries ; at last, the land breeze springing up," (fee. An 
English officer, who took part in this affair, says : "It 
was well for us that the land wind came off, or we should 
never have got out ; and God knows what would have 
been our fate, had we remained all night." 

The motives of the retreat cannot, therefore, be doubt- 
ed. Had the Arabs set themselves zealously at work, 
during the night, to prepare for a new contest, by re- 
mounting their guns, and placing others behind the ruins 
of those batteries which had fallen, — in other words, had 
the works now been placed in hands as skilful and expe- 
rienced as the English, the contest would have been far 
from ended. But (to use the words of the Board of De- 
fence) Lord Exmouth relied on the effects produced on 



188 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. V 

« 

the people by his dreadful cannonade ; and the result 
proves that he was right. His anxiety to clear the ves- 
sels from the contest shows that there was a power still 
unconquered, Avhich he thought it better to leave to -be 
restrained by the suffering population of the city, than to 
keep in a state of exasperation and activity by his pres-, 
ence. What was this power but an unsubdued energy in 
the batteries ? 

The true solution of the question is, then, not so much 
the amount of injury done on the one side or the other — 
particularly as there was on one side a city to suffer as 
well as the batteries — as the relative efficiency of the 
parties when the battle closed. All political agitation and 
popular clamor aside, Avhat would have been the result 
had the fight been continued, or even had Lord Exmouth 
renewed it next morning ? These are questions that can 
be answered only on conjecture ; but the manner the bat- 
tle ended certainly leaves room for many doubts whether, 
had the subsequent demands of Lord Exmouth been re- 
jected, he had it in his power to enforce them by his 
ships ; whether, indeed, if he had renewed the fight, he 
would not have been signally defeated. On the whole, 
we do not think that this battle, although it stands pre- 
eminent as an example of naval success over batteries, 
presents an argument to shake the confidence which for- 
tifications, well situated, well planned, and well fought, 
deserve, as the defences of a seaboard. 

We cannot help regarding these conclusions as just, 
when we reflect upon all the circumstances of the case. 
The high character, skill, and braver}' of the attacking 
force ; their immense superiority in number of guns, with 
no surplus human life to be exposed ; the antiquated and 
ill-managed works of defence, the entire want of skill of 
the Algerine artillerists, and the neglect of the ordinary 
means of preparation ; the severe execution which these 



^ SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 189 

ill-served guns did upon the enemy's ships, — an execution 
far more dreadful than that effected by the French or 
Dutch fleets in their be^t-contested naval battles with the 
ships of the same foe, — from these facts, we must think that 
those who are so ready to draw from this case conclusions 
unfavorable to the use of land-batteries as a means of de- 
fence against shipping, know but little of the nature of 
the contest. 

An English historian of some note, in speaking of this 
attack, says : — " It is but little to the purpose, unless to 
prove what may be accomplished by fleets against towns 
exactly so circumstanced, placed, and governed. Algiers 
is situated on an amphitheatre of hills, sloping down to- 
wards the sea, and presenting therefore the fairest mark 
to the fire of hostile ships. But where is the capital ex- 
actly so situated that we are ever likely to attack ? And 
as to the destruction of a few second-rate towns, even 
when practicable, it is a mean, unworthy species of war- 
fare, by which nothing was ever gained. The severe loss 
sustained before Algiers must also be taken into account, 
because it was inflicted by mere Algerine artillery, and 
was much inferior to what may be expected from a con- 
test maintained against batteries manned with soldiers in- 
structed by officers of skill and science, not only in work- 
ing the guns, but in the endless duty of detail necessary 
for keeping the whole of an artillery material in a proper 
state of formidable efficiency." 

San Juan d'XJlloa. — The following facts, relative to the 
attack on San Juan d'Ulloa by the French, in 1838, are 
drawn principally from the report of a French engineer 
officer who was one of the expedition. 

The French fleet consisted of four ships, carrying one 
hundred and eighty-eight guns, two armed steamboats, 
and two bomb-ketches with four large mortars. The 
whole number of guns, of whatever description, found in 



190 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

the fort was one hundred and eighty-seven ; a large por- 
tion of these, however, were for land defence. (Fig. 37.) 
When the French vessels were towed into the position 
selected for the attack, " it was lucky for us," says the 
French officer in his report, " that the Mexicans did not dis- 
turb this operation, which lasted nearly two hours, and that 
they permitted us to commence the fire." " We were exposed 
to the fire of one twenty-four-pounder, five sixte en-pounders, 
seven twelve-pounders, one eight-pounder, and five eigh- 
teen-pounder carronades — in all nineteen pieces only^ If 
these be converted into equivalent twenty- four-pounders, in 
proportion to the w^eight of the balls, the whole nineteen 
guns will be less than twelve twenty -four pounders. This 
estimate is much too great, for it allows three eight- 
pounders to be equal to one twenty-four-pounder, and 
each of the eighte en-pounder carronades to be three 
quarters the power of a long twenty-four-pounder ; where- 
as, at the distance at which the parties were engaged, these 
small pieces were nearly harmless. Two of the powder 
magazines, from not being bomb-proof, were blown up 
during the engagement, by which three of the nineteen 
guns on the water front of the castle were dismounted ; 
thus reducing the land force to an equivalent of ten twenty- 
four-pounders. The other sixteen guns were still effect- 
ive when abandoned by the Mexicans. The cannonade 
and bombardment continued about six hours, eight thou- 
sand two hundred and fifty shot and shells being fired at 
the fort by the French. The principal injury received by 
the work was from the explosion of the powder maga- 
zine. But very few guns were dismounted by the fire of 
the French ships, and only three of these on the water 
front. The details of the condition of the ships and fort 
are given in the report of the French officer,* but it is 
unnecessary to repeat them here. 
* Vide also House Doc. No. 206, twenty-sixth Congress, first session. 



SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 191 

In general terms, it appears from the above-mentioned 
report, that the number of guns actually brought into action by 
the floating force, (counting only one broadside of the ship,) 
amounted to ninety-four guns, besides four heavy sea-mor^ 
tars ; that the whole number so employed in the fort was 
only nineteen, including the smallest calibres ; that these guns 
were generally so small and inefficient, that their balls 
would not enter the sides of the ordinary attacking frigates ; 
the principal injury sustained by the castle was produced 
by the explosion of powder magazines injudiciously placed 
and improperly secured ; that the castle, though built of 
poor materials, was but slightly injured by the French flre ; 
that the Mexicans proved themselves ignorant of the ordi- 
nary means of defence, and abandoned their works when 
only a few of their guns had been dismounted ; that not- 
withstanding all the circumstances in favor of the French, 
their killed and wounded, in proportion to the guns acting 
against them, was upwards of four times as great as the 
loss of the English at the battle of Trafalgar ! 

St. Jean d'Acre. — The narratives of the day contained 
most exaggerated accounts of the English attack on St. 
Jean d'Acre ; now, however, the principal facts connected 
with this attack are fully authenticated. For the amount 
of the fleet we quote from the British official papers, and 
for that of the fort, from the pamphlet of Lieutenant-col- 
onel Matuszewiez. These statements are mainly con- 
firmed by the narratives, more recently published, of sev- 
eral English and French eye-witnesses. 

The fortifications were built of poor materials, antiqua- 
ted in their plans, and much decayed. Their entire arma- 
ment amounted to only two hundred guns, some of which 
were merely field-pieces. The water fronts were armed 
with one hundred cannon and sixteen mortars, those of the 
smaller calibre included. (Fig. 38.) When approached by 
the British fleet, the works were undergoing repairs, and, 



192 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

says Commodore Napier, "were fast getting into a state 
of preparation against attack." 

The British fleet consisted of eight ships of the line, 
carrying six hundred and forty-six guns ; six frigates, car- 
rying two hundred and thirty-six guns ; four steamers, 
carrying eighteen guns ; and two or three other vessels, 
whose force is not given. " Only a few guns," says Na- 
pier, " defended the approach from the northward," and 
most of the ships came in from that direction. The west- 
ern front was armed with about forty cannon ; but opposed 
to this were six ships and two steamers, carrying about 
five hundred guns. Their fire was tremendous during the 
engagement, but no breach was made in the walls. The 
south front was armed in part by heavy artillery and 
in part by field-pieces. This front was attacked by six 
ships and two steamers, carrying over two hundred guns. 
The eastern front was armed only with light artillery ; 
against this was concentrated the remainder of the fleet, 
carrying about two hundred and forty guns. The guns of 
the works were so poorly mounted, that but few could be 
used at all ; and these, on account of the construction of 
the fort, could not reach the ships, though anchored close 
by the walls. " Only five of their guns," says Napier, 
" placed in a flanking battery, were well served, and never 
missed ; but they were pointed too high, and damaged our 
spars and rigging only." The stone was of so poor a 
quality, says the narrative of Colonel Matuszewiez, that 
the walls fired upon presented on the exterior a shattered 
appearance, but they were nowhere seriously injured. In 
the words of Napier, " they were not breached^ and a deter- 
mined enemy might have remained secure under the breast- 
works, or in the numerous casemates, without suffering much 
lossy The accidental explosion of a magazine within the 
fort, containing six thousand casks of powder, laid in ruins 
a space of sixty thousand square yards, opened a large 



SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 193 

breach in the walls of the fortifications, partially destroyed 
the prisons, and killed and wounded a thousand men of 
the garrison. This frightful disaster, says the French ac- 
count, hastened the triumph of the fleet. The prisoners 
and malefactors, thus released from confinement, rushed 
upon the garrison at the same time with the mountaineers, 
who had besieged the place on the land side. The use- 
lessness of the artillery, the breaches of the fort, the at- 
tacks of the English, all combined to force the retreat of 
the garrison, " in the midst of scenes of blood and atro- 
cious murders." 

We will close this account with the following extract 
of a speech of the Duke of Wellington, in the House of 
Lords, Feb. 4, 1841 : ^' He had had," he said, "a little 
experience in services of this nature ; and he thought it 
his duty to warn their lordships, on this occasion, that they 
must not always expect that ships, however well command- 
ed, or however gallant their seamen might be, were capable 
of commonly engaging successfully with stone walls. He 
had no recollection, in all his experience, except the recent 
instance on the coast of Syria, of any fort being taken by 
ships, excepting two or three years ago, when the fort of 
San Juan d'Ulloa was captured by the French fleet. This 
was, he thought, the single instance that he recollected, 
though he believed that something of the sort had occur- 
red at the siege of Havana, in 1763. The present 
achievement he considered one of the greatest of modern 
times. This was his opinion, and he gave the highest 
credit to those who had performed such a service. It was, 
altogether, a most skilful proceeding. He was greatly sur- 
prised at the small number of men that was lost on board 
the fleet; and, on inquiring how it happened, he discovered 
that it was because the vessels were moored within one- 
third of the ordinary distance. The guns of the fortress were 
intended to strike objects at a greater distance ; and the con 

17 



194 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

sequence was, that the shot went over the ships that were 
anchored at one-third the usual distance. By that means, 
they sustained not more than one-tenth of the loss which 
they would otherwise have experienced. Not less than 
five hundred pieces of ordnance were directed against the 
walls, and the precision with which the fire was kept up, 
the position of the vessels,' and, lastly, the blowing up of 
the large magazine — all aided in achieving this great vic- 
tory in so short a time. He had thought it right to say 
thus much, because he wished to warn the public against 
supposing that such deeds as this could be effected every 
day. He would repeat that this was a singular instance, 
in the achievement of which undoubtedly great skill was 
manifested, but which was also connected with peculiar 
circumstances, which they could not hope always to oc- 
cur. It must not therefore be expected, as a matter of 
course, that all such attempts must necessarily succeed. *''♦ 

Having completed our examination of the abihty of land 
batteries to cope, gun for gun, with a naval force, let us 
consider, for a few moments, the objection which is some- 
times made to the use of fortifications for the defence of 
the sea-coast, viz. : that our maritime cities and arsenals can 
he better and more economically secured by a home squadron^ 

We have already alluded to the impossibility of substi- 
tuting one means of defence for another. The efficiency 
of the bayonet can in no way enable us to dispense with 
artillery, nor the value of engineer troops in the passage 
of rivers, and the attack and defence of forts, render cav- 
alry the less necessary in other operations of a campaign. 
To the navy alone must we look for the defence of our 
shipping upon the high seas ; but it cannot replace fortifi- 
cations in the protection of our harbors, bays, rivers, ar- 
senals, and commercial towns. 

Let us take a case ia point. ' For the defence of New 
York city, it is deemed highly important that the East 



SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 195 

River should be closed to the approach of a hostile fleet at 
least fifteen or twenty miles from the city, so that an army 
landed there would have to cross the Westchester creek, 
the Bronx, Harlem river, and the defiles of Harlem heights 
— obstacles of great importance in a judicious defence. 
Throg's Neck is the position selected for this purpose ; 
cannon placed there not only command the channel, but, 
from the windings of the river, sweep it for a great dis- 
tance above and below. No other position, even in the 
channel itself, possesses equal advantages. Hence, if we 
had only naval means of defence, it would be best, were 
such a thing possible, to place the floating defences them- 
selves on this point. Leaving entirely out of considera- 
tion the question of relative power, position alone would 
give the superior efficiency to the fort. But there are 
other considerations no less important than that of position. 
Fort Schuyler can be garrisoned and defended in part by 
the same militia force which will be employed to prevent 
the march of the enemy's army on the city. On the other 
hand, the crews of the floating defences must be seamen ; 
they will consequently be of less value in the subsequent 
land operations. Moreover, forts, situated as this is, can 
be so planned as to bring to bear upon any part of the 
channel a greater number of guns than can be presented 
by any hostile squadron against the corresponding portion 
of the fort. This result can be obtained with little diffi- 
culty in narrow channels, as is done in most of the other 
works for the defence of New York, the works for Boston, 
Newport, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Charleston, Savannah, 
New Orleans, &c., and an approximation to it is not in- 
compatible with the defence of the broader estuaries, like 
the Chesapeake. 

But we will suppose that there are no such points of 
land, in the irdets to our harbors, and that we rely for de- 
fence upon a naval force exclusively. Let us leave out of 



196 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

consideration the security of all our other harbors and out 
commerce on the high seas, and also the importance of 
having at command the means of attacking the enemy's 
coast, in the absence of his fleet. We take the single 
case of the attack being made on New York harbor, and 
that our whole fleet is assembled there. Now, if this 
fleet be equal in number to the enemy, the chances of suc- 
cess may be regarded as equal ; if inferior, the chances 
are against us — for an attacking force would probably be 
of picked men and of the best materials. But here the 
consequences of victory are very unequal : the enemy can 
lose his squadron only, while we put in peril both our 
squadron and the objects it is intended to defend. If we 
suppose our own naval force superior to that of the enemy, 
the defence of this harbor would in all respects be com- 
plete, provided this force never left the harbor. But, then, 
all the commerce of the country upon the ocean must be 
left to its fate ; and no attempt can be made to react of- 
fensively upon the foe, unless we can control the chances 
of finding the enemy's fleets within his ports, and the still 
more uncertain chance of keeping him there ; the escape 
of a single vessel being suflicient to cause the loss of our 
harbor." 

These remarks are based upon the supposition that we 
have but the single harbor of New York ; whereas Port- 
land, Portsmouth, Boston, Newport, the Delaware, the 
Chesapeake, Charleston, Savannah, Pensacola, Mobile, 
New Orleans, and numerous other places, are equally 
open to attack, and therefore must be equally defended, 
for we know not to which the enemy will direct his as- 
saults. If he come to one of these in the absence of our 
fleet, his object is attained without resistance ; or. if his 
whole force be concentrated upon one but feebly defended, 
we involve both fleet and harbor in inevitable ruin. Could 
our fleet be so arranged as to meet these enterprises ? 



SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 197 

" As it cannot be denied that the enemy can select the 
point of attack out of the whole extent of coast, where is 
the prescience that can indicate the spot ? And if it can- 
not be foretold, how is that ubiquity to be imparted that 
shall always place our fleet in the path of the advancing 
foe ? Suppose we attempt to cover the coast by cruising 
in front of it, shall we sweep its whole length — a distance 
scarcely less than that which the enemy must traverse in 
passing from his coast to ours ? Must the Gulf of Mexico 
be swept, as well as the Atlantic ; or shall we give up the 
Gulf to the enemy ? Shall we cover the southern cities, 
or give them up also ? We must unquestionably do one 
of two things — either relinquish a great extent of coast, 
confining our cruisers to a small portion only, or include 
so much that the chances of intercepting an enemy would 
seem to be out of the question." 

" On the practicability of covering a small extent of 
coast by cruising in front of it — or, in other words, the 
possibility of anticipating an enemy's operations, discov- 
ering the object of movements of which we get no glimpse 
and hear no tidings, and seeing the impress of his foot- 
steps on the surface of the ocean — it may be well to con- 
sult experience." 

The naval power of Spain under Philip II. was almost 
unlimited. With the treasures of India and America at 
his command, the fitting out of a fleet of one hundred and 
fifty or two hundred sail, to invade another country, was 
no very gigantic operation. Nevertheless, this naval force 
was of but little avail as a coast defence. Its efficiency 
for this purpose was well tested in 1596. England and 
Holland attacked Cadiz with a combined fleet of one hun- 
dred and seventy ships, which entered the Bay of Cadiz 
without, on its approach to their coast, being once seen by 
the Spanish navy. This same squadron, on its return to 
England, passed along a great portion of the Spanish coast 

17* 



198 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

without ever meeting with the slightest opposition from 
the innumerable Spanish floating defences. 

In 1744, a French fleet of twenty ships, and a land 
force of twenty-two thousand men, sailed from Brest to 
the English coast, without meeting with any opposition 
from the superior British fleet which had been sent out, 
under Sir John Norris, on purpose to intercept them. 
The landing of the troops was prevented by a storm, which 
drove the fleet back upon the coast of France to seek 
shelter. 

In 1755, a French fleet of twenty-five sail of the line, 
and many smaller vessels, sailed from Brest for America. 
Nine of these soon afterwards returned to France, and 
the others proceeded to the gulf of St. Lawrence. An 
English fleet of seventeen sail of the line and some frig- 
ates had been sent out to intercept them ; but the two 
fleets passed each other in a thick fog, and all the French 
vessels except two reached Quebec in safety. 

In 1759, a French fleet, blockaded in the port of Dun- 
kirk by a British force under Commodore Bogs, seizing 
upon a favorable opportunity, escaped from the enemy, 
attacked the coast of Scotland, made a descent upon Car- 
rickfergus, and cruised about till February, 1760, without 
meeting a single British vessel, although sixty-one ships 
of the line were then stationed upon the coasts of Eng- 
land and France, and several of these were actually in 
pursuit. 

In 1796, when the French attempted to throw the army 
of Hoche into Ireland, the most strenuous eflbrts were 
made by the British navy to intercept the French fleet in 
its passage. The Channel fleet, of near thirty sail of the 
line, under Lord Bridport, was stationed at Spithead j 
Sir Roger Curtis, with a smaller force, was cruising to 
the westward ; Yice-admiral Colpoys was stationed ofi" 
Brest, with thirteen sail of the line ; and Sir Edward 



SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 199 

Pellew (afterwards Lord Exmouth) watched the harbor, 
with a small squadron of frigates. Notwithstanding this 
triple floating bulwark, as it was called — one fleet on the 
enemy's coast, a second in the Downs, and a third close on 
their own shores — the French fleet of forty-four vessels, 
carrying a land force of twenty-five thousand men, reached 
Bantry Bay in safety I This fleet was eight days on the 
passage, and three more in landing the troops ; and most 
of the vessels might have returned to Brest in safety, had 
it not been for disasters by storms, for only one of their 
whole number was intercepted by the vast naval force 
which England had assembled for that express object. 
" The result of this expedition," says Alison, " was preg- 
nant with important instructions to the rulers of both coun- 
tries. To the French, as demonstrating the extraordinary 
risks which attend a maritime expedition, in comparison 
with a land campaign ; the small number of forces which 
can be embarked on board even a great fleet ; and the 
unforeseen disasters which frequently, on that element, 
defeat the best concerted enterprises. To the English, 
as showing that the empire of the seas does not always afford 
security against invasion ; that, in the face of superior 
maritime forces, her possessions were for sixteen days at 
the mercy of the enemy ; and that neither the skill of her 
sailors nor the valor of her armies, but the fury of the 
elements, saved them from danger in the most vulnerable 
part of their dominions. While these considerations are 
fitted to abate the confidence in invasion, they are calcu- 
lated, at the same time, to weaken an overweening confi- 
dence in naval superiority, and to demonstrate that the 
only base upon which certain reliance can he placed^ even by 
an insular power, is a well-disciplined army and the patri- 
otism of its own subjects y 

Subsequent events still further demonstrated the truth 
of these remarks. In the following year, a French squad- 



200 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

ron of two frigates and two sloops, passed the British 
fleets with perfect impunity, destroyed the shipping in the 
port of Ilfracombe, and safely landed their troops on the 
coast of Wales. Again, in 1798, the immense British 
naval force failed to prevent the landing of General Hum- 
bert's army in the bay of Killala ; and, in the latter part 
of the same year, a French squadron of nine vessels and 
three thousand men escaped Sir J. B. Warren's squadron, 
and safely reached the coast of Ireland. As a further 
illustration, we quote from the report of the Board of Na- 
tional Defence in 1839. 

The Toulon fleet, in 1798, consisting of about twenty 
sail of the line and twenty smaller vessels of war, and 
numerous transports, making in all, three hundred sail 
and forty thousand troops, slipped out of port and sailed 
to Malta. " It was followed by Nelson, who, thinking 
correctly that they were bound for Egypt, shaped his 
course direct for Alexandria. The French, steering to- 
wards Candia, took the more circuitous passage ; so that 
Nelson arrived at Alexandria before them, and, not finding 
them there, returned, by way of Caramania and Candia, 
to Sicily, missing his adversary in both passages. Sail- 
ing again for Alexandria, he found the French fleet at 
anchor in Aboukir bay, and, attacking them there, achieved 
the memorable victory of the Nile. When we consider 
the narrowness of the sea ; the numerous vessels in the 
French fleet ; the actual crossing of the two fleets on a 
certain night ; and that Nelson, notwithstanding, could 
see nothing of the enemy himself, and hear nothing 
of them from merchant vessels, we may judge of the 
probability of waylaying our adversary on the broad 
Atlantic. 

" The escape of another Toulon fleet in 1805 ; the long 
search for them in the Mediterranean by the same able 
ofiicer ; the pursuit in the West Indies ; their evasion of 



SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 201 

him among the islands ; the return to Europe ; his vain 
efforts subsequently, along the coast of Portugal, in the 
bay of Biscay, and off the English channel ; and the 
meeting at last at Trafalgar, brought about only because 
the combined fleets, trusting to the superiority that the 
accession of several reinforcements had given, were wil- 
ling to try the issue of a battle — these are instances, of the 
many that might be cited, to show how small is the proba- 
bility of encountering upon the ocean an enemy who de- 
sires to avoid a meeting, and how little the most unti- 
ring zeal, the most restless activity, the most exalted pro- 
fessional skill and judgment, can do to lessen the adverse 
chances. For more than a year Nelson most closely 
watched his enemy, who seems to have got out of port as 
soon as he was prepared to do so, and without attracting 
the notice of any of the blockading squadron. When, out, 
Nelson, perfectly in the dark as to the course Villeneuve 
had taken, sought for him in vain on the coast of Egypt. 
Scattered by tempests, the French fleet again took refuge 
in Toulon ; whence it again put to sea, when refitted and 
ready, joining the Spanish fleet at Cadiz. 

" On the courage, skill, vigilance, and judgment, acceded 
on all hands to belong in a pre-eminent degree to the na- 
val profession in this country, this system of defence re- 
lies to accomplish, against a string of chances, objects of 
importance so great that not a doubt or misgiving as to the 
result is admissible. It demands of the navy to do per- 
fectly, and without fail, that which, to do at all, seems 
impossible. The navy is required to know the secret 
purposes of the enemy, in spite of distance, and the broken 
intercourse of a state of war, even before these purposes 
are known to the leader who is to execute them ; nay, 
more, before the purpose itself is formed. On an element 
where man is but the sport of storms, the navy is required 
to lie in wait for the foe at the exact spot and moment, in 



202 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

spite of weather and seasons ; to see him in spite of fogs 
and darkness. 

" Finally, after all the devices and reliances of the sys- 
tem are satisfactorily accomplished, and all the difficulties 
subdued, it submits to the issue of a single battle, on equal 
terms, the fate of the war, having no hope or reserve beyond. 

" The proper duty of our navy is, not coast or river de- 
fence ; it has a more glorious sphere — that of the offensive. 
In our last war, instead of lying in harbor, and contenting 
themselves with keeping a few more of the enemy's ves- 
sels in watch over them than their own number — instead 
of leaving the enemy's commerce in undisturbed enjoy- 
ment of the sea, and our coimnerce without countenance 
or aid, they scattered themselves over the wide surface of 
the ocean, penetrated to the most remote seas, everywhere 
acting with the most brilliant success against the enemy's 
navigation. And we believe, moreover, that in the amount 
of the enemy's property thus destroyed, of American prop- 
erty protected or recovered, and in the number of hostile 
ships kept in pursuit of our scattered vessels, ships evaded 
if superior, and beaten if equal — they rendered benefits a 
thousand-fold greater, to say nothing of the glory they ac- 
quired for the nation, and the character they imparted to it, 
than any that would have resulted from a state of passive- 
ness within the harbors. Confident that this is the true 
policy as regards the employment of the navy proper, we 
doubt not that it will in the future be acted on, as it has 
been in the past ; and that the results, as regards both 
honor and advantage, will be expanded commensurately 
with its own enlargement. In order, however, that the 
navy may always assume and maintain that active and en- 
ergetic deportment, in offensive operations, which is at the 
same time so consistent with its functions, and so conso- 
nant with its spirit, we have shown that it must not be oc- 
cupied with mere coast defence." 



SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 203 

A few remarks on the relative cost of ships and forts, 
and the economy of their support, and we will close this 
discussion. We do not regard this question, however, as 
a matter of any great importance, for it can seldom be de- 
cisive in the choice of these two means of defence. No 
matter what their relative cost may be, the one cannot often 
be substituted for the other. There are some few cases, 
however, where this might be taken into consideration, 
and would be decisive. Let us endeavor to illustrate our 
meaning. For the defence of New York city, the Nar- 
rows and East River must be secured by forts ; ships can- 
not, in this case, be substituted. But let us suppose that 
the outer harbor of New York furnishes no favorable place 
for the debarkation of troops, or that the place of debarka- 
tion is so far distant that the troops cannot reach the city 
before the defensive forces can be prepared to repel them. 
This outer harbor would be of great importance to the en- 
emy as a shelter from storms, and as a place of debarka- 
tion or of rendezvous preparatory to a forcible passage of 
the Narrows ; while to us its possession would not be ab- 
solutely essential, though very important. Strong fortifi- 
cations on Sandy Hook, and one of the shoals, might prob- 
ably be so constructed as to furnish a pretty sure barrier 
to the entrance of this outer harbor ; on the other hand, a 
naval force stationed within the inner harbor, and acting 
under the protection of forts at the Narrows, might also 
furnish a good, though perhaps less certain protection for 
this outer roadstead. Here, then, we might well consider 
the question of relative cost and economy of support of the 
proposed fortifications, and of a home squadron large 
enough to effect the same object, and to be kept continu- 
ally at home for that special purpose. If we were to allow 
it to go to sea for the protection of our commerce, its char- 
acter and efficiency as a harbor defence would be lost. 
We can therefore regard it only as a local force — fixed 



204 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

witllin the limits of the defence of this particular place — 
and our estimates must be made accordingly. 

The average durability of ships of war in the British 
navy, has been variously stated at seven and eight years 
in time of war, and from ten to twelve and fourteen years 
in time of peace. Mr. Perring, in his " Brief Inquiry," 
published in 1812, estimates the average durability at 
about eight years. His calculations seem based upon 
authentic information. A distinguished English writer 
has more recently arrived at the same result, from esti- 
mates based upon the returns of the Board of Admiralty 
during the period of the wars of the French Revolution. 
The data in our own possession are less complete ; the 
appropriations for building and repairing having been so 
expended as to render it impossible to draw any accurate 
line of distinction. But, in the returns now before us, 
there are generally separate and distinct amounts of the 
timbers used for these two purposes ; and consequently, 
so far as this (the main item of expense) is concerned, 
we may form pretty accurate comparisons. 

According to Edge, (pp. 20, 21,) the average cost of 
timber, for hulls, masts, and yards, in building an English 
74 gun ship, is ^£6 1,382. Let us now compare this cost of 
timber for building, with that of the same item for repairs, 
for the following fifteen ships, between 1800 and 1820. 
The list would have been still further enlarged, but the 
returns for other ships during some portion of the above 
period are imperfect : 



SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 



205 



Name of Ship. 

Vengeance, 

Ildefonso, 

Scipio, 

Tremendous, 

Elephant, 

Spencer, 

Romulus, 

Albion, 

Doiieg;al, 

Implacable, 

Illustrious, 

Northumberland, . . . 

Kent, 

Sultan, 

Sterling Castle, 



No. of 


When 


Guns. 


built. 


74 


_ 


74 


— 


74 


- 


74 


- 


74 


— 


74 


1800 


74 


- 


74 


1802 


74 


- 


74 


— 


74 


1803 


74 


- 


74 


- 


74 


1807 


74 





Repaired from 



Cost. 



1800 to 
1807 to 
1807 to 

1807 to 

1808 to 

1809 to 

1810 to 
1810 to 

1812 to 

1813 to 

1813 to 

1814 to 
1814 to 
1816 to 
1816 to 



1807 
1808 
1809 
1810 
1811 
1813 
1812 
1813 
1815 
1815 
1816 
1815 
1818 
1818 
1818 



£84,720 
85,195 
60,785 

135,397 
67,007 

124,186 
73,141 

102,295 

101,367 
59,865 
74,184 
59,795 
88,357 
61,518 
65,280 



This table, although incomplete, gives for the above 
fifteen ships, during a period of less than twenty years, 
the cost of timber alone used in their repair, an average 
of about $400,000 each. More timber than this was 
used, in all probability, upon the same vessels, and paid 
for out of the funds appropriated " for such as may be or- 
dered in course of the year to be repaired." But the 
amount specifically appropriated for timber for these fif- 
teen ships, would, in every twelve or fifteen years, equal 
the entire first cost of the same items. If we add to this 
amount, the cost of labor required in the application of 
timber to the operations of repair, and take into consider- 
ation the expense of other materials and labor, and the 
decayed condition of many of the ships at the end of this 
period, we should not be surprised to find the whole sum 
expended under these heads to equal the first cost, even 
within the minimum estimate of seven years. The whole 
cost of timber used for hulls, masts, and yards, in build- 
ing between 1800 and 1820, was jC18,727,551 ; in repairs 
and "ordinary wear and tear," jG17,449,780 ; making an 
annual average of $4,560,158 for building timber, and 
$4,273,371 for that used in repairs. A large portion of 

18 



206 



MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 



the vessels huilt were intended to replace others which 
had been lost, or were so decayed as to be broken up. 

But it may be well to add here, the actual supplies 
voted for the sea-service, and for wear and fear, and the 
extraordinary expenses in building and repairing of ships, 
from 1800 to 1815. 



Year. 



1800 
1801 
1802 
1803 
1804 
1805 
1806 
1807 
1808 
1809 
1810 
1811 
1812 
1813 
1814 
1815 



For the wear 

and tear of 

Ships. 



i:4,350,000 
5,850,000 
3,684,000 
3,120,000 
3,900,000 
4,680,000 
4,680,000 
5,070,000 
5,070,000 
3,295,500 
3,295,500 
3,675,750 
3,675,750 
3,549,000 
3,268,000 
2,386,500 



Ext. Expenses 
for building, 
repairing, &c. 



For entire sea- 
service. 



i:772,140 

933,900 

773,500 

901,140 

948,520 

1,553,690 

1,980,830 

2,134,903 

2,351,188 

2,296,030 

1,841,107 

2,046,200 

1,696,621 

2,822,031 

2,086,274 

2,116,710 



£13,619,079 
16,577,037 
11,833,571 
10,211,378 
12,350,606 
15,035,630 
18,864,341 
17,400,337 
18,087,544 
19,578,467 
18,975,120 
19,822,000 
19,305,759 
20,096,709 
19,312,070 
19,032,700 



It appears from this table that the appropriations for the 
service, during the first fifteen years of the present cen- 
tury, amounted to a little less than ninety millions of dol- 
lars per annum ; and for the wear and tear of ships, and 
"the extraordinary expenses in building and repairing 
ships, &c.," the annual appropriations amounted to near 
thirty millions. 

Our own naval returns are also so imperfect that it is 
impossible to form any very accurate estimate of the rel- 
ative cost of construction and repairs of our men-of-war. 
The following table, compiled from a report of the Secre- 
tary of the Navy, in 1841, (Senate Doc. No. 223, 26th 
Congress,) will afford data for an approximate calcula- 
tion : — 



SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 



207 







Total Cost of 




Cost of Re- 




Name of Ship. 


No. of 


building, 
exclusive of 


When 
com- 


pairs, exclu- 
sive of ord- 


Repaired 
between 




. 


arinanient, 


pleted. 


nance, 








stores, &c. &c. 




&c. &c. 




Delaware, .... 




$543,368 00 


1820 


$,354,132 56 


1827 and 1838 


N. Carolina, . . 




431,8.52 00 


1825 


317,6-28 92 


1824 and 1836 


Constitution,.. 




302,718 84 


1797 


266,878 34 


1833 and 1839 


United states,. 




299,336 56 


1797 


571,972 77 


1821 and 1841 


Brandy wine,.. 




*299,218 12 


1825 


*377,665 95 


1826 and 1><38 


Potomac, 




*231,013 02 


1822 


*82,597 03 


1829 and 1835 


Concord, 


20 


115,325 80 


1828 


72,796 22 


1832 and 1840 


Falmouth, 


20 


94,093 27 


1827 


130,015 43 


1828 and 1837 


John Adams, . 


20 


110,670 69 


1829 


119,641 93 


1834 and 1837 


Boston, 


20 


91,973 19 


1825 


189,264 37 


1826 and 1840 


St. Louis, 


20 


102,461 95 


1828 


135,458 75 


1834 and 1839 


Vincennes, . . . 


20 


111,512 79 


1826 


178,094 81 


1830 and 1838 


Vandalia, 


20 


90,977 88 


1828 


59,181 34 


1832 and 1834 


Lexington, 


20? 


114,622 35 


1826 


83,386 52 


1827 and 1837 


Warren, 


20? 


99,410 01 


1826 


152,596 03 


1830 and 1838 


Fairlield, 


20 


100,490 35 


1826 


65,918 26 


1831 and 1837 


Natches,t 


20? 


106,232 19 


1827 


129,969 80 


1829 and 1836 


Boxer, 


10 


30,697 88 


1831 


28,780 48 


1834 and 1840 


Enterprise, 


10 


27,938 63 


1831 


20,716 59 


1834 and 1840 


Grampus, 


10 


23,627 42 


1821 


96,086 36 


1825 and 1840 


Dolphin, 


10 


38,522 62 


1836 


15,013 35 


1839 and 1840 


Shark, 


10 


23,627 42 


1821 


93,395 84 


1824 and 1839 



It appears from the above table, that the cost of con- 
structing ships of the line is about $6,600 per gun ; of 
frigates, $6,500 per gun ; of smaller vessels of war, a 
little less than $5,000 per gun : making an average cost 
of vessels of war to be more than six thousand dollars per 
gun. And the expense of repairs for these vessels is 
more than seven per cent, per annum on their first cost. 

We have as yet had but little experience in the use of 
war-steamers. The Fulton, four guns, built in 1838-39, 
cost three hundred and thirty-three thousand seven hun- 
dred and seventy dollars and seventy-seven cents ; the 
Mississippi and Missouri, ten guns each, built in 1841, 
cost about six hundred thousand dollars a piece ; making 
an average cost for war-steamers of over sixty thousand 
dollars per gun. The cost of repairs of steam ships will 
be much greater than those for vessels of war ; but we 



* Returns incomplete. 



t Broken up in 1840. 



208 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

liave not yet had sufficient experience to determine the 
exact amount. It has been estimated, however, by com- 
petent judges, that when kept, the expense of repairs 
will at least equal twelve per cent, of the first cost. The 
expense of keeping them in commission is enormously 
great. " Their engines," says the Secretary of the Navy, 
in his annual report in 1842, " consume so much fuel as 
to add enormously to their expenses ; and the necessity 
that they should return to port, after short intervals of 
time, for fresh supplies, renders it impossible to send 
them on any distant service. They cannot be relied on 
as cruisers, and are altogether too expensive for service 
in time of peace. I have therefore determined to take 
them out of commission, and substitute for them other and 
less expensive vessels." 

The average cost of permanent fortifications is but 
little more than three thousand dollars per gun. And it 
must be obvious, from the nature of the materials of 
which they are constructed, that the expense of their 
support must be inconsiderable. It is true that for some 
years past a large item of annual expenditure for fortifi- 
cations has been under the head of " repairs ;" but much 
of this sum is for alterations and enlargements of tempo- 
rary and inefficient works, erected anterior to the war of 
1812. Some of it, however, has been for actual repairs 
of decayed or injured portions of the forts ; these injuries 
resulting from the nature of the climate, the foundations, 
the use of poor materials and poor Avorkmanship, and 
from neglect and abandonment. But if we include the 
risk of abandonment at times, it is estimated, upon data 
drawn from past experience, that one-third of one per cent, 
per annum, of the first cost, will keep in perfect repair 
any of our forts that have been constructed since the last 
war. 

But it is unnecessary to further discuss this question. 



SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 209 

We repeat what has already been said, no matter what 
may be the relative cost of ships and forts, the one, as a 
general thing, cannot be substituted for the other. Each 
has its own sphere of action, and each will contribute, in 
its own way, to the national defence ; and any undue in- 
crease of one, at the expense of the other, will be at- 
tended by a corresponding diminution of national power.* 

* For further information concerning our system of sea. coast de- 
fences, the reader is referred to House Doc. 206, twenty-sixth Con- 
gress, second session ; Senate Doc. 85, twenty-eighth Congress, sec- 
ond session ; and to the annual reports of the Chief Engineer. 

18* 



210 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES. 

In discussing engineering as a branch of the military 
art, we spoke of the use of fortifications on land frontiers, 
and their influence on the strategic operations of a cam- 
paign. A brief notice was also given of the different sys- 
tems that have been proposed for arranging these defen- 
sive works. Let us now apply this discussion to our 
northern frontier. 

The principle laid down by Napoleon and Jomini, 
*' that fortifications should always be constructed on im- 
portant strategic points," is undoubtedly the correct one : 
but how to determine these points is a question that will 
often perplex the patience and try the skill of the engi- 
neer ; yet determine them he must, or his fortifications 
will be worse than useless ; for a fort improperly located, 
like a cannon with its fire reversed on its own artillerists, 
will be sure to effect the destruction of the very forces it 
was designed to protect. 

The selection of positions for fortifications on our 
northern frontier must have reference to three distinct 
classes of objects, viz. : the security, first, of the large 
frontier towns, where much public and private property is 
exposed to sudden dashing expeditions of the foe, made 
either on land or by water ; second, of lake harbors, im- 
portant as places of refuge and security to our own ships, 
or to the enemy's fleets while engaged in landing troops 
or furnishing supplies to an invading army ; third, of all 
strategic points on the probable lines of offensive or de- 



OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES. 211 

fensive operations. These objects are distinct in their 
nature, and would seem to require separate and distinct 
means for their accomplishment ; nevertheless, it will 
generally be found that positions selected with reference 
to one of these objects equally fulfil the others, so inti- 
mately are they all connected. To determine the strategic 
points of a probable line of military operations is there- 
fore the main thing to be attended to in locating fortifica- 
tions. That such points of maximum importance are ac- 
tually marked out by the peaceful or hostile intercourse of 
nations cannot be doubted. 

The relative importance of cities and towns is less va- 
ried by the fluctuations of commerce on a land frontier 
than on the sea-coast. The ever-changing system of " in- 
ternal improvements," by furnishing new highways and 
thoroughfares for the transportation of the products of 
manufacturers and agriculture, either continually varies 
the relative standing of the seaports already opened, or 
opens new ones for the exportation of these products, and 
the importation of foreign articles received in exchange. 
But these " internal improvements" are seldom carried so 
far as to connect together two separate and distinct coun- 
tries, and consequently the principal places on the di- 
viding line usually retain their relative importance, no 
matter how often they may have declined during times of 
hostility, or again flourished with the increased commer- 
cial intercourse which results from peace. The principal 
European places of trafi[ic near the frontiers have remained 
the same for ages, and in all probability ages hence the 
great frontier marts will be nearly the same as at present. 
This stability of rank among border towns is not confined 
to commercial influence ; the same holds true with re- 
spect to that established by intercourse of a hostile char- 
acter. Military history teaches us that lines of hostile 
operations, and the fields upon which the principal battles 



212 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

between any two countries have been fought, are nearly 
the same, no matter hoAv remote the periods of comparison. 
These points and lines, so important in commerce as well 
as in war, result from the natural features of the ground, 
and we ought therefore to expect that they would be as 
little liable to sudden changes as the character of the 
earth itself. 

From these remarks it will readily be perceived that 
there are three distinct methods of determining the strate- 
gic points between this country and Canada: 1st, by an 
examination of the topography of the two countries ; 2d, 
by tracing out the main channels of commercial inter- 
course ; 3d, by reviewing the lines of their military oper- 
ations. The last method is the least liable to error, and 
perhaps is the most easily understood, inasmuch as it is 
sometimes difficult to point out the precise degree of con- 
nection between prospective military lines and the chan- 
nels of commerce, or to show why these two have a fixed 
relation to the physical features of the country. In the 
present instance, moreover, this method furnishes ample 
data for the formation of our decision, inasmuch as the 
campaigns between this country and Canada have been 
neither few in number nor unimportant in their character 
and results. 

In tracing out the main features of the early wars upon 
our northern frontier, it must be borne in mind that nearly 
the same portion of country which is now possessed by 
the English, was then occupied by the French, and that 
the English possessions in North America included the 
present Middle and Northern States. At the period of 
the American revolution the French and English had com- 
pletely changed ground, the armies of the former opera- 
ting in the " States," while the English were in possession 
of Canada, 

The first expedition to be noticed against that portion of 



OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES. 213 

the country, was conducted by Samuel Argall, who sailed 
from Virginia in 1613, with a fleet of eleven vessels, at- 
tacked the French on the Penobscot, and afterwards the 
St. Croix. 

In 1654, Sedgwick, at the head of a small New Eng- 
land army, attacked the French on the Penobscot, and 
overrun all Arcadia. 

In 1666, during the contest between Charles II. and 
Louis XIV., it was proposed to march the New England 
troops across the country by the Kennebec or Penobscot, 
and attack Quebec ; but the terrors and difficulties of cross- 
ing " over rocky mountains and howling deserts" were such 
as to deter them from undertaking the campaign. 

In 1689, Count Frontenac, governor of Canada, made a 
descent into New York to assist the French fleet in redu- 
cing that province. His line of march was by the river 
Sorrel and Lake Champlain. An attack upon Montreal 
by the Iroquois soon forced him to return ; but in the fol- 
lowing January a party of French and Indians left Mon- 
treal in the depth of a Canadian winter, and after wading, 
for two and twenty days, with provisions on their backs, 
through snows and swamps and across a wide wilderness, 
reached the unguarded village of Schenectady. Here a 
midnight war-whoop was raised, and the inhabitants either 
massacred or driven half-clad through the snow to seek 
protection in the neighboring towns. 

In 1690, a congress of the colonies, called to provide 
means for the general defence, assembled at New York, 
and resolved to carry war into Canada : an army was to 
attack Montreal by way of Lake Champlain, and a fleet to 
! attempt Quebec by the St. Lawrence. The former ad- 
vanced as far as the lake, when the quarrels of the com- 
manding oflacers defeated the objects of the expedition. 
The Massachusetts fleet of thirty-four vessels, (the largest 
carrying forty-four guns each,) and two thousand men, 



214 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

failed to reduce Quebec, though the defences of that place 
were then of the slightest character, and armed with only 
twenty-three guns. 

In 1704, and again in 1707, Port Royal was attacked by 
costly expeditions fitted out by the eastern colonies ; and 
again, in 1709, a land force of fifteen hundred men ad- 
vanced against Montreal by Lake Champlain; but nothing 
of importance was effected by either expedition. 

In 1711, Lord Bolingbroke planned the conquest of Can- 
ada. The land forces, numbering five thousand men in all, 
were separated into two distinct aniiies, the one sent 
against Detroit, and the other against Montreal by Lake 
Champlain ; while a fleet of fifteen ships of war, forty 
transports, and six store-ships, carrying a land force of 
six thousand five hundred men, was to attack Quebec. 
The maritime expedition failed to reach its destination, 
and after losing a part of the fleet and more than a thou- 
sand men in the St. Lawrence, this part of the project 
was abandoned. Nor was any thing important accom- 
plished by either division of the land forces. 

The same plan of campaign was followed in 1712. An 
army of four thousand men marched against Montreal by 
Lake Champlain, but on hearing of the failure of the naval 
expedition and of the concentration of the French forces 
on the river Sorel, they retired towards Albany. 

The next expedition of any importance was the naval 
one of 1745 against Louisburg. For the attack of this 
place the colonies raised about four thousand men, and one 
hundred small vessels and transports, carrying between 
one hundred and sixty and two hundred guns. They 
were afterwards joined by ten other vessels carr}dng near 
^ve hundred guns. This attacking force now, according 
to some of the English writers, consisted of six thousand 
provincials, and eight hundred seamen, and a combined 
naval force of near seven hundred guns. The troops 



OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES. 215 

landed, and laid siege to the town. The garrison of the 
fortifications of Louisburg consisted of six hundred regu- 
lars and one thousand Breton militia, or, according to 
some writers, of only twelve hundred men in all. The 
armament of these works was one hundred and one cannon, 
seventy-six swivels, and six mortars. Auxiliary to the 
main works were an island-battery of thirty twenty-two- 
pounders, and a battery on the main land armed with 
thirty large cannon. Frequent attempts were made to 
storm the place, but the most persevering efforts were of 
no avail, many of the New Englanders being killed and 
wounded, and their boats destroyed, while the garrison 
remained unharmed. At length, after a siege of forty- 
nine days, want of provisions and the general dissatisfac- 
tion of the inhabitants, caused the garrison to surrender. 
When the New Englanders saw the strength of the works, 
and the slight impression which their efforts had produced, 
they were not only elated but greatly astonished at their 
success. It should be noticed, that in the above attack 
the number of guns in the fleet was almost three times as 
great as that of all the forts combined ; and yet the naval 
part of the attack was unsuccessful. The besieging army 
was more than four times as great as all the garrisons 
combined ; and yet the place held out forty-nine days, and 
at last was surrendered through the* want of provisions 
and the disaffection of the citizens. This place was soon 
afterwards restored to the French. 

We see that, thus far in these wars, the English were 
vastly superior in strength and numbers, yet the result of 
the several campaigns was decidedly in favor of the 
French, who not only retained their possessions in the 
North, but extended their jurisdiction to the mouth of the 
Mississippi, and laid claim to the whole country west of 
the Alleghany mountains. This success must be attribu- 
ted, not to any superiority of the Canadians in bravery, 



216 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

but to the higher military character of their governors, 
and more especially to their fortifications, which were con- 
structed in situations most judiciously selected, to influ- 
ence the Indians and facilitate incursions into the Eng- 
lish colonies. The French pursued interior and central 
lines, while the English followed exterior and divergent 
lines. The disparity of numbers was always very great. 
At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the whole 
population of the colonies amounted to upwards of one 
million of souls, while that of both Canada and Louisiana 
did not exceed fifty-two thousand. But the French pos- 
sessions, though situated at the extremities of a continent 
and separated by an almost boundless wilderness, were 
nevertheless connected by a line of military posts, strong 
enough to resist the small arms that could then be brought 
against them. This fort-building propensity of the French 
became a matter of serious alarm to the colonies, and in 
1710 the legislature of New York especially protested 
against it in an address to the crown. While the military 
art was stationary in England, France had produced her 
four great engineers — Errard, Pagan, Vauban, and Cor- 
montaigne ; and nowhere has the influence of their sys- 
tem of military defence been more strikingly exhibited 
than in the security it aflbrded to the Canadian colony, 
when assailed by such vastly superior British forces. 
Still further accessions were now made to these English 
forces by large reinforcements from the mother country, 
while the Canadians received little or no assistance from 
France ; nevertheless they prolonged the war till 1760, 
forcing the English to adopt at last the slow and expen- 
sive process of reducing all their fortifications. This 
will be shown in the following outline of the several cam- 
paigns. 

Very early in 1755, a considerable body of men was 
sent from Great Britain to reinforce their troops in this 



OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES. 217 

country. These troops were again separated into four 
distinct armies. The first, consisting of near two thou- 
sand men, marched to the attack of Fort Du Quesne, but 
was met and totally defeated by one-half that number of 
French and Indians. The second division, of fifteen hun- 
dred, proceeded to attack Fort Niagara by way of Oswego, 
but returned without success. The third, of three thou- 
sand seven hundred men, met and defeated Dieskau's 
army of twelve hundred regulars and six hundred Cana- 
dians and Indians, in the open field, but did not attempt 
to drive him from his w^orks at Ticonderoga and Crown 
Point. The fourth, consisting of three thousand three 
hundred men and forty-one vessels, laid waste a portion of 
Nova Scotia ; thus ending the campaign without a single 
important result. It was commenced under favorable aus- 
pices, with ample preparations, and a vast superiority of 
force ; hut this superiority was again more than counterbal- 
anced by the faulty plans of the English, and by the fortifi- 
cations which the French had erected, in such positions as to 
give them a decided advantage in their military operations. 
Washington early recommended the same system of de- 
fence for the English on the Ohio ; and, after Braddock's 
defeat, advised " the erection of small fortresses at con- 
venient places to deposite provisions in, by which means 
the country will be eased of an immense expense in the 
carriage, and it will also be a means of securing a retreat 
if we should be put to the rout again." 

But this advice of Washington w^as unheeded, and the 
campaign of 1756 was based upon the same erroneous 
principles as the preceding one. T\ie first division, of three 
thousand men, was to operate against Fort Du Quesne ; the 
second, of six thousand men, against Niagara ; the third, of 
ten thousand men, against Crown Point; and di fourth, of 
two thousand men, was to ascend the Kennebec river, de- 
stroy the settlements on the Chaudiere, and, by alarming 

19 



218 MILITARY A:rr AND SCIENCE. 

the country about Quebec, produce a diversion in favor of 
the third division, v^hich was regarded as the main army, 
and was directed along the principal line of operations. 
The entire French forces at this time consisted of only 
three thousand regulars and a body of Canadian militia. 
Nevertheless, the English, with forces nearly six times as 
numerous, closed the campaign without gaining a single 
advantage. 

We here see that the French, with very inferior forces, 
still continued successful in every campaign, uniformly 
gaining advantage over their enemy, and gaining ground 
upon his colonies. By the possession of Forts William 
Henry, Ticonderoga, and Crown Point, they completely 
commanded Lake George and Lake Champlain, which af- 
forded the shortest and easiest line of communication be- 
tween the British colonies and Canada. By means of 
their forts at Montreal, Frontenac, Detroit, &c., they had 
entire dominion of the lakes connecting the St. Lawrence 
with the Mississippi, and Canada with Louisiana ; more- 
over, by means of Fort Du Quesne and a line of auxiliary 
works, their ascendency over the Indians on the Ohio was 
well secured. But experience had at length taught the 
English wherein lay the great strength of their opponents, 
and a powerful effort was now to be made to displace the 
French from their fortresses, or at least to counterbalance 
these works by a vast and overwhelming superiority of 
troops. 

In 1757, a British fleet of fifteen ships of the line, 
eighteen frigates, and many smaller vessels, and a land 
force of twelve thousand effective men, were sent to at- 
tempt the reduction of the fortifications of Louisburg ; but 
they failed to effect their object. 

In 1758 the forces sent against this place consisted of 
twenty ships of the line and eighteen frigates, with an ar- 
my of fourteen thousand men. The harbor was defended 



OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES. 219 

by only five ships of the line, one fifty-gun ship, and five 
frigates, three of which were sunk across the mouth of the 
basin. The fortifications of the town had been much neg- 
lected, and in general had fallen into ruins. The garri- 
son consisted of only two thousand five hundred regulars, 
and six hundred militia. Notwithstanding that the number 
of guns of the British fleet exceeded both the armaments 
of the French ships and of all the forts, these British ships 
did not risk an attack, but merely acted as transports and 
as a blockading squadron. Even the French naval defence, 
and the outer works commanding the harbor, were reduced 
by the temporary land-batteries which Wolfe erected ; and 
the main work, although besieged by aninequality of forces 
of nearly ^t;e to one, held out for two months, and even 
then surrendered through the fears and petitions of the 
non-combatant inhabitants, and not because it had received 
any material injury from the besiegers. The defence, 
however, had been continued long enough to prevent, for 
that campaign, any further operations against Canada. The 
whole number of the English land forces in this campaign 
was computed at fifty thousand men, of which more than 
forty thousand were in the field. The^r^^ division, of 
nine thousand men, was directed against Fort Du Quesne, 
whose garrison did not exceed as many hundred. The 
second division, of sixteen thousand effective troops, pro- 
ceeded against Ticonderoga and Crown Point ; while a 
detachment of three thousand men captured Fort Fronte- 
nac, then garrisoned by only one hundred and ten men. 
The whole force of the French amounted to only five 
thousand ; the English attempted to drive them from their 
works by storm, but were repulsed with a loss of near two 
thousand men, while their opponents were scarcely in- 
jured. The third division acted, as has just been stated, 
in concert with the naval force against Louisburg. 

In 1759, the western division of the English army, con- 



220 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

sisting of a strong body of Indians, and five thousand 
troops, wasted the whole season in reducing Fort Niagara, 
which was garrisoned by only six hundred men. The 
central column of thirteen thousand men was sufficiently 
successful to enable it to winter at Crown Point. The 
eastern division of eight thousand men under Wolfe as- 
cended the St. Lawrence with a fleet of twenty-two ships, 
thirteen frigates, and fourteen sloops, and smaller vessels, 
carrying one thousand nine hundred and ninety guns, and 
five thousand five hundred and ninety seamen. The naval 
defence of Quebec consisted of eight frigates, carrying two 
hundred and ten guns ; the land forces numbered about 
nine thousand, and the fortifications were armed with nine- 
ty-four guns and five mortars, only a part of which could 
be brought to bear upon the anchorage ground. Several 
attempts were made by the combined forces to carry these 
works, but they proved equally unsuccessful. Although 
the English fleet carried twenty times as many guns as the 
forts, their inability to reduce these works was acknowl- 
edged. The siege had continued for two months, and still 
the fortifications were uninjured. General Wolfe himself 
distinctly stated, that, in any further attempt to carry the 
place, the " guns of the shipping could not be of much 
use ;" and the chief engineer of the expedition gave it as 
his opinion, that " the ships would receive great damage 
from the shot and bombs of the upper batteries, without 
making the least impression upon them." Under these 
circumstances it was finally determined to endeavor to de- 
coy Montcalm from his works, and make him risk a battle 
in the open field. In an evil hour, the French consented 
to forego the advantages of their fortifications, and the 
contest was finally decided on the plains of Abraham, with 
forces nearly equal in number. Both Wolfe and Mont- 
calm fell in this battle, but the former on the field of vic- 
tory ; and five days afterwards the inhabitants of Quebec, 



OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES. 221 

weakened and dispirited by their losses, surrendered the 
town, ahhough its fortifications were still unharmed. 

The French, in this campaign, had relinquished all idea 
of opposing the enemy in the open field, and confined their 
efforts to retard the advance of the English till France 
could send troops to their relief ; but no such relief came : 
and when the campaign of 1760 opened, the little French 
army was concentrated at Montreal. As the English di- 
visions advanced, one by Oswego, one by Lake Champlain, 
and the third by Quebec, they afforded to the French a fine 
opportunity for the strategic movement from a centre against 
converging lines ; but the garrison was too weak to hope 
for success in either direction, and therefore awaited the 
enemy within their works. Montreal, being but slightly 
fortified, was soon reduced, and with it fell the French 
empire erected in this country at infinite labor and ex- 
pense. 

At the first outbreak of the American Revolution, it was 
so obviously important to get possession of the military 
works commanding the line of Lake Champlain, that ex- 
peditions for this purpose were simultaneously fitted out 
by Massachusetts and Connecticut. The garrisons of 
these works were taken by surprise. This conquest, says 
Botta, the able and elegant historian of the Revolution, 
" was no doubt of high importance, but it would have had 
a much greater influence upon the course of the whole 
war, if these fortresses, which are the bulwarks of the col- 
onies^ had been defended in times following, with the 
same prudence and valor with which they had been ac- 
quired." 

In the campaign of 1775, an army of two thousand 
seven hundred and eighty-four effective men, with a re- 
serve of one thousand at Albany, crossed the lake and 
approached the fortress of St. John's about the 1st of 
September. The work was garrisoned by only about five 

19* 



222 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

or six hundred regulars, and some two hundred militia. 
This was the only obstacle to prevent the advance of our 
army into the very heart of Canada ; to leave it unreduced 
in rear would cut off all hope of retreat. Allen had al- 
ready made the rash and foolish attempt, and his whole 
army had been destroyed, and he himself made prisoner. 
The reduction of this place was therefore deemed abso- 
lutely necessary, but was not effected till the 3d of Novem- 
ber, and after a long and tedious siege. This delay decided 
the fate of the campaign ; for, although Montreal fell im- 
mediately afterwards, the season was so far advanced that 
a large portion of our troops, wearied with their sufferings 
from cold and want of clothing, now demanded their dis- 
charge. The eastern division, of one thousand men un- 
der Arnold, crossing the country by the Kennebeck and 
Chaudiere, through difficulties and suffering almost un- 
paralleled, arrived opposite Quebec on the 9th of Novem- 
ber. The place was at this time almost without defence, 
and, had Arnold possessed a suitable ponton equipage, it 
might easily have been taken by surprise. But by the 
time that the means for effecting a passage could be 
prepared, and a junction could be effected between the 
two American armies, Quebec was prepared to sustain 
their attack. The result of that attack is too well known 
to require a repetition here. 

Early the next season it was deemed necessary to 
withdraw the American army from Canada. This retreat 
of undisciplined troops, in the presence of vastly superior 
numbers of the enemy, would have been extremely haz- 
ardous had it not been effected on a line of forts which 
were held by our own troops. As it was we sustained no 
considerable loss. 

Carleton pursued on rapidly, to co-operate with General 
Howe, who was now lying at New York with over one 
hundred ships and about thirty-five thousand troops ; but 



OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES. 223 

he received a decided check from the guns of Ticonde- 
roga, and retired again to Canada. 

By the British plan of campaign in 1777, the entire 
force of their northern army was to concentrate at Al- 
bany. One division of fifteen hundred men, including 
Indians, advanced by Oswego, Wood Creek, and the Mo- 
hawk ; but Fort Stanwix, with a garrison of only six 
hundred men, arrested their progress and forced them to 
return. Another, leaving New York, ascended the Hud- 
son as far as Esopus ; but its progress was so much re- 
tarded by the small forts and water-batteries along that 
river, that it would have been too late to assist Burgoyne, 
even if it could possibly have reached Albany. The 
principal division of the enemy's army, numbering about 
nine thousand men, advanced by the Champlain route. 
Little or no preparations were made to arrest its progress. 
The works of Ticonderoga were so out of repair as to be 
indefensible on the flanks. Its garrison consisted of only 
fifteen hundred continental troops, and about as many mi- 
litia, over whom the general had no control. Their sup- 
ply of provisions was exhausted, and only one man in ten 
of the militia had bayonets to their guns. Under these 
circumstances it Avas deemed best to withdraw the garri- 
son six days after the investment. Burgoyne now ad- 
vanced rapidly, but with so little precaution as to leave 
his communications in rear entirely unprotected. Being 
repulsed by the American forces collected at Saratoga, 
his line of supplies cut ofl* by our detached forts, his pro- 
visions exhausted, his troops dispirited, and his Indian 
allies having deserted him, retreat became impossible, 
and his whole army was forced to capitulate. This cam- 
paign closed the military operations on our northern fron- 
tier during the war of the Revolution. 

We now come to the war of 1812. In the beginning of 
this war the number of British regulars in the Canadas did 



224 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

not exceed three thousand men, who were scattered along 
a frontier of more than nine hundred miles in extent. In 
the whole of Upper Canada there were but seven hundred 
and twenty men, and at Montreal, Three Rivers, and on 
the whole line of the Sorel the whole defensive force 
amounted to only thirteen hundred and thirty men, and the 
garrison of Quebec was so small, that no detachment 
could be made without great inconvenience and danger. 
The fortifications of Isle aux Noix, then emphatically the 
key of central Canada, was without a garrison during 
nearly the whole of the first campaign. Under these cir- 
cumstances an American force of fifteen hundred or two 
thousand men marching rapidly from Albany, might readi- 
ly have broken the enemy's line of defence, and cut off all 
Upper Canada from supplies and reinforcements from 
England by way of Quebec. Let us see what course was 
pursued. 

On the 1st of June an army of two thousand men was 
collected at Dayton, in Ohio, placed under the command 
of an imbecile old officer of the Revolution, and directed 
by Detroit against the Canadian Peninsula. The dilatory 
march, absurd movements, and traitorous surrender of 
Hull's army to a British force of three hundred regulars 
and four hundred militia, are but too well known. An- 
other American army of about ten thousand men was 
afterwards raised in the west ; the main division of this 
army under Harrison marched by three separate routes to 
invade Canada by way of Maiden ; but they failed to reach 
their destination, and wintered behind the river Portage. 
The Eastern army was collected at Albany in the early 
part of the summer and placed under the command of 
General Dearborn, another old officer of the Revolution. 
Instead of pushing this force rapidly forward upon the 
strategic line of Lake Champlain, the general was directed 
to divide it into three parts, and to send one division 



OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES. 225 

against the Niagara frontier, a second against Kingston, 
and a third against Montreal. These orders were dis- 
patched from Washington the 26th of June, nearly a month 
after Hull had begun his march from Dayton. Dearborn's 
anny, on the first of September, consisted of six thousand 
five hundred regulars and seven thousand militia — thirteen 
thousand 1^Ye hundred in all : six thousand three hundred 
for the Niagara frontier, two thousand two hundred at 
Sacketts Harbor, and five thousand for Lake Cham plain. 
Even with this absurd plan of campaign and faulty division 
of the forces, we might have succeeded if the general had 
acted with energy, so exceedingly weak were the Cana- 
dian means of defence ; but instead of taking advantage 
of his superiority in numbers and the favorable circum- 
stances of the time, he entered into an armistice with the 
British general, and his whole army of thirteen thousand 
^\Q hundred men lay inactive till the 13th of October, 
when the absurd project of crossing the Niagara at Lewis- 
ton failed, because the New-York militia had constitu- 
tional scruples against crossing a river so long as the ene- 
my were on the other side. The Lake Champlain column, 
consisting of three thousand regulars and two thousand 
militia, a considerable portion of which had been collected 
as early as the first of August, had in four months advanced 
as far as La Cole river, a distance of about two hundred 
miles from Albany. The unimportant action at this place 
terminated the campaign, and the army of the North re- 
turned to winter-quarters. 

All the early part of the campaign of 1813, on the 
northern frontier, was spent in a war of detachments, in 
which our troops captured Fort George and York, and 
repelled the predatory excursions of the enemy. In these 
operations our troops exhibited much courage and energy, 
and the young officers who led them, no little skill and 
military talent. But nothing could have been more ab- 



226 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

surd than for a general, with superior forces in the vi- 
cinity of an enemy, to act only by detachments at a time 
when his opponents were daily increasing in number. 
This useless war of outposts and detachments was con- 
tinued till July, when General Dearborn was recalled, 
and General Wilkinson, another old officer of the Revo- 
lution, put in his place. It was now determined to make 
a push for Montreal, with the combined forces of the 
Northern anny. Wilkinson, with 8,000 men, descended 
the St. Lawrence, but did not reach Prescott till the 6th 
of November, thus affording to the English plenty of leis- 
ure to prepare for his reception. Hampton, another old 
officer of the Revolution, ascended Lake Champlain with 
another column of 4,000 men, but refused to form any co- 
operation with Wilkinson, and after the unimportant com- 
bat of Chrystler's Field, the whole army again retired to 
winter-quarters . 

In the mean time the army of the West, under Har- 
rison, who was assisted by the military skill and science 
of M'Crea and Wood, and the bravery of Croghan and 
Johnson, held in check the British and Indians ; and the 
battle of the Thames and the victory of Lake Erie form- 
ed a brilliant termination to the campaign in that quarter. 
Had such victories been gained on the Montreal or east- 
em portion of the frontier, they would have led to the 
most important results. 

The plan of operations for the campaign of 1814 was 
of the same diverse and discordant character as before. 
But the command of the troops had now fallen into the 
hands of young and energetic officers ; and Brown, as- 
sisted by such men as Wood, M'Crea, Scott, Ripley, 
Miller, soon gained the victories of Fort Erie, Chippe- 
wa, and Lundy's Lane ; while M'Comb and M'Donough 
drove back the enemy from the line of Lake Champlain. 
With these operations terminated the Northern campaign 



OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES. 227 

of 1814, the last which has been conducted on that fron- 
tier. 

Let us now turn to the system of works projected for 
the defence of this line. 

The first works are at the Falls of St. Mary, on the 
western extremity of the line. 

The second works are at Mackinaw. 

The third works are at the foot of Lake Huron. 

The fourth works are near Detroit. 

The fifth works are near Buffalo. 

The sixth works are at the mouth of the Niagara river. 

The seventh works are at Oswego. 

The eighth works are at Sacketts Harbor. 

The ninth works are below Ogdensburg. 

The tenth works are at Rouse's Point. 

The eleventh works are near the head-waters of the 
Kennebec or the Penobscot. 

The twelfth works are at Calais, on the St. Croix. 

All these works are small, and simple in their charac- 
ter, well calculated to assist the operations of armed 
forces in the field, but incapable of resisting a protracted 
siege. They are entirely different in their character from 
those on the coast, the latter being intended principally 
for the use of our citizen-soldiery, in the defence of our 
seaport towns, while the former are intended merely as 
auxiliaries to the operations of more disciplined troops. 

This system of defence for our Northern frontier has 
been much commented on by men professing some know- 
ledge of the military art, and various opinions have been 
advanced respecting its merits. Some have thought that 
more and larger works should be placed on the western 
extremity of this line ; others attach by far the greatest 
importance to the central or Montreal portion of the fron- 
tier ; while others, again, attach a higher value to the 
eastern extremity of the line. 



228 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

These last would have us concentrate our main forces 
on the head-waters of the Kennebec and the Penobscot, 
and then advance upon Quebec, a distance of some 250 
miles, along the isolated carriage-road, through the valley 
of the Chaudiere. Here is only a single road, but little 
travelled, and penetrating a wide and almost uninhabited 
wilderness. General Jomini says emphatically, that a 
line of operations should always offer two or three roads for 
the movement of an army in the sphere of its enterprises, — 
an insuperable objection to the Kennebec route, except 
as a diversion to the main attack. But there are still 
stronger objections to this route, than its want of feasi- 
bility for the transportation of the main army ; for even 
should that army succeed in reaching Quebec in safety, 
the expedition would be entirely without military results, 
unless that fortress could be immediately reduced, — a 
contingency which would be extremely doubtful under 
the most favorable circumstances ; and even should we be 
ever so fortunate in our operations, the siege of such a 
place would occupy a considerable length of time. It 
would be throwing our forces along the most difficult line 
of operations, against the strongest point in the enemy's 
line of defence, and making the success of the whole 
plan depend upon the contingency of a reduction, in a 
few days, of one of the strongest fortresses in the world. 
What principle in military science would justify such a 
plan of campaign ? We are fully aware of the great ad- 
vantages to be derived from the reduction of Quebec ; 
and we are also aware of the great difficulties to be en- 
countered in any attempt to accomplish that object. It 
may, and probably will ere long, be made to surrender to 
our arms ; but it would be utter folly to base our military 
operations on the contingency of a short and successful 
siege. By advancing upon Montreal by the Lake Cham- 
plain route, we could cut off the Canadian forces in the 



OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES. 229 

West from all reinforcements ; and then, as circumstances 
might direct, could besiege Quebec, or attack the enemy 
in the field, or perhaps, manoeuvring as the French did at 
the siege of Mantua, accomplish both objects at the same 
time. 

We have seen that it was one of Napoleon's maxims 
that an army should choose the shortest and ?nost direct line 
of operations, which should either pierce the enemxfs line of 
defence, or cut off his communications with his base. It is 
the opinion of men of the best military talent in our army 
that the Lake Champlain line satisfies all these conditions 
at the same time ; — that it is the most direct, most feasi- 
ble, and most decisive line which can be pursued in case 
of operations against Canada ; and that it is indispensable 
to success in war that this line be well fortified in time 
of peace. All agree that the St. Lawrence above Quebec 
constitutes the key point of the enemy's defence, and the 
objective point towards which all our operations should be 
directed. To reach this point, all our Boards of Engi- 
neers have deemed it best to collect our troops at Albany 
and advance by Lake Champlain, a distance of only two 
hundred miles. Besides the advantages of a good water 
communication the whole distance for the transportation 
of military stores, there are several roads on each side, 
all concentrating on this line within our own territory. 
It has already been shown by the brief sketch of our nor- 
thern wars, that this line has been the field of strife and 
blood for fifteen campaigns. Nature has marked it out as 
our shortest and easiest line of intercourse with Canada, 
both in peace and war. Military diversions will always 
be made on the eastern and western extremities of this 
frontier, and important secondary or auxiliary operations 
be carried on by the eastern and western routes ; but until 
we overthrow the whole system of military science as 
established by the Romans, revived by Frederick, and 

20 



230 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

practised and improved by Napoleon, the central and inte- 
rior line, under all ordinary circumstances, will furnish the 
greatest probabilities of success. 

If the line of Lake Champlain is, as we have endeav- 
ored to show, the most important line in the north, its 
security by fortifications is a matter of the greatest inter- 
est. The works recommended by the Board, consist of a 
single fort, costing $600,000, at Rouse's Point, on the 
extreme frontier, and unfortified depots at Plattsburg and 
Albany. But is this sufficient to accomplish the object ? 
If the hostile army should pass the extreme frontier bar- 
rier, what is to retard his advance, — what defensive works 
are to protect the debouche of the Northern canal, or even 
to save the great central depot 1 We know of no foreign 
engineer who has recommended less than three lines of 
fortifications for the security of a land frontier ; and Na- 
poleon, the Archduke Charles, and General Jomini, agree 
in recommending at least this number of lines. There 
may be circumstances that render it unnecessary to resort 
to a three-fold defence throughout the whole extent of our 
northern frontier ; but upon our main line of communica- 
tion with Canada, — a line of maximum importance both to 
us and to the enemy, we know of no reason for violating 
the positive rules of the art, — rules which have been estab- 
lished for ages, and sanctioned by the best engineers and 
greatest generals of modern times. 

Ticonderoga has more than once stayed the waves of 
northern invasion ; and we know of no change in the art 
of war, or in the condition of the country, that renders 
less important than formerly the advantages of an inter- 
mediate point of support between Albany and the Cana- 
dian lines. Indeed it would seem that the connection of 
the Hudson with the lake by the northern canal had even 
increased the value of such a point. 

It would seem, moreover, that the great value of a cen- 



OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES. 231 

tral depot near Albany would warrant a resort to the best 
means of security which can be afforded by defensive 
works. Here we already have one of our largest arsenals 
of construction ; here are to be located magazines for the 
collection and deposite, in time of peace, of gunpowder ; 
here, in time of war, is to be formed the grand military 
depot for our whole northern armies ; and here is the 
point of junction of the lines of communication of our 
northern and eastern states, and the great central rallying- 
point where troops are to be collected for the defence of 
our northern frontier, or for offensive operations against 
Canada. Such a place should never be exposed to the 
coup-de-main of an enemy. The chance operations of a 
defensive army are never sufficient for the security of 
so important a position. We do not here pretend to say 
what its defences should be. Perhaps strong tHes-de-pont 
on the Mohawk and Hudson rivers, and detached works 
on the several lines of communication, may accomplish the 
desired object ; perhaps more central and compact works 
may be found necessary. But we insist on the importance 
of securing this position by some efficient means. The 
remarks of Napoleon, (which have already been given,) 
on the advantages to be derived from fortifying such a 
central place, where the military wealth of a nation can 
be secured, are strikingly applicable to this case. 

But let us look for a moment at what is called the west- 
ern plan of defence for our northern frontier. 

Certain writers and orators of the western states, in 
their plans of military defence, would have the principal 
fortifications of the northern frontier established on Lake 
Erie, the Detroit river, the St. Clair, and Lake Huron ; 
and the money proposed for the other frontier and coast 
works, expended in establishing military and naval depots 
at Memphis and Pittsburg, and in the construction of a 
ship-canal from the lower Illinois to Lake Michigan, — for 



232 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

the purpose of obtaining the naval control of the northern 
lakes. 

It is said that British military and steam naval forces 
will ascend the St. Lawrence to Lake Ontario ; that to 
counteract these operations we must build an opposition 
steam-navy at Pittsburg and Memphis, and collect our 
troops on the Ohio and Mississippi, ascend the Mississippi 
and Illinois, Lake Michigan, Lake Huron, and the Geor- 
gian Bay, cross over to the Ottawa by French river and 
Lake Nipissing, or Moon river and the Muskago, then de- 
scend the Ottawa river to Montreal. But as there might 
be some difficulty in conveying their war-steamers over 
some twelve or fifteen portages between the Georgian Bay 
and the Ottawa, and as the upper waters of that river are 
not navigable by such craft, it has, by some of the military 
writers before alluded to, been deemed preferable to de- 
scend Lake Huron, St. Clair river and lake, run the 
gauntlet past the British forts on the Detroit, descend 
Lake Erie and the Niagara* into Lake Ontario, so as ta 
meet the English as they come steaming up the St. Law-; 
rence ! 

It is agreed upon all sides that the British must first 
collect their forces at Quebec, and then pass along the 
line of the St. Lawrence and Lake Ontario to reach the 
Niagara and Detroit frontiers. Our boards of engineers 
have deemed it best to collect troops on the Champlain 
line, and, by penetrating between Montreal and Quebec, 
separate the enemy's forces and cut off all the remainder 
of Canada from supplies and reinforcements from England. 
But it has been discovered by certain western men that 
to cut the trunk of a tree is not the proper method of fell- 
ing it : we must climb to the top and pinch the buds, or, at 



* How they are to pass the Falls was not determined either' Yiij 
Harry Bluff or the Memphis Convention. 



OUR NORTHERN MILITARY DEFENCES. 233 

most, cut off a few of the smaller limbs. To blow up a 
house, we should not place the mine under the foundation, 
but attach it to one of the shingles of the roof ! We have 
already shown that troops collected at Albany may reach 
the great strategic point on the St. Lawrence by an easy 
and direct route of two hundred miles ; but forces collected 
at Pittsburg and Memphis must pass over a difficult and 
unfrequented route of two tJiousand iniles. 

Our merchant marine on the lakes secures to us a na- 
val superiority in that quarter at the beginning of a war ; 
and our facilities for ship-building are there equal if not 
superior to any possessed by the enemy. The only way, 
therefore, in which our ascendency on the lakes can be 
lost, is by the introduction of steam craft from the Atlan- 
tic. The canals and locks constructed for this object will 
pass vessels of small dimensions and drawing not over 
eight and a half feet water. 

How are we to prevent the introduction of these Atlan- 
tic steamers into our lakes ? Shall we, at the first opening 
of hostilities, march with armed forces upon the enemy's 
line of artificial communication and blow up the locks of 
their ship-canals, thus meeting the enemy's marine at the 
very threshold of its introduction into the interior seas ; 
or shall we build opposition steam-navies at Pittsburg and 
Memphis, some two thousand miles distant, and then ex- 
pend some forty or fifty millions* in opening an artificial 

* The construction of the Illinois ship-canal, for vessels of eight and 
a half feet draught, is estimated at fifteen millions ; to give the same 
draught to the Mississippi and lower Illinois, would require at least ten 
millions more ; a ship canal of the corresponding draught around Nia- 
gara Falls, will cost, say^ten millions ; the navy yard at Memphis, with 
docks, storehouses, &c., will cost about two millions, and steamers sent 
thence to the lakes will cost about fifty thousand dollars per gun. Oa 
the other hand, the military defences which it is deemed necessary to 
erect in time of peace for the security of the Champlain frontier, will 

20* 



234 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

channel to enable them to reach Lake Ontario, after its 
borders have been laid waste by the hostile forces ? Very 
few disinterested judges would hesitate in forming their 
opinion on this question.* 

cost only about two thousand dollars per gun ; the whole expenditure 
not exceeding, at most, two millions of dollars ! 

It is not to be denied that a water communication between the Mis- 
sissippi and the northern lakes will have great commercial advantages, 
and that, in case of a protracted war, auxiliary troops and military 
stores may be drawn from the valley of the Mississippi to assist the 
North and East in preventing any great accessions to the British mili- 
tary forces in the Canadas. We speak only of the policy of expending 
vast sums of money on this military (?) project^ to the neglect of mat- 
ters of more immediate and pressing want. We have nothing to say 
of its character as a commercial project, or of the ultimate military ad- 
vantages that might accrue from such a work. We speak only of the 
present condition and wants of the country, and not of what that con- 
dition and those wants may be generations hence ! 

* There are no books devoted exclusively to the subjects embraced 
in this chapter ; but the reader will find many remarks on the northern 
frontier defences in the histories of the war of 1812, in congressional 
reports, (vide House Doc. 206, XXVIth Congress, 2d session ; and 
Senate Doc, No. 85, XXVIIIth Congress, 2d session,) and in numerous 
pamphlets and essays that have appeared from the press within the 
last few years. 



STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS. 235 



CHAPTER IX. 

ARMY ORGANIZATION STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS. 

By the law of the 12th of December, 1790, on the or- 
ganization of the public force of France, the Army was 
defined, " A standing force drawn from the public force, 
and designed to act against external enemies." [Une 
force hahituelle extraite de la force publique, et destinee es- 
sentiellement a agir contre les ennemis du dehors.] 

In time of peace, the whole organized military force of 
the State is intended when we speak of the army ; but in 
time of war this force is broken up into two or more frac- 
tions, each of which is called an army. These armies are 
usually named from the particular duty which may be as- 
signed to them — as, army of invasion^ army of occupation, 
army of observation, army of reserve, <Sfc. ; or from the 
country or direction in which they operate — as, army of the 
North, of the South, of Mexico, of Canada, of the Rhine, 6fc. ; 
or from the general who commands it — as, the army of 
Soult, army of Wellington, army of Blucher, (Sfc. 

All modern armies are organized on the same basis. 
They are made up of a Staff and Administrative depart- 
ments, and four distinct arms — Infantry, Cavalry, Artil- 
lery, and Engineers ; each having distinct duties, but all 
combining to form one and the same military body. In 
the actual operations of a campaign, these forces are form- 
ed into corps d^armee, each corps d'armee being composed 
of two or more grand-divisions ; each grand-division, of 
two or more brigades ; and each brigade, of several com- 
panies, squadrons, or batteries. 



236 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

In speaking of an army in the field, it is sometimes sup- 
posed to be divided into two classes of men — the Staff 
and the line. We here include in the first class — 

All officers, of whatever arm, above the rank of colonel ; 

All officers of the staff corps of whatever grade, and 

All officers attached to the staff as aides, &c. ; 

All officers of the administrative departments ; 

All officers of artillery and engineer staffs ; 

The corps of geographical or topographical engineers, 
and 

The guards. 

In the second class are included all troops, of what- 
ever arm, which belong to the active army, in infantry,- 
cavalry, artillery, and engineers. All troops on detached 
service, such as recruiting, guarding posts and depots, es- 
corting convoys, &c., as well as all sedentary corps, gar^ 
risons of fortified places, &c., are not regarded in this 
classification as composing any part of the line of: the 
army. 

Troops of the line is a term applied only to such troops 
as form the principal line on the battle-field, viz : — -The 
heavy infantry and heavy cavalry. These are technically 
called infantry of the line, and cavalry of the line. In this 
sense of the term, light infantry, light cavalry or dragoons, 
artillery, and engineers, are not classed as troops of the 
line. But this distinction is now pretty much fallen into 
disuse, and the division of an army into Staff and Admin- 
istrative departments, and four arms of service — Infan- 
try, Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers — is now regarded 
as the most convenient, from being precise and definite in 
its meaning. 

The general staff of an army includes all general offi- 
cers of the army, and such officers of lower grades as are 
attached to this general duty, instead of serving with 
troops, or on special administrative duty. The general 



STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS. 237 

officers are — 1st, the generalissimo^ or commander-in-chief; 
2d, generals, or marshals, as they are called in France, or 
field-marshals and generals of infantry and cavalry, as 
they are called in England and the northern states of Eu- 
rope ; 3d, lieutenant-generals ; 4th, generals of division, 
or major-generals, as they are called in England ; 5th, gen- 
erals of brigade, or brigadier-generals, as they are sometimes 
called ; — colonels, majors, captains, lieutenants, ensigns, 
and cornets or cadets, are also either attached to the staff, 
or form a part of the staff corps. The titles of " adjutant- 
general," and of " inspector-general," are given to staff 
officers selected for these special services, either in the 
general staff or in the several corps d'armee. No special 
rank is attached to these offices themselves, and the grade 
of those who hold them is fixed by some special rule, or 
by their general rank in the army. 

In the war of the Revolution, Washington held the rank 
of General, and in 1798 the rank of Lieutenant-general. 
In the war of 1812, the highest grade held by any of our 
officers was that of General of Division, or Major-general, 
as it was called. The highest grade in our army at the 
present time is called Major-general — a title that properly 
belongs, not to the general of an army, but to the chief of 
staff. Hamilton had this title when chief of Washington's 
staff; Berthier and Soult when chief of Napoleon's staff, 
the former till the close of the campaign of 1814, and the 
latter in the Waterloo campaign. General Jomini first 
greatly distinguished himself as chief of Ney's staff, and 
afterwards on the staff of the Emperor of Russia. Other 
generals have owed much of their success to the chiefs of 
their staflT: — Pichegru to Regnier, Moreau to Dessoles, 
Kutusof to Toll, Barclay to Diebitsch, and Bliicher to 
Thurnhorst and Gneisenau. 

The generalissimo or commander-in-chief of an army is 
the person designated by the law of the land to take charge 



238 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

of the organized military forces of the state. In this coun- 
try the President, through his Secretary of War, exercises 
this general command. In England, Wellington acts in 
the capacity of commander-in-chief of all the British mili- 
tary forces. In France, the Minister of War, under the 
king, has this general direction. In other European ser- 
vices, some prince of the blood, or distinguished general, 
exercises the functions of generalissimo. 

An active army in the field should be commanded by a 
general, or, as is done in some European countries, by 
a marshal. These may be regarded as of assimilated rank. 

A corps d'armee should be commanded by a Lieutenant- 
general. This rule is almost imiversal in Europe. The 
number of marshals in France under Napoleon was so 
great, that officers of this grade were often assigned to 
corps d^armee. 

A grand division of an army should be commanded by a 
General of Division. In England, the assimilated grade is 
that of major-general, and in France at the present time, 
the younger lieutenant-generals, or the marechaux-de-camp^ 
command divisions. 

A brigade should be commanded by a Brigadier- general. 
At the present time in the French service, mar echaux- de- 
camp act as commanders of brigades. 

The several corps d^armee are designated by numbers, 
1st, 2d, 3d, &c., and in the same way the several divisions 
in each corps d'armee, and the several brigades in each di- 
vision. 

When the number of troops are placed on a war footing, 
each corps d'armee ordinarily contains from twenty to thirty 
thousand men. 

The command of these several corps d'armee, divi- 
sions, and brigades, is taken by the officers of the corre- 
sponding grades according to seniority of rank, and with- 
out reference to arms, unless otherwise directed by the 



STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS. 239 

generalissimo, who should always have the power to des- 
ignate officers for special commands. 

The chief of staff of an army is usually selected from 
the grade next below that of the general commanding, and 
receives the title, for the time being, which is used to 
designate this special rank. In some European armies, 
and formerly in our own service, this officer was called 
major-general. In France, if the generalissimo commands 
in person, a marshal is made chief of staff with the tem- 
poray title of major-general ; but if a marshal commands 
the army, a lieutenant-general or marechal-de-camp be- 
comes chief of staff with the title of aide-major-general. 
The chiefs of staff of corps d'armee and of divisions, are se- 
lected in precisely the same way. 

The position assigned by the commanding general for the 
residence of his staff, is denominated the General Head- 
Quarter of the army ; that of a corps d^armee staff, the Head- 
Quarters of [1st or 2d, &c.] corps d^arinee; that of a divi- 
sion, the Head-Quarters of [1st or 2d, &c.] division, [1st 
or 2d, (fee] corps d^armee. 

The petty staffs of regiments, squadrons, &c., consisting 
of an adjutant, sergeant-major, <fec., are especially organ- 
ized by the commandants of the regiments, &c., and have 
no connection whatever with the general staff of an army. 
Of course, then, they are not embraced in the present 
discussion. 

The subordinate officers of the staff of an army, in time 
of war, are charged with important and responsible duties 
connected with the execution of the orders of their re- 
spective chiefs. But in time of peace, they are too apt to 
degenerate into fourth-rate clerks of the Adjutant-general's 
department, and mere military dandies, employing their 
time in discussing the most unimportant and really con- 
temptible points of military etiquette, or criticising the 
letters and dispatches of superior officers, to see whether 



240 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

the wording of the report or the folding of the letter exact- 
ly corresponds to the particular regulation applicable to 
the case. Such was the character given to the first staff of 
Wellington, and a similar class of men composed the staff 
of the army of Italy when it was abolished by Napoleon 
and a new one formed in its place. There are also some 
officers of this stamp in our own service, but they are re- 
garded by the army with universal contempt. The staff 
of our army requires a new and different organization, and 
should be considerably enlarged. 

The following is the composition of a regularly organ- 
ized general staff in the French service for an army of 
forty or fifty thousand men divided into two corps d'armee 
and a reserve. 

1st. The marshal (or general) commanding-in-chief; 
and one colonel or lieutenant-colonel, one major, three 
captains and three subalterns, as aides-de-camp. 

2d. A lieutenant-general as chief-of-staff, with the title 
of major-general, assisted by one colonel or lieutenant-co- 
lonel, three majors, five captains, and one subaltern, as 
aides-de-camp. 

3d. Three lieutenant-generals, commanding the corps 
d'armee and reserve. Each of these will be assisted by 
aides in the same way as the major-general, and each will 
also have his regularly-organized staff of corps d'armee^ 
with a general of division or general of brigade as chief. 

4th. Six or nine generals commanding divisions, each 
having his own distinct and separately organized staff. In 
the French army, the staff of an officer commanding a di- 
vision is composed of one colonel, two majors, three cap- 
tains, and six subalterns. 

5th. Twelve or more generals of brigade, each having 
one captain, and one subaltern for aides. 

6th. There is also attached to the staff of the general- 
in-chief of the army, the commandants of artillery and en- 



STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS. 241 

gineers, with several subordinates, inspector-generals, and 
the ranking officers of each of the administrative depart- 
ments, with their assistants. 

The generals select their aides and assistants from the 
staff corps, or from either of the four arms of service. 

The troops of these arms may be distributed as follows : 

52 battalions of infantry, .... 35,000 men. 
42 squadrons of horse, .... 6,500 " 

13 batteries of artillery, (4 mounted and 9 foot,) . 2,500 " 

5 companies of sappers, 2 of pontoniers,* and 1 of arti- 
ficers, ..... 1,500 " 



45,500 « 

If we add to these the staff, and the several officers and 
employes of the administrative departments, we have an 
army of nearly fifty thousand men. 

This, it will be remembered, is the organization of an 
army in the field ; in the entire military organization of a 
state, the number of staff officers will be still higher. 

In 1788, France, with a military organization for about 
three hundred and twenty thousand men, had eighteen mar- 
shals, two hundred and twenty-five lieutenant-generals, 
five hundred and thirty-eight mar echaux- de-camp, and four 
hundred and eighty-three brigadiers. A similar organiza- 
tion of the general staff was maintained by Napoleon. At 
present the general staff of the French army consists of 
nine marshals, (twelve in time of war ;) eighty lieutenant- 
generals in active service, fifty-two in reserve, and sixty- 
two en retraite — one hundred and ninety-four in all ; one 
hundred and sixty mar echaux-de- camp in active service 
eighty-six in reserve, and one hundred and ninety en re- 
traite — four hundred and thirty-six in all. The officers of 
the staff-corps are : thirty colonels, thirty lieutenant-colo- 

* One bridge -equipage is required for each corps d'armie. 
21 



242 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

nels, one hundred majors, three hundred captains, and one 
hundred lieutenants. Those of other European armies are 
organized on the same basis. 

It will be seen from these remarks that the organization 
of our own general staff is exceedingly defective, and en- 
tirely unsuited to the object for which it is created. We 
have two brigadier-generals for the command of two bri- 
gades, and one general of division, with the title of major- 
general, who acts in the fourfold capacity of general com- 
manding the army, lieutenant-general, general of division, 
and chief of staff of the army. But as it is impossible 
with this number to maintain a proper organization, the 
President (with the advice and consent of the Senate) 
has, from time to time, increased this number to three ma- 
jor-generals, and nine brigadier-generals, and numerous 
officers of staff with lower grades. Nearly all these officers 
are detached from their several regiments and corps, thus in- 
juring the efficiency of regiments and companies ; and we 
have in our service, by this absurd mode of supplying the 
defects of our system of organization by brevet rank, the 
anomaly of ojfficers being generals, and at the same time not 
generals ; of holding certcdn ranks and grades^ and yet not 
holding these ranks and grades ! Let Congress do away 
this absurd and ridiculous system, and establish a proper 
and efficient organization of the general staff, and restore 
the grades of general and lieutenant-general. In the war 
of 1812, instead of resorting to a proper organization when 
an increase of the general staff was required, we merely 
multiplied the number of major-generals and generals of bri- 
gade by direct appointment, or by conferring brevet rank. 
It is now conceded that there never was a more inefficient 
general stafT than that with which our army was cursed 
during the war ; and the claims of brevet rank have ever 
since been a source of endless turmoils and dissatisfaction, 
driving from the army many of its noblest ornaments. 



STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS. 243 

In the event of another war, it is to be hoped that Con- 
gress will not again resort to the ruinous system of 1812. 
Possibly it may by some be objected to the creation of 
generals, lieutenant-generals, &c., that it increases the 
expense of the army and the number of its officers. This 
need not be. The number, pay, &c., may remain the 
same, or nearly the same, as at present. But by increas- 
ing the grades you avoid in a considerable measure the 
difficulties of seniority claims and brevet rank — the prin- 
cipal curses of our present system. If we merely in- 
crease the number of each existing grade, giving a part 
of these rank above their name and office, we merely 
multiply evils. But we will leave this subject for the 
present, and recur to the general discussion of staff du- 
ties. 

The following remarks of Jomini on the importance of 
the staff of an army are worthy of attention. " A good 
staff," says he, " is, more than all, indispensable to the 
constitution of an army ; for it must be regarded as the 
nursery where the commanding general can raise his 
principal supports — as a body of officers whose intelli- 
gence can aid his own. When harmony is wanting be- 
tween the genius that commands, and the talents of those 
who apply his conceptions, success cannot be sure ; for the 
most skilful combinations are destroyed by faults in exe- 
cution. Moreover, a good staff has the advantage of being 
more durable than the genius of any single man ; it not 
only remedies many evils, but it may safely be affirmed 
that it constitutes for the army the best of all safeguards. 
The petty interests of coteries, narrow views, and mis- 
placed egotism, oppose this last position : nevertheless, 
every military man of reflection, and every enlightened 
statesman, will regard its truth as beyond all dispute ; for 
a well-appointed staff is to an army what a skilful minis- 
ter is to a monarchy — it seconds the views of the chief, 



244 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

even thougli it be in condition to direct all things of it- 
self; it prevents the commission of faults, even though 
the commanding general be wanting in experience, by 
furnishing him good councils. How many mediocre men 
of both ancient and modern times, have been rendered 
illustrious by achievements which were mainly due to 
their associates ! Reynier was the chief cause of the 
victories of Pichegru, in 1794; and Dessoles, in like 
manner, contributed to the glory of Moreau. Is not Gen- 
eral Toll associated with the successes of Kutusof ? Die- 
bitsch with those of Barclay and Witgenstein ? Gneise- 
nau and Muffling with those of Blucher 1 Numerous 
other instances might be cited in support of these asser- 
tions. 

" A well-established staff does not always result from a 
good system of education for the young aspirants ; for 
a man may be a good mathematician and a fine scholar, 
without being a good warrior. The staff should always 
possess sufficient consideration and prerogative to be 
sought for by the officers of the several arms, and to 
draw together, in this way, men who are already known 
by their aptitude for war. Engineer and artillery officers 
will no longer oppose the staff, if they reflect that it will 
open to them a more extensive field for immediate dis- 
tinction, and that it will eventually be made up exclu- 
sively of the officers of those two corps who may be 
placed at the disposal of the commanding general, and 
who are the most capable of directing the operations of 
war." 

" At the beginning of the wars of the Revolution," says 
this able historian elsewhere, " in the French army the 
general staff, which is essential for directing the opera- 
tions of war, had neither instruction nor experience." 
The several adjutant-generals attached to the army of 
Italy were so utterly incompetent, that Napoleon became 



STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS. 245 

prejudiced against the existing staff-corps, and virtually 
destroyed it, dravi^ing his staff-officers from the other 
corps of the army. In his earlier v^ars, a large portion 
of staff duties v^ere assigned to the engineers ; but in his 
later campaigns the officers of this corps v^ere particu- 
larly required for the sieges carried on in Germany and 
Spain, and considerable difficulty was encountered in 
finding suitable officers for staff duty. Some of the de- 
fects of the first French staff-corps were remedied in the 
latter part of Napoleon's career, and in 1818 it was re- 
organized by Marshal Saint-Cyr, and a special school es- 
tablished for its instruction. 

Some European nations have established regular staff- 
corps, from which the vacancies in the general staff are 
filled ; others draw all their staff-officers from the corps 
of the army. A combination of the two systems is pre- 
ferred by the best judges. Jomini recommends a regular 
staff-corps, with special schools for its instruction ; but 
thinks that its officers should be drawn, at least in part, 
from the other corps of the army : the officers of engi- 
neers and artillery he deems, from their instruction, to be 
peculiarly qualified for staff duty. The policy of holding 
double rank at the same time in the staff and in the corps 
of the army, as is done in our service, is pronounced by 
all competent judges as ruinous to an army, destroying 
at the same time the character of the staff and injuring 
the efficiency of the line. 

The following remarks on the character and duties of 
general-officers of an army, made at the beginning of the 
war of 1812, are from the pen of one of the ablest mili- 
tary writers this country has yet produced : — 

" Generals have been divided into three classes,-^ 
Theorists J who by study and reflection have made them- 
selves acquainted with all the rules or maxims of the art 
they profess ; Martinets, who have confined their atten- 



246 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

tion merely to the mechanical part of the trade ; and 
Practical men^ who have no other or better guide than 
their own experience, in either branch of it. This last 
description is in all services, excepting our own, the 
most numerous, but with us gives place to a fourth class, 
viz., men destitute alike of theory and of experience. 

" Self-respect is one thing, and presumption another. 
Without the former, no man ever became a good officer ; 
under the influence of the latter, generals have commit- 
ted great faults. The former is the necessary result of 
knowledge ; the latter of ignorance. A man acquainted 
with his duty can rarely be placed in circumstances new, 
surprising, or embarrassing ; a man ignorant of his duty 
will always find himself constrained to guess^ and not 
Imowing how to be right by system^ will often be wrong 
by chance. 

" These remarks are neither made nor offered as ap- 
plying exclusively to the science of war. They apply to 
all other sciences ; but in these, errors are comparatively 
harmless. A naturalist may amuse himself and the pub- 
lic with false and fanciful theories of the earth ; and a 
metaphysician may reason very badly on the relations 
and forms of matter and spirit, without any ill effect but 
to make themselves ridiculous. Their blunders but make 
us merry ; they neither pick pockets, nor break legs, nor 
destroy lives ; while those of a general bring after them 
evils the most compounded and mischievous, — ^the slaugh- 
ter of an army — ^the devastation of a state — the ruin of an 
empire ! 

" In proportion as ignorance may be calamitous, the 
reasons for acquiring instruction are multiplied and 
strengthened. Are you an honest man ? You will spare 
neither labor nor sacrifice to gain a competent knowledge 
of your duty. Are you a man of honor ? You will be 
careful to avoid self-reproach. Does your bosom glow 

21* 



STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS. 247 

with the holy fervor of patriotism ? You will so accom- 
plish yourself as to avoid bringing down upon your coun- 
try either insult or injury. 

" Nor are the more sellish impulses without a similar 
tendency. Has hanger made you a soldier ? Will you 
not take care of your bread ! Is vanity your principle of 
action ? Will you not guard those mighty blessings, your 
epaulets and feathers ! Are you impelled by a love of 
glory or a love of power ? And can you forget that these 
coy mistresses are only to be won by intelligence and 
good conduct ? 

" But the means of instruction, sa)^ you, where are 
they to be found ? Our standing army is but a bad and 
ill-organized militia, and our militia not better than a mob. 
Nor have the defects in these been supplied by Lycees, 
Prytanees, and Polytechnic schools. The morbid patri- 
otism of some, and the false economy of others, have 
nearly obliterated every thing like military knowledge 
among us. 

" This, reader, is but one motive the more for reinsta- 
ting it. Thanks to the noble art of printing ! you still 
have hooks which, if studied, will teach the art of war. 

*' Books ! And what are they but the dreams of pe- 
dants ? They may make a Mack, but have they ever 
made a Xenophon, a Caesar, a Saxe, a Frederick, or a 
Bonaparte 1 Who would not laugh to hear the cobbler of 
Athens lecturing Hannibal on the art of war ? 

" True ; but as you are not Hannibal, listen to the 
cobbler. Xenophon, Caesar, Saxe, Frederick, and Napo- 
leon, have all thought well of books, and have even com- 
posed them. Nor is this extraordinary, since they are 
but the depositories of maxims which genius has sug- 
gested, and experience confirmed ; since they both en- 
lighten and shorten the road of the traveller, and render 
the labor and genius of past ages tributary to our own. 



248 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

These teach most emphatically, that the secret of suc- 
cessful war is not to be found in mere legs and arms, but 
in the head that shall direct them. If this be either un- 
gifted by nature, or uninstructed by study and reflection, 
the best plans of mancBuvre and campaign avail nothing. 
The two last centuries have presented many revolutions 
in military character, all of which have turned on this 
principle. It would be useless to enumerate these. We 
shall quote only the greatest and the last — The troops of 
Frederick ! How illustrious under him ! How contempt- 
ible under his successors ! Yet his system was there ; 
his double lines of march at full distance ; his oblique 
order of battle ; his simple lines of manoeuvre in the 
presence of an enemy ; his wise conformation of an etat- 
major ; — all, in short, that distinguished his practice from 
that of ordinary men, survived him ; but the head that 
truly comprehended and knew how to apply these, died 
with Frederick. What an admonition does this fact pre- 
sent for self-instruction,— for unwearied diligence, — for 
study and reflection ! Nor should the force of this be 
lessened by the consideration that, after all, unless nature 
should have done her part of the work, — unless to a soul 
not to be shaken by any changes of fortune — cool, col- 
lected, and strenuous — she adds a head fertile in expedi- 
ents, prompt in its decisions, and sound in its judgments, 
no man can ever merit the title of a general.''^ 

The celebrated Marshal Saxe has made the following 
remarks on the necessary qualifications to form a good 
general. The most indispensable one, according to his 
idea, is valor, without which all the rest will prove nuga- 
tory. The next is a sound understanding with some ge- 
nius : for he must not only be courageous, but be extreme- 
ly fertile in expedients. The third is health and a robust 
constitution. 

" His mind must be capable of prompt and vigorous re- 



STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS. 249 

sources ; he must have an aptitude, and a talent at dis- 
covering the designs of others, without betraying the 
slightest trace of his own intentions ; he must be, seem- 
ingly, commimicative, in order to encourage others to un- 
bosom, but remain tenaciously reserved in matters that 
concern his own army ; he must, in a word, possess ac- 
tivity with judgment, be able to make a proper choice of 
his officers, and never deviate from the strictest line of 
military justice. Old soldiers must not be rendered 
wretched and unhappy by unwarrantable promotions, nor 
must extraordinary talents be kept back to the detriment 
of the service on account of mere rules and regulations. 
Great abilities will justify exceptions ; but ignorance and 
inactivity will not make up for years spent in the profes- 
sion. 

" In his deportment he must be affable, and always su- 
perior to peevishness or ill-humor ; he must not know, or 
at least seem not to know, what a spirit of resentment is ; 
and when he is under the necessity of inflicting military 
chastisement, he must see the guilty punished without 
compromise or foolish humanity ; and if the delinquent be 
from among the number of his most intimate friends, he 
must be doubly severe towards the unfortunate man. For 
it is better, in instances of correction, that one individual 
should be treated with rigor (by orders of the person over 
whom he may be supposed to hold some influence) than 
that an idea should go forth in the army of public justice 
being sacrificed to private sentiments. 

" A modern general should always have before him the 
example of Manlius ; he must divest himself of personal 
sensations, and not only be convinced himself, but con- 
vince others, that he is the organ of military justice, and 
that what he does is irrevocably prescribed. With these 
qualifications, and by this line of conduct, he will secure 
the affections of his followers, instil into their minds all 



250 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

the impulses of deference and respect ; he will be feared, 
and consequently obeyed. 

" The resources of a general's mind are as various as 
the occasions for the exercise of them are multiplied and 
checkered : he must be perfectly master of the art of 
knowing how to support an anny in all circumstances and 
situations ; how to apply its strength, or be sparing of its 
energy and confidence ; how to post all its different com- 
ponent parts, so as not to be forced to give or receive bat- 
tle in opposition to settled plans. When once engaged, he 
must have presence of mind enough to grasp all the rela- 
tive points of disposition and arrangement, to seize favor- 
able moments for impression, and to be thoroughly con- 
versant in the infinite vicissitudes that occur during the 
heat of a battle ; on a ready possession of which its ulti- 
mate success depends. These requisites are unquestion- 
ably manifold, and grow out of the diversity of situations, 
and the chance medley of events that produce their ne- 
cessity. 

" A general to be in perfect possession of them, must 
on the day of battle be divested of every thought, and be 
inaccessible to every feeling, but what immediately regards 
the business of the day ; he must reconnoitre with the 
promptitude of a skilful geographer, w^hose eye collects 
instantaneously all the relative portions of locality, and 
feels his ground as it were by instinct ; and in the dispo- 
sition of his troops he must discover a perfect knowledge 
of his profession, and make all his arrangements with ac- 
curacy and dispatch. His order of battle must be simple 
and unconfused, and the execution of his plan be as quick 
as if it merely consisted in uttering some few words of 
conunand ; as, the first line will attack ! the second unll sup- 
port it! or, such a battalion will advance and support the line, 

"The general officers who act under such a general 
must be ignorant of their business indeed, if, upon the re- 



STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS. 251 

ceipt of these orders, they should be deficient in the im- 
mediate means of answering them, by a prompt and ready 
co-operation. So that the general has only to issue out 
directions according to the growth of circumstances, and 
to rest satisfied that every division will act in conformity 
to his intentions ; but if, on the contrary, he should so far 
forget his situation as to become a drill-sergeant in the heat 
of action, he must find himself in the case of the fly in 
the fable, which perched upon a wheel, and foolishly im- 
agined that the motion of the carriage was influenced by 
its situation. A general, therefore, ought on the day of 
battle to be thoroughly master of himself, and to have both 
his mind and his eye riveted to the immediate scene of 
action. He will by these means be enabled to see every 
thing ; his judgment will be unembarrassed, and he will 
instantly discover all the vulnerable points of the enemy. 
The instant a favorable opening offers, by which the con- 
test may be decided, it becomes his duty to head the near- 
est body of troops, and, without any regard to personal 
safety, to advance against the enemy's line. [By a ready 
conception of this sort, joined to a great courage. General 
Dessaix determined the issue of the battle of Marengo.] 
It is, however, impossible for any man to lay down rules, 
or to specify with accuracy all the different ways by which 
a victory may be obtained. Every thing depends upon a 
variety of situations, casualties of events, and intermedi- 
ate occurrences, which no human foresight can positively 
ascertain, but which may be converted to good purposes 
by a quick eye, a ready conception, and prompt execution. 

" Prince Eugene was singularly gifted with these quali- 
fications, particularly with that sublime possession of the 
mind, which constitutes the essence of a military char- 
acter." 

" Many commanders-in-chief have been so limited in 
their ideas of warfare, that when events have brought the 



252 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

contest to issue, and two rival armies have been drawn 
out for action, their whole attention has devolved upon a 
straight alignment, an equality of step, or a regular dis- 
tance in intervals of columns. They have considered it 
sufficient to give answers to questions proposed by their 
aides-de-camp, to send orders in various directions, and to 
gallop themselves from one quarter to another, without 
steadily adhering to the fluctuations of the day, or calmly 
watching for an opportunity to strike a decisive blow. 
They endeavor, in fact, to do every thing, and thereby do 
nothing. They appear like men whose presence of mind 
deserts them the instant they are taken out of the beaten 
track, or reduced to supply unexpected calls by uncommon 
exertions ; and from whence, continues the same sensible 
writer, do these contradictions arise 1 from an ignorance 
of those high qualifications without which the mere routine 
of duty, methodical arrangement, and studied discipline 
must fall to the ground, and defeat themselves. Many 
officers spend their whole lives in putting a few regiments 
through a regular set of manoeuvres ; and having done so, 
they vainly imagine that all the science of a real military 
man consists in that acquirement. When, in process of 
time, the command of a large army falls to their lot, they 
are manifestly lost in the magnitude of the undertaking, 
and, from not knowing how to act as they ought, they 
remain satisfied with doing what they have partially 
learned." 

" Military knowledge, as far as it regards a general or 
commander-in-chief, m.ay be divided into two parts, one 
comprehending mere discipline and settled systems for 
putting a certain number of rules into practice ; and the 
other originating a sublimity of conception that method 
may assist, but cannot give." 

" If a man be born with faculties that are naturally 
adapted to the situation of a general, and if his talents do 



STAFF AND AD:.11NISTIIATIVE CORPS. 253 

not lit the extraordinary casualties of war, he will never 
rise beyond mediocrity." 

" It is, in fact, in war as it is in painting, or in music. 
Perfection in either art grows out of innate talent, but it 
never can be acquired without them. Study and perse- 
verance may correct ideas, but no application, no assiduity 
will give the life and energy of action ; these are the 
works of nature." 

" It has been my fate (observes the Marshal) to see sev- 
eral very excellent colonels become indifferent generals. 
I have known others, who have distinguished themselves 
at sieges, and in the different evolutions of an army, lose 
their presence of mind and appear ignorant of their pro- 
fession, the instant they were taken from that particular 
line, and be incapable of commanding a few squadrons of 
horse. Should a man of this cast be put at the head of an 
army, he will confine himself to mere dispositions and 
manoeuvres ; to them he will look for safety ; and if once 
thwarted, his defeat will be inevitable, because his mind 
is not capable of other resources." 

" In order to obviate, in the best possible manner, the 
innumerable disasters which must arise from the uncer- 
tainty of war, and the greater uncertainty of the means 
that are adopted to carry it on, some general rules o€ght 
to be laid down, not only for the government of the troops, 
but for the instruction of those who have the command of 
them. The principles to be observed are : that when the 
line or the columns advance, their distances should be 
scrupulously observed ; that whenever a body of troops is 
ordered to charge, every proportion of the line should rush 
forward with intrepidity and vigor ; that if openings are 
made in the first line, it becomes the duty of the second 
instantly to fill up the chasms." 

" These instructions issue from the dictates of plain na- 
ture, and do not require the least elucidation in writing. 

22 



254 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

They constitute the A, B, C of soldiers. Nothing can be 
more simple, or more intelligible ; so much so, that it 
would be ridiculous in a general to sacrifice essential ob- 
jects in order to attend to such minutiae. His functions in 
the day of battle are confined to those occupations of the 
mind, by which he is enabled to watch the countenance 
of the enemy, to observe his movements, and to see with 
an eagle's or a king of Prussia's eye, all the relative di- 
rections that his opponents take. It must be his business 
to create alarms and suspicions among the enemy's line in 
one quarter, while his real intention is to act against 
another ; to puzzle and disconcert him in his plans ; to 
take advantage of the manifold openings which his feints 
have produced, and when the contest is brought to issue, 
to be capable of plunging with effect upon the weakest 
part, and carrying the sword of death where its blow is 
certain of being mortal. But to accomplish these impor- 
tant and indispensable points, his judgment must be clear, 
his mind collected, his heart firm, and his eyes incapable 
of being diverted, even for a moment, by the trifling occur- 
rences of the day." 

The administrative service of an army is usually divided 
into several distinct departments, as — 

Pay department. 

Subsistence " 

Clothing 

Medical " ) rr.i • • . i 

TT • 1 , i ^ nese m our service are united. 

Hospital '' ) 

Barrack " ^ These in our service are combined 

Fuel " > in one, called the Quartermas- 

Transportation " ) ter's department. 

Recruiting " 

Military Justice, or Court Martial department. 

It was intended to enter into the history, organization, 



STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS. 255 

and use of each of these civico-military departments of an 
army ; but our limits are such as to preclude any thing 
like so detailed a discussion as would be necessary for a 
proper understanding of the subject. We therefore pass 
from the staff directly to the line, or rather the four princi- 
pal arms of an army organization.* 

* Of works that treat directly of staff organization and duties, those 
of Grimoard, Thiebault, Boutourlin, Labaume, are esteemed among the 
best. The writings of Jomini, Napoleon, Rocquancourt, Vauchelle, 
Odier, Scharnhorst, also contain much valuable infomiation on this sub- 
ject. The following list of books may be referred to for further infor- 
mation on the subjects alluded to in this chapter : 

Aide-Memoire des officiers generaux et superieurs et des capitaines. 

Precis de Vart de la guerre. Jomini. 

Memoires de Napoleon. Montholon et Gourgaud. 

Cours elementaire d'art et d'histoire militaires. Rocquancourt. 

Cours elementaire d^ administration militaire. Vauchelle. 

Droite elementaire d^art militaire, &c. Gay de Vernon. 

Annuaire militaire historique, &c. Sicard. 

Cours abrege d' administration militaire. Bemier. 

Cours d^ administration militaire, &c. Odier. 

De r administration de Varmee d'Espagne. Odier. 

De Vorganization de la force armee en France. Carion-Nisas. 

Elemens de Vart militaire, &c. Cugnot. 

Memoires sur la guerre. Feuquieres. 

Cours d-art militaire et d'histoire. Jacquinot de Presle. 

Cours d'art militaire. Fallot. 

Theorie de Vofficier superieur. L€orier. 

Histoire de V administration de la guerre. Audouin. 

Instructions diverses a Vusage de Vecole d' application du corps 
royal d^etat-major. 

Handhuchfur offiziere, &c. Schanihorst. 

Having omitted all discussion of the several departments of the ad- 
ministrative service of an army organization, it is not deemed necessary 
to give the names of books of reference on the subjects of pay, courts- 
martial, medicinal and hospital departments, &c., &c. 



256 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 



CHAPTER X. 

ARMY ORGANIZATION.* INFANTRY AND CAVALRY. 

Infantry. — Infantry constitutes, in active service, by far 
the most numerous portion of an army ; in time of peace 
its duties are simple, and, in most countries, of little com- 
parative importance ; but in our country the continually re- 
curring difficulties on the Indian frontiers, render this arm 
peculiarly necessary and important, even in time of gen- 
eral peace. From the nature of infantry service — no pe- 
culiar technical knowledge (we speak of the privates and 
officers of the lower grades) being so absolutely indispen- 
sable as in the other arms — the soldier may in a short 
time be trained and instructed in his duties. For this 
reason the ratio of infantry in a peace establishment is 
ordinarily much less than in active service, this arm being 
always capable of great expansion when occasion re- 
quires. 

In the early periods of society, and in countries where 
horses abounded, men have usually preferred fighting on 
horseback ; but civilization and a more thorough acquaint- 

* In discussing our own organization, it may be well to compare it 
with the armies of some of the principal nations of Europe. Our limits 
will not allow us to go very much into details, nor to make a com- 
parison with more than a single European power. We shall select 
France, inasmuch as her army organization has served as a model 
for the rest of Europe, and is still, in some respects, superior to most 
others. 



ARMY ORGANIZATION. 257 

ance with war has always increased the importance of 
infantry. 

The Hebrews, and also the Egyptians, employed this 
arm almost exclusively. The Asiatics generally em- 
ployed both infantry and cavalry, but with the Greeks the 
infantry was the favorite arm. Even their kings and 
generals usually fought on foot. The Romans conquered 
the world mainly with their infantry. This arm was also 
considered of the greatest importance by the ancient Ger- 
mans and Gauls ; but the migration of the Huns and other 
Mongolic tribes mounted on small and fleet horses, and 
the acquaintance formed by the Franks of northern Spain 
with the Moors, who were mounted on beautiful horses 
from Arabia and the plateau of Asia, introduced a taste 
for cavalry in western Europe. This taste was still fur- 
ther cultivated under the feudal system, for the knights 
preferred fighting on horseback to serving on foot. During 
the crusades the infantry fell into disrepute. But the in- 
vention of gunpowder changed the whole system of war- 
fare, and restored to infantry its former importance. 

" The Romans," says Napoleon in his Memoirs, " had 
two infantries ; the first, lightly armed, was provided with 
a missile weapon ; the second, heavily armed, bore a short 
sword. After the invention of powder two species of in- 
fantry were still continued : the arquebusiers, who were 
lightly armed, and intended to observe and harass the 
enemy ; and the pikemen, who supplied the place of the 
heavy-armed infantry. During the hundred and fifty years 
which have elapsed since Yauban banished lances and 
pikes from all the infantry of Europe, substituting for them 
the firelock and bayonet, all the infantry has been lightly 

armed There has been since that time, properly 

speaking, only one kind of infantry : if there was a company 
of chasseurs in every battalion, it was by way of counter- 
poise to the company of grenadiers ; the battalion being 

22* 



258 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

composed of nine companies, one picked company did not 
appear sufficient. If the Emperor Napoleon created com- 
panies of voltigeurs armed like dragoons, it was to substi- 
tute them for those companies of chasseurs. He com- 
posed them of men under five feet in height, in order to 
bring into use that class of the conscription which measured 
from four feet ten inches to five feet ; and having been un- 
til that time exempt, made the burden of conscription fall 
more heavily on the other classes. This arrangement 
served to reward a great number of old soldiers, who, be- 
ing under five feet in height, could not enter into the com- 
panies of grenadiers, who on account of their bravery, de- 
served to enter into a picked company : it was a powerful 
incentive to emulation to bring the giants and pigmies into 
competition. Had there been men of different colors in 
the armies of the emperor, he would have composed com- 
panies of blacks and companies of whites : in a country 
where there were cy clops or hunchbacks, a good use 
might be made of companies of cyclops, and others of 
hunchbacks. 

"In 1789, the French armyv/as composed of regiments 
of the line and battalions of chasseurs ; the chasseurs of 
the Cevennes, the Yivarais, the Alps, of Corsica, and the 
Pyrenees, who at the Revolution formed half brigades of 
light infantry ; but the object was not to have two differ- 
ent sorts of infantry, for they were raised alike^ instructed 
alike, drilled alike ; only the battalions of chasseurs were 
recruited by the men of the mountainous districts, or by the 
sons of the garde-chasse ; whence they were more fit to 
be employed on the* frontiers of the Alps and Pyrenees ; 
and when they were in the armies of the North, they were 
always detached, in preference, for climbing heights or 
scouring a forest : when these men were placed in line, in a 
battle, they served very well as a battalion of the line, 
because they had received the same instructions, and 



ARMY ORGANIZATION. 259 

were armed and disciplined in the same manner. Every 
power occasionally raises, in war-time, irregular corps, 
under the title of free or legionary battalions, consisting 
of foreign deserters, or formed of individuals of a particu- 
lar party or faction ; but that does not constitute two sorts 
of infantry. There is and can be but one. If the apes 
of antiquity must needs imitate the Romans, it is not light- 
armed troops that they ought to introduce, but heavy-armed 
soldiers, or battalions armed with swords ; for all the in- 
fantry of Europe serve at times as light troops." 

Most European nations, for reasons probably similar to 
those of Napoleon, keep up this nominal division of in- 
fantry of the line and light infantry ; but both are usually 
armed and equipped alike, and both receive the same or- 
ganization and instruction. The light infantry are usual- 
ly made up from the class of men, or district of country, 
which furnishes the greatest number of riflemen and sharp- 
shooters. In France, the light infantry is best supplied 
by the hunters of the Ardennes, the Vosges, and the Jura 
districts ; in Austria, by the Croates and Tyrolese ; in 
Prussia, by the " forsters," or woodsmen ; and in Russia, 
by the Cossacks. Our own western hunters, with proper 
discipline, make the best tirailleurs in the world. 

Light infantry is usually employed to protect the flanks 
of the main army, to secure outposts, to reconnoitre the 
ground, secure avenues of approach, deceive the enemy 
by demonstrations, and secure the repose of the other 
troops by patrolling parties. They usually begin a battle, 
and afterwards take their places in the line, either on the 
flanks, or in the intervals between the larger bodies. The 
battle of Jena furnishes a good example of the use of 
French light infantry ; and at the battle of Waterloo, the 
Prussian tirailleurs were exceedingly effective in clearing 
the ground for the advance of Blucher's heavy columns. 
The attack of Floh-hug by Augereau, of Yierzehn Heile- 



260 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

gen by Suchet, of Iserstaedt by Desjardins, are models 
well worthy of study. 

The infantry of the line acts in masses, and, on the 
field of battle, constitutes the principal fighting force. Its 
formations and the manner of engaging it have already 
been discussed under the head of tactics. 

The importance of infantry is due, in considerable part, 
to the fact that it can be used everywhere — in mountains 
or on plains, in woody or open countries, in cities or in 
fields, on rivers or at sea, in the redoubt or in the attack 
of the breach ; the infantry depends only on itself, where- 
as the other arms must depend in a considerable degree 
on the efficiency of their materials and the will and 
strength of brute force ; and when the snows of Russia or 
the deserts of Egypt deprive their animals of the means of 
sustenance, they become perfectly useless. 

Foot-soldiers, in olden times, were armed with a spear 
and sometimes with a sword, arrows, lance, and sling. 
At present they are armed with a gun and bayonet, and 
sometimes with a sword. In some European services a 
few of the foot-soldiers are armed with a pike. Some of 
the light troops used as sharp-shooters carry the rifle, but 
this weapon is useless for the great body of infantry. The 
short-sword is more useful as an instrument for cutting 
branches, wood, &c., than for actual fighting. The in- 
fantry have no defensive covering, or at least very little. 
The helmet or cap serves to protect the head, and the 
shoulders are somewhat defended by epaulets. It has 
often been proposed in modern times to restore the ancient 
defensive armor of the foot-soldier ; but this would be 
worse than useless against firearms, and moreover would 
destroy the efficiency of these troops by impeding their 
movements. The strength of this arm depends greatly 
upon its discipline ; for if calm and firm, a mass of infan- 
try in column or in square is almost impenetrable. 



ARMY ORGANIZATION. 261 

The bayonet was introduced by Vauban in the wars of 
Louis XIV., and after the years 1703 and '4, the pike was 
totally suppressed in the French army. This measure 
was warmly opposed by Marshal Montesquieu, and the 
question was discussed by him and Marshal Vauban with 
an ability and learning worthy of these great men. The 
arguments of Vauban were deemed most conclusive, and 
his project was adopted by the king. 

This question has been agitated by military writers in 
more recent times, Puysegur advocating the musket, and 
Folard and Lloyd contending in favor of restoring the pike. 
Even in our own service, so late as the war of 1812, a dis- 
tinguished general of the army strongly urged the use of 
the pike, and the fifteenth (and perhaps another regiment) 
was armed and equipped in part as pikemen ; but expe- 
rience soon proved the absurdity of the project. 

Napoleon calls the infantry the arm of battles and the 
sinews of the army. But if it be acknowledged, that, next 
to the talent of the general-in-chief, the infantry is the first 
instrument of victory, it must also be confessed that it finds 
a powerful support in the cavalry, artillery, and engineers, 
and that without these it would often be compromised, and 
could gain but a half success. 

The French infantry is divided into one hundred regi- 
ments of three battalions each, a battalion being composed . 
of seven companies. There are also several other battal- 
ions of chasseurs, zuaves, &c., being organized especially 
for service in x\frica, and composed in part of native 
troops. 

In our own army we have eight regiments of infantry, 
each regiment forming a single battalion often companies. 
The flank companies are intended for light infantry. 

In all properly organized armies the infantry constitutes 
from three-fourths to four-fifths of the entire active force in 
the field, and from two-thirds to three-fourths, say about 



262 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

seven-tenths of the entire military establishment. In time 
of peace this proportion may be slightly diminished. 

Cavalry. — The use of cavalry is probably nearly as old 
as war itself. The Egyptians had cavalry before the time 
of Moses, and the Israelites often encountered cavalry in 
their wars with their neighbors, though they made no use 
of this arm themselves until the time of Solomon. 

The Greeks borrowed their cavalry from the Asiatics, 
and especially from the Persians, who, according to Xen- 
ophon, held this arm in great consideration. After the 
battle of Platea, it was agreed by assembled Greece that 
each power should furnish one horseman to every ten foot- 
soldiers. In Sparta the poorest were selected for this arm, 
and the cavalry marched to combat without any previous 
training. At Athens the cavalry service was more popular, 
and they formed a well-organized corps of twelve hundred 
horsemen. At Thebes also this arm had consideration in 
the time of Epaminondas. But the cavalry of Thessaly 
was the most renowned, and both Philip and Alexander 
drew their mounted troops from that country. 

The Romans had made but little progress in this arm 
when they encountered the Thessalians, who fought in the 
army of Pyrrhus. They then increased their cavalry, but 
it was not numerous till after their wars with the Cartha- 
ginians. Scipio organized and disciplined the Roman 
cavalry like that of the Numidians. This arm was sup- 
plied from the ranks of the richest citizens, and afterwards 
formed an order intermediary between the Senate and the 
people, under the name of knights. 

At a later period, the cavalry of the Gauls was particu- 
larly good. The Franks were without cavalry when they 
made their first irruption into Gaul. Under the reign of 
Childeric I. we see for the first time the " cavaliers francs" 
figure as a part of the national forces. At the battle of 
Tours the cavalry and infantry were in the proportion of 



ARMY ORGANIZATION. 263 

one to five, and under Pepin and Charlemagne their num- 
bers were nearly equal. Under Charles the Bald armies 
were composed entirely of cavalry, and during the middle 
ages the knights disdained the foot service, and fought 
only on horseback. 

After the introduction of artillery, cavalry was still em- 
ployed, though to little advantage. Gustavus Adolphus 
was the first to perceive the real importance of this arm in 
modern warfare, and he used it with great success. But 
it was left for Seidlitz to perfect it under the direction of 
Frederick the Great. 

Marshal Saxe very justly remarked, that cavalry is the 
^' arme du moment, ^^ for in almost every battle there are 
moments when a decisive charge of cavalry will gain the 
victory, but if not made at the instant it may be too late. 
The efficiency of cavalry depends upon the moral impres- 
sion which it makes on the enemy, and is greater in pro- 
portion to the size of the mass, and the rapidity of its mo- 
tion. This last quality enables a commander to avail him- 
self immediately of a decisive moment, when the enemy 
exposes a weak point, or when disorder appears in his 
ranks. But this requires a bold and active spirit, which 
shrinks not from responsibility, and is able to avail itself 
with quickness and decision of every opportunity. If it be 
remembered that it is essential that this coup d^ceil, so rare 
and so difficult to acquire, be accompanied by a courage 
and vigor of execution which nothing can shake, we shall 
not be astonished that history furnishes so few good cav- 
alry generals, and that this arm so seldom does such exe- 
cution as it did under Frederick and Napoleon, with Seid- 
litz and Murat as commanders. 

The soldier gains great velocity by the use of the horse 
in war ; but in other respects he is the loser. The great 
expense and care required of the cavalier to support his 
horse ; the difficulty experienced in surmounting ordinary 



264 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

obstacles, and in using his fire-arms to advantage, are all 
prejudicial to success. 

The unequal size of the horse, and the great diversity 
in his strength and breed, have rendered it necessary to 
divide this arm into light and heavy cavalry, and a mixed 
class called dragoons. The heavy cavalry is commonly 
used in masses where /orce is mainly requisite ; the lighter 
troops are used singly and in small detachments, where 
rapidity of movement is most desired. 

The heavy cavalry are divided into carabiniers, cuiras- 
siers, and sometimes lancers. The two latter are fre- 
quently united, the cuirassiers being armed with the lance. 
These troops are seldom used for scouts, vanguards, and 
convoys ; but are frequently employed to sustain the light 
cavalry. Their main duty is ''to appear on the field of hat- 
tie and make the decisive charges.'''' 

The light cavalry is composed of chasseurs, or troopers, 
hussars, and lancers. The latter, when composed of large 
men and mounted on heavy horses, are attached to the 
heavy cavalry. 

The dragoons were formerly a mixed body of horse and 
foot, but it being found impossible to unite these two dis- 
tinct arms in one, and the attempt having destroyed the 
usefulness of the body to act in either capacity, the term 
was applied to a mixed kind of cavalry between the hea\y 
and the light horse. In more recent wars they have also 
been instructed as infantry and employed as foot-soldiers, 
till horses could be found in the enemy's country with 
which to mount them. But we believe there is no instance 
in more modern wars in which they have been employed 
at the same time in both capacities. 

This tenn is, very improperly, applied to all our cavalry ; 
and some of the congressional wiseacres have recently 
experimented on one of our so-called regiments of dra- 
goons, by dismounting it one year, selling its horses at 



ARMY ORGANIZATION. 265 

auction, and changing its arms and equipments, and again, 
the next year, purchasing new horses, arms, and equip- 
ments for remounting it ; and all this for economy ! 

The Roman cavalry at first wore a round shield and 
helmet, the rest of their body being nearly uncovered. 
Their arms were a sword and long thin javelin, or lance, 
with an iron head. They afterwards reduced the shield 
to a much smaller size, and made square, and their lance 
was greatly increased in size and length, and armed at 
both ends. In other respects they were armed in the 
same way as infantry. The use of the lance and the 
shield at the same time, of course rendered both nearly 
worthless. The Roman cavalry was superior to that of their 
enemies, except, perhaps, the light cavalry of the Parthians. 

The heavy armor which was sometimes worn by the 
ancients, like the gens d'armes of the middle ages, rendered 
them greatly inferior to infantry in a close engagement. 
Tigranes, king of Armenia, brought an army of one hun- 
dred and fifty thousand horse into the field, against the 
Roman general Lucullus, who had only about six thousand 
horse and fifteen thousand foot. But the Armenian cav- 
alry, called cataphratti, were so overburdened with armor, 
that when they fell from their horses they could scarcely 
move or make any use of their arms. They were routed 
by a mere handful of Roman infantry. 

The modern cavalry is much lighter, and, by dispensing 
with armor, shields, <fec., it can move with much greater 
rapidity. A modern cavalry horse carries a weight of 
from two hundred and fifty to three hundred pounds, viz. : 



The rider, .... 
His arms and equipments, 
His horse equipments, .... 
Two days' rations of provisions and grain, 


Heavy 
cavalry. 

160 

55 

60 

25 


Light 
cavalry. 

140 lbs. 

40 

45 

25 



300 250 
23 



266 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

The horse moves per minute — 

At a walk, . . . from 110 yards to 120 

At a trot, 220 240 

At a gallop, 330 360 

But on a march over the ordinary average of good and 
bad roads, cavalry will walk about one hundred yards per 
minute, and at an easy trot, two hundred. 

An ordinary day's march for cavalry is about thirty 
miles, but on a forced march this arm can march fifty miles 
within the twenty-four hours. A single horseman, or a 
small detachment, can easily exceed this distance. 

"Light cavalry," says Napoleon, in his Memoirs, "ought 
to reconnoitre and watch the motions of the enemy, con- 
siderably in advance of the army ; it is not an appendage 
to the infantry : it should be sustained and protected espe- 
cially by the cavalry of the line. Rivalry and emulation 
have always existed between the infantry and cavalry : 
light cavalry is indispensable to the vanguard, the rear- 
guard, and the wings of the army ; it, therefore, cannot 
properly be attached to, and forced to follow the move- 
ments of any particular corps of infantry. It would be 
more natural to attach it to the cavalry of the line, than 
to leave it in dependence upon the infantry, with which it 
has no connection ; but it should be independent of both. 

" If the light cavalry is to form vanguards, it must be 
organized into squadrons, brigades, and divisions, for the 
purpose of manceuvring ; for that is all vanguards and rear- 
guards do : they pursue or retreat by platoons, form them- 
selves into several lines, or wheel into column, or change 
their position with rapidity for the purpose of outfronting 
a whole wing. By a combination of such evolutions, a 
vanguard, of inferior numbers, avoids brisk actions and 
general engagements, and yet delays the enemy long 
enough to give time for the main army to come up, for the 



ARMY ORGANIZATION. 267 

infantry to deploy, for the general-in-ehief to make his 
dispositions, and for the baggage and parks to file into 
their stations. The art of a general of the vanguard, or 
of the rear-guard, is, without hazarding a defeat, to hold 
the enemy in check, to impede him, to compel him to 
spend three or four hours in moving a single league : tac- 
tics point out the methods of effecting these important 
objects, and are more necessary for cavalry than for in- 
fantry, and in the vanguard, or the rear-guard, than in any 
other position. The Hungarian Insurgents, whom we 
saw in 1797, 1805, and 1809, were pitiful troops. If the 
light troops of Maria Theresa's times became formidable, 
it was by their excellent organization, and, above every 
thing, by their numbers. To imagine that such troops 
could be superior to Wurmser's hussars, or to the dra- 
goons of Latour, or to the Archduke John, would be en- 
tertaining strange ideas of things ; but neither the Hun- 
garian Insurgents, nor the Cossacks, ever formed the van- 
guards of the Austrian and Russian armies ; because to 
speak of a vanguard or a rear-guard, is to speak of troops 
which manoeuvre. The Russians considered a regiment 
of Cossacks who had been trained worth three regiments 
untrained. Every thing about these troops is despicable, 
except the Cossack himself, who is a man of fine person, 
powerful, adroit, subtle, a good horseman, and indefatiga- 
ble ; he is born on horseback, and bred among civil 
wars ; he is in the field, what the Bedouin is in the desert, 
or the Barbet in the Alps ; he never enters a house, never 
lies in a bed ; and he always changes his bivouac at sun- 
set, that he may not pass a night in a place where the 
enemy may possibly have observed him. 

" Two Mamelukes kept three Frenchmen at bay, because 
they were better armed, better mounted, and better exer- 
cised ; they had two pairs of pistols, a tromblon, a carbine, 
a helmet with a visor, a coat of mail, several horses, and 



268 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

several men on foot to attend them. But a hundred 
French did not fear a hundred Mamelukes ; three hun- 
dred were more than a match for an equal number ; and 
one thousand would beat fifteen hundred : so powerful is 
the influence of tactics, order, and evolutions ! Murat, 
Leclerc, and Lasalle, cavalry generals, presented them- 
selves to the Mamelukes in several lines : when the latter 
were upon the point of outfronting the first line, the second 
came to its assistance on the right and left ; the Mame- 
lukes then stopped, and wheeled, to turn the wings of this 
new line : this was the moment seized for charging them ; 
they w^ere always broken. 

" The duty of a vanguard, or a rear-guard, does not con- 
sist in advancing or retiring, but in manoeuvring. It 
should be composed of a good light cavalry, supported by a 
good reserve of cavalry of the line, by excellent battalions 
of foot, and strong batteries of artillery : the troops must 
be well trained ; and the generals, officers, and soldiers, 
should all be equally well acquainted with their tactics, 
each according to his station. An undisciplined troop 
would only embarrass the advanced guard." 

"It is admitted that for facility in manoeuvring, the 
squadron should consist of one hundred men, and that every 
three or four squadrons should have a superior officer." 

" It is not advisable for all the cavalry of the line to 
wear cuirasses : dragoons, mounted upon horses of four 
feet nine inches in height, armed with straight sabres, and 
without cuirasses, should form a part of the heavy caval- 
ry ; they should be furnished with infantry-muskets, with 
bayonets : should have the shakot of the infantry, panta- 
loons covering the half-boot-buskin, cloaks wdth sleeves, 
and portmanteaus small enough to be carried slung across 
the back when the men are on foot. Cavalry of all de- 
scriptions should be furnished with fire-arms, and should 
know how to manoeuvre on foot. Three thousand light 



ARMY ORGANIZATION. 269 

cavalry, or three thousand cuirassiers, should not suffer 
themselves to be stopped by a thousand infantry posted in 
a wood, or on ground impracticable to cavalry ; and three 
thousand dragoons ought not to hesitate to attack two 
thousand infantry, should the latter, favored by their posi- 
tion, attempt to stop them. 

" Turenne, Prince Eugene of Savoy, and Vendome, 
attached great importance to dragoons, and used them 
successfully. The dragoons gained great glory in Italy, 
in 1796 and 1797. In Egypt and in Spain, during the 
campaigns of 1806 and 1807, a degree of prejudice sprung 
up against them. The divisions of dragoons had been 
mustered at Compiegne and Amiens, to be embarked with- 
out horses for the expedition of England, in order to serve 
on foot until they should be mounted in that country. 
General Baraguay d'Hilliers, their first inspector, com- 
manded them ; he had them equipped with gaiters, and 
incorporated with them a considerable number of recruits, 
whom he exercised in infantry manoeuvres alone. These 
were no longer cavalry regiments : they served in the 
campaign of 1806 on foot, until after the battle of Jena, 
when they were mounted on horses taken from the Prus- 
sian cavalry, three-fourths of which were unserviceable. 
These combined circumstances injured the dragoons ; but 
in 1813 and 1814 their divisions acquired honor in rival- 
ling the cuirassiers. Dragoons are necessary for the sup- 
port of light cavalry in the vanguard, the rear-guard, and 
the wings of an army ; cuirassiers are little adapted for 
van and rear-guards : they should never be employed in 
this service but when it is requisite to keep them in prac- 
tice and accustom them to war." 

Napoleon further recommends that light cavalry be di- 
vided into two kinds, chasseurs or troopers, and light 
horse ; and the heavy to be composed of dragoons and 
cuirassiers ; the troopers to be mounted on horses of 4 ft. 

23* 



270 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

6 in. ; light cavalry on horses of 4 ft. 7 or 8 in. ; dragoons 
on horses of 4 ft. 9 in. ; and cuirassiers on horses of 4 ft. 
10 or 11 in.; which employ horses of all kinds for 
mounting the troops. 

All cavalry must receive the same instruction ; and all 
should be capable, in case of need, of performing any of 
the duties of mounted troops. The shock is the principal 
effect produced by this arm ; therefore, the greater the 
velocity the greater must be this effect, provided the 
troops can be kept in mass. But it is found, by experi- 
ence, that it is impossible to preserve them in line when put 
to the height of their speed. The best authorities there- 
fore prefer, as we have said elsewhere, the charge at the 
trot, or at any rate the gallop should not be taken up till 
within a very short distance of the enemy. The charge 
of a compact mass at a trot is much greater than that of a 
wavering one at a gallop. 

On the field of battle the cavalry of the line is consider- 
ed as the arm of the shock, to break through any corps 
that may be in opposition ; but it is unable of itself to re- 
sist a shock, and therefore should on no account wait to 
receive the charge of another body of mounted troops. It. 
was on this account that Frederick directed his cavalry 
officers, under the severest penalties, never to receive a 
charge, but always to meet the attacking force half way. 
This is the only mode of preventing defeat. 

A good infantry can always sustain itself against the 
charges of cavalry. At the battle of Auerstedt, in 1806, 
Davoust ordered the divisions of Gudin to form squares to 
resist the Prussian cavalry, which, by means of a fog, had 
gained a most advantageous position. Bllicher led his 
cavalry in repeated and impetuous charges, but all was in 
vain ; the French infantry presented a front of iron. At 
the combat of Krasnoi, in 1812, the cavalry of Grouchy, 
Nansonty, and Bordesoult, attacked and overthrew the 



ARMY ORGANIZATION. 271 

dragoons of Clarkof, but the Russian infantry under Neve- 
roffskoi sustained itself against the repeated charges of 
vastly superior numbers of these French horse. At the 
battle of Molwitz, the grenadiers sustained the charges of 
the enemy's cavalry, although the cavalry of the great 
Frederick had already been completely overthrown. 

But when the infantry is engaged with the infantry of 
the enemy, the charges of cavalry are generally success- 
ful, and sometimes decide the fate of the battle, as was 
the case at Rosbach, Zornsdorf, Wurtsburg, Marengo, 
Eylau, Borodino, &c. 

Cavalry may also be very efficacious against infantry 
in wet weather, when the rain or snow renders it impos- 
sible for the foot soldiers to use their fire-arms to advan- 
tage, as was the case with the corps of Augereau, at 
Eylau, and with the Austrian left, at the battle of Dresden. 
Again, if the infantry be previously weakened, or thrown 
into disorder by the fire of batteries. The charge of the 
Russian cavalry at Hohenfriedberg, in 1745, is a remark- 
able example of this kind. 

Cavalry should always be immediately sustained in its 
efforts either by infantry or other bodies of horse ; for as 
soon as the charge is made, the strength of this arm is 
for a time exhausted, and, if immediately attacked, defeat 
becomes inevitable. The charge of the cavalry of Ney 
on Prince Hohenlohe at the battle of Jena, and of the 
French horse on Gossa at Leipsic, are fine examples of 
the successful charges of cavalry when properly sus- 
tained. Kunnersdorf and Waterloo are examples of the 
disastrous consequences of leaving such charges without 
support. 

The choice of the field of battle is sometimes such as 
to render cavalry almost useless. Such was the case at 
the battle of Cassano, between the Duke of Vendome and 
the Prince Eugene. The field was so cut up by the 



272 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

Adda and the canals of Rittorto and Pendina, that Prince 
Eugene could make no use of his horse. If, when mas- 
ter of the bridge of Rittorto, he had been able to charge 
the French with a body of cavalry, there had been no 
doubt of his complete success. 

After a battle, and in the pursuit of a flying enemy, 
cavalry is invaluable. If Napoleon had possessed a suit- 
able number of mounted troops, with an able commander, 
at the battles of Lutzen and Ligny, the results of these 
victories had been decisive ; whereas they were really 
without consequence. On the other hand, the Prussian 
army in 1806, after the battle of Jena, and Napoleon's 
army in 1815 at Waterloo, were completely cut to pieces 
by the skilful use of cavalry in the pursuit of a defeated 
and dispirited foe. 

The want of good cavalry was severely felt in the war 
of the American Revolution. Had Washington possessed 
a few good squadrons of horse, his surprise and defeat in 
the lines of Brooklyn, and the consequent loss of New 
York, had never taken place. The efficient employment 
of a few good squadrons of cavalry might readily have 
prevented the defeat at Bladensburg, and the loss of the 
capitol, in 1814. 

In a well-organized army, the cavalry should be from 
one-fourth to one-sixth of the infantry, according to the 
nature of the war.* 



* To gain a competent knowledge of the duties connected with the 
two arms of service mentioned in this chapter, the officer should make 
himself thoroughly acquainted with Scott's System of Infantry Tac- 
tics, for the United States' Infantry, or at least with Major Cooper's 
abridged edition of Infantry Tactics, and with the system of Cavalry 
Tactics, adopted in our army ; also with the directions for the use of 
these two arms in a campaign, and their employment on the battle- 
field, given in the writings of Jomini, Decker, Okouneff, Rocquancourt, 
and Jacquinot de Presle 



ARMY ORGANIZATION. 273 

The following books may be referred to for further information re- 
specting the history, organization, use, and instruction of infantry and 
cavalry : — 

Essai general dc tactique. Guibert. 

Considerations generales sur Vinfanterie frangaise, par un g^ndral 
en rdtraite. A work of merit. 

De Vinfantericj par I'auteur de I'histoire de I'expddition de Russie. 

Histoire de la guerre de la peninsule. Foy. This work contains 
many interesting and valuable remarks on the French and English 
systems of tactics, and particularly on the tactics of Infantry. 

Corns d^art et d'histoire militaires. Jacquinot de Presle. 

Art de la guerre, Rogniat. 

Instruction destinee aux troupes legereSf &c., redigee sur une in- 
struction de Frederick II. ^ ses officiers. 

English Infantry Regulations. , 

Ordonnance (French) pour Vexercice et les manoeuvres de Vin- 
fanterie, par le commission de manoeuvres. 

Aide-memoires des officiers generaux et superieurs, et des capi- 
iaines. 

Essai sur Vhistoire generale de Vart militaire. Carion-Nisas. 

Histoire de la milice frangaise. Daniel. 

Cours elementaire d'art et d'histoire militaires. Rocquancourt 

Traite elementaire dart militaire, &c. Gay de Vernon. 

Introduction a V etude de Vart de la guerre. La Roche-Amyou. 

Tactique des trois armes. Decker. 

Examen raisonne des trois armes, &c. OkounefF. 

The last two are works of great merit. The writings of Okouneff, 
however, are very diiFuse. 

Instruction pour le service de Vinfanterie legere. Guyeird. 

Instruction de Vinfanterie, &c. Schauenbourg. 

Traite de tactique. Temay et Koch. 

Mecanism des manoeuvres de guerre de Vinfanterie polonaise, 
Vroniecki. 

Traite sur Vinfanterie legere. Beurmann. 

English Cavalry Regulations, 

Ordonnance (French) sur Vexercice et les evolutions de la ca* 
Valerie. 

Les troupes a cheval de France, &c. De Bourge. 

Avant-postes de cavalerie legere. Brack. The author served with 
distinction under Lassale, Colbert, Maison, Pujol, and Excelmans. 

Reflexions sur Vemploi de la cavalerie, &c. Caraman. 



274 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

Observations sur Vordonnance, ^c, de la cavalerie. Dejean. 

Tactique de la cavalerie. Itier. 

Elements de tactique pour la cavalerie, par Mottin de la Balme. 
A work of rare merit. 

De Vemploi de la cavalerie a la. guerre. Schaueuboiirg. 

Remarques sur la cavalerie. Warnery. This work has long en- 
joyed a high reputation among the cavalry officers of the European 
services. The Paris edition is enriched with notes by a French gen- 
eral officer. 

Nachrichten und Betrachtungen iiber die Thaten und Schicksale 
der Reiterei, &c. This work discusses the operations of cavalry in 
the campaigns of Frederick the Great and of Napoleon, down to the 
battle of Lutzen in 1813. 

Examen du livret provisoire, &c. Marbot. 

Le Spectateur Militaire, contains many essays by cavalry officers 
on the various questions connected with the organization and use of 
this arm. 

Die Gefechtslehre der beiden verbundenen Waffen-Kavallerie und 
reitenden Artillerie. Decker 

Manuel de Vofficier. Ruble de Lilienstem. 

Aide-memoire, a V usage des officiers de cavalerie. 

Journal de Vinfanterie et de la cavalerie. 

Traite de tactique pour les officiers dHnfanterie et de cavalerie. 

Histoire des exploits et des vicissitudes de la cavalerie prus- 
sienne. Coutz. 



ARTILLERY. 275 



CHAPTER XI. 

ARMY ORGANIZATION. ARTILLERY. 

Artillery. — Previous to the invention of gunpowder in 
the thirteenth century, the machines of war were divided 
between two classes of military men, the engineers (en- 
gignours, as they were called in the middle ages) and the 
artillery, {artilliers, as they were formerly called,) the lat- 
ter being particularly charged with the management of the 
lighter and more portable projectile machines, such as the 
balistas and arco-balistas, which were used for throwing 
different kinds of arrows — -fliches, viretons, carreaux, ma- 
tras, &c., while the former managed the battering-rams, 
cranes, helipoles, &c. And, indeed, for a long time after 
the discovery of gunpowder, this distinction was kept up, 
and the artillery retained all the more ordinary projectile 
machines, while the engineers constructed and managed 
the more ponderous weapons of attack and defence. But 
the new artillery was gradually introduced, without, how- 
ever, immediately displacing the old, and there were for 
a time, if we may be allowed the expression, two artille- 
ries, the one employing the old projectile machines, and 
the other those of the new invention. The latter were 
called canoniers, to distinguish them from the former, who 
still retained the name of artilliers. 

The first cannon were invented in the early part of the 
fourteenth century, or, perhaps, among the Arabs as early 
as the middle of the thirteenth century, but they were not 
much known in Europe till about 1350. Cannon are said 
to have been employed by the Moors as early as 1249, and 
by the French in 1338. The English used artillery at 



276 MILITARY- ART AND SCIENCE. 

the battle of Crecy in 1346. Both cannon and the ancient 
projectile machines were employed at the siege of Ai- 
guillon in 1339, at Zara in 1345, at Rennes in 1357, and 
at Naples in 1380. At this last siege the ancient balista 
was employed to throw into the castle of Naples barrels 
of infectious matter and mutilated limbs of prisoners of 
war. We read of the same thing being done in Spain at 
a later period. 

Cannon in France were at first called bombards and 
couleuverines, but were afterwards named from certain 
figures marked on them, such as serpentines, basilisks, scor- 
pions, Sic. In the infancy of the art they were made 
small, weighing only from twenty to fifty pounds, and were 
mounted on small moveable carriages. This species of 
fire-arms became quite numerous about the beginning of 
the fifteenth century. They were followed by heavier 
pieces, used in the attack and defence of towns. This 
siege artillery continued to be increased in dimensions, 
till, towards the latter part of the fifteenth century, they 
reached such an enormous size as to be almost useless as 
a military machine. Louis XI. had an immense piece 
constructed at Tours, in 1770, which, it was said, carried 
a ball from the Bastille to Charenton, (about six miles !) 
Its caliber was that of five hundred pounds. It was in- 
tended for experiment, and burst on the second discharge. 
The famous culverin of Bolduc was said to carry a ball 
from that city to Bommel. The culverin of Nancy, made 
in 1598, was more than twenty-three feet in length. 
There is now an ancient cannon in the arsenal at Metz 
of about this length, which carries a ball of one hundred 
and forty pounds. Cannon balls were found at Paris as 
late as 1712, weighing near two hundred pounds, and from 
twelve to sixteen inches in diameter. At the siege of 
Constantinople in 1453, there was a famous metallic bom- 
bard which threw stone balls of an incredible size ; at the 



ARTILLERY. 277 

sieg<^ of Bourges in 1412, a cannon was used which, it 
was said, threw stone balls " of the size of mill-stones." 
The Gantois, under Arteville, made a bombard fifty feet 
in length, whose report was heard at a distance of ten 
leagues ! 

The first cannon were made of wood, and covered with 
sheet-iron, or embraced by iron rings : longitudinal bars 
of iron were afterwards substituted for the wooden form. 
Towards the end of the fourteenth century, brass, tin, cop- 
per, wrought and cast iron, were successively used for 
this purpose. The bores of the pieces were first made in 
a conical shape, and it was not until a much later period 
that the cylindrical form was introduced. 

In the wars between the Spaniards and Moors in the 
latter part of the fifteenth century, very great use was made 
ol' artillery in sieges and battles. Ferdinand the Catholic 
had at this time, probably, a larger artillery train than any 
other European power. The Spanish cannon, generally 
very large, were composed of iron bars about two inches 
in breadth, held together by bolts and rings of the same 
metal. The pieces were firmly attached to their car- 
riages, and incapable of either horizontal or vertical move- 
ment. The balls thrown by them were usually of marble, 
though sometimes of iron. Many of the pieces used at 
the siege of Baza, in 1486, are still to be seen in that city, 
and also the cannon balls then in use. Some of the latter 
are fourteen inches in diameter, and weigh one hundred 
and seventy-five pounds. The length of the cannon was 
about twelve feet. These dimensions are a proof of a 
slight improvement in this branch of military science, 
which was, nevertheless, still in its infancy. The awk- 
wardness of artillery at this period may be judged of by its 
slowness of fire. At the siege of Zeteuel, in 1407, five 
'* bombards," as the heavy pieces of ordnance were then 
called, were able to discharge only forty shot in the course 

24 



278 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

of a day ; and it is noticed as a remarkable circumstance, 
at the siege of Albahar, that two batteries discharged one 
hundred and forty balls in the course of the twenty-four 
hours ! 

In the Italian wars between France and Spain, in the 
beginning of the sixteenth century, the difficulty of moving 
the heavy cannon then in use was so great that only a very 
small number of pieces were brought upon the battle-field. 
At the battle of Cerignola, in 1503, the number of cannon 
in the French army was only thirteen. Indeed, during 
the greater part of this century, four or five pieces were 
considered sufficient for an ordinary army in the field, and 
many agreed to the doctrine of Machiavelli, that the only 
legitimate use of artillery was in the attack and defence 
of places. But in the wars of Henry IV. of France, this 
arm of service was again increased, and the troops which 
this king destined against the house of Austria had an ar- 
tillery train of fifty pieces. Great improvements were also 
made about this period in the manufacture of powder, and 
all kinds of fire-arms. Sully gave greater development 
to this arm of service, improving its materials, and in- 
creasing its efficiency. Then, as at most other periods, the 
French were in advance of most other nations in artillery. 

It was near the close of the sixteenth or the beginning 
of the seventeenth century, that the heavy and ill-shaped 
artillery began to give place to more waeldy and useful 
pieces. A certain M. de Linar demonstrated, in the lat- 
ter part of the sixteenth century, that cannon twelve feet 
in length would give a greater range than those seventeen 
feet in length, the calibre being the same ; but some years 
elapsed before advantage was taken of this discovery. In 
1624, Gustavus Adolphus caused experiments to be made 
to verify this point, and, on being convinced of its truth, 
caused his batteries to be furnished with shorter and light- 
er pieces. This great king introduced, about the same 



ARTILLERY. 279 

time, a new and lighter kind of artillery, made of sheet 
iron and leather. Each piece had its chamber formed of 
thin metal and embraced by strong iron rings ; over these 
was placed a form of hardened leather, which was again 
encircled with rings and held compactly together. These 
pieces were momited on light carriages, so that two men 
could easily manoeuvre them. It was said that they would 
fire from eight to ten rounds without requiring repairs. 
Gustavus made use of them in all his military operations 
from 1628 to the time of his death. They did him excel- 
lent service on numerous occasions ; being so very light 
they could be easily transported, and, on the field of bat- 
tle, their movements could be made to conform to the 
movements of his troops. 

As cannon and small arms were gradually introduced 
into general use, various inventions and improvements 
were proposed and introduced from time to time. Can- 
non were constructed with two or more barrels ; some " 
were arranged for being loaded in the breech, and others 
at the mouth of the piece ; two pieces were sometimes 
connected by horizontal timbers, which revolved about 
a vertical axis, so that the recoil of one piece would 
bring the other into battery ; and various other arrange- 
ments of this description, which have recently been re- 
vived and some of them patented as new inventions. The 
small arms employed at this period were much the same 
as those used at the present day, except the match- 
lock, which afterwards gave place to flint-locks. Arms 
of this description were sometimes made to be load- 
ed at the breach, and guns with two, three, and even as 
many as eight barrels, were at one time in fashion. In 
the Musee de VArtillerie at Paris may be found many arms 
of this kind, which have been reproduced in this country 
and England as new inventions. In this Museum are two 
ancient pieces, invented near the end of the sixteenth or 



280 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

the beginning of the seventeenth century, which very 
nearly correspond with Coifs patent, with the single ex- 
ception of the lock !* 

The materiel of artillery employed in modern warfare 
is divided into two general classes : 1st. Siege Artillery, 
or such as is employed in the attack and defence of 
places. 2d. Field Artillery, or such as is used in battle, 
or in the field-operations of an army. 

1. Siege Artillery is composed of mortars, large how- 
itzers, Paixhan guns or Columhiads,\ and all cannon of a 
large calibre. In our service this class of ordnance in- 
cludes the twelve, eighteen, twenty-four, thirty-two, and 
forty-two-pounder guns, the eight, ten, and thirte en-inch 
mortars, the sixteen-inch stone mortar, the twenty-four- 
pounder coehorn mortar, the twenty-four-pounder carron- 
ade, and the eight, ten, and twelve-inch howitzers. 

All these, except the smaller mortars, are made of cast 
iron. This substance is less tenacious than wrought iron 
or bronze, and the cannon made of it are, on this account, 

* It is not to be inferred that the modern improvements (as they 
are called) are copied from the more ancient inventions. Two men 
of different ages, or even of the same age, sometimes fall upon the 
same identical discovery, without either's bon*owing from the other. 

t These pieces were first invented by Colonel Bomford, of the U. S. 
army, and used in the war of 1812. The dimensions of these guns 
were first taken to Europe by a young French officer, and thus fell 
into the hands of General Paixhan, who immediately introduced them 
into the French service. They were by this means first made known 
to the rest of Europe, and received the name of the person who in- 
troduced them into the European services, rather than that of the 
original inventor. All these facts are so fully susceptible of proof, 
that Europeans now acknowledge themselves indebted to us for the 
invention ; even General Paixhan gives up all claim to originality in 
his gun, and limits himself to certain improvements which he intro- 
duced. The original gun, which was invented by Colonel Bomford, 
and whose dimensions were carried to General Paixhan in France, is 
now lying at the ordnance d^p6t, in New York harbor. 



ARTILLERY. 281 

much heavier than of the other materials ; but for the na- 
val service, and the attack and defence of fortifications, 
the weight required to secure the necessary strength is 
not very objectionable. Wrought iron and bronze are 
much more expensive and less durable. Moreover, the 
difficulty of forging wrought iron in masses of sufficient 
size has been such as to prevent its being brought into 
general use for artillery. Numerous attempts have been 
made, at different periods, to construct large guns of this 
material, but none have yet been successful. Improve- 
ments which are now making in the manufacture of 
wrought iron, may render this the preferable material for 
the smaller pieces of artillery ; but the best informed mil- 
itary men deem it objectionable for the heavier cannon, 
both on account of its cost and the imperfection of its 
manufacture. Even should the latter objection be re- 
moved, its cost must prevent its general application to the 
construction of siege artillery. Charlatans in military sci- 
ence, both in this country and in Europe, bring this sub- 
ject up every fifteen or twenty years as a new invention, 
and flaming notices of the improvement, and predictions 
of the revolution it is to effect in the art of war, are cir- 
culated in the newspapers to "gull" a credulous public; 
and after some fifty or one hundred thousand dollars have 
been squandered on some court-favorite, the whole matter 
ends in the explosion of the " improvement,^^ and probably 
the destruction of the " inventor,^^ and perhaps also of his 
spectators. Let us be distinctly understood on this sub- 
ject. There may be inventions and improvements in the 
manufacture of wrought iron, but there is nothing new in 
its application to the construction of cannon, for it has 
been used for this purpose as long ago as the first inven- 
tion of the art. 

2. Field Artillery is composed of the smaller guns and 
howitzers. In our service this class of cannon includes 

24* 



282 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

the six and twelve-pounder guns, and the twelve and 
twenty-four-pounder howitzers. All these are now made 
of bronze. This material is more expensive than cast- 
iron, but its superior tenacity renders it more useful 
where great weight is objectionable. Improvements in 
the manufacture of cast iron may render it safe to employ 
this metal in the construction of field-pieces. It is also 
possible the wrought iron may be forged in masses large 
enough, and the cost be so reduced as to bring it into use 
for field-pieces. It is here important to combine strength 
with lightness, and additional expense may very properly 
be incurred to secure this important object. 

The projectiles now in use are solid shot, shells, strap- 
shot, case or canister-shot, grape-shot, light and fire-balls, 
carcasses, grenades, and rockets. 

Solid shot are now almost invariably made of cast iron,* 
formed in moulds of sand or iron. This projectile is used 
under almost every circumstance, whether in the battle- 
field or in the attack and defence of places, and is the 
only one that is effectual against the stone walls of forts. 
Hot shot are used against shipping and wooden structures 
of every description. Red-hot balls were first employed 
by the king of Poland, in 1575, but, on account of the dif- 
ficulty of heating them with rapidity, and the danger of 
loading the piece with them, this kind of projectile was 
not in general use till a much later period. It was at first 
supposed that the expansion of the metal would be so 
great, when heated to a red or white heat, as to prevent 
the ball from entering the piece ; it is found, however, 
that the windage is still sufficient for loading with facility. 
These red-hot balls are principally used to fire wooden 
buildings, ships, and other combustible matter. They are 
therefore much used as a projectile for coast defence, and 

* In Mexico, where iron is scarce, copper is used for shot and 
shells ; but it is a poor substitute. 



ARTILLERY. 283 

all fortifications on the seaboard should be provided with 
furnaces and grates, arranged so as to heat them with fa- 
cility and rapidity. 

There are several kinds of holloW'shot and shells, called 
bombs, howitzes, grenades, &c. They are made of cast iron, 
and usually in a spherical shape, the cavity being concen- 
tric with the exterior surface. The cavity was formerly 
made eccentric with the exterior, under the belief that the 
heavier side would always strike first. The rotary motion 
of the shell during its flight rendered this precaution of 
no use. Fire is communicated to the combustible matter 
within the shell by means of a fuse, which is so regulated 
that the explosion shall take place at the desired moment. 
Hollow-shot are used with advantage to destroy ordinary 
buildings, ships, earthwork, and thin walls of masonry ; 
they, however, are of little avail in breaking the massiv^e 
walls of well-constructed forts. Howitzes and grenades 
are particularly eflective against cavalry and columns of 
infantry, and are much employed on the battle-field ; they 
are also much used in the attack and defence of places. 

We find that as early as 1486 the Spaniards made use 
of a projectile similar to the modern bomb. " They threw 
from their engines large globular masses, composed of 
certain inflammable ingredients mixed with gunpowder, 
which, scattering long trains of light," says an eye-wit- 
ness, " in their passage through the air, filled the behold- 
ers with dismay, and descending on the roofs of edi- 
fices, frequently occasioned extensive conflagration." In 
the siege of Constantinople by Mahomet H., shells 
were used, and also mortars of enormous size. In 1572 
Valturus proposed to throw, with a kind of mortar, 
" globes of copper filled with powder." In 1588, an arti- 
ficer of Venloo burned Wachtendeck by throwing bombs 
into the place. A similar attempt had just been made at 
Berg-op-Zoom. The use of this projectile became quite 



284 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

common in France under Louis XIII. Howitzes were 
not much used till the seventeenth century. They are of 
German origin, and the howitzer first bore the name of 
haufmitz. 

The strap-shot consists of a round ball attached to a 
sahot of the same calibre, by means of two strips of tin 
passing over the shot at right angles, and fastened to a 
third, which is soldered around the sabot. One end of 
the sabot is arranged for attaching it to the cartridge, the 
other being hollowed out to receive the shot. The sup- 
posed advantages of this arrangement are, 1st, a diminu- 
tion of the windage ; 2d, the gun may be loaded with 
greater rapidity ; and, 3d, the cartridge is transported with 
greater safety. 

The case or canister -shot is prepared by filling a tin can- 
ister with grape-shot or musket-balls, and attaching it to 
the cartridge by means of a sabot. There being two sizes 
of grape-shot, and one of musket-balls, we have three kinds 
of canister-shot calculated to reach at different distances. 
The three sizes of shot are frequently mixed in the same 
canister. This projectile is particularly effective against 
lines of infantry and cavalry, when the distance is short. 

The grape-shot is composed of small balls arranged 
round an upright pin attached to a plate of wood or iron. 
The concave cast-iron plate is preferable, as it increases 
the range of the shot. The balls are covered with can- 
vass, and thoroughly confined by a quilting of strong twine. 
This shot is used for the same purposes as the canister. 

Light a,nd fire-balls are formed of an oval case of sacking, 
filled with combustible matter, and attached to a culot of 
cast-iron. The whole is covered with a net of spun-yarn. 
Light-balls are used to light up our own works, and are 
not armed ; fire-balls being employed to light up the works 
or approaches of an enemy, it is necessary to arm them 
with pistol-barrels, in order to prevent any one from extin- 



ARTILLERY. 285 

guishing them. When made of very combustible mate- 
rials, and used for setting fire to wooden structures, they 
are denominated incendiary balls. 

Carcasses are employed for the same purpose as incen- 
diary balls ; they are of two kinds : 1st, the shell-carcass ; 
and, 2d, the ribbed-carcass. The first is composed of a 
spherical shell, cast with five fuse-holes, one being at the 
top, and the other four in a plane perpendicular to this and 
at right angles with each other ; the shell is filled with 
matter highly combustible. The second is formed of iron 
ribs connected by iron straps, and attached at the ends to 
culots of the same material, the whole being filled with 
combustible composition. This is more expensive than 
the shell carcass, and cannot be fired with as great accu- 
racy ; it is now seldom used. Carcasses may be armed 
in the same manner as fire-balls. 

Smoke and suffocating balls are used to drive an enemy 
from galleries and mines. They are thrown by hand. 

The personnel of the French artillery was for a long 
time retained, together with the engineers, under the gen- 
eral direction of the " Grand Master of Cross-bows.'* 
In 1420 the master-general of artillery was made inde- 
pendent of the grand-master of cross-bows ; but previous 
to the reign of Louis XIV., the artillery troops had no or- 
ganization as a separate corps. In 1668 six companies 
of canoniers were created, and soon after two companies 
of bombardiers. In 1693 the first regiment of fusiliers 
was changed into a royal regiment of artillery^ and both 
the canoniers and bombardiers were eventually incorpo- 
rated with it. The staff of artillery, towards the close 
of this reign, was composed of one grand-master, sixty 
lieutenants, sixty commissaries, and eighty officiers-poin- 
teurs. In 1721 the artillery was divided into five battal- 
ions and stationed at Metz, Strasbourg, Grenoble, Per- 
pignan, and La Fere, where they established schools of 



286 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

theory and practice. In 1756 the artillery was organized 
into seven regiments, each regiment having its own sepa- 
rate school. This organization continued without any 
remarkable change till the Revolution. 

During the earlier campaigns of the French Revolu- 
tion it is impossible to trace out the changes that took 
place in army organization, every thing was then so 
irregular and confused, the troops of different arms being 
frequently united together. In the campaign of 1792 
there were some six or seven regiments of foot artillery, 
and ten companies of horse. This arm was greatly in- 
creased during the subsequent campaigns, and its organ- 
ization was completely remodelled by Napoleon on his 
elevation to the head of the government. The personnel 
of the artillery was then composed of a general staff, 
nine regiments of foot and six of horse. In 1815 it was 
reduced to eight regiments of foot and four of horse. 

The personnel of artillery in modern army organization 
is divided into four classes : the staff, guards, artificers^ 
and troops. 

I. The Staff, or Ordnance, as it is called in our service, 
is charged with the construction of all the materials of 
artillery, and the collection of powder and military stores. 
As the lives of persons using these materials, and, in a 
considerable degree, the success of war, depend upon the 
nature and quality of the stores thus manufactured and 
collected, it is obvious that the members of this branch 
of the artillery service should possess high and peculiar 
qualifications. In the French army the artillery staff is 
composed of two hundred and eighty-three officers of dif- 
ferent grades : also twenty-four officers of the general 
staff are attached to this service. In our army the ord- 
7ia;2ceis composed of twenty-eight officers of different grades. 

II. Artillery -guards. — These in our service are divided 
into two classes : 1st. Military Store-keepers. 2d. Ord- 



ARTILLERY. 287 

nance Sergeants. Both are alike charged with the care 
and preservation of the artillery property and stores at 
the several garrisons, arsenals, and magazines. In our 
army we have fifty-eight of these guards, viz : fifteen 
commissioned military store-keepers, and forty-three ord- 
nance sergeants. We seldom have more than this num- 
ber of permanent posts ; each one can therefore be sup- 
plied with an artillery guard for the care of the artillery 
stores. In the French service there are three hundred 
and fifteen of these artillery guards ; they are divided 
into three classes. 

III. Artificers. — This class of men are employed in 
the construction and repairs of military materials. In 
most of our arsenals and armories it is thought to be 
best to employ unenlisted workmen, by the piece or con- 
tract. Nevertheless a limited number of enlisted men of 
this description are found to be both useful and necessary. 
We have three hundred and thirty of these in our army, 
viz : two hundred and fifty enlisted " ordnance men," and 
eighty " artificers" attached to the regiments. In the 
French army they have for the service of the arsenals 
and establishments, one hundred and forty-nine *' ouv- 
riers," and twelve " artificers ;" there are also three hun- 
dred and sixty *' ouvriers" and seventeen " armuriers" 
attached to the corps of artillery, making in all five hun- 
dred and thirty-eight. 

IV. Artillery Troops. — Artillery, as an arm of service, 
IS divided in the same manner as its materiel; the field- 
artillery being intended for field service, and the garrison 
or ^i^^e-artillery, for the attack and defence of places. 
The troops of the artillery corps of a modern army usu- 
ally do duty either in the field, or in sieges, or garrison, 
as occasion may require. When employed in the service 
of a campaign, artillery is usually divided into two class- 
es : 1st. jPo(?^ Artillery ; and 2d. //or^e Artillery. 



288 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

In the early history of artillery, as has already been 
shown, but few pieces were ever brought upon the battle- 
field. Charles VIII . crossed the Alps with a pretty large 
train ; but a part of these were hand-guns, and but very 
few of the larger pieces were ever brought into battle; 
indeed, it was then thought that this arm would be of little 
use except in sieges. At the battle of Gravelines the 
army of Philip II. had only seventeen pieces of artillery ; 
and at the battle of Ivry the French had only four pieces 
of cannon, and two culverins : the army of the League 
had also only four pieces. At the battle of Moncontour 
the opposing armies had but eight pieces each. 

Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden not only improved the 
character of artillery, but also gave to it great develop- 
ment as an arm of service. At the battle of Breetenfield 
he had one hundred pieces of artillery, great and small, 
and at the camp of Nuremberg he numbered about three 
hundred. This king also made a more skilful use of his 
cannon by uniting them more in mass than had been done 
by his predecessors ; his system was nevertheless very 
imperfect. In the disposition of this arm on the field of 
battle, a vast improvement was made by Conde, Turenne, 
and Prince Eugene of Savoy. Frederick the Great 
also made great use of this arm, and was the first to 
introduce horse artillery. This mode of using field- 
pieces has peculiar properties which in many circum- 
stances render it an invaluable arm. The promptness and 
rapidity of its movements enable it to act with other troops 
without embarrassing them. The French soon introduced 
into their army the improvements made by the king of 
Prussia, and in 1763 the celebrated Gribeauval appeared. 
He improved the form of the cannon and greatly dimin- 
ished the weight of field artillery, giving it an organ- 
ization which has been but slightly changed since his 
time. 



ARTILLERY. 289 

The successive improvements in artillery have for a 
long time constituted a prominent feature in war. The 
power of this arm to throw projectiles to a great distance, 
and to overturn and destroy opposing obstacles, renders it 
a necessary arm on the battle-field, and a strong barrier 
and safeguard of states. It is an essential element in all 
army organization. 

In our army we have four regiments of artillery, form- 
ing the basis of forty batteries. In the French service 
there are fourteen regiments, forming the basis of two 
hundred and six field batteries. 

The term battery^ when applied to artillery as an arm 
of service, refers to a permanent organization of a certain 
number of cannon, with the men and other accessaries re- 
quired to serve them. This is the unit of force in this 
arm. The regimental organization is a mere nominal ar- 
rangement, for in actual service artillery acts by batteries, 
and never by regiments. Its strength is therefore invaria- 
bly estimated by the number of its batteries. 

A battery is ordinarily composed of six pieces, two of 
them being howitzers. The lighter batteries would, in 
our service, be formed of six-pounder guns and twelve- 
pounder howitzers ; and the heavier of twelve-pounder 
guns and twenty-four-pounder howitzers. These heavy 
batteries would usually form the reserve. Each piece be- 
ing attended by its caisson, this formation would give 
twelve carriages to each battery, six for the guns and six 
for the caissons. The extra caissons form a part of the 
reserve, and move with the train. In some foreign ser- 
vices a battery is composed of eight pieces with their 
caissons. 

This arm admits of three formations — in column, in battle^ 
and in battery. In column it ordinarily moves by sections 
of two pieces, each piece being followed or preceded by 
its caisson. Columns of half-batteries are sometimes 

25 



290 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

formed, and also columns of single pieces ; but the latter 
ought never to be employed except in cases of necessity, 
in passing a narrow defile, and at a distance from the 
enemy. 

In order of battle, the pieces are drawn up in line, their 
caissons forming a second line, at the distance of a few 
paces. 

When in order of battery, the pieces are formed in the ' 
same way as for battle, except that the guns are directed 
towards the enemy and prepared for firing. 

The movements and manoeuvres of foot artillery corre- 
spond with those of infantry, and of mounted artillery with 
those of cavalry, a battery being regarded as a battalion or 
squadron, of which the pieces form the platoons. Mounted 
batteries can seldom move with greater rapidity than the 
trot, except in cases of emergency, and even then the 
gallop can be kept up only for a very short time ; but this 
is of no great importance, as the batteries never accom- 
pany cavalry in the charge. 

The French and German writers discuss artillery as 
employed in battle, under two distinct heads — 1st, as an 
arm of preparation, and 2d, as an arm of succor. 

I. As an arm of preparation it serves, 1st, to protect the 
deploying of the other troops ; 2d, to disorganize the ene- 
my's masses, and to facilitate the action of infantry and 
cavalry, by weakening the intended points of attack ; 3d, 
to force an enemy to evacuate a position by overthrowing 
obstacles with which he has covered himself; 4th, to 
keep up the action till the other troops can be prepared to 
strike the decisive blow. 

The force of this arm depends upon the rapidity and 
accuracy of its fire ; rash valor is therefore far less desi- 
rable in artillery than skill, patience, and cool courage. 
Artillery always acts at a distance, and in mass ; single 
pieces are seldom employed, except to cover reconnoitring 



ARTILLERY. 291 

parties, or to sustain the light infantry in a skirmish. 
Mounted batteries sometimes approach within two or 
three hundred yards of the enemy's infantry ; but this is 
only done with a strong support of other troops, and to 
prepare the way for a charge of cavalry. The batteries 
do not accompany the charge, but they should always 
follow up and complete the success ; mounted batteries 
are particularly useful in pursuit. If Murat, in 1812, had 
accompanied his attacks upon NeverofFskoi's retreating 
columns of sixty thousand infantry by two or three bat- 
teries of mounted artillery, the whole column must have 
been captured or destroyed. 

Artillery, on the field of battle, is very liable to allow 
its fire to be drawn, and its projectiles wasted, while the 
enemy is at too great a distance to be reached. It is a 
very common thing in a battle, to employ two or three 
pieces of heavy calibre at the beginning of the fight, in 
order to provoke the opposing batteries to open their fire 
before the proper time. The waste of material is not the 
only loss attending this error ; the troops are fatigued and 
disheartened, while the courage and confidence of their 
opponents are always revived by a weak and inaccurate 
fire. To avoid such an error the commanding officer of a 
battery of artillery should be perfectly familiar with the 
eflfective ranges of his pieces, and accustomed to form a 
correct estimate of distances. For this purpose the eye 
should be frequently practised in time of peace in esti- 
mating the ranges for different calibres. 
The eff*ective range of a 12-pounder field-piece 

is about 1000 yds. 

u u u 5 a u 800 " 

" " " 24 " howitzer, 600 " 

u « a 12 " " 500 " 

" " " grape and case shot is 

from 300 to 500 " 



292 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

Even at these distances the aim is usually so inaccurate, 
that a large portion of the projectiles are lost. In the at- 
tack on Spires, a whole column of artillery expended its 
fire while at a distance of 900 yards from the enemy, who, 
of course, received little or no injury. In firing from for- 
tifications, the aim is far more accurate, and the artillery 
may therefore be employed to advantage as soon as the 
enemy comes within the longest range. 

II. As an arm of succor, the artillery serves, 1st, to give 
impulsive force to the attacking columns ; 2d, to assist in 
arresting, or at least in retarding, the offensive movements 
of an enemy ; 3d, to protect the avenues of approach, and 
to defend obstacles that cover a position ; and, 4th,<ilo 
cover a retrograde movement. 

Mounted artillery is, like cavalry, much the most effec- 
tive in attack ; but batteries of foot are better calculated 
for defence. The cannoniers are so armed as to be capa- 
ble of defending their pieces to the last extremity ; they 
therefore cannot be easily captured by opposing columns 
of infantry. "As to pretending to rush upon the guns," 
says Napoleon, " and carry them by the bayonet, or to 
pick off the gunners by musketry, these are chimerical 
ideas. Such things do sometimes happen ; but have we 
not examples of still more extraordinary captures by a 
coup de main ? As a general rule, there is no infantry, how- 
ever intrepid it may be, that can, without artillery, march 
with impunity the distance of five or six hundred toises, 
against two well-placed batteries (16 pieces) of cannon, 
served by good gunners ; before they could pass over two- 
thirds of the way, the men would be killed, wounded, or 
dispersed. * * * * A good infantry forms, no doubt, the 
sinews of an army ; but if it were required to fight for a 
long time against a very superior artillery, its good quality 
would be exhausted, and its efficiency destroyed. In the 
first campaigns of the wars of the Revolution, what France 



ARTILLERY. 293 

had in the greatest perfection was artillery ; we know not 
a single instance in which twenty pieces of cannon, judi- 
ciously placed, and in battery, were ever carried by the bay- 
onet. In the affair at Valmy, at the battles of Jemmapcs, 
Nordlingen, and Fleurus, the French had an artillery su- 
perior to that of the enemy, although they had often only 
two guns to one thousand men ; but that was because their 
armies were very numerous. It may happen that a gen- 
eral, more skilful in manoeuvring, more expert than his ad- 
versary, and commanding a better infantry, may obtain 
successes during a part of a campaign, although his ar- 
tillery may be far inferior to that of his opponent ; but on 
the critical day of a general engagement, his inferiority in 
point of metal will be severely felt." 

History furnishes us numerous examples of the use of 
artillery in protecting avenues of approach : — such as the 
defile of Koesen at the battle of Auerstedt ; the avenues 
between the redoubts of Pultowa, &c., &:c. 

When an army is forced to retreat, it covers its rear by 
that portion of its cavalry and mounted artillery which has 
suffered least during the battle. By placing the squadrons 
of horse and the light batteries in echelon, the retiring 
column may be well protected. The artillery, by using 
the prolonge, may also continue its retreat while in bat- 
tery and firing. It was in this way that at the battle of 
Albuera, in 1811, the French artillery on the left wing 
held in check the right and centre of the Anglo-Spaniards 
till the army effected its retreat ; the artillery then retired 
in echelons, by batteries and fractions of batteries, under 
the protection of the cavalry. 

We have already discussed, under the general head of 
tactics, the position and use of artillery on the battle-field , 
a few additional remarks must suffice. 

As a general rule, batteries should be placed in positions 
from which they can employ their fire to advantage, and 

25* 



294 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

also be free to move in any direction that the progress of 
the battle may require. Advantage should always be 
taken of natural or artificial obstacles, such as hedges, 
clumps of trees, logs, mounds of earth, &c., to cover and 
conceal the guns till the moment they open their fire. El- 
evated positions are, contrary to the common opinion, gen- 
erally unfavorable, for artillery cannot fire to advantage at 
any considerable angle of depression. The slopes in front 
should be of considerable length, otherwise the balls would 
do very little execution upon that portion of the column of 
attack which occupied the valley. The ground should 
also be smooth, for if rough the balls will either bury 
themselves in the earth, or ricochet at a high angle of de- 
flection, thus destroying a considerable part of the eflect 
of the fire. The counterforts or spurs of hills are favora- 
ble for artillery, as they enable it to see, with an enfilading 
fire, the slopes of the principal range. Batteries should 
seldom be placed so as to fire over other troops, for they 
will not only be intimidated by this fire, but also exposed 
to the opposing fire of the enemy's artillery. A large num- 
ber of pieces should never be crowded into the same place, 
but an interval should be left between the guns of forty or 
fifty feet, according to the locality. The most favorable 
position for this arm in ordinary ground, is in the intervals 
between the regiments or brigades of the line, and far 
enough in advance of this line not to draw upon the other 
troops the fire of the enemy's artillery. The flanks of the 
line are also favorable for the action of this arm. 

Sometimes artillery has been employed to form a part 
of the line of battle ; but such instances are exceptions, 
and can never be comprised in general rules. ¥/henever 
this disposition has been made, it has resulted from the 
defective character of the other arms, or from some pecu- 
liar circumstance in the battle which enabled a bold and 
skilful commander to deviate from the ordinary rules of 



ARTILLERY. 295 

tactics. Such was the case with Napoleon at Wagram. 
In Saxony, in 1813, he was several times obliged to sub- 
stitute his artillery to supply the want of other arms. 

In the defence and attack of field-works, and in the 
passage of rivers, artillery plays an important and indis- 
pensable part ; but it here becomes an auxiliary to the dis- 
positions of the engineers, or at least acts in concert with 
that arm. 

The troops of artillery, in all well-regulated army or- 
ganizations, should equal about two-thirds of the cavalry, 
or one-seventh of the infantry.* 

* To qualify himself for the duties connected with his arm of ser- 
vice, the artillery officer must make himself thoroughly acquainted 
with — 

The Instruction for United States Field Artillery, horse and foot ; 

Capt. Anderson's Instruction for Garrison Artillery ; 

Kinsley's Notes on Pyrotechny ; 

Knowlton's Notes on Gunpowder, &c. ; and 

The writings of Thiroux and Piobert on theoretical and practical 
instruction, and the writings of Joraini, Decker, and Okouneff, on the 
use of this arm on the field of battle. 

The following list of books of reference may be of use to those who 
wish to make themselves perfectly familiar with all the branches of 
artillery. 

Histoire general de Vartillerie, Brunet. 

L'artillerie a cheval dans les combats de cavalerie. Par mi officier 
de I'artillerie Prussienne. 

Considerations et experiences sur le tir des obus a balles, Bor- 
mann. 

Essai sur les obusiers. Dusaert. 

Essai sur Vorganisation de V artilleries Le Bourg. 

Traite sur Vartillerie, (traduit de I'Allomand.) Rouvroy. 

Bombardier Frangais. Belidor. 

Memoires d'artillerie. St. Remy. 

Essai sur Vusage de Vartillerie dans la guerre de campagno et 
celle de siege. Dupuget. 

Memoires sur les nouveaux sysiemes d'artillerie* St AubiiL 

Treatise on Artillery. Miiller. 



296 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

Artificial Fire-WorJcs. Jones. 

Table de tir les canons et obusiers. Lombard. 

On Gunpowder. Antoni. 

JRecherches sur Vartillerie en general. Texier de Norbec. 

Description de Vart defabriquer les canons. Monge. 

Procedes de la fabrication des armes blanches. Vandermonde, 

Manuel de Vartilleur. Durtubie. 

Traite du mouvement des projectiles. Lombard. 

Treatise on Artillery. Scheel. (Translated from the German.) 

Traite pratique des feux d^ artifice. Morel. 

Manuel du canonnier marin. Cornibert. 

New Principles of Gunnery. Robins. 

Memoir es sur la fabrication des armes portatives. Cotty. 

Recherches sur la poudre. Cossigny. 

Supplement. Cossigny. 

Fabrication de la poudre. Renaud. 

American Artillerists Companion. Toussard. 

Tables des portees des canons et canonades de la marine. Cor- 
nibert. 

Traite d'artifices de guerre. Bigot. 

Tarite elementaire de la fabrication des bouches a feu. Dartein. 

Traite de Vart de fabriquer la poudre a canon. Bottee et RifFault. 

L^art du salpetrier. Bottee et Riffault. 

Dictionary of Artillery. Hoyer. (German.) 

New Experiments on Gunnery. Hutton — (Button's Tracts.) 

Des bois propres an service des Arsenaux. Herbin de Halles. 

Instruction sur le service de Vartillerie. Hulot. 

Manoeuvres deforce. Bigot. 

Balistique. Obenheim. 

Treatise on Artillery. German. Schamhorst. (Translated into 
French, 1840.) 

Essai sur Vart de pointer. Pomnet. 

Reflexions sur la fabrication des bouches a feu. Lamartillibre. 

Memoire sur la planchette du canonnier. Obenheim. 

Aide-Memoire. Gassendi. 

Observations on the use of Artillery at the sieges of Badajos, St 
Sebastian, ^c. 

Treatise on Artillery. Lallemand. 

Elemens de pyrotechnic. Ruggieri. 

Nouvelle force maritime. Paixhans. 

Dictionnaire d^artillerie. Cotty. 



ARTILLERY. 297 

Recherches halistiques. Coste. 

Poudres fulminantes. Vergnaud. 

Manuel de la metallurgie du fer. Culman. 

Pyrotechnie militairey (traduit de TAllemand, par R. de Peretsdorff) 

Journal des Sciences Militaires. 

Pyrotechny. Cutbush. 

Trait e elementaire d'artillerie. Decker. 

Fusees de guerre. Montgery. 

Documens sur la matter e a canons. Herv^. 

Observations sur le nouveau systeme d^artillerie. AUix. 

Systeme d^artillerie de campagne. Allix. 

Pocket Gunner. Adye. 

On the Rocket System. Congreve. 

Essai sur Vart des fontes. Serres. 

Receuil de Mhnoires sur la poudre a canon. Proust. 

Memorial de Vartilleur marin. Michel. 

Observations sur le nouveau systeme de Vartillerie. Poumet. 

Memorial d'artillerie. 

British Gunner. Spearman. 

Regies de pointage a bord des vaisseaux. Montgery. 

Manuel du maitre de forges. Landrin. 

Naval Gunnery. Douglass. 

Metallurgie du fer (traduit de I'Allemand, par Culman.) Kar- 
sten. 

Aide-Memoire d Vusage des officers d'artillerie. (Strasbourg.) 

Traite de Vorganisation et de la tactique de Vartillerie, (traduit de 
I'Allemand par PeretsdorfF.) Grewenitz. 

Supplement au dictionnaire d'artillerie. Cotty. 

Memoir on Gunpowder. Braddock. 

Manuel de Varmurier. Paulin-Desormeaux. 

Journal des armes speciales. 

Cours sur le service des officiers dans les fonderies. Serres. 

Experiences sur la fabrication et la duree des bouches a feu en 
fer et bronze, (traduit de I'Allemand par PeretsdorfF.) Meyer. 

Applications du fer aux constructions de Vartillerie. Thierry. 

Aide-Memoire d'art militaire. Lebas. 

Memorial a Vusage de Varmee Beige. 

InstructioThs and Regulations for the service and management of 
heavy ordnance in the British service. 

Experiences sur les principes du tir, faites ^ Metz, en 1834. 

Traite d'artillerie theoriquc et pratique. Piobert. 



298 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

Aide-Mhnoire a Vusage des officiers d' ar tiller ie, (avec approbation 
du comite d'artillerie.) 

Manuel d'artillerie a Vusage des officiers de la Republique HeU 
vetique. Bonaparte, (Napoleon Louis.) 

Experiences comparatives entre des bouches a feu en fonte defer, 
d^origine Frangaise, Anglaise et Suedoise, faites ^ Gavres, en 1836. 

Experiences faites a Brest en 1831, sur les canons. Paixhans. 

Essai sur Vorganisation de V artillerie. Le Bourg. 

Experiences sur des projectiles creux, faites en 1829, '30, '31. 

Instruction pratique sur Vemploi des projectiles, (traduit de I'Alle- 
mand par PeretsdorfF.) Decker. 

Effects of heavy ordnance as applied to ships of war. Simmons. 

Experiences sur les poudres de guerre, faites k Esquerdes, en 1832, 
'33, '34, and '35. Maguin. 

Cours d^artillerie a Vusage des sous-officiers. De Cr6py. 

Instruction theorique et pratique d^artillerie, k I'usage des Aleves 
de St. Cyr. Thiroux. 

Cours sur le service des officiers d^ artillerie dans les forges. 

Manuel historique de la technologic des armes a feu, (traduit de 
I'Allemand par M. RiefFel.) Meyer. 

Formules relatives aux effets du tir sur affut. Poisson. 

Manuel de Vartificer. Vergnaud. 

Etat actuel de Vartillerie de campagne de toutes les puissances 
de V Europe, (traduit par Maze ; Ire partie, Artillerie Anglaise.) Ja- 
cobi. (Six other parts have been published in German, containing de- 
scriptions of the French, Belgian, Hessian, Wirtemburg, Nassau, and 
Swedish systems.) 

Introduction a Vetude de Vartillerie. Madelaine. 
Cours sur le service des officiers d'artillerie dans les fonderies. 

Description de la fabrication des bouches a feu a la fonderie royals 
de Liege. Huguenin. 

Poudre a canon. Timmerhans. 

Procedes de fabrication dans les forges, (extraitdu cours sur le ser- 
vice des officiei's dans les forges.) 

Renseignements sur le materiel de Vartillerie navale de la Gfrande 
Bretagne. Zeni et des Hays. 

Theorie des affuts et des voitures de Vartillerie. Migout et Bergery. 

Ar tiller is fs Manual. Griffith. 

Handbuch fur die K. K.Oesterreichische Artillerie Offiziere, (man- 
ual for the Austrian artillery officers.) 

Sammlung von Steindruckzeichnungen der Preussischen Artillerie^ 



ARTILLERY. 299 

tnit Erlduterungerif (collection of plates of the Prussian artillery, with 
explanatory text.) 

Histoire des fusees de guerre. 

Ordnance Manual, for the use of the officers of the United States 
Army. 

Experiments on Gunpowder. Capt. Mordecai. 

Pyrotechnyt for the use of the Cadets at the United States Military 
Academy. Kinsley. 

Notes on Gunpowder, Percussion Powder, Cannon, and Projec- 
tilts. Lt. Knowlton. 



300 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 



CHAPTER XII. 

ARMY ORGANIZATION ENGINEERS. 

Engineers. — The term engineer is derived from the un- 
classical Latin word ingenium, which was applied both to 
a machine and the mind or skill of the person who devised 
or constructed it. 

It was Philip Augustus, say the French writers, who 
first introduced engineers {engigneurs, or engignours, as 
they were called) into France, and restored the art of 
sieges. The engineers of that age were seldom charged 
with the construction of works of military defence, but, 
like Archimedes at Syracuse, and Longinus at Palmyra, 
they directed their attention principally to devising imple- 
ments of war and the most effective manner of using them. 
Engines of war were at that time divided between the en- 
gigneurs and the artilliers, the former being charged with 
the heavier machines, and the latter with the smaller wea- 
pons used for throwing projectiles. After the invention 
of gunpowder, the old battering-rams, cranes, helipoles, 
&c., disappeared, and with them the engigneurs, or mas- 
ters of engines. The new inventions were united with 
the few old projectile machines that remained in the artil- 
lery, and the engineers were for a time left almost with- 
out employment. The revival of the art of fortification 
was very slow, and the modern system scarcely began to 
be developed till near the sixteenth century. 

We must omit for the present giving even an outline of 



ENGINEERS. 301 

the history of military engineering, and pass to the troops 
of this arm, as constituting an essential element of an 
army organization. The subject of fortification, and the 
history of its various changes, will be examined in the 
next chapter. 

The engineers, in modern army organization, constitute 
the fourth arm of service, as, compared with artillery, 
their relative numbers are about as two to three. They 
are divided in the same manner as the artillery, viz. : — 
1st, the staff; 2d, guards, or fort-keepers ; 3d, artificers ; 
and 4th, the troops. 

I. The officers constituting the stafif of this corps are 
charged in time of peace with planning, constructing, and 
repairing all fortifications and other defensive works ; the 
construction and preparation of all military materials, and 
stores connected with this arm ; and (in our service) 
with the disbursements of money connected with these 
operations : in time of war they are charged with the at- 
tack and defence of military works, the laying out and 
construction of field defences, redoubts, intrenchments, 
roads, &c. ; in the attack they form a part of the van- 
guard, to remove obstructions ; and in retreat they form a 
part of the rear-guard, to erect obstacles, destroy roads, 
bridges, &c., so as to retard an enemy's pursuit. 

From the important character of these duties as con- 
nected with the means essential to a national defence, and 
the vast amount of money expended in these operations, 
it is evident that a high order of acquirements should be 
deemed necessary to qualify one to perform the duties of 
a military engineer. This officer requires a knowledge 
of chemistry, to guide his choice of materials for mortars, 
cements, and mastics ; of mineralogy and geology, for 
selecting stone ; of botany, for timber and the means of 
preventing its decay ; of mathematics, in laying out his 
work and calculating the thickness and stability of his 

26 



302 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

walls, embankments, &c. ; of mechanical philosophy, in 
constructing his machinery ; of military engineering, in 
his plans of fortifications ; and of all the higher branches 
of military science, in selecting positions for these works, 
such that they shall have the proper relations to the means 
of national defence, and to the grand operations of armies 
in the field. The avenues to appointment to this corps 
are guarded, in most European armies, with special care, 
to prevent the influence of money, politics, or family con- 
nections ; and in our own army it is now specified by law 
of Congress, that the vacancies shall be filled only from the 
most distinguished graduates of the military academy. 
Formerly our service suffered most severely from the em- 
ployment of incompetent persons, introduced through 
political influence from civil life, and foreign charlatans, 
the refuse of European armies. Many of our earlier 
military works (as will be mentioned hereafter) were 
modelled upon systems for a long time discarded by the 
profession in Europe, and even some of those which have 
been constructed within the last thirty years are made of 
such wretched materials and workmanship that they are 
already crumbling into ruins. While the existing laws 
and regulations seem well calculated to prevent the recur- 
rence of similar abuses and errors, it nevertheless can be 
shown that the organization of this arm of our service re- 
quires modifications and extensions to give it the requisite 
degree of efficiency, and to economize the public expen- 
ditures. 

The wars of Louis XIV. first led to a regular military or- 
ganization, and a regular system of defence. In these wars 
the engineers received great development, and have ever 
since occupied a prominent position as parts of an army or- 
ganization. We therefore find in all the great sieges and 
battles of this era a large and continually increasing number 
of engineers and engineer troops, this force being grad- 



ENGINEERS. 303 

ually augmented as the true principles of war became 
better understood, and as the wants of the service required. 
Even in the earliest of these battles we find the engineers 
taking a prominent and distinguished part. In the war 
of 1688, twenty-four engineers were killed and wounded 
at the siege of Philipsbourg, eighteen at Namur, eight at 
Huy, ten at Charleroi, eight at Ath, thirty at Barcelona, 
&c. Such losses were good proofs of the usefulness of 
these officers, and before this war was closed, their num- 
ber was increased to six hundred; and in 1706 the army 
contained eight brigades of engineers and four companies 
of miners. 

The engineer corps being partially disbanded in the early 
part of the French Revolution, great difficulty was experi- 
enced in reorganizing it and in finding competent men to 
supply the places of those who had been driven into exile or 
sacrificed during the reign of terror. Energy and activity, 
combined with republican zeal, could supply the place of 
skill in the other arms, but the science of the engineer 
could not be acquired in a day. 

In 1799, the staff of the engineer corps consisted of 
four hundred and forty-nine officers, without including the 
general officers, commanding departments, or those con- 
nected with the engineer troops. The same organization 
was continued in 1804. The engineer staff of the French 
army now numbers four hundred and thirty-two officers. 
We have in our service forty-three engineer officers, for 
staff duty, who are now engaged in the construction and 
repairs of some sixty or seventy fortifications, and other 
works of a civil and military character. 

II. Engineer Guards, or Fort-Keepers, are a class of 
men charged with the general care of forts, and all public 
property deposited in the several engineer depots and 
garrisons, and in the public works during their construction. 

There are five hundred and fifty of these '' gardes du 



304 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

Genie^^ in the French army, who rank next the sub-lieuten- 
ants of engineers, and are assimilated with the sub-lieu- 
tenants of infantry in the hospitals, marches, &c. In our 
service we have no engineer guards or fort-keepers. 

This defect in our organization has been the cause of 
serious inconvenience, and the consequent waste of public 
property. The expense of hiring civil agents for this 
purpose has more than trebled the cost of supporting a 
suitable number of non-commissioned guards to maintain 
the good order and efficiency of our forts, in the absence 
of engineer officers, and to preserve and keep in repair 
the military implements and stores connected with this 
department of the army. It has already been shown that 
we have fifty-eight of these guards for the artillery service, 
and it really seems somewhat singular that the engineers, 
with a much greater amount of public property in their 
charge, are allowed no assistants of this kind. 

III. Engineer artificers are a class of men employed in 
the practical operations of constructing forts and other 
military defences, and in making and repairing all the im- 
plements used by the engineer troops in the operations of 
sapping and mining, in crossing rivers, in ctDnstructing 
field-defences, and in the attack and defence of field- 
works. 

As very few new fortifications are now required in 
France, the services of engineer artificers are less neces- 
sary and important than in our service, where large sums 
of money are annually expended upon military defences. 
There are, however, in the French army a corps of en- 
gineer artificers, consisting of eight officers and a cadre of 
fifty-four non-commissioned officers, with a variable num- 
ber of privates, organized into two companies. But in 
our army we have no regular engineer artificers ! In our 
artillery service we have three hundred and thirty enlist- 
ed artillery artificers. If these are useful and necessary 



ENGINEERS. 305 

to the artillery service, which no one doubts, for still 
stronger reasons would it be advantageous to the public 
service to employ at least an equal number of enlisted en- 
gineer artificers on our fortifications ; for the annual ex- 
penditure of public money is here much greater than in 
the corresponding branch of the artillery service. 
1st, sappers and pioneers ; 2d, miners ; and 3d, ponto?iiers. 
IV. Engineer troops are divided into three classes — 
In the French army of 1799, there v^ere four battalions of 
sappers, consisting of 120 officers and 7,092 men. In 1 804, 
Napoleon organized five battalions of these troops, consist- 
ing of 165 officers and 8,865 men. Even this number was 
found insufficient in his campaigns in Germany and Spain, 
and he was obliged to organize an additional number of 
sappers from the Italian and French auxiliaries. The 
pioneers were then partly attached to other branches of 
the service. There is, at present, in the French army a 
considerable number of sappers or pioneers detached for 
the service of the infantry regiments, three companies of 
sapeurs-conducteurs, and forty-two companies of sapeurs. 
In the French army of 1799, there were six companies 
of miners, consisting of 24 officers and 576 men. In 1804, 
Napoleon increased these troops to nine companies, con- 
taining 36 officers and 864 men. The present French 
peace establishment contains six companies of miners, 
organized much the same as under Napoleon. In the 
French army of 1799 there were two regiments of pon- 
toniers, of 38 officers and 960 men. But this number was 
found too small in the remaining campaigns, and the de- 
ficiency was temporarily supplied by organizing sailors 
for these duties. In the present French army organiza- 
tion, there are eleven companies of pontoniers, forming a 
regiment of sixty-three officers. 

We have in our service no sappers, miners, or pontoniers^ 
and, in case of war, would be found without the means of 

26* 



306 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

executing any military works, or performing any military 
operation which would require engineer troops! 

In the preliminary stages of army organization under 
Louis XIV., infantry troops were detailed as sappers, and 
instructed in these duties by the engineers. This irregu- 
larity of service soon caused difficulties and losses, and 
the evils springing from it were so great, that Yauban ur- 
ged the propriety of a separate organization. In 1670 
he officially recommended to the king to establish a regi- 
ment of twelve hundred sappers and ouvriers, and in a sub- 
sequent report on the value of these troops, used the fol- 
io v/ing language : " They would be useful in peace as 
well as in war, and w^ould be the means of saving much in 
all fortifications where they should be employed. In fact, 
I have not the least doubt that they would save annually 
to the king much more than their pay. I assert all I have 
said on this subject with as much confidence as if I had 
seen the result ; and I can, with the same certainty, add, 
that this small troop will be the means of saving large 
numbers of good engineers and brave officers and soldiers, 
from the stern necessity to which we are reduced of ex- 
posing, almost always, the laborers and those w^ho support 
them ; which necessity would not arise had we at com- 
mand a sufficient number of this kind of workmen well in- 
structed. To such a degree have I felt the necessity of 
sappers, at every siege at which I have been present, that 
I have always had reason to repent of not having more 
urgently solicited the creation of this company." 

Such are the views of the greatest of military engi- 
neers, a man who fought one hundred and forty battles, 
conducted fifty-eight sieges, and built or repaired three 
hundred fortifications. His anticipations of the useful- 
ness of engineer troops were fully realized, and they have 
ever since received the most careful attention, and now 
form, as has just been shown, one of the most important 



ENGINEERS. 307 

and efficient arms in the French service. The fortifi- 
cations constructed by the engineers, as organized by 
Vauban, have ever since constituted one of the principal 
elements of the French military power. 

In the wars of Napoleon there are innumerable instan- 
ces in illustration of the delays and disasters attending the 
operations of armies not supplied with engineer troops ; 
and, on the other hand, the advantages resulting from their 
services when properly organized and instructed. We 
have already pointed out the influence which the fortifica- 
tions in the hands of the French exerted on the results of 
these wars, and the fatal consequences to the Allies of 
neglecting these works of national defence. Every stu- 
dent of military history will immediately call to mind the 
influence of Savona, Coni, Mondovi, Ceva, Govi, Ales- 
sandria, Tortona, Pizzighitone, Peschara, Mantua, Palma- 
Nuova, Osopo, Klagenfurth, &c., in the campaigns of 
1796-7 ; of Genoa, Fort Bard, the fortifications of the 
Var, Ulm, Ingoldstadt, &c., in 1800; of Milan, Turin, 
Mantua, Roco d'Aufo, Genoa, Alessandria, (fee, in 1805; 
the importance of Kehl, Cassel, Wesel, &c., to the French 
in 1806, and the fatal consequences to the Prussians in 
that campaign, of their total and culpable neglect of their 
own fortifications. 

All military historians speak of the influence of fortifi- 
cations in the Peninsular campaigns : those which had 
been given up to Napoleon previous to the opening of 
hostilities, contributed very much to the success of his 
arms, while those which were retained by Spain and her 
allies, contributed in an equal degree to hamper and em- 
barrass his operations. Some of these, like Saragossa 
and Tarragona, with their broken walls and defective ar- 
maments, kept the enemy in check some sixty days each, 
and did much to weaken the French power in the Penin- 
sula. 



308 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

Temporary or field-fortifications also had an important 
influence here. The lines of Torres- Vedras, the field- 
works of Ronda, the intrenched camps of the Pyrenees, 
Bayonne, Toulouse, &c., are examples under this head. 
In fact, field-works played a most important part in all of 
Napoleon's wars. We might mention the redoubt of Mon- 
tenotte, the intrenchments at Milesimo, the batteries of 
Lobau, the field-defences of Hougomont, La Haye-Sainte, 
and Papelotte at Waterloo, and numerous other cases 
equally striking. Just before the battle of Waterloo, Wel- 
lington employed some eighteen thousand peasants and 
two thousand horses, under the direction of British of- 
ficers of engineers. In speaking of these defences, Colo- 
nel Pasley says : " It may be easily conceived that to 
have directed such a great body of workmen to proper ad- 
vantage, by means of a few officers of engineers, would 
have been impossible, but for the system adopted of sub- 
dividing the various works among the non-commissioned 
officers and privates of the engineer troops, each of whom 
was made responsible for laying out the details of his own 
portion, and for the direction of a party of from twenty to 
one hundred men, or even more, according to circum- 
stances." 

But to return to the Peninsular war. These campaigns 
exhibit in strong colors the advantages derived, on the one 
side, from a well-organized engineer corps, and the losses, 
delays, and defects sufiered on the other, until the defects 
of the organization were remedied. Napoleon entered 
Spain with a well-appointed army, and soon, through 
strategy and well-directed force, gained possession of the 
important fortresses of the Peninsula : seizing in this 
way the strategic routes and important geographical points, 
he was enabled to retain possession of the country for 
eight years, in spite of the numerous forces arrayed against 
him, the absence of himself and his best generals in Ger- 



ENGINEERS. 309 

many, and the great inefficiency of Joseph and of many of his 
generals. These fortifications were old, and of strength 
inferior to modern works of defence, but it required years 
and the expenditure of millions in blood and treasure 
to expel from the country those who had possession of 
them. 

For the first five years of this war the English strug- 
gled with a most imperfect army organization.* When 
'^ the first serious siege," says Napier, was undertaken by 
the British army, " to the discredit of the English gov- 
ernment, no army was ever so ill provided with the means 
of prosecuting such an enterprise. The engineer officers 
were exceedingly zealous ; and many of them were well 
versed in the theory of their business. But the ablest 
trembled when reflecting on their utter destitution of all 
that belonged to real service. Without a corps of sap- 
pers and miners, without a single private who knew how 
to carry on an approach under fire, they were compelled 
to attack fortresses defended by the most warlike, prac- 
tised^ and scientific troops of the age. 

" The best officers and finest soldiers were obliged to 
sacrifice themselves in a lamentable manner, to compen- 
sate for the negligence and incapacity of a government, 
always ready to plunge the nation into war, without the 

*In a letter dated February 11th, 1812, Wellington wrote to the 
Secretary of State as follows : — " I would beg leave to suggest to 
your lordship the expediency of adding to the engineer establishment 
a corps of sappers and miners. It is inconceivable with what disad- 
vantages we undertake any thing like a siege for want of assistance 
of this description. There is no French corps d'armee which has not 
a battalion of sappers and a company of miners ; but we are obliged 
to depend for assistance of this description upon the regiments of the 
line ; and although the men are brave and willing, they want the 
knowledge and training which are necessary. Many casualties among 
them consequently occur, and much valuable time is lost at the most 
critical period of the siege." 



310 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

slightest care of what was necessary to obtain success. 
The sieges carried on by the British in Spain were a 
succession of butcheries ; because the commonest mate- 
rials, and the means necessary to their art, were denied 
the engineers." Colonel J. T. Jones writes in nearly 
the same terms of the early sieges in the Peninsula, and 
with respect to the siege of Badajos, adds in express 
terms, that " a body of sappers and miners, and the ne- 
cessary fascines and gabions, would have rendered the 
reduction of the work certain."* Soon after this siege a 
body of engineer troops arrived from England, but their 
number was insufficient, and Wellington, having learned 
by sad experience the importance of engineer troops, or- 
dered a body of two hundred volunteers to be detached 
from the line, " and daily instructed in the practice of 
sapping, making and laying fascines and gabions, and the 
construction of batteries, &c." The siege of Ciudad 
Rodrigo, which immediately followed this organization, 
was conducted with greater skill and success than any 
other till nearly the close of the war ; and all mifttary 
writers have attributed this result to the greater efficiency 
of the engineer force engaged in the siege. This arm 
was now gradually increased, and the last year of the 
war the engineer force with the English army in the field 
consisted of seventy-seven officers, seven assistant-engi- 
neers and surveyors, four surgeons and assistants, one 
thousand six hundred and forty-six sappers, miners, arti- 
ficers, &c., one thousand three hundred and forty horses, 
and one hundred and sixty carriages. 

During all this time the French furnished their armies 

* Colonel Pasley states that only one and a half ycn'ds of excava^ 
tion, per man, was executed in a whole nighty by the unlramed 
troops in the Peninsular war ; whereas an instructed sapper can 
easily accomplish this in twenty minutes, and that it has been done 
by one of his most skilful sappers, at Chatham, in seven minutes! 



ENGINEERS. 311 

in Spain with well-organized engineer forces. We have 
endeavored to form a comparison of the number of French 
engineers and artillerists employed on these peninsular 
sieges. But from the loose manner in which these de- 
tails are usually given by historians, it is almost im- 
possible to distinguish between the two. Both are not 
unfrequently given under the same head, and when a 
distinction is apparently kept up, only the engineer staff 
is mentioned under the head of engineers — the sappers, 
miners, artificers, the train, &c., all being put down as 
artillery. In the following table we have endeavored to 
arrange them as is done in our own army. The trains of 
both arms are left out, for frequently that of one arm per- 
formed the duties of the other. Moreover, in our service 
a portion of these duties of engineer and artillery trains is 
performed by the quartermaster's department. For those 
w^ho wish to know the exact organization of the French 
engineer train, we give it as it existed in 1811, viz.: — 
seven troops, each troop consisting of three officers, one 
hundred and forty-one non-commissioned officers and pri- 
vates, two hundred and fifty horses, and fifty wagons, con- 
veying five thousand two hundred and seventy intrenching 
tools, one thousand seven hundred cutting tools, one thou- 
sand eight hundred and two artificers' tools, two hundred 
and fifty-three miners' tools, and eight thousand three hmi- 
dred and eighteen kilogrammes' weight of machinery and 
stores, each article being made to a particular pattern. 
The pioneers in Spain acted sometimes with one arm and 
sometimes with the other, and we have assigned them ac- 
cordingly in the table. The pontoniers, however, in our 
service are included with the engineers ; we have there- 
fore put them, in our table, in the same column with the 
engineers. 



312 



MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 



Name of Siege. 



Engineer 

tafF, sappers, 

miners, ponlo- 

niers, and 

pioneers. 



Artillery staff, 
horse and foot 

artillery, 
oiivriers, and 

pioneers. 



Of&c. Men 



Offic. Men. 



Total 
of 
engineers, 
sappers, 
miners, 
ponton- 
iers, and 
pioneers. 



Total of 
artillery 
staff, horse 
and foot 
artillery, 
ouvners, 

and 
pioneers. 



Saragossa, 

Rosas, 

Girona, 

Astorga, 

Lerida, 

Meguinenza, 

]st Cindad Rodrigo, 

Almeida, 

Tortosa, 

Tarragona, 

Olivensa, 

1st Badajos, 

Tarifa, 

Peniscola,.., 

2d Ciudad Rodrigo,. 

2d Badajos, 

Burgos, 

Castio Udiales, 

St. Sebastian, 



21 

54 

7 

15 

34 

34 

34 

43 

50 

10 

25 

12 

13 

3 

9 

4 

5 

13 



1189 
211 
603 

91 
316 
278 
441 
489 
429 
681 
106 
707 
235 
138 

12 
256 
124 

68 
248 



90 

62 
17 
11 



32 

46 

41 
17 
9 

8 



1276 

1299 

427 
208 



381 
701 

699 
148 
183 
160 

126 
197 
166 



1275" 
232 
657 

98 
331 
312 
475 
523 
472 
731 
116 
732 
247 
151 

15 
265 
128 

73 
261 



1360 
461 

1361 
444 
219 
136 

1019 

1019 
413 
747 
186 
740 
165 
192 
168 
268 
129 
205 
173 



From this table it appears that the ratio of the two arms 
at these sieges, making the comparison on the basis of 
our own organization, is about the same as for the present 
French army in Algeria, or a little more than five of engi- 
neers to six of artillery. 

Thus far we have spoken of the field-operations of en- 
gineer troops in connection with fortifications, alluding 
only incidentally to the use of military bridges and the 
passage of rivers. In the early wars of the French Revo- 
lution the want of pontoniers was severely felt, and from 
the deficiency of this branch of service, the operations of 
the French generals were on several occasions very much 
restricted. The evil was afterwards remedied in a great 
degree by the introduction of several battalions of ponto- 
niers in the regular army organization. On many occa- 
sions, during his wars, did Napoleon feel and acknow- 
ledge the importance of these troops ; but on none, per- 



ENGINEERS. 313 

haps, was this importance more clearly shown than in tho 
passage of the Beresina during his retreat from Moscow 
with the wreck of his army. The Russians had cut the 
bridge of Borisow and taken position in great strength on 
the right bank of the river, both at this point and below ; 
the French, wearied with long and difficult marches, des- 
titute of artillery, provisions, and military stores, with a 
wide and deep river in front, and a powerful enemy on 
their flank and rear, benumbed by the rigors of a merciless 
climate, and dispirited by defeat — every thing seemed to 
promise their total destruction. " General Eble," says an 
English general officer, in his remarks on this retreat, 
" who, from the beginning of the campaign, had made all 
the arrangements for the equipment and construction of 
military bridges, was specially charged with the important 
duty of providing for the passage of this river ; and he 
discharged that duty with a degree of forecast and ability 
to which certainly Napoleon owed his escape and the 
wreck of his army its safety. General Eble had begun to 
prepare, at Smolensko, for the difficulties which he fore- 
saw in this operation. He formed, with every care, a 
train sufficient for the transport of all the tools and stores 
that might be required ; and, further to provide against 
casualties and accidents, every man belonging to the com- 
panies of pontoniers was obliged to carry from Smolensko 
a tool or implement of some kind, and a proportion of 
nails : and fortunate was it for the army that he did so ; 
for such was the difficulty in getting through the carriages 
containing stores, that only two forge-wagons and six cais- 
sons of tools and nails could be preserved. To these the 
general added a quantity of iron-work taken from the 
wheels of carriages that were abandoned on the march. 
Much was sacrificed to bring off these valuable materials 
for making clamps and fastenings, but, as Segur observes, 
that exertion * sauva Varmee.^ " 

27 



314 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

But it is not always in the possession of a thing that 
we are most likely to appreciate its utility ; the evils and 
inconveniences resulting from the want of it not unfre- 
quently impress us most powerfully with its importance 
and the advantages to be derived from its possession. A 
few examples of this nature, drawn from military history, 
may be instructive. We need not go back to the disas- 
trous passage of the Vistula by Charles XII., the failure 
of Marlborough to pass the Dyle, and Eugene to cross the 
Adda in 1705, nor of the three unsuccessful attempts of 
Charles of Lorraine to cross the Rhine in 1743. The 
wars following the French Revolution are sufficiently re- 
plete with useful instruction on this subject.* 

In 1794 so great was the disorder in the direction of 
affairs, that the boats of the bridges across the Wahal and 
the Rhine were disposed of for commercial purposes ; and 
in the beginning of 1795, says Jomini, " the conquerors of 

* Before recurring to these, it might be useful to give one example, 
as it is often referred to, in the campaign of 1702. It was deemed 
important for the success of the campaign to attack the Prince of Ba- 
den in his camp at Friedlingen. Accordingly, a bridge was thrown 
across the Rhine at Huningen, the passage effected, and the victory- 
gained. But Villars was several times on the point of losing all for 
want of a sufficient ponton equipage. Having but a single bridge, 
the passage was necessarily slow ; the artillery and stores were fre- 
quently interrupted by the infantry hurrying to the field of battle ; 
disorder ensued, and the whole movement was retarded ; Villars could 
bring only a small part of his artillery into action, and towards the 
close of the battle the infantry were in want of ammunition : more- 
over, the whole operation had nearly failed from the attempt of the 
enemy to destroy this bridge, but the skill of the French pontoniers 
saved it. We here remark, 1st, the passage secured to Villars an im- 
portant victory; 2d, from having an inefficient bridge-equipage his 
whole army was placed in great peril, and the operation had nearly 
failed ; 3d, if the Prince of Baden had possessed a skilful corps to op- 
pose that of Villars, this single bridge would have been destroyed, and 
the army cut to pieces ; 4th, the skill of the little corps of French pon- 
toniers saved the bridge, and of consequence, the army. 



ENGINEERS. 315 

Belgium and Holland had not even a bridge equipage, at 
a time too when the success of the campaign depended 
solely on the means of crossing a river." A few boats 
were procured from the Wahal and the Meuse, and others 
manufactured in the forests of the Moselle ; but " these 
operations consumed precious time, 3,nd four months thus 
passed away in preparations." Even after other things 
were all ready, the army was obliged to wait thirty days 
for the arrival of boats for ponton bridges ; during this 
delay the Austrians strengthened their position, and with 
very little exertion they might easily have prevented the 
passage. 

In 1796, profiting by the errors of the former campaigns, 
the French collected more suitable bridge equipages, and 
the two armies passed the Rhine at Neuweid and Kehl 
without loss or delay. The latter of these passages has 
often been referred to as a model for such operations, and 
certainly does credit to the general who directed it. But 
Korean's bridge equipage having been destroyed during 
this disastrous campaign, his operations the following year 
were considerably delayed in preparing a new one, and 
even then he was under the necessity of seizing all pri- 
vate boats that could be found within reach ; but the diffi- 
culty of collecting and using boats of all sizes and de- 
scriptions was so great as entirely to defeat his plan of 
surprising the enemy on the opposite bank of the river. 
The necessity of co-operating with Hoche admitted of no 
further delay, and he was now obliged to force his pas- 
sage in the open day, and in face of the enemy. Under- 
taken under such circumstances, " the enterprise was ex- 
tremely sanguinary, and at one time very doubtful ;" and 
had it failed, " Moreau's army would have been ruined for 
the campaign." 

Napoleon's celebrated passage of the Po, at Placentia, 
shows plainly how important it is for a general to possess 



316 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

the means of crossing rivers. " I felt the importance of 
hastening the enterprise in order not to allow the enemy 
time to prevent it. But the Po, which is a river as wide 
and deep as the Rhine, is a barrier difficult to be over- 
come. We had no means of constructing a bridge, and 
were obliged to content ourselves with the means of em- 
barkation found at Placentia and its environs. Lannes, 
chief of brigade, crossed in the first boats, with the ad- 
vanced guard. The Austrians had only ten squadrons on 
the other side, and these were easily overcome. The 
passage was now continued without interruption, but very 
slowly. If I had had a good ponton-equipage, the fate of 
the enemy's army had been sealed ; hut the necessity of pass- 
ing the river by successive embarkations saved itP 

In the campaign of 1799, the Archduke attempted to 
pass the Aar, and attacked the French on the opposite 
side, but for want of suitable equipage his operation was 
delayed till the enemy had collected sufficient forces to 
intercept the passage ; he was now obliged to enter into 
a stipulation for a suspension of hostilities, and to with- 
draw his bridges. 

The operations of the French in the campaign of 1800, 
led to the most glorious results, but their execution w^as 
attended wdth the greatest difficulties. The passage of 
the Alps w^as greatly facilitated by the ability of the chief 
engineer, Marescot, and the skill of the troops under his 
command ; and the facility of passing rivers afforded Na- 
poleon by his pontoniers, had an important influence upon 
the success of'the campaign. " The army of the reserve 
had many companies of pontoniers and sappers ; the pon- 
tons of course could not be taken across the St. Bernard, 
but the pontoniers soon found materials on the Po and 
Tesin for constructing bridge equipages." Moreau's army 
in the same year profited w^ell by his pontoniers, in the 
passages of the Inn, the Salza, the Traun, the Alza, &c., 



ENGINEERS. 317 

and in the pursuit of the Austrian anuy — a pursuit that 
has but a single parallel example in modern history. 

The facility with which Napoleon crossed rivers, made 
forced marches, constructed redoubts, fortified depots, and 
grasped the great strategic points of the enemy in the 
campaign of 1805, resulted from the skilful organization 
of his army, and the efficiency given to the forces em- 
ployed in these important operations. The engineer staff 
of the French army at this period, consisted of four hun- 
dred and forty-nine officers, and there were four battalions 
of sappers, of one hundred and twenty officers and seven 
thousand and ninety-two men ; six companies of miners, 
of twenty-four officers and five hundred and seventy-six 
men ; and two regiments of pontoniers, of thirty-eight offi- 
cers and nine hundred and sixty men. On the contrary, 
the enemy's neglect of these things is one of the most 
striking of the many faults of the war, and his ill-directed 
efforts to destroy the great wooden bridge across the 
Danube, and the successful operations of the French sap- 
pers in securing it, formed one of the principal turning 
points in the campaign. 

The same organization enabled the French to perform 
their wonderfully rapid and decisive movements in the 
Prussian campaign of 1806, and the northern operations 
of 1807. 

In 1809, Napoleon's army crossed, with the most won- 
derful rapidity, the Inn, the Salza, the Traun, and other 
rivers emptying into the Danube, and reached Vienna be- 
fore the wonder-stricken Austrians could prepare for its 
defence. It was then necessary for the French to effect 
a passage of the Danube, which was much swollen by 
recent rains and the melting snow of the mountains. 
Considering the depth and width of the river, the positions 
of the enemy, and his preparations to oppose a passage, 
with the disastrous consequences that would result to the 

27*. 



318 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

French from any failure in its execution; taking all these 
things into consideration, Jomini pronounced it " one of 
the most hazardous and difficult of all the operations of 
war." Here the fate of the army depended, apparently, 
upon the skill and efficiency of the engineers and pon- 
toniers, and nobly did they discharge the trust reposed in 
them. When the pontons failed, tressel-bridges were 
substituted, and even fifty-four enonnous boats were put in 
requisition. So skilfully were these operations conducted, 
that Napoleon's immense army crossed over in safety, di- 
rectly in the face of a superior enemy, and the same day 
fought the memorable battle of E sling. Forced to retire 
before numbers vastly superior to his own, Napoleon con- 
centrated his forces on the island of Lobau, and intrenched 
his position. Surrounded by the broad and deep channel 
of the Danube, and watched by numerous and skilful ene- 
mies, it required the most constant activity and the greatest 
good fortune to effect a passage. Here the skill and 
efficiency of the engineers shone conspicuously ; a num- 
ber of bridges were thrown across-lhe river in the face 
of the Austrians, and against obstacles almost insurmount- 
able ; the whole French army passed in safety, and soon 
put the finishing stroke to that brilliant campaign. So 
high an estimate did Napoleon attach to the construction 
of these bridges, that, when the passage w^as completed, 
he offered to place Bertrand, the constructing engineer, 
though of comparatively low rank, at the head of the 
French corps du genie. 

On many occasions during the retreat in 1812-13, from 
the Beresina to the left of the Rhine, across the Niemen, 
the Vistula, the Oder, the Elbe, and the numerous other 
rivers which divide that immense country, the French 
derived vast advantages from the experience and skill of 
their engineers and pontoniers, several times whole corps 
escaping through their means from the grasp of their pur- 



ENGINEERS. 319 

suers. When, however, the disasters of this retreat had 
absorbed most of the material of the army, and had sadly- 
thinned the ranks of men of skill and experience, they 
sustained many severe, and, in other circumstances, unne- 
cessary losses. Of this character we may mention the 
passage of the Elster by the bridge of Lindnau, where, 
through the ignorance and carelessness of those charged 
with the mines, and through the want of suitable bridge 
arrangements, thousands of brave men were buried in the 
muddy waters of this small river. So sensibly did Napo- 
leon feel this want of bridge equipages, in the winter of 
1813-14, that he addressed to his minister of war, on this 
subject, the folio wmg remarkable words : " If I had had 
pontons, I should have already annihilated the army of 
Schwartzenberg, and closed the war; I should have taken 
from him eight or ten thousand wagons, and his entire 
army in detail ; but for want of the proper means I could 
not pass the Seine." Again, on the 2d of March he wrote : 
" If I had had a bridge equipage this morning, Bllicher's 
army had been lost." Whoever will examine the details 
of the operations of this campaign, will be convinced of 
the full force of these remarks. 

In Spain in 1808, Sir John Moore, in order to assist the 
native forces, had penetrated so near the army of Napo- 
leon, that retreat became exceedingly difficult, and he was 
several times on the point of being lost. The English 
army was at this time very deficient in engineer troops, 
and Moore suffered much for want of miners to destroy 
bridges, and pontoniers to construct new ones. In order 
to cover his retreat and impede the advance of the French, 
the commander-in-chief, says Napier, "directed se¥eral 
bridges to be destroyed, but the engineers [for want of 
miners and miner's tools] failed of success in every at- 
tempt." 

In Soult's retreat, in 1809, he crossed the Duero at 



320 MILITARY ART ANB SCIENCE. 

Oporto, and destroyed the bridges so as to cut off the pnr- 
suit of WelUngton. But while Soult, deceived by treach- 
ery ill his own corps, neglected to guard the river with 
proper vigilance, Wellington collected boats at differ- 
ent points, crossed over his army, surprised the French, 
and, had it not been for the singular delay and indecision 
of General Murray, would most certainly have forced the en- 
tire army to capitulate ; as it was, his operation produced a 
decided influence on the campaign, and effected the safety 
of Beresford's corps. Soult destroyed his artillery and 
baggage, and hastily retreated through the mountain 
passes ; but his army was again arrested at the river Ca- 
vado, and placed on the very brink of destruction, when 
the brave and skilful Dulong succeeded in effecting a pas- 
sage at the Ponte Nova ; the same daring officer opened, 
on the same day, a way for the further escape of the 
French across the Misarella by the Saltador. 

In the pursuit of Massena, in 1810, it was important to 
the English to cross the Guadiana, and attack the French 
before Badajos could be put in a state of defence. Be- 
resford was directed by Wellington to pass this river at 
Jerumina, where the Portuguese had promised to furnish 
pontons ; but they neglected to fulfil their engagement, 
and the army had to wait till Capt. Squire, an able and 
efficient officer of engineers, could construct other means 
for effecting a passage. Every thing was done that genius 
could devise and industry execute ; nevertheless, the op- 
erations of the army were greatly delayed — " a delay ^^ 
says the historian, " that may he considered as the 'principal 
cause of those long and hloody operations which afterwards 
detained Lord Wellington more than a year on the frontiers 
of Portugal.''^ 

We might prolong these remarks by discussing the pas- 
sages of the Ceira and Alva, and their influence on the 
pursuit of Massena ; Wellington's passage of the Tagus, 



ENGINEERS. 321 

and his retreat from Burgos in 1812 ; the passage of the 
Adour and Garonne in 1814 ; and the faihire of the mines 
to blow up the bridges of Saltador, Alcantara, &c. ; but a 
sufficient number of examples, it is believed, has already 
been adduced to show the advantage of maintaining a prop- 
erly organized and instructed body of sappers, miners, and 
pontoniers, and the fatal results attending the want of such 
troops, as a component part of an army organization. 

It has already been remarked that the infantry of an 
army must always form the basis of the apportionment ; 
and by the general rule laid down by military writers, the 
cavalry should be from one-fourth to one-sixth of the in- 
fantry, according to the character of the war ; the artillery 
about two-thirds of the cavalry, or one-seventh of the in- 
fantry ; and the engineers from one-half to three-fourths 
of the artillery, — say about two-thirds. The staff and ad- 
ministrative corps must vary according to the nature of the 
organization, and the character of the theatre of war. The 
former ought to be from two to five in a thousand, and the 
latter from twenty-five to seventy-five,* as a general rule. 
These ratios would give for a good army organization : 

Staff, about 5 

Administrative service — pay, medical, commis- 
sary, quarter-master, &c. , . 65 
Infantry, .... . . 650 

Cavalr>^ .... . . 130 

Artillery, 90 

Engineers, 60 

Total, . . 1,000 

In a broken country, and against savage and undis- 
ciplined foes, like the Indians in this country, the natives 
opposed to the English in India, to the French in Algeria, 

* Tills supposes the teamsters, wagon -masters, hospital -servants, 
&c., to be enlisted men, and not persons hired for the occasion, as is 
done in our army. 



322 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

or to the Russians in Circassia, the cavalry, artillery, and 
engineers would be diminished, and the infantry and ad- 
ministrative corps proportionably increased ; the former 
because light troops are always preferable against an un- 
disciplined foe, and the latter because of the difficulty of 
moving and procuring supplies in new and uncultivated 
countries. The French forces in Algeria, in 1844, amount- 
ed to about sixty thousand men, in the following propor- 
tion : — 



Staff, 

Administrative, &c., . 
Infantry, . 
Cavalry, . 
Artillery, . 
Engineers, 



4.7 



112.3 

687.3 
86.6 
61.2 
47.9 

1000 men. 



In small peace establishments the relative proportion of 
infantry and cavalry should be much less than when pre- 
pared for the field, because troops for these two arms can 
be much more readily formed in case of emergency, than 
for those w^hich require more scientific information, and 
technical skill and instruction. The staff and engineers 
are evidently the most difficult to be formed in case of 
war, and next to these the artillery and administrative corps. 

In this country we can maintain, in time of peace, only 
the frame-work of an army, looking to our citizen soldiery 
to form, in case of need, the great mass of our military 
force. This is the starting point in our military system, 
and the basis of our army organization. Let us see 
whether this principle is carried out in practice. 

For every thousand men in our present organization* we 
have, 

* These numbers are the real rather than the nominal proportions, 
many of om- officers being called staff, who properly belong to one of 
the other classes. 



ENGINEERS. 323 

For the staff, 2 

Administrative, 20* 

Infantry, 513 

Cavalry, 150 

Artillery, 310 

Engineers, 50 

1000 

We see from this table, that while our artillery is nearly 
six times as numerous as in ordinary armies, our staff is 
less by one-half, and our engineers not more than one -half 
what ought to be their proportion in a war establishment. 
To this excess of artillery over infantry and cavalry in our 
army in time of peace there is no objection, inasmuch as 
the latter could be more easily expanded in case of war 
than the artillery. But for a still stronger reason our staff 
and engineers should also be proportionally increased, in- 
stead of being vastly diminished, as is actually the case. 

Experience in the first campaigns of the American 
Revolution strongly impressed on the mind of Washing- 
ton the absolute necessity of forming a regular and sys- 
tematic army organization. But so difficult was it to ob- 
tain properly instructed engineers, that he was obliged to 
seek his engineer officers in the ranks of foreign adven- 
turers, and to make drafts from the other arms of service, 
and have them regularly instructed in the duties of engi- 
neer troops, and commanded by the officers of this corps. 
An order, in his own handwriting, giving the details of 
this temporary arrangement, is dated March 30th, 1779. 
Until men are enlisted for the purpose, companies of sap- 
pers and miners shall be formed by drafts from the line. 
** The duties of the companies of sappers and miners," 

* Much of the administrative duty in our army is done by unen- 
listed men, or by soldiers detached from their companies. Where such 
is the case, the ratio of this branch of the service ought to be no high- 
er than is represented above. 



324 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

he continues, " shall be under the direction of the engi- 
neers, to construct field-works of every kind, and all 
works necessary for the attack or defence of places, as 
circumstances may require. On a march in the vicinity 
of an enemy, a detachment of the companies of sappers 
and miners shall be stationed at the head of the column, 
directly after the vanguard, for the purpose of opening 
and mending the roads, and removing obstructions," &c. 
&c. 

The great difficulties encountered by Washington in 
instructing his inexperienced forces in the more difficult 
branches of the art, made him the more earnest, in after 
years, to impress on us how important it was for us hi 
peace to prepare for war. The preparation here meant is 
not the keeping up, in time of peace, of a large standing 
army, ever ready to take the field ; but rather the forma- 
tion of a small body, educated and practised in all the 
scientific and difficult parts of the profession ; a body 
which shall serve as the cadre or framework of a large 
army, capable of imparting to the new and inexperienced 
soldiers of the republic that skill and efficiency which 
has been acquired by practice. How far have we accom- 
plished this object, and what will be the probable opera- 
tions in case of another contest with a European power ? 
New and inexperienced troops wdll be called into the 
field to oppose a veteran and disciplined army. From 
these troops we shall expect all the bravery and energy 
resulting from ardent patriotism and an enthusiastic love 
of liberty. But we cannot here expect much discipline, 
military skill, or knowledge of the several branches of 
the military art. The peaceful habits of our citizens 
tend but little to the cultivation of the military character. 
How, then, are we to oppose the hostile force 1 Must 
human blood be substituted for skill and preparation, and 
the dead bodies of our citizens serve as epaulements 



ENGINEERS. 325 

against the inroads of the enemy ? To some extent, we 
fear it must be the case ; but not entirely so, for govern- 
ment has not aUogether neglected to make preparation for 
such an event. Fortifications have been planned or 
erected on the most important and exposed positions ; 
military materials and munitions have been collected in 
the public arsenals ; a military school has been organized 
to instruct in the military sciences ; there are regularly 
kept up small bodies of infantry and cavalry, weak in 
numbers, but capable of soon making good soldiers of a 
population so well versed as ours is in the use of the 
musket and the horse ; an artillery force, proportionally 
much larger, is also regularly maintained, with a suf- 
ficient number of men and officers to organize and make 
good artillery-men of citizens already partially acquainted 
with the use of the cannon. But an acquaintance with 
infantry, cavalry, and artillery duties is not the only prac- 
tical knowledge requisite in war. In the practical oper- 
ations of an army in the field, rivers are to be crossed, 
bridges suddenly erected and suddenly destroyed, field- 
works constructed and defended, batteries captured and 
destroyed ; fortifications are to be put in order and de- 
fended, or to be besieged and recaptured ; trenches must 
be opened, mines sprung, batteries established, breaches 
made and stormed ; trous-de-loup, abattis, palisades, ga- 
bions, fascines, and numerous other military implements 
and machinery are to be constructed. Have our citizens 
a knowledge of these things, or have we provided in our 
military establishment for a body of men instructed and 
practised in this branch of the military art, and capable 
of imparting to an army the necessary efficiency for this 
service ? Unfortunately this question must be answered 
in the negative ; and it is greatly to be feared that the 
future historian will have to say of us, as Napier has 
said of the English : — " The best officers and soldiers were 

28 



326 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

obliged to sacrifice themselves in a lamentable manner, to 
compensate for the negligence and incapacity of a govern- 
ment always ready to plunge the nation into a war, without 
the slightest care of what was necessary to obtain success. 
Their sieges were a succession of butcheries ; because the 
commonest materials, and the means necessary to their art, 
were denied the engineersP^ 

* The subjects discussed in this chapter are also treated by most 
authors on Mihtary Organization and Military History, and by the 
several writers on Military Engineering. AUent, Vauban, Cormon- 
taigne, Rocquancourt, Pasley. Douglas, Jones, Belmas, Napier, Gay 
de Vernon, may be referred to with advantage. Pasley, Douglas, 
Jones, and Napier, speak in the strongest terras of the importance of 
engineer troops in the active operations of a war, and of the absolute 
necessity of organizing this force in time of peace. A list of books of 
reference on Military Engineering will be given at the close of the fol- 
lowing chapters. 

While these pages are passing through the press. Congress has au- 
thorized the President to raise one company of engineer troops ! This 
number is altogether too small to be of any use in time of war. 



PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. 327 



CHAPTER XIII. 

PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. 

Fortification is defined, — the art of disposing the ground 
in such a manner as to enable a small number of troops 
to resist a larger army the longest time possible. If 
the work be placed in a position of much importance, 
and its materials be of a durable character, it is called 
permanent; if otherwise, it receives the appellation of field, 
or temporary. Field-works are properly confined to oper- 
ations of a single campaign, and are used to strengthen 
positions which are to be occupied only for a short period. 
Generally these works are of earth, thrown up by the 
troops in a single day. They are intimately connected 
with a system of permanent fortifications, but from the fa- 
cility of their construction, no provision need be made for 
them before the actual breaking out of war. Indeed,^ 
they could not well be built before hostilities commenced, 
as their locality in each case must be determined by the 
position of the hostile forces. 

Having already described the general influence of per- 
manent fortifications as a means of national defence, we 
shall here speak merely of the principles of their con- 
struction. It is not proposed to enter into any technical 
discussion of matters that especially belong to the instruc- 
tion of the engineer, but merely to give the nomenclature 
and use of the more important parts of a military work ; 
in a word, such general information as should belong to 
officers of every grade and corps of an army. 



328 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

The first species of fortification among the ancients 
was of course very simple, consisting merely of an earth- 
en mound, or palisades. A wall was afterwards used, and 
a ditch was then added to the wall. It was found that a 
straight wall could be easily breached by the enemy's bat- 
tering-rams ; to remedy this evil, towers were built at 
short intervals from each other, forming a broken line of 
salient and re-entering parts. These towers or salient 
points gradually assumed a shape approximating to the 
modern bastion. 

After the invention of gunpowder and the application 
of cannon to the attack and defence of places, it became 
necessary to arrange earthen ramparts behind the thin 
walls of the ancient works, for the reception of the new 
artillery. Moreover these walls were soon found inad- 
equate to resist the missiles of the besiegers, and it be- 
came necessary to replace them by parapets of earth. In 
order to cover the retaining walls of these parapets from 
the besieging batteries, it was aiso found to be necessary 
to lower these v/alls as much as possible, and to raise the 
counterscarps. The traces or plans of the works, how- 
ever, received no material change till about the close of 
the fifteenth century. 

It is not known who first changed the ancient towers 
into bastions. Some attribute it to an Italian, and with 
considerable show of reason^ for a bastion was built at 
Turin as early as 1461. Achmet Pacha, it is said, forti- 
fied Otranto in this way, in 1480, but whether the system 
was previously known among the Turks cannot be deter- 
mined. Others attribute the invention to Ziska, the cele- 
brated leader of the Hussites. It is most probable that 
the transition from the tower to the bastion was a very 
gradual one, and that the change was perfected in several 
countries at about the same time. 

Fortifications, like other arts and sciences, greatly 



PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. 329 

flourished in Italy under the Medicis, and that country 
furnished Europe with its most skilful engineers. Cath- 
arine of Medicis introduced into France many of her 
countrymen, distinguished in this profession ; among these 
may be named Bellamat, Bephano, Costritio, Relogio, 
Vorganno, the two Marini, Campi, and Hieronimo, who 
built scA^eral important places and directed the sieges of 
others. These able foreigners were rivalled by some 
distinguished French engineers, Avho laid the foundation 
of the " corps du Genie^'' which has since become a school 
of military instruction for the w^orld. Among the early 
French engineers may be distinguished Lafontaine De 
Serre, Feuquicres, and St. Remy. Pedro Navarro had 
been appointed a member of this corps, but his attention 
was more specially directed to mining, and we do not 
learn that he distinguished himself in the construction of 
any fortification. 

In Germany, in the beginning of the sixteenth century, 
Albert Durer distinguished himself as a writer on fortifi- 
cation ; his book is remarkable as containing the germs 
of many of the improvements which were made by those 
who followed him. This is the more to be wondered at 
as he was not a professed engineer. After him followed 
Spekel, a native of Strasburg, who died in 1589. His 
writings are valuable as showing the state of the art at 
that time, and the changes which he himself introduced. 
He was an engineer of much practical knowledge and 
experience, having assisted at the sieges of Malta, Gol- 
letta, Vienna, Jula, Nicosia, Famagusta, &c. 

The first French engineer who wrote on fortification was 
Errard de Bar-le-Duc, who published near the close of 
the sixteenth century. As an engineer, he was rivalled 
by Chatillon, a man of distinguished merit. Errard for- 
tified Amiens, built a part of the castle of Sedan, and a 
portion of the defences of Calais. Under the reign of 

28* 



330 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

Louis XIII., Desnoyers, Deville, Pagan, and Fabre were 
greatly distinguished. Deville published in 1628. He 
was a man of much learning and experience ; but he is 
said to have adopted, both in his theory and practice, the 
principles of the Italian school, with, most of its errors. 
Pagan began his military career while young, and became 
marechal de champ at the age of 38, w^hen, having the mis- 
fortune to become blind, he v/as compelled to relinquish 
his brilliant hopes. He was the ablest engineer of his 
age, and was also greatly distinguished in other branches 
of science. In his plans he inclined to the Dutch rather 
than the Italian school of fortification. He published in 
1645. 

At the close of the sixteenth century, the Dutch had 
been forced to resort to military defences to protect 
themselves against the aggressions of the Spaniards. As 
the Dutch were inferior in other military means, fortifica- 
tion became one of the vital resources of the country. 
Their works, however, throAvn up in much haste, were 
in many respects defective, although w^ell adapted to the 
exigencies of the time. Freytag, their principal engineer, 
wrote in 1630. Some of his improvements w^ere intro- 
duced into France by Pagan. He was preceded by Ma- 
rolois, (a cotemporary of Pagan,) who published in 1613. 

In Germany, Rimpler, a Saxon, w^rote on fortification in 
1671. He was a man of great experience, having served 
at the sieges of Candia, Phillipsburg, Bonn, Riga, Bre- 
men, Dansburg, Bommeln, &c. He fell at the siege of 
Vienna in 1683. His writings are said to contain the 
groundwork of Montalembert's system. 

In Italy, after the time of Tartaglia, Marchi, Campi, 
&c., we find no great improvement in this art. Several 
Italians, however, distinguished themselves as engineers 
under the Spaniards. The fortifications of Badajos are a 
good example of the state of the art in Italy and Spain at 



PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. 331 

that epoch. The citadel of Antwerp, built by two Italian 
engineers, Pacciotti and Cerbelloni, in 1568, has become 
celebrated for the siege it sustained in 1832. 

The age of Louis XIV. effected a great revolution in 
the art of fortification, and carried it to such a degree of 
perfection, that it has since received but slight improve- 
ment. The years 1633 and 1634 are interesting dates in 
the history of this art, as having given birth respectively 
to Vauban and Coehorn. The former was chief engineer 
of France under Louis XIV., and the latter held a corre- 
sponding position under the Dutch republic. Coehorn's 
ideas upon fortification are conceived with an especial 
view to the marshy soil of his own country, and, although 
well suited to the object in view, are consequently of less 
general application than those of his more distinguished 
cotemporary and rival. The best specimens of his mode 
of construction that exist at the present day, are the 
fortresses of Manheim, Bergen-op-Zoom, Nimiguen, and 
Breda. 

Coehorn was followed in Holland by Landsberg, an able 
and practical engineer, who to much reading added ex- 
tensive experience, having himself served at sixteen 
sieges. His system was in many respects peculiar, both 
in trace and relief; it dispensed with the glacis, and all 
revertments of masonry. His plans could be applied only 
to marshy soils. The first edition of his work was pub- 
lished in 1685. 

But the career of Vauban forms the most marked and 
prominent era in the history of fortification ; it constitutes 
the connecting link between the rude sketches of the ear- 
lier engineers, and the well-established form which the 
art has since assumed. In his earlier works we find many 
of the errors of his predecessors ; but a gradual change 
seems to have been wrought in his mind by reflection and 
experience, and these faults were soon remedied and a 



332 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

new and distinct system developed. Vauban has left no 
treatise upon his favorite art, and his ideas upon fortifica- 
tion have been deduced from his constructions, and from 
detached memoirs left among his papers. The nature of 
his labors, and the extent of his activity and industry, 
may be imagined from the fact that he fought one hundred 
and forty battles, conducted fifty-eight sieges, and built or 
repaired three hundred fortifications. His memoirs, found 
among his manuscript papers, on various military and po- 
litical subjects, are numerous, and highly praised even at 
the present day. But his beautiful and numerous con- 
structions, both of a civil and military character, are real 
monuments to his genius. The best illustrations of 'his 
principles of fortification occur at Lille, Strasbourg, Lan- 
dau, Givet, and Neuf-Brisack. His vvTitings on mines, 
and the attack and defence of places, are, by the profes- 
sion, regarded as classic. His improvements in the ex- 
isting method of attack gave great superiority to the arms 
of his countrymen, and even enabled him to besiege and 
capture his rival Coehorn, in his ov^nw^orks. He died in 
1707, and was soon succeeded by Cormontaigne. 

The latter did not attempt the introduction of any new 
system, but limited himself to improving and perfecting 
the plans of his illustrious predecessors. His improve- 
ments, however, were both extensive and judicious, and 
are sufficient to entitle him to the place he holds as one 
of the ablest military engineers the world has ever pro- 
duced. His works on the subject of fortification, besides 
being elegantly written, contain the most valuable infor- 
mation of any works we have. His most admired con- 
structions are to be found at Metz, Thionville, and Bitche. 
The beautiful crown works of Billecroix, at Metz, are per- 
fect models of their kind. Cormontaigne died in 1750. 

Cotemporary with him were Sturin and Glasser. The . 
former deviated but slightly from the systems of his prede- 



PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. 333 

cessors,but the latter invented several ingenious improve- 
ments which gave him great reputation. 

Next follows Rosard, a Bavarian engineer ; and Fred- 
erick Augustus, king of Poland, who devoted himself par- 
ticularly to this art. The former casemated only the flanks 
of his works, but the latter introduced casemate fire more 
extensively than any one who had preceded him. 

In France, Belidor and De Filey published about the 
middle of the last century. They were both able engineers, 
but their systems were inferior to that of Cormontaigne. 

In 1767 De la Chiche introduced a system of fortifica- 
tion in many respects original. He raised his covered- 
ways so as to conceal all his masonry, and casemated a 
great portion of his enceinte. For exterior defence, he 
employed direct fire from his barbettes, and curvated fire 
from his casemates ; the direct fire of the latter secured 
his ditches. 

Next to De la Chiche follows Montalembert, who pub- 
lished in 1776. He was a man of much experience and 
considerable originality, but of no great ability as an engi- 
neer. Most of his ideas were derived from De la Chiche 
and the German school of Rimpler. His plans have gen- 
erally been rejected by his own countrymen, but they still 
have advocates among the Germans. 

General Virgin, a distinguished Swedish engineer, 
wrote in 1781. His idea of strongly fortifying the smaller 
towns to the comparative neglect of the larger cities, con- 
stitutes one of the principal novelties in his system. 

In 1794, Reveroni devised a system in which the case- 
mates of Montalembert were employed, but his guns were 
so arranged as to be employed in barbette while the be- 
siegers were at a distance, and afterwards to be used for 
casemated fire. The casemate gun-carriage, which form- 
ed a part of his invention, was ingenious, but never much 
employed in practice. 



334 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

Bousmard, a French emigrant, published in 1799. He 
adopted the general trace of Vauban, but introduced modi- 
fications in the details essentially different from those of 
Cormontaigne. Some of these modifications are very val- 
uable improvements, while others are of a more doubtful 
character. Bousmard is, on the whole, a very abl§ wri- 
ter, and his works should be found in the library of every 
military engineer. 

Carnot's celebrated treatise was published in 1810. He 
was evidently a man of genius, and during his career at 
the head of the War Department of France, numerous and 
very important improvements were made in the several 
branches of the military art, and especially in strategy. 
His Avork on fortification exhibits much originality and 
genius, but it is doubtful whether it has very much contrib- 
uted to the improvement of this art. His ideas have been 
very severely, and rather unfairly criticised by the Eng- 
lish, and particularly by Sir Howard Douglas. 

Chasseloup de Laubat early distinguished himself as an 
engineer of much capacity and talent. He followed Na- 
poleon in nearly all his campaigns, and conducted many 
of his sieges. He remodelled the fortifications of North- 
ern Italy and of the Lower Rhine. He published in 1811. 
The improvements which he introduced are numerous 
and valuable, and he probably contributed more to advance 
his art, and to restore the equilibrium between attack and 
defence, than any other engineer since Cormontaigne. 
After the fall of Napoleon and the partition of his empire, 
the allies mutilated or destroyed the constructions of Chas- 
seloup, so that, it is believed, no perfect specimen of his 
system remains. 

The cotemporaries of Chasseloup were mostly engaged 
in active field service and sieges, and few had either lei- 
sure or opportunity to devote themselves to improvements 
in permanent fortification. 



PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. 335 

Choumara published in 1827. His system contains 
much originality, and his writings give proof of talent and 
genius. He has very evidently more originality than 
judgment, and it is hardly probable that his system will 
ever be generally adopted in practice. 

The Metz system, as arranged by Noizet, as a theore- 
tical study, is undoubtedly the very best that is now known. 
It, however, requires great modifications to suit it to dif- 
ferent localities. For a horizontal site, it is probably the 
most perfect system ever devised. It is based on the 
system of Vauban as improved by Cormontaigne, and con- 
tains several of the modifications suggested by modem 
engineers. It is applied in a modified form to the new 
fortifications of Paris. 

Baron Rohault de Fleury has introduced many modifi- 
cations of the ordinary French system in his new defences 
of Lyons. We have seen no written account of these 
works, but from a hasty examination in 1844, they struck 
us as being too complicated and expensive. 

The new fortifications of Western Germany are modi- 
fications of Rempler's system, as improved by De la 
Chiche and Montalembert. It is said that General Aster, 
the directing engineer, has also introduced some of the 
leading principles of Chasseloup and Carnot. 

The English engineers have satisfied themselves with 
following in the track of their continental neighbors, and 
can offer, no claims to originality. 

Of the system of fortification now foUow^ed in our ser- 
vice we must decline expressing any opinion ; the time 
has not yet arrived for subjecting it to a severe and judi- 
cious criticism. But of the system pursued previous to 
1820, we may say, without much fear of contradiction, 
that a worse one could scarcely have been devised. In- 
stead of men of talent and attainments in military science, 
most of our engineers were then either foreigners, or 



336 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

civilians who owed their commissions to mere political 
influence. The qualifications of the former were proba- 
bly limited to their recollection of some casual visit to 
two or three of the old European fortresses ; and the latter 
probably derived all their military science from some old 
military book, which, having become useless in Europe, 
had found its way into this country, and which they had 
read without understanding, and probably without even 
looking at its date. The result was what might have been 
anticipated — a total waste of the public money. We 
might illustrate this by numerous examples. A single 
one, however, must suffice. About the period of the last 
war, eight new forts were constructed for the defence of 
New York harbor, at an expense of some two millions of 
dollars. Six of these were circular, and the other two were 
star forts — systems which had been discarded in Europe 
for nearly two thousand years ! Three of these works 
are now entirely abandoned, two others are useless, and 
large sums of money have recently been expended on the 
other three in an attempt to remedy their faults, and ren- 
der them susceptible of a good defence. Moreover, a 
number of the works which were constructed by our en- 
gineers before that corps w^as made to feel the influence 
of the scientiflc education introduced through the medium 
of the Military Academy — we say, a considerable number 
of our fortifications, constructed by engineers who owed 
their appointment to political influence, are not only wrong 
in their plans, but have been made of such wretched mate- 
rials and workmanship that they are already crumbling 
into ruins. 

A fortification, in its most simple form, consists of a 
mound of earth, termed the rampart, w^hich encloses the 
space fortified ; a parapet, surmounting the rampart and 
covering the men and guns from the enemy's projectiles ; 
a scarp wall, which sustains the pressure of the earth of 



PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. 337 

the rampart and parapet, and presents an insurmountable 
obstacle to an assault by storm ; a wide and deep ditch^ 
which prevents the enemy from approaching near the body 
of the place ; a counterscarp wall, which sustains the earth 
on the exterior of the ditch ; a covered way, which occu- 
pies the space between the counterscarp and a mound of 
earth called a glacis, thrown up a few yards in front of the 
ditch for the purpose of covering the scarp of the main work. 

The work by which the space fortified is immediately 
enveloped, is called the enceinte, or body of the place. 
Other works are usually added to the enceinte to strength- 
en the weak points of the fortification, or to lengthen the 
siege by forcing the enemy to gain possession of them be- 
fore he can breach the body of the place : these are term- 
ed outworks, when enveloped by the covered way, and 
advanced works, when placed exterior to the covered way, 
but in some way connected with the main work ; but if 
entirely beyond the glacis, and not within supporting dis- 
tance of the fortress, they are called detached works. 

In a bastioned front the principal outwork is the demi' 
lune, which is placed in front of the curtain ; it serves to 
cover the main entrance to the w^ork, and to place the 
adjacent bastions in strong re-enterings. 

The tenaille is a small low work placed in the ditch, to 
cover the scarp w^all of the curtain and flanks from the 
fire of the besieger's batteries erected along the crest of 
the glacis. 

The places of arms, are points where troops are assem- 
bled in order to act on the exterior of the w^ork. The re- 
entering places of arms, are small redans arranged at the 
points of junction of the covered ways of the bastion and 
demi-lune. The salient places of arms are the parts of the 
covered way in front of the salients of the bastion and 
demi-lune. 

Small permanent works, termed redoubts, are placed 

29 



338 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

within the demi-lune and re-entering places of arms for 
strengthening those works. Works of this character con- 
structed within the bastion are termed interior retrench- 
ments ; when sufficiently elevated to command the exte- 
rior ground, they are called cavaliers. 

Caponniers are works constructed to cover the passage 
of the ditch from the tenaille to the gorge of the demi- 
lune, and also from the demi-lune to the covered way, by 
which communication may be maintained between the 
enceinte and outworks. 

Posterns are underground communications made through 
the body of the place or some of the outworks. 

Sortie-passages are narrow openings made through the 
crest of the glacis, which usually rise in the form of a 
ramp from the covered way, by means of which commu- 
nication may be kept up with the exterior. These pas- 
sages are so arranged that they cannot be swept by the 
fire of the enemy. The other communications above 
ground are called ramps, stairs, &:c. 

Traverses are small works erected on the covered way 
to intercept the fire of the besieger's batteries. 

Scarp and counterscarp galleries are sometimes con- 
structed for the defence of the ditch. They are arranged 
with loop-holes, through which the troops of the garrison 
fire on the besiegers when they have entered the ditch, 
without being themselves exposed to the batteries of the 
enemy. 

In sea-coast defences, and sometimes in a land front for 
the defence of the ditch, embrasures are made in the scarp 
wall for the fire of artillery ; the whole being protected 
from shells by a bomb-proof covering over head : this ar- 
rangement is termed a casemate. 

Sometimes double ramparts and parapets are formed, so 
that the interior one shall fire over the more advanced ; 
the latter in this case is called Sifaussebraie, 



PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. 339 

If the inner work be separated from the other it is called 
a retrenchment* and if in addition it has a commanding 
fire, it is termed, as was just remarked, a cavalier. 

The capital of a bastion is a line bisecting its salient 
angle. All the works comprehended between the capitals 
of two adjacent bastions is termed b, front : it is taken as 
the unit in permanent fortification. 

Fig. 39 represents the ground plan of a modern bas- 
tioned front, of a regular and simple form, on a horizontal 
site. 
At Ai A — Is tlie enceinte, or body M — The redoubt of the re-entering 

of the place. places of arms. 

B — The bastions. N — The ditches of the redoubts. 

C— The main ditch. O— The tenaille. 

D — The covered ways. P — The double caponnier. 

E — The re-entering places of arms, a — The traverses. 
F — The salient places of arms. h — The sortie-passages. 

G — The demi-lune. c — Stairs. 

if— The demi-lune ditch. d — Cut in the demi-lune to flank 

J — The demi-lune redoubt. the redoubt of the re-entering 

L — The ditch of the demi-lune place of arms. 

redoubt. 
Fig. 40 represents a section through the line mn'^ of the 
preceding figure. 

A — Is the rampart. F— The glacis. 

B — The parapet. G — The covered way. 

C— -The ditch. if— The terre-plein. 

D — The scarp wall. J— The parade. 

JE — The counterscarp wall. 
Sometimes half embrasures are cut in the earthen par- 
apet of a fort, so as to sink the gun below the crest, and 
thus more effectually cover the men from the enemy's fire. 

* The term retrenchment implies an interior work, which is con- 
structed within or in rear of another, for the purpose of strengthening 
it; the term intrenchment, on the contrary, implies an independent 
work, constructed in the open field, without reference to any other ad- 
joining work. 



340 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

But guns m embrasure have a far less extended field of 
fire than when mounted in barbette ; moreover, the embra- 
sures present openings through which an enemy may pen- 
etrate in an assault. Owing to these objections, they are 
employed only for the protection of particular points ; that 
is, where it is important to cover the artillerists from the 
enemy's fire, or where the guns are to be used merely to 
protect a ditch, or to enfilade a road, &c. The bottom of 
the embrasure is called the sole, the sides are called 
cheeks, and the mass of earth between two embrasures, the 
merlon. Embrasures may be made either direct or oblique, 
according as the fire is required to be perpendicular or 
oblique to the parapet. 

A coverport is a small outwork of any convenient form, 
erected immediately in front of a gateway, to screen it 
from the enemy's fire. 

A counterguard is a more extensive work, constructed in 
front of a part of the fortress itself, or of some other outwork 
of greater importance, which it is intended to cover. These 
are sometimes called coverfaces, from their situation and 
object ; but the former term is most commonly used. 

Sometimes outworks, called tenaillons, consisting of one 
long and one short face, are placed on each side of the 
demi-lune of a front of fortification, for the purpose of pro- 
longing the siege. (Fig. 41.) 

Small, or demi-tena^illons, are frequently so arranged as 
to cover only one-half of the demi-lune, and then a bonnet 
constructed in front of the salient of the demi-lune. (Fig. 
42.) In this case the bonnet is flanked by the short faces 
of the demi-tenaillons ; these short faces are themselves 
flanked by the demi-lune, while the bastions flank the long 
faces. 

A hornwork consists of a front of fortification, and two 
wings resting on the faces of bastions of a front of the 



PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. 341 

fortress. It sometimes has also a demi-lune or bonnet, as 
in the case of demi-tenaillons. (Fig. 43.) 

A crownwork consists of two fronts of fortification, and 
two wings. (Fig. 44.) It is sometimes made double, and 
even triple. 

These works are also employed as advanced works, 
and placed entirely in front of the glacis. They have 
generally been added to a fortress for the purpose of oc- 
cupying some important piece of ground not included 
within the limits of the main work. They may be con- 
structed with covered ways, and sometimes it may be 
found advantageous to secure them by retrenchments. 

A detached work may be made in any form deemed best 
suited to the site. Being but remotely connected with the 
fortress, the latter will exercise but slight influence on the 
character of its plan or construction. They are usually 
of limited extent and slight relief, partaking much of the 
nature of field-works.* 

* The general principles of permanent fortification may be best 
learned from the writings of Cormontaigne, St. Paul de Noizet, and 
Laurillard-Fallot. A list of valuable books of reference on the seve- 
ral branches of military engineering will be given at the close of the 
next chapter. 

29* 



842 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 



CHAPTER XIV. 

FIELD-ENGINEERING. 

Field' Engineering includes the making of military re- 
connaissances, temporary fortifications, and military roads ; 
the planning and construction of military bridges ; the at- 
tack and defeat of military works ; — in fine, all the various 
duties of engineer troops, either in the operations of a 
campaign, or in the dispositions on the battle-field. 

Military reconnaissance .—By this term is meant an ex- 
amination of a portion of the theatre of war, to ascertain 
its military character and resources. If the examination 
be made of a large district of country, and for an entire 
campaign, the reconnaissance is general ; if made for col- 
lecting detailed information respecting a proposed line of 
march, the passage of a river, the position of an enemy, 
&c., it is termed special. 

In making a general reconnaissance, great care should 
be taken to collect accurate information respecting the 
general topography of the country ; the character of the 
mountains, forests, and watercourses ; the nature of the 
roads, canals, and railways ; the quality of the soil, and 
the amount of provisions and forage it produces ; the pop- 
ulation and character of the cities, towns, and villages ; 
the commercial and manufacturing resources of every part 
of the country, and the means of transportation to be found 
in each district. The plan of military operations will be 
based on the information thus obtained, and any serious 
error in the reconnaissance may involve the results of the 
campaign, and even the fate of the war. 

In a special reconnaissance, not only accurate but mi- 



FIELD-ENGINEERING. 343 

nute information will be required : the character of the 
roads must be given in detail ; the nature of the water- 
courses, their depth and velocity ; the position and charac- 
ter of bridges, and fords ; — in fine, a full description of 
all obstacles to be encountered, and the moans that can be 
made available for overcoming these obstacles. 

A reconnoitring officer may usually derive much valua- 
ble ififormation from the published maps and descriptions 
of the country to be examined ; additional matters of de- 
tail may be obtained from woodsmen, hunters, and fisher- 
men ; and also from the innkeepers and local authorities 
of the district. But the officer should always verify this 
information, so far as practical, by personal examination. 
In making a reconnaissarice in the vicinity of an enemy, 
he must be supported by a strong escort of mounted troops, 
and in all his operations the greatest precaution will be re- 
quisite to ensure success. 

Some simple instrument, such as a pocket sextant, or 
compass, will be sufficient to enable the reconnoitring offi- 
cer to measure, with considerable accuracy, the height of 
mountains, the width of streams, &c., and an ordinary scale 
and dividers will enable him to make a suitable military 
sketch. 

Temporary Fortification. — It has been stated in the pre- 
ceding chapter that temporary fortifications are properly 
confined to the operations of a single campaign, and are 
used to strengthen positions which are to be occupied only 
for a short period ; and that they are usually made of 
earth, thrown up by the troops in a single day. Tempo- 
rary fortifications, as a part of field-engineering, may there- 
fore be regarded rather as an arm than an art. The prin- 
ciples of their construction are derived, of course, from the 
theory of permanent fortification, but in applying these prin- 
ciples to practice in the field, much greater latitude is allowed 
than in the exact scientific arrangement of permanent works. 



344 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

The purpose of field-works (or intrenchments, as they 
are commonly called) is to arrest, or at least to impede, 
the march of the attacking foe ; to shelter the defensive 
troops from the missive weapons of the assailants, and to 
detain them in a position where they will be exposed to 
the fire of the defensive force. The numerical and posi- 
tive strength of the assailed may be much less than that 
of the assailant, and yet an equilibrium exist ; the material 
obstacles compensating for the difference in numbers. In- 
trenchments, though inert masses, must therefore be re- 
garded as most valuable and important accessaries in the 
defence of a position. 

Intrenchments consist either Of lines of works made to 
cover extended positions, or of detached works designed 
simply to defend the ground they occupy. The former 
generally present a front against the enemy in but one di- 
rection, while the latter are usually closed on all their sides. 

Tlfc^ following figures have been employed for the plan 
of simple intrenchments, viz. : the polygon, redan, lunette, 
mitre, star-fort, and bastion. 

Square or polygonal redoubts are the most common forms 
given to field-works, on account of the ease of their con- 
struction. But they have many defects. There is a sec- 
tor without fire in front of each salient, and the ditches are 
without protection. The latter objection also holds good 
against all circular works. 

The redan (Fig. 45) is frequently used to cover a point 
in rear, as a bridge, a ford, or a defile. When used alone, 
its gorge should be closed by palisades. Its ditches are 
unprotected. 

The lunette (Fig. 46) has nearly the same defects as 
the redan. 

The mitre, or priest-cap, (Fig. 47,) may be employed 
with advantage when a cross-fire is required on the capi- 
tal of the work. 



FIELD-ENGINEERING. 845 

The star-fort has all the defects, without the merit of 
simplicity, which belong to the polygonal redoubt. 

The hastion-fort (Fig. 48) more fully satisfies the con- 
ditions of a good defence than any other plan ; but it is 
less simple and easy of execution. It is usually composed 
of four or five fronts, but it may be applied to a polygon of 
any number of sides. 

For the details of the construction of these several 
works, we must refer to the special treatises on field-forti- 
fication. 

Lines of intrenchments may be made either continuous 
or with intervals. In adopting either plan, the engineer 
should avail himself of all the natural obstacles presented 
by the position, so as to diminish the labor of erecting 
artificial means of defence. 

The simplest arrangement for a continuous intrench- 
ment is the cremailliire, or indented line. When applied 
to an irregular site, or used to connect together distant 
and detached works, the indented line may be regarded 
as a good disposition. Mitres and redans, connected by 
straight curtains, are sometimes employed, as also a com 
bination of large and small redans, forming alternate sa 
lient and re-entering angles. A continuous line of bas- 
tions is preferable to any other arrangement, when there 
is plenty of tim.e for their construction. 

Lines with intervals are frequently formed of alternate 
lunettes and square redoubts. Other detached works may 
be employed in the same way. This manner of intrench- 
ing a position has several advantages, with disciplined 
troops. The first shock of the assailant is sustained by 
the detached works, and when he attempts to penetrate in 
the intervals, his flanks become exposed to a deadly cross 
fire. These intervals also allow the assailed to act on the 
offensive, by charging the enemy at the opportune moment. 
But with raw and militia forces it will be safer to resort 



346 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

to continuous lines. If cavalry form any part of the de- 
fensive force, it will be absolutely necessary to leave in- 
tervals through which these troops may charge. 

A vertical section of all intrenchments is of the same 
general form ; the dimensions will, of course, vary with 
the nature of the soil, and the time and means employed in 
their construction. The minimum dimensions that can be 
used with any considerable advantage are given in Fig. 49. 

In laying out field-works advantage should be taken of 
all available artificial obstacles, such as hedges, walls, 
houses, outbuildings, &c. A thickset hedge may be ren- 
dered defensible by throwing up against it a slight parapet 
of earth. Stone fences may be employed in the same way. 
Walls of masonry may be pierced with loopholes and ar- 
ranged for one or two tiers of fire. The walls of houses 
are pierced in the same manner, and a projecting wooden 
structure, termed a machicoulis gallery^ is sometimes made 
from the floor of the second story, to enable the assailed 
to fire down upon their opponents. This arrangement is 
frequently employed to advantage in wooden blockhouses 
against a savage foe ; but it is of little avail when exposed 
to the fire of artillery. Some have proposed galleries of 
this description in permanent works of masonry, but the 
project is too obviously absurd to m^erit discussion. 

In addition to the parapet of an intrenchment, a good 
engineer will always find time and means for constructing 
other artificial obstacles, such as trous-de-loup, abattis, 
palisades, stockades, fraises, chevaux-de-frise, crows'-feet, 
mines, (fee. 

Trous'de-loup are pits dug in the earth in the form of 
an inverted truncated cone, some six feet in diameter, and 
about the same number of feet in depth. They are usu- 
ally placed a few yards in front of the ditch, and concealed 
by some slight covering. 

AbcUtis are tops and large limbs of trees arranged along 



FIELD-ENGINEERING. 347 

the glacis of a work ; the ends of the branches are lopped 
oiTand sharpened. 

Palisades are stakes some eight or ten feet long, with 
one end fastened in the ground and the other made sharp. 
They are placed in juxtaposition and connected together 
by horizontal riband-pieces. This arrangement is fre- 
quently placed at the foot of the counterscarp. When the 
timbers are large and the work is intended as a part of a 
primary defence, it is called a stockade ; when the stakes 
are placed at the foot of the scarp, either horizontally or 
inclined, they receive the name of /raises. 

A cheval-de-frise consists of a horizontal piece of timber 
armed with wooden or iron lances, which project some 
eight or ten feet. It is much employed against cavalry, 
and on rocky soils serves as a substitute for palisades. 

Crows'* 'feet are small wooden or iron forms filled with 
sharp spikes. They are thrown, with their points up- 
ward, on ground which is to be passed over by cavalry. 

Mines are sometimes used in connection with intrench- 
ments, but more commonly in the attack and defence of 
permanent works. They will be noticed further on. 

Field-works which are to be occupied for a consider- 
able length of time will usually have their steeper slopes 
revetted, and be arranged with scarp and counterscarp, 
galleries, traverses, blindages, &c. Such works hold an 
intermediary rank between temporary and permanent for- 
tification. 

As examples of the importance of field fortifications 
and of the manner of organizing them, the reader is re- 
ferred to the celebrated battle of Fontenoy, in 1745, where 
the carefully-arranged intrenchments of Marshal Saxe en- 
abled the French to repel, with immense destruction, the 
attacks of greatly superior numbers ; to the battle of Fleu- 
rus, in 1690, where the Prince of Waldeck exposed him- 
self to a most disastrous defeat "by neglecting the re- 



348 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

sources of fortification and other indispensable precau- 
tions ;" to the battle of Malplaquet, in 1709, where 
Marshal Villars, by neglecting to occupy and intrench the 
farm that closed the passage between the woods of Sars 
and Laniere, exposed himself to a disastrous defeat ; to 
the operations of 1792, where General Custine, by 
neglecting to intrench the heights that covered Bingen, 
as the engineers had recommended, exposed himself to 
those terrible disasters which forced him to a precipi- 
tate retreat ; to the works of Wervike, which, by a vig- 
orous resistance on the 10th of September, 1793, saved 
the Dutch army from total destruction ; to the intrenched 
camp of Ulra, in 1800, which for six weeks held in check 
the victorious army of Moreau ; to the intrenched lines of 
Torres Yedras, in 1810, which saved from destruction the 
English army of Wellington ; to the field-defences of 
Hougomont, which contributed so much to the victory of 
Waterloo, &c. 

Military communications. — The movements of armies 
are always much embarrassed by forests, marshes, and 
water-courses, and nothing contributes more to the dis- 
patch of military operations than the means of opening 
practical and easy communication through these various 
obstacles. 

It is not necessary here to enter into any detailed dis- 
cussion of the manner of constructing military communi- 
cations through forests or marshes. In a new country 
like ours, where almost every one has had some experi- 
ence in road-making, no very great technical knowledge 
is required for the construction of temporary works of 
this character ; but much professional skill and experience 
will be requisite for the engineers who make the prelimi- 
nary reconnaissances, and fix the location of these roads. 

Water-courses may be crossed by means of fords, on 
the ice, or by ferries and bridges. When temporary 



FIELD-ENGINEERING. 349 

bridges or ferries are constructed by the army in the field, 
the)4 are classed under the general head of military bridges ^ 
or more properly, pontoniering . 

Where the depth of the stream is not great, the current 
slight, and the bottom smooth and hard, the passage may 
be effected hy fording. If the bottom be of mud, or large 
stones, the passage will be difficult and dangerous, even 
where the depth and current are favorable. Under favor- 
able circumstances infantry can ford a stream where the 
depth is not greater than four feet ; cavalry to a depth of 
four or five feet ; but artillery, and engineer trains, cannot 
go to a depth of more than two and a half feet, without 
greatly exposing their ammunition and military stores. 
The fords should be accurately staked out before the pas- 
sage is attempted, and ropes ought to be stretched across 
the stream, or cavalry and small boats stationed below, to 
prevent the loss of life. 

Ice may be crossed by infantry, in small detachments. 
Its strength may be increased by covering it with boards, 
or straw, so as to distribute the weight over a greater sur- 
face. By sprinkling water over the straw, and allowing 
it to freeze, the mass may be made still more compact. 
But large bodies of cavalry, and heavy artillery, cannot 
venture on the ice unless it be of great thickness and 
strength. An army can never trust, for any length of 
time, to either fords or ice ; if it did a freshet or a thaw 
would place it in a most critical state. Military bridges 
will, therefore, become its only safe reliance for keeping 
open its communications. 

Military bridges are made with trestles, rafts, boats, and 
other floating bodies. Rope bridges are also sometimes 
resorted to by troops for passing rivers. 

Trestle bridges are principally used for crossing small 
streams not more than seven or eight feet in depth : they 
also serve to connect floating bridges with the shore, in 

30 



350 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

shallow water. The form of the trestle is much the same 
as that of an ordinary carpenter'^ s horse^ i. e., a horizpntal 
beam supported by four inclined legs. These trestles are 
placed in the stream, from twelve to twenty feet apart, and 
connected by string-pieces, (or hoiks as they are termed 
in technical language,) which are covered over with 
plank. The action of the current against the bridge may 
be counteracted by anchors and cables, or by means of 
boxes or baskets attached to the legs of the trestles, and 
filled with stones. A more substantial form may be given 
to the bridge by substituting for the trestles, piles, or the 
ordinary framed supports so much used in the newer 
parts of our country. 

For examples of the use of bridges of this description 
we would refer to Caesar's celebrated bridge across the 
Rhine ; the passage of the Scheldt in 1588 by the Span- 
iards ; the passage of the Lech in 1631 by Gustavus 
Adolphus ; the passage of the Danube in 1740 by Mar- 
shal Saxe ; the great bridge across the Yar during Na- 
poleon's Italian campaigns ; the passage of the Lech in 
1800 by Lecourbe ; the bridges across the Piava, the 
Isonso, &c., in the subsequent operations of the army in 
Italy ; the celebrated passage of the Danube at the island 
of Lobau in 1809; the passage of the Agueda in 1811 
by the English ; the passages of the Dwina, the Mos- 
cowa, the Dneiper, the Beresina, &c., in the campaign 
of 1812 ; the repairing of the bridge near Dresden, and 
the passage of the Elbe in 1813, &c. 

Rafts formed of timbers, casks, barrels, &;c., are fre- 
quently used as military bridges. They may be made to 
bear almost any weight, and will answer for the passage 
of rivers of any depth and width, provided the current be 
not rapid. 

Where the bridge is to be supported by rafts made of 
solid timbers, these timbers should be first placed in the 



FIELD-ENGINEERING. 351 

water, to ascertain their natural position of stability, and 
then the larger ends cut away on the und^r side, so as to 
present the least possible resistance to the action of the 
current. They are afterwards lashed together by strong 
rope or withe lashing, or fastened by cross-pieces let into 
the timbers, and held firm by bolts, or wooden pins. 
These rafts are kept in place by anchors and cables pla- 
ced up and down stream. The roadway is formed in 
nearly the same manner as for a bridge supported on 
trestles. Empty casks, and other floating bodies, may be 
substituted in place of logs in the construction of rafts. 

For examples of the use of rafts in the construction of 
military bridges, we would refer to the passage of the 
Seine in 1465 by Count Charolais ; the passage of the 
Meuse in 1579 by Alexander Farnese ; the passage of 
the Vistula in 1704, the Borysthenese in 1709, and the 
Sound in 1718, by Charles XII. ; the passage of the 
Adige in 1796 ; the passage of the Po in 1807; and the 
subsequent military operations in the Spanish Peninsula. 

Military bridges are frequently made of boats, and the 
ordinary river-craft found in the vicinity of the intended 
passage. Flat-bottomed boats are the most suitable for 
this purpose, but if these cannot be obtained, keel boats 
will serve as a substitute. When these water-craft are of 
very unequal sizes, (as is frequently the case,) two smaller 
ones may be lashed together to form a single support ; 
they can be brought to the same level by means of stone 
ballast. The gunwales must be suitably arranged for sup- 
porting the balks, or else frameworks should be erected 
for this purpose from the centre of the boat. The ar- 
rangement of the roadway, anchors, &;c., is the same as 
before. 

A bridge-equipage made to follow an army in its move- 
ments in the field, is generally composed of light skiffs or 
batteaux, and the necessary timbers, planks, anchors, &c.» 



352 MIl^ITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

for forming the roadway, and keeping the bridge in its po- 
sition. All thfjse articles are constructed especially for 
this purpose. All the wood-work should be of tough and 
well-seasoned timber, so as to impose no unnecessary 
weight on the wagon trains. The bateaux should also be 
made of strong and light materials. For convenience in 
transportation, these boats are sometimes made with hinges 
so as to fold up. The ribs are usually of oak, and the 
sides and bottom of pine. Instead of plank, a covering of 
tin, copper, India-rubber, &c., has sometimes been substi- 
tuted. Floating supports of this character are often made 
in compartments, so as to prevent their sinking when in- 
jured by the enemy's projectiles. Indian-rubber pontons 
may be folded up into a small space, and their slight weight 
renders them convenient for transportation. 

On navigable streams a part of the bridge resting on 
one or two bateaux should be so arranged that it can be 
shipped out of its place, forming a draw for the passage of 
river-craft. Indeed, it would be well, even where the 
river is not navigable, to form a draw for the passage of 
trees, and other floating bodies, sent down by the enemy 
against the bridge. 

An ordinary bridge-equipage of bateaux, or light pontons, 
for crossing a river of from three to four hundred yards in 
width, and of moderate current, will require a train of from 
sixty to eighty wagons.* Under favorable circumstances, 
and with a well-instructed corps of pontoniers, the bridge 
may be thrown across the river, and prepared for the pas- 
sage of an army in a few hours at most.f After the troops 

* The number of wagons in a ponton train will be greatly diminished 
if it be found that Indian-rubber boats may be used as supports for the 
bridge. The engineer department of our army are making experi- 
ments to determine this point. 

t In 1746, three bridges of bateaux were thrown across the Po,near 
Placentia, each fifteen hundred feet in length, and entirely comple- 



FIELD-ENGINEERING. 353 

have passed over, the bridge may be taken up, and re- 
phiced on the wagons in from a quarter to half an hour. 

The following examples will serve to illustrate the use 
of different kinds of boat-bridges in military operations : — 
the passage of the Rhine, in 1702, by Villars ; the pas- 
sage of ihe Dnieper and the Bog, in 1739, by the Rus- 
sians ; the passage of the Danube, in 1740, by Marshal 
Saxe ; the passage of the Rhine, near Cologne, in 1758, 
by the Prince of Clermont ; the passage of the Rhine, in 

1795, by Jourdan ; the passage of the Rhine, at Kehl, in 

1796, by Moreau ; and again the same year, at Weissen- 
thuiu, and at Neuwied, by Jourdan ; the bridges across 
the Rhine, at the sieges of Kehl and Huninguen, in 
1797 ; the passage of the Limmat, in 1799, by Massena ; 
the passages of the Mincio, the Adige, the Brenta, the Pi- 
ava, &c., in 1800 ; the passages of these rivers again in 
1805; the passages of the Narew, in 1807, by the Rus- 
sians ; the several passages of the Danube, in 1709, by 
the French and Austrian armies ; the passages of the Ta- 
gus and Douro, in 1810, by the English ; the passages of 
the Niemen, the Dwina, the Moskwa, and the Beresina, 
in 1812, by the French; and of the great rivers of Ger- 
many and France, in 1813 and 1814. 

A floating body, propelled from one bank to the other by 
the current of the stream, is termed d^fiying -bridge. The 
usual mode of establishing a ferry of this kind, is to at- 

ted in eight hours. In 1757, two bridges of bateaux were thrown 
across the Rhine, at Wesel, in half an hour ; again, in the same 
year, a third bridge was thrown across this river near Dusseldorf, in 
six hours. In 1841, Col. Birago, of the Austrian army, arrived on the 
bank of the Weisgerben arm of the Danube, with his bridge-equipage, 
at a round trot, and immediately began the construction of his bridge, 
without any previous preparation or examination. In less than three- 
quarters of an hour the bridge was completed, and three loaded four- 
horse wagons passed over on a trot, followed by a column of infantry. 

30* 



354 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

tach the head of the boat by meafis of a cable and anchor, 
to some point near the middle of the stream. By steering 
obliquely to the current, the boat may be made to cross 
and recross at the same point. A single passage may be 
made in the same way, by the action of the current with- 
out the cable and anchor, but the boat in this case will be 
carried some distance down the stream. Rowboats are 
employed for crossing over infantry by successive debar- 
kations ; but this process is too slow for the passage of a 
large force ; it may very well be resorted to as auxiliary 
to other means. 

Steam craft are so common at the present day on all 
navigable streams, that an army in the field will frequent- 
ly be able to avail itself of this means of passing the 
larger rivers. But, in a hostile country, or in one already 
passed over by the enemy, it will not be safe to rely with 
confidence upon obtaining craft of this character. A well- 
organized army will always carry in its train the means of 
effecting a certain and speedy passage of all water-courses 
that may intercept its line of march. 

Flying-bridges or rowboats were employed in the pas- 
sage of the Dwina, in 1701, by the Swedes ; the passage 
of the Po, in 1701, by Prince Eugene ; the passage of the 
Rhine, at Huninguen, in 1704; Jourdan's passage of the 
Rhine in 1795 ; Moreau's passage in 1796 ; the sieges of 
Kehl and Huninguen in 1 797 ; Massena's passage of the 
Limmat, and Soult's passage of the Linth, in 1799; the 
passage of the Rhine, at Lucisteig, in 1800; the passage 
of the Po, by the French, just before the battle of Maren- 
go ; and others in Italy, Germany, and Spain, in the sub- 
sequent campaigns of Napoleon. 

Military bridges have sometimes been formed of ropes, 
cables stretched across the stream, and firmly attached at 
each end to trees, or posts let into the earth. If the shore 
is of rock, rings with staples let into the stone form the 



FIELD-ENGINEERING. 355 

best means for securing the ends of the main ropes. Plank 
are laid on these cables to form the road-way. The ropes 
forming the " side-rail" of the bridge are passed over tres- 
tles at each shore, and then fastened as before. Short 
vertical ropes attach the main supports to these side ropes, 
in order thai they may sustain a part of the weight passing 
over the bridge. Constructions of this character are fully 
described in Douglas's Essay on Military Bridges. For 
example, see the passage of the Po, near Casal, in 1515, 
b)'' the Swiss ; the bridge thrown over the Clain by Admi- 
ral Coligni, at the siege of Poitiers, in 1569; the opera- 
tions of the Prince of Grange against Ghent and Bruges, 
in 1631 ; the passage of the Tagus, at Alcantara, in 1810, 
by the English ; the bridge constructed across the Zezere, 
by the French, in 1810 ; the bridge thrown across the 
Scarpe, near Douai, in 1820; the experiments made at 
Fere in 1823, &c. 

The passage of a river in the presence of an enemy, 
whether acting offensively or in retreat, is an operation of 
great delicacy and danger. In either case the army is 
called upon to show the coolest and most determined 
courage, for its success will depend on its maintaining the 
strictest discipline and good order. 

In the case of a retreat the bridge should 6e covered by 
field intrenchments, called a t^te de pont, and defended by 
a strong guard. If the river be of moderate width, the 
enemy may be kept at a distance by heavy batteries on 
the opposite shore. As soon as the passage is effected 
by the main body, the bridge, if permanent, will be blown 
up, or otherwise destroyed by the miners, and if floating, 
will be swung round to the other shore. The rear-guard 
will pass over in rowboats, or the end pontons detached 
for that purpose. An army retreating in the face of an 
enemy should never rely upon one single bridge, no mat- 
ter what may be its character ; for the slightest accident 



356 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

happening to it might expose the whole army to inevita- 
ble destruction. 

The passage of a river by main force, against an enter- 
prising and active enemy on the opposite shore, is always 
an operation of the greatest difficulty, and not unfrequent- 
ly accompanied with the most bloody results. 

The most effectual method of accomplishing this ob- 
ject is by stratagem. Demonstrations are made at seve- 
ral points at the same time : bodies of troops are thrown 
across, after nightfall, in rowboats or by flying-bridges, to 
get possession of the opposite bank. The vanguard of 
light cavalry may cross by swimming. The pontoniers 
should have their bridge equipage in readiness near the 
intended point of passage, so that it can be thrown across 
with the greatest possible rapidity, while the advanced 
guards are still able to keep the enemy at a distance. 
Under favorable circumstances the pontoniers will have the 
bridge in readiness for the passage of the army before the 
enemy can collect his troops upon the threatened point. 

Cannon-balls and hollow shot are the most effectual 
means for destroying an enemy's bridge when our batteries 
can be planted within reach. When this cannot be done, 
we must resort to fire-boats, floating rafts, &c., to accom- 
plish our object. Operations of this kind carried on in 
the night, are most likely to succeed. 

To protect bridges from the action of these floating 
bodies, stockades, or floating chevaux-de-frise are con- 
structed across the stream at some distance above the 
bridge ; strong cables, or chains stretched directly across 
the river, or with an angle up stream, may be used in 
place of stockades, or in conjunction with them. Guards 
should be stationed above the bridge, with boats, ropes, 
grapnels, <fec., for the purpose of arresting all floating 
bodies and drawing them ashore, or directing them safely 
through the draw in the bridge arrangement. 



FIELD-ENGINEERING. 367 

The troops especially charged with the construction 
and management of the various kinds of military bridges, 
are denominated pontoniers. The duties of these troops 
are arduous and important, and, in a country like ours, 
intersected by numerous water-courses, the success of a 
campaign will often depend upon their skill and efficiency. 

Sapping. — This is a general term applied to the opera- 
tions of forming trenches, along which troops may ap- 
proach a work without being exposed to the fire of the 
besieged. 

In addition to the ordinary sapping-tools, such as shov- 
els, picks, gabion-forks, &c., used in constructing trenches, 
there will also be required a considerable amount of sap- 
ping materials, such as gabions, fascines, sap-fagots, sand- 
bags, &c. 

The gabion is a cylindrical basket of twigs, about two 
feet in diameter, and some three feet in length, and with- 
out a bottom. It is made by driving into the ground, in a 
circular form, a number of small pickets about an inch in 
diameter, and of the length required for the gabion. 
Twigs are wattled between the pickets like ordinary bas- 
ket-work, and fastened at the ends by withs or packthread. 
Gabions are used in forming saps, batteries, blindages, 
powder-magazines, and in revetting the steep slopes of 
field-works. 

The fascine is a bundle of twigs closely bound up, from 
nine to twelve inches in diameter, and from ten to fifteen 
or twenty feet in length. The largest are sometimes called 
saucissons. In making a fascine, straight twigs about the 
thickness of a man's finger are laid side by side, and 
firmly compressed together by a strong rope or chain at- 
tached to the extremities of two levers. While held in 
this position the twigs are firmly bound together by withs 
or cords. Fascines are used in constructing trenches, bat- 
teries, &c., and for filling up wet ditches. 



358 'military art and science. 

The sap'fagot is a strong fascine about ten inches in 
diameter and two feet in length, with a picket inserted 
through the middle. It is used in the double sap in con- 
nection with gabions. 

Sand-hags are usually made of coarse canvass. When 
filled w^ith earth they are some six or eight inches in dia- 
meter, and from eighteen inches to two feet in length. 
From their perishable nature, they are used only when 
other materials cannot be procured, and where it is im- 
portant to place the troops speedily under cover from the 
enemy's fire. 

Bales of wool, cotton, hay, straw, &c., may be employed 
in sapping for the same purposes as the above materials, 
when they can be procured in sufficient quantity. Pork 
and flour barrels, which are usually in abundance in a 
camp, are frequently filled with sand and used for forming 
magazines, blindages, &c., in field-works. 

A trench constructed in ordinary soil beyond the range 
of the enemy's grape, is called a simple sap, or ordinary 
trench. The earth is thrown up on the side towards the 
place besieged, so as to form a kind of parapet to cover 
the men in the trench. The labor is here executed under 
the supervision of engineer soldiers, by working parties 
detached from the other arms. Fig. 50 represents a ver- 
tical section of a simple sap. 

When within range of the enemy's grape, the fli/ing sap 
is resorted to in order to place the workmen speedily under 
cover. In this operation, gabions are placed in juxtapo- 
sition on the side towards the besieged work, and filled 
with all possible speed by the workmen. Three rows of 
fascines are usually placed on the top of the gabions to in- 
crease the height. The most difficult part of the flying 
sap is executed by engineer troops, and the trench is com- 
pleted by the ordinary working parties. Fig. 51 repre- 
sents a section of this sap. 



FIELD-ENGINEERING. 359 

The full-sap is employed when the works of the be- 
siegers are within range of musketry, or when the grape 
fire of the besieged is so deadly that the flying sap can 
no longer be used. This is a difficult operation, and un- 
less executed with great care and by well-instructed engi- 
neer troops, the construction of the trench will be attend- 
ed with an immense loss of life. The work must be ex- 
ecuted under cover of a sap-roller^ which is a cylindrical 
mass of fascines, wool, or cotton, some two feet in diame- 
ter. On very smooth ground a ball-proof shelter on wheels 
might be used as a substitute. The sap-roller being 
placed along the line of the trench so as to cover the sap- 
per in front, who is armed with a musket-proof head- 
piece and cuirass, this sapper commences the sap by 
placing a gabion on the line of the proposed trench and 
fdls it with earth, working on his hands and knees. Hav- 
ing filled the first gabion, he pushes forward the sap-roller 
and places a second one next the first, stopping the open 
joint between the two with a stop-fagot. The second 
gabion being filled in the same manner as the first, others 
are successively established. When the first sapper has 
advanced a few feet, he is followed by a second, also in 
defensive armor, who increases the excavation and em- 
bankment ; this sapper is then followed in the same way 
by a third and a fourth, after which the trench will be suf- 
ficiently advanced to be turned over to the ordinary work- 
men. The sap-fagots may be removed when the em- 
bankment becomes thick enough to resist grape. Fig. 52 
represents a plan and section of a full-sap. 

When the direction of the trench is such that the men 
are exposed on both sides, it will be necessary to throw 
up an embankment both to the right and left. This oper- 
ation is called the double sap, and is executed by two 
parties of sappers, working side by side. In this sap it 
will be necessary to frequently change the direction of 



360 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

the trencli, or to throw up traverses, in order to cover the 
men at a distance from the sap-roller. Wing-traverses, 
on the side of the trench which is least exposed, some- 
times serve the same purpose as a double sap. 

Mines. — By mining, as a military term, we understand 
the operations resorted to for the demolition, with pow- 
der, of a military structure of any description. The term 
mine is applied both to the excavation charged with pow- 
der for the purpose of producing an explosion, and to the 
communications which lead to this excavation. 

The place in which the charge of powder is lodged is 
called the chamber, the communication by which this 
place is reached the gallery, and the excavation made by 
the explosion is termed the crater. 

The form of the crater caused by an explosion in or- 
dinary soils is assumed to be a truncated cone, the diam- 
eter, c d, (Fig. 53,) of the lower circle being one-half the 
diameter, a b, of the upper circle. This form has never 
been ascertained to be exactly correct, but the theoretical 
results deduced from a mathematical discussion of this 
figure have been fully verified in practice. The radius, 
p b, of the upper circle is termed the crater i^adius ; the 
line p, drawn from the centre of the charge perpendicular 
to the surface where the explosion takes place, is termed 
the line of least resistance ; the line o b, drawn from the 
centre of the powder to any point in the circumference of 
the upper circle, is termed the radius of explosion. 

When the crater radius is equal to the line of least re- 
sistance, the mine is termed common ; when this radius is 
greater than the line of least resistance, the mine is 
termed overcharged ; and when the radius is less, under- 
charged. A mine of small dimensions, formed by sinking 
a shaft in the ground, is termed a fougasse. The term 
camouflet is applied to a mine used to suffocate the ene- . 
my's miner, without producing an explosion. Small mines 



FIELD-ENGINEERING. 361 

made in rock or masonry, merely for the purpose of ex- 
cavation, without any considerable external explosion, are 
called blasts. 

From experiments made on common mines, whose line 
of least resistance did not exceed fifteen feet, it has been 
ascertained that the tenacity of the earth is completely 
destroyed around the crater to a distance equal to the 
crater radius, and that empty galleries would be broken 
in at once and a half that distance. It has also been 
proved by experiment, that the crater radius in over- 
charged mines may be increased to six times the line 
of least resistance, but not much beyond this ; that within 
this limit the diameter of the crater increases nearly in 
the ratio of the square roots of the charge ; and that 
empty galleries may be destroyed by overcharged mines 
at the distance of four times the line of least resistance. 

By means of the deductions of physi co-mathematical 
theory, and the results of experiments, rules have been 
determined by which the miner can calculate, with much 
accuracy, the charge necessary to produce a required 
result in any given soil. 

In the earlier stages of the history of this art, mines 
were only used to open breaches and demolish masses of 
masonry ; but in later times they have been employed as 
important elements in the attack and defence of places. 

An isolated wall, only two or three feet thick, may 
readily be demolished by exploding one or two casks of 
powder placed in contact with its base. If the wall be 
five or six feet thick, the charges should be placed under 
the foundation. For walls of still greater thickness it 
will be best to open a gallery to the centre of the wall, a 
foot or two above its base, and place the powder in cham- 
bers thus excavated. Revetment walls may be over- 
turned by placing the charges at the back of the wall, 
about one-third or one-quarter of the way up from the 

31 



362 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

base. If placed too near the base, a breach will be made 
in the wall without overturning it. 

To demolish a bridge of masonry the powder should be 
lodged in chambers excavated in the centre of the piers. 
When there is not time for excavating these chambers in 
the piers, a trench may be cut over the key of the arch, 
in which the powder is placed and exploded ; or, the 
casks of powder may be suspended immediately under 
the arch, with the same results. Where a saving of pow- 
der is of consequence, small chambers may be excavated 
in the haunches of the arch, and the mine carefully 
tamped before firing it. 

Bridges of wood may be destroyed by suspending casks 
of powder under the principal timbers, or attaching them 
to the supports. 

Palisading, gates, doors, &c., may be destroyed in the 
same way, by suspending casks or bags of powder against 
their sides ; or still more effectually, by burying the 
charges just beneath their base. 

To demolish a tower, magazine, or house, of masonry, 
place charges of powder under the piers and principal 
walls of the building* In wooden structures the powder 
should be placed under, or attached to the principal sup- 
ports. Where time is wanting to effect these arrange- 
ments, a building may be blown down by placing a large 
mass of powder in the interior. The powder may be 
economized, in this case, by putting it in a strong case, 
which should be connected with the walls of the building 
on all sides by wooden props. 

Special treatises on military mining contain full in- 
structions for regulating the size and position of the 
charge for the various cases that may be met with in 
the practical operations of field-engineering. 

As applied to the attack and defence of a fortified place, 
mines are divided into two general classes — offensive and 



FIELD-ENGINEERING. 363 

defensive mines. The fonner are employed by the besie- 
gers to overthrow the scarps and counterscarps of the 
place, to demolish barriers, palisades, walls, and other 
temporary means of defence, and to destroy the mines of 
the besieged. The latter are employed by the opposite 
party to blow up the besiegers' works of attack, and to de- 
fend the passage of ditches against an assault. Small 
mines called fougasses may be employed for the last 
named object. The shell-fougasse is composed of a wooden 
box filled with one or more tiers of shells, and buried just 
below the surface of the earth. Sometimes a quantity of 
powder is placed under the shells, so as to project them 
into the air previous to their explosion. The stone fou- 
gasse is formed by making a funnel-shaped excavation, 
some five or six feet deep, and placing at the bottom a 
charge of powder enclosed in a box, and covered with a 
strong wooden shield ; several cubic yards of pebbles, 
broken stone, or brickbats, are placed against the shield, 
and earth well rammed round, to prevent the explosion from 
taking place in the wrong direction. These mines are 
fired by means of powder hose, or by wires connected 
with a galvanic battery. 

The defensive mines employed to blow up the besie- 
gers' works, are generally common mines with the lines of 
least resistance seldom greater than fifteen feet. All the 
main galleries and principal branches of mines for a per- 
manent fortification are constructed at the same time with 
the other portions of the work, leaving only the secondary 
branches, chambers, &c., to be made during the siege. 
For the general arrangement of these galleries, and the 
precautions necessary for their protection from the opera- 
tions of the besiegers, reference must be made to trea- 
tises specially devoted to the discussion of this subject. 

Mines can seldom be employed with advantage in works 
of slight relief, and liable to an assault. But if judiciously 



364 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

arranged in the plan of their construction, and well man- 
aged during the operations of the siege, they contribute 
very materially to the length of the defence. 

Attack and defence. — This subject admits of two natural 
divisions : 1st, of intrenchments, and 2d, of permanent 
works. 

I. Intrenchments maybe attacked either by surprise, or 
by open force. In either case the operations should be 
based on exact information of the strength of the works 
and the number and character of the garrison — information 
that can be obtained from spies, deserters, and prisoners, 
and confirmed by examinations or reconnaissances made 
by officers of engineers. By these means a pretty accu- 
rate knowledge may be obtained of the natural features of 
the ground exterior to the works ; their weak and strong 
points ; and their interior arrangements for defence. 

In an attack by surprise, the troops should consist of a 
storming party and a reserve of picked men. The at- 
tacking column is preceded by a company of sappers 
armed with axes, shovels, picks, crowbars, &c. ; bags of 
powder are also used for blowing down gates, palisades, 
&c. All the operations must be carried on with the ut- 
most dispatoh. The time most favorable for a surprise is 
an hour or two before day, as at this moment the sentinels 
are generally less vigilant, and the garrison in a profound 
sleep ; moreover, the subsequent operations, after the first 
surprise, will be facilitated by the approach of day. Un- 
der certain circumstances, it may be advisable to make 
false attacks at the same time with the true one, in order 
to distract the attention of the garrison from the true point 
of danger. But false attacks have, in general, the objec- 
tion of dividing the forces of the assailants as well as of 
the assailed. In all attacks by surprise, secrecy is the 
soul of the enterprise. 

In an open assault, if artillery be employed, the troops 



FIELD-ENGINEERING. 365 

should be drawn up in a sheltered position, until the fire 
of the works is silenced, and breaches effected in the par- 
apet. But if the bayonet alone be resorted to, the troops 
are immediately brought forward at the beginning of the 
assault. The attack is begun by a storming party of picked 
men : they are preceded, as before, by a body of sappers, 
provided with necessary means for removing obstacles, 
and followed by a second detachment of engineers, who 
will widen the passages, and render them more accessi- 
ble to the main body of troops who now advance to the 
assistance of the storming party. If the assailants should 
be arrested at the counterscarp by obstacles which must 
be removed before any farther progress can be made, the 
infantry troops of the detachment display and open a fire 
upon the assailed, in order to divert their fire from the 
sappers. A few pieces of light artillery, on the flanks of 
the column, may sometimes be employed for this purpose 
with great advantage. 

The storming party should always be provided with sca- 
ling-ladders, planks, fascines, &c., for crossing the ditch, 
and mounting the scarp. If the counterscarp be revetted 
with masonry, the troops must either descend by ladders, 
or fill up the ditch with fascines, bales of straw, bundles of 
wool, &c. : if not revetted, a passage for the troops into 
the ditch will soon be formed by the shovels of the sap- 
pers. When the ditch is gained, shelter is sought in a 
dead angle till the means are prepared for mounting the 
scarp, and storming the work. If the scarp be of earth 
only, the sappers will soon prepare a passage for the es- 
calade ; but if revetted with masonry, the walls must be 
breached with hollow shot, or scaled by means of ladders. 

In the defence, the strictest vigilance should be at all 
times exerted to guard against a surprise : sentinels are 
posted on all the most commanding points of the work ; 
all the avenues of approach are most thoroughly guarded ; 

31* 



366 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

and patroles are constantly scouring the ground in all di- 
rections. At night all these precautions are redoubled. 
Light and fire-balls are thrown out in front of the work to 
light up the ground, and discover the movements and ap- 
proach of the enemy. Each man should have his particu- 
lar post assigned to him, and be thoroughly instructed in 
the duties he will have to perform. All auxiliary arrange- 
ments, such as palisades, abattis, &c., should be defended 
with the utmost obstinacy ; the longer the enemy is held 
in check by these obstacles, the longer will he be exposed 
to the grape and musketry of the main work. When he 
assaults the parapet, he will be opposed by the bayonet in 
front and a well-aimed fire in flank. While in the ditch, 
or as he mounts the scarp, hollow projectiles, incendiary 
preparations, stones, logs, &c., will be rolled down upon 
his head. But when the assaulting column has gained 
the top of the scarp, the bayonet forms the most effective 
meafts of resistance. 

The measures resorted to in the attack and defence of 
the larger class of field-works, will necessarily partake 
much of the nature of the operations employed in the at- 
tack and defence of permanent fortifications. 

II. The attack and defence of a fortress may be car- 
ried on either by a regular siege, or by irregular opera- 
tions and an assault. The latter plan has sometimes been 
adopted when the works of the place were weak and im- 
properly defended ; where the time and means were want- 
ing for conducting a regular siege ; or where the assail- 
ants were ignorant of the means proper to be resorted to 
for the reduction of the fortress. Such operations, how- 
ever, are usually attended by an iimnense sacrifice of hu- 
man life, and the general who neglects to employ all the 
resources of the engineer's art in carrying on a siege, is 
justly chargeable with the lives of his men. In the siege 
of Cambrai, Louis XIY., on the solicitation of Du Metz, 



FIELD-ENGINEERING. 367 

but contrary to tlie advice of Vauban, ordered the demi- 
lune to be taken by assault, instead of waiting for the re- 
sult of a regular siege. The assault was made, but it was 
unsuccessful, and the French sustained great losses. The 
king now directed Vauban to take the demi-lune by regu- 
lar approaches, which was done in a very short time, and 
with a loss of only five men ! Again, at the siege of Ypres, 
the generals advised an assault before the breaches were 
ready. " You will gain a day by the assault," said Vauban, 
" but you will lose a thousand men." The king directed 
the regular works to be continued, and the next day the 
place was taken with but little loss to the besiegers. 

But a work may be of such a character as to render it 
unnecessary to resort to all the works of attack which 
would be required for the reduction of a regular bastioned 
fort, on a horizontal site. For example : the nature of the 
ground may be such as to enable the troops to approach to 
the foot of the glacis, without erecting any works what- 
ever ; of course, all the works up to the third parallel may 
in this case be dispensed with without any violation of the 
rules of a siege. Again, the point of attack may be such 
that the other parts of the place will not flank the works 
of approach ; here a single line of hoyaux and short par- 
allels may be all-sufficient. 

But for the purpose of discussion, we will here suppose 
the place besieged to be a regular bastioned work on a 
horizontal site, (Fig. 54.) 

The operations of the siege may be divided into three 
distinct periods. 

1st. The preliminary operations of the attack and de- 
fence previous to the opening of the trenches. 

2d. The operations of the two parties from the opening 
of the trenches to the establishment of the third parallel. 

3d. From the completion of the third parallel to the re- 
duction of the place. 



368 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

First period. The object of the investment of the place is 
to cut off all communication between the work and the 
exterior, thus preventing it from receiving succors, pro- 
visions, and military munitions, and also to facilitate a 
close reconnoissance of the place by the engineers, who 
should always accompany the investing corps, and pursue 
their labors under its protection. This corps should be 
composed chiefly of light troops — cavalry, light infantry, 
horse artillery, " brigades of engineers and mounted sap- 
pers," — who march in advance of the besieging army, and, 
by a sudden movement, surround the work, seize upon all 
the avenues of approach, and carry off every thing without 
the work that can be of service either to the garrison or to 
the besiegers. To effect this object, the enterprise must 
be conducted with secrecy and dispatch. 

The investing corps is now distributed around the work 
in the most favorable positions for cutting oflf all access 
to it, and also to prevent any communication with the ex- 
terior by detachments from the garrison, and even single in- 
dividuals are sent out to give intelligence to a succoring ar- 
my or to reconnoitre the operations of the besieging corps. 
These posts and sentinels, called the daily cordon, are 
placed some mile or mile and a half from the work, and 
beyond the reach of the guns. But in the night-time 
these posts are insufficient to accomplish their object, and 
consequently as soon as it is dark the troops move up as 
close to the work as possible without being exposed to the 
fire of musketry. This arrangement constitutes the nightly 
cordon. 

By the time the main army arrives the reconnoissance 
will be sufficiently complete to enable the chief engineer 
to lay before the general the outline of his plan of attack, 
so as to establish the position of his depots and camp. 
These will be placed some two miles from the work, ac- 
cording to the nature of the ground. As they occupy a 



FIELD-ENGINEERING. 369 

considerable extent of ground around the work, it will gene- 
rally be necessary to form intrenchments strong enough to 
prevent succors of troops, provisions, &c., from being 
thrown into the place, and also to restrain the excursions 
of the garrison. The works thrown up between the 
camp and besieged place are termed the line of countervail 
lation, and those on the exterior side of the camp form the 
line of circumvallation. These lines are generally about 
six hundred yards apart. It is not unusual in modern 
warfare to dispense with lines of circumvallation, (except 
a few detached works for covering the parks of the engi- 
neers and artillery,) and to hold the succoring army in 
check by means of an opposing force, called the armi/ of 
observation. 

The measures of defence resorted to by the garrison 
will, of course, be subordinate, in some degree, to those 
of attack. As soon as any danger of an investment is ap- 
prehended, the commanding general should collect into 
the place all the necessary provisions, forage, military 
munitions, &c., to be found in the surrounding country ; 
all useless persons should be expelled from the garrison ; 
a supply of timber for the works of the engineers and ar- 
tillery, fascines, gabions, palisades, &c., prepared ; all 
ground within cannon range around the work levelled ; 
hedges and trees cut down ; holes filled up ; temporary 
buildings demolished or burnt ; and all obstacles capable 
of covering an enemy and interrupting the fire of the 
work, removed. 

During this period the engineer troops and working 
parties detached from the other arms will be most actively 
employed. As soon as the investing corps makes its ap- 
pearance, bodies of light troops are thrown out to cut off 
reconnoitring parties, and, if possible, to draw the enemy 
into ambush. To facilitate these exterior operations, and 
to prevent a surprise, several guns of long range are 



370 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

placed on the salients of the bastions and demi-lunes, and 
others, loaded with grape, in the embrasures of the flanks, 
so as to sweep the ditches. About one-third of the gar- 
rison may be employed in exterior operations, and the 
other two-thirds in arranging the means of defence in the 
interior. 

Second period. — As soon as the engineers have com- 
pleted their reconnaissances and determined on the front 
of attack, and all the other preparations are made, the 
general will direct the opening of the trenches. The 
ground being previously marked out, battalions of light 
troops, termed guards of the trenches, as soon as it is dark, 
are placed about thirty yards in front of the first parallel, 
(A. Fig. 54,) with smaller sections, and sentinels about 
the same distance further in advance. These guards lie 
down, or otherwise conceal themselves from the fire of 
the work. The engineer troops and detachments of work- 
men being first marched to the depots and supplied with 
all the necessary tools for carrying on the work, now 
commence their labors under the protection of these 
guards. By daybreak the construction of the first parallel, 
and the trenches connecting it with the depots, will be 
sufficiently advanced to cover the men from the fire of 
the place ; the guards will therefore be withdrawn, and 
the workmen continue their labors during the day to give 
the trenches the proper size and form. 

The parallels are the long lines of trench which en- 
velop the besieged work, and serve both as covered ways 
for the circulation of the besiegers, and as means of de- 
fence against sorties from the garrison; they are therefore 
arranged with banquettes for musketry fire. The boyaux 
are trenches run in a zigzag direction along the capitals 
of the front of attack, and are intended exclusively for the 
circulation of the troops ; they have no banquettes. The 
first parallel is about six hundred yards from the place, 



FIELD-ENGINEERING. 371 

and consequently beyond the reach of grape. It is con- 
structed by the simple 'sap. After the first night, the 
guards, instead of advancing in front of the work, are 
placed ill the trenches. 

The second parallel (B) is made some three hundred 
or three hundred and fifty yards from the place, and being 
much exposed to grape, the Jiymg-sap is employed in its 
construction. Batteries (H) are established between the 
first and second parallels to silence the fire of the demi- 
lunes of the collateral bastions, and others (I) near the 
second parallel, to enfilade the faces of the front of at- 
tack. These are armed in part with mortars and in part 
with heavy siege-pieces. 

The works are now gradually pushed forward to the 
third parallel, (C,) which is constructed about sixty yards 
from the salients of the place. As the operations of the 
besiegers are here greatly exposed to musketry fire, the 
trenches are constructed by the full-sap. The third paral- 
lel, having to contain the guards of the trenches, and being 
of less development than the two preceding, is made much 
wider. The second parallel now contains the reserve, 
and the first parallel becomes the depot of materials. 
Demi-parallels (G) are frequently established between the 
second and third, to be occupied by detachments of guards. 

The operations of defence during this period are so 
directed as to harass the workmen in the trenches and 
retard the advance of the works of attack. Garrison 
pieces of long range and large howitzers are brought for- 
ward on the salients of the bastions and demi-lunes of at- 
tack, so as to fire in ricochet along the capitals on which 
the boyaux must be pushed : light and fire-balls are thrown 
out as soon as it becomes dark, to light up the ground oc- 
cupied by the besiegers, thus exposing them to the fire of 
the work and to the attacks of the sortie parties. These 
parties are composed of light troops who charge the guards 



372 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

and compel the workmen to abandon their sapping tools 
and stand upon the defence. They are most effective 
when the besiegers commence the second parallel, as the 
guards in the first parallel are not so immediately at hand 
to protect the workmen. When the sortie detachment has 
driven these workmen from the trenches, instead of pur- 
suing them into the first parallel, it will display itself in 
battle order to cover the engineer troops, (who should al- 
ways accompany the detachment in this enterprise,) while 
they fill up the trenches and destroy the implements of 
the besiegers. When the guards of the trenches appear 
in force, the detachment will retire in such a way, if pos- 
sible, as to draw the enemy within range of the grape and 
musketry of the collateral works. These sorties, if suc- 
cessful, may be frequently repeated, for they tend very 
much to prolong the siege. The best time for making 
them is an hour or two before day, when the workmen and 
guards are fatigued with the labors of the night. While 
the besiegers are establishing their enfilading batteries, a 
strong fire of solid shot and shells will be concentrated on 
the points selected for their construction. The garrison 
will also labor during this period to put the work into a 
complete state of defence : constructing all necessary pa- 
lisadings, traverses, blindages, barriers ; and strengthening, 
if necessary, the covering of the magazines. 

Third period. — After the completion of the third paral- 
lel, the crowning of the covered way may be effected by 
storm, by regular approaches, or (if the work is secured by 
defensive mines) by a subterranean warfare. 

In the first case stone mortar-batteries are established 
in front of the third parallel, which, on a given signal, will 
open their fire in concert with all the enfilading and mor- 
tar batteries. When this fire has produced its effect in 
clearing the outworks, picked troops will sally forth and 
carry the covered way with the bayonet, sheltering them- 



FIELD-ENGINEERING. 373 

selves behind the traverses until the sappers throw up a 
trench some four or five yards from the crest of the glacis, 
high enough to protect the troops from the fire of the be- 
sieged. It may afterwards be connected with the third 
parallel by boyaux. 

When the covered way is to be crowned by regular ap- 
proaches, a double sap is pushed forward from the third 
parallel to within thirty yards of the salient of the covered 
way ; the trench is then extended some fifteen or twenty 
yards to the right or left, and the earth thrown up high 
enough to enable the besiegers to obtain a plunging fire 
into the covered way, and thus prevent the enemy from 
occupying it. This mound of earth is termed a trench ca- 
valier^ (O.) Boyaux are now pushed forward to the crown- 
ing of the covered way and the establishing of breach bat- 
teries, (J.) Descents are then constructed into the ditches, 
and as soon as these batteries have made a breach into 
the walls of the bastions and outworks, the boyaux are 
pushed across the ditches and lodgments effected in the 
breaches. The demi-lune is first carried ; next the demi- 
lune redoubt and bastion ; and lastly, the interior retrench- 
ments and citadel. In some cases the breaches are car- 
ried by assault, but the same objection is applicable here 
as in the storming of the covered way ; time is gained, hut 
at an immense expense of human life. 

If the place is defended by mines it will be necessary 
for the besiegers to counteract the eff*ects of these works 
by resorting to the slow and tedious operations of a sub- 
terranean warfare. In this case a fourth trench is formed 
in front of the third parallel ; shafts are sunk in this, 
about six yards apart, for establishing overcharged mines ; 
as soon as the galleries of the besieged are destroyed by 
the explosion of these mines, the covered way is attacked 
by storm ; other mines are established on the terre-plain 
of the covered way to destroy the entrance to the gal- 

32 



374 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

leries, and thus deprive the besieged of the use of their 
entire system of mines. 

The measures of defence during this period must em- 
brace every thing calculated to retard the works of the be- 
siegers. This may be most effectually accomplished by 
maintaining a constant fire of grape and musketry on the 
heads of the sap, and throwing grenades, shells, &c., into 
the trenches, to harass and destroy the workmen. As 
the musketry fire of the besiegers now becomes very de- 
structive to the artillerists at the guns, strong musket-proof 
blinds are arranged to mask the mouths of the embrasures 
when the guns are not in battery, and also sloping blind- 
ages to cover the men when serving at the pieces. The 
possession of the outworks should be disputed inch by 
inch, and when the besiegers have reached the ditch of 
the body of the place, sorties, and every species of pro- 
jectile, should be employed to drive off the sappers, and 
to retard the construction of their works. In fine, all the 
resources of the engineer's art should be put in requisition 
for the defence of the breach, and the final assault should 
be vigorously resisted by the bayonet, and by a well-sus- 
tained fire from all the collateral works. 

With respect to the relative strength of the opposing 
forces it may be well to remark, that if the fortress is 
properly constructed the garrison will be able to resist a 
besieging army six times as numerous as itself. Such is 
the estimate of the best engineers.'^ 

* A good knowledge of the several subjects discussed in this chapter 
may be derived from the writings of Vauban, Cormontaigne, and Noi- 
zet de St. Paul, on the attack and defence of places and field fortifica- 
tion ; the several manuels used in the French service on sapping, mi- 
ning, and pontoniering ; Col. Pasley's experiments on the operations of 
a siege, sapping, mining, &c. ; Douglas's work on military bridges ; 
Macauley's work on field fortification ; and Professor Mahan's Treatise 
on Field Fortification. Tiiis last is undoubtedly the ver>^ best work 



FIELD-ENGINEERING. 375 

that has ever been written on field fortification, and every oflficer going 
into the field should supply himself with a copy. 

The following are recommended as books of reference on subjects 
discussed in the three preceding chapters. 

Memorial pour la fortification pennanente et passagere. Cormon- 
taigne. 

Defense des places. Cormontaigne. 

Attaque des places. Cormontaigne. 

Attaque des places. Vauban. 

Traite des mines. Vauban. 

Memorial pour la castrametation et la fortification passagere. 
Lafitte-Clav^. 

Exercice sur les fortifications. Duvigneau. 

Memorial de Vofiicier du genie. A periodical of rare merit, con- 
taining most valuable militaiy and scientific matter. It is conducted 
by officers of the French corps of engineers. It has already reached 
its fourteenth number, each number forming a volume. 

Traite complet de fortification. Noizet de St. Paul. 

Traite d^art militaire et de la fortification. Gay de Vernon. 

Art de la guerre. Rogniat. 

Essai general de fortification, &c. Bousmard. 

Aide-memoire portatif a Vusage des officiers du genie. Laisnd. 
A ver)^ valuable and useful book. 

Aide-memoire de Vingenieur militaire. Grivet. 

Cours d^art militaire. Laurillard Fallot. 

Cours de fortification, &c. Lavart. 

Le livre de la guerre. Perrot. 

Journaux des sieges dans la penijisule. Belmas. 

Journal of Sieges in Spain. John Jones. 

Both of the above are works of great value. 

Cours d'art militaire et de fortification militaire. Fran§ois. 

Architettura militare. Marchi. 

Essai sur la fortification. Baltard. 

La fortification. Bar-le-Duc. 

Elemens de fortification. Bellaire. 

La science des ingenieurs. Belidor. 

L'art universel des fortifications. Bitainvieu. 

Nouvelle maniere de fortifier les places. Blondel. 

Les sept sieges de Lille. Brun Lavaine. 

Defense des places fortes. Carnot. 

Memoire sur la fortification. Carnot. 



376 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

Defense de Saragosse. Cavaliero. 
Memoires sur la fortification. Choumara. 
Nouvelle fortification. Coehom. 
Theorie de la fortification. Cugnot. 
Des fortifications, &c. &c. Dar9on. 
Relation de la defense de Dantzik. D'Artois. 
Les fortifications. Deville. 
Perihologie. Dilich. 

De la fortification permanente. Dufour. A work of merit. 
Essai sur la defense des etats par les fortifications. Duvivier. 
Attaque et defense des places du camp de St. Omer. 
Vecole de la fortification. Fallois. 
Introduction a la fortification. De Fer. 
Precis de la defense de Valenciennes. Ferrand. 
Traite theorique, &c. Foissac-Latour. 
Examen deiaille, &c. Foissac-Latour. 
Les ouvrages militaires de Fosse. 
Instruction sur la fortification, &c. Gaillard. 
Memoires pour V attaque et defense d'une place. Goulon. 
Siege of Peschiera. Henin. 
Journal du siege de Pkilisbourg. 
Precis du siege de Dantzick. Kirgener. 
Deuxieme defense de Badajos. Lamare. 
Fortification, et V attaque et defense des places. Leblond. 
(Euvres de Lefehvre. 
n architecture des forteresses. Mandar. 
Traite sur Vart des sieges. Mazeroy. 

La surete des etats par le moyen des forteresses. Maigret. 
Defense d^Ancone. Mangourit. 
Fartification. Marolois. 
Siege de Turin. Mengin. 
Recherches sur Fart defensif, &c. Michaloz. 
La fortification de campagne, &c. Miller. 
L'art defensif, &c. Montalembert. 
Journaux des sieges de Flandre. 

Relations des sieges en Europe, &c. Musset-Pathay. A very 
valuable and interesting work. 
Relation du siege de Metz. 
Relation du siege d^Anvers. 
Les sieges de Jaffa et de St. Jean d'Acre. 
Les sieges de Saragosse et de Tortose. Rogniat, 



FIELD-ENGINEERING. 377 

Siege de Dantzick. Sainte-Susaime. 

Memoire sur la fortification permanente. S^a. 

Le siege de Constantine. 

Elemens de fortification. Trincano. 

Des places fortes. Valaz^. 

Essay on Military Bridges. Douglas. A valuable work. 

Guide du pontonier. Drieu. 

Memoire sur la guerre souierraine. CoutMe. 

Traite des mines. Etiemie. 

Traite de Vart du mineur. Geuss. 

Traite de fortification souierraine. Gillot. 

Traite pratique et theorique des mines. Lebrun. 

Nouveau traite des mines, &c. Prudhomme. 

Manuel du sapeur. Used in the French service. 

Manuel du mineur. " " " 

Manuel du pontonier. " " " 

Essay on Field Fortifications. Pleydell. 

Elements of Field Fortifications. Lochee. 

Relation du siege de Grave et Mayence. 

Sieges de Genes. Thiebault. 

Traite de fortification souierraine. Mouze. 

Militairische Mittheilungen. Xilander. 

Die Befestigung der Stdtten. Hauser. 

Ahhandlung uher die Befestigung»kunst, &lc. Hauser 

Versuch uher die Verschanzungskunst. MuUer. 

Course of Elementary Fortification. Pasley. This is a work of 
much detail — useful, no doubt, to an uneducated engineer soldier, but 
to an officer at all acquainted with his profession, it must seem ridicu- 
lously minute. 

To the above list miglit be added a long list of books on that branch 
of the engineer's art called constructions ; but as this part of the pro- 
fession is, in some degree, common both to the civil and military engi- 
neer, it is not deemed necessary to mclude works of this character in a 
list of books strictly military. 

32* 



378 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 



CHAPTER XV. 

MILITARY EDUCATION APPOINTMENT AND PROMOTION. 

With the Romans, six years' instruction was required 
to make a soldier ; and so great importance did these an- 
cient conquerors of the world attach to military education 
and discipline, that the very name of their army was de- 
rived from the verb to practise. 

Modern nations, learning from experience that military 
success depends more upon skill and discipline than upon 
numbers, have generally adopted the same rule as the Ro- 
mans ; and nearly all of the European powers have estab- 
lished military schools for the education of their officers 
and the instruction of their soldiers. 

France, which has long taken the lead in military sci- 
ence, has six military schools for the instruction of officers, 
containing in all more than one thousand pupils, and nu- 
merous division and regimental schools for the sub-officers 
and soldiers. 

Prussia maintains some twelve general schools for mil- 
itary education, which contain about three thousand pu- 
pils, and also numerous division, brigade, garrison, and 
company schools for practical instruction. 

Austria has some fifty military schools, which contain 
in all about four thousand pupils. 

Russia has thirty-five engineer and artillery technical 
schools, with about two thousand pupils ; twenty-five mili- 
tary schools for the noblesse, containing eight thousand 
seven hundred pupils ; corps d'armee schools, with several 
thousand pupils ; regimental schools, with eleven thou- 



MILITARY EDUCATION. 379 

sand pupils ; and brigade-schools, with upwards of one 
hundred and fifty-six thousand scholars ; — making in all 
about two hundred thousand pupils in her military schools ! 

England has five military schools of instruction for offi- 
cers, number of pupils not known ; a military orphan 
school, with about twelve thousand pupils ; and numerous 
duput and regimental schools of practice. 

The smaller European powers — Belgium, Sardinia, Na- 
ples, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden, Wurtemberg, 
Bavaria, Baden, have each several military schools, with 
a large number of pupils. 

It is seen from these statistics, that the European pow- 
ers are not so negligent in educating their officers, and in 
instructing and disciplining their soldiers, as some in this 
country would have us believe. 

Washington, Hamilton, Knox, Pickering, and others, 
learning, by their own experience in the war of the Amer- 
ican revolution, the great necessity of military education, 
urged upon our government, as early as 1783, the impor- 
tance of establishing a military academy in this country, 
but the subject continued to be postponed from year to year 
till 1802. In 1794, the subaltern grade oi cadet was cre- 
ated by an act of Congress, the officers of this grade being 
attached to their regiments, and " furnished at the public 
expense with the necessary books, instruments, and appa- 
ratus" for their instruction. But this plan of educating 
young officers at their posts was found impracticable, and 
in his last annual message, Dec. 7th, 1796, Washington 
urged again, in strong language, the establishment of a 
military academy, where a regular course of military in- 
struction could be given. " Whatever argument," said he, 
" may be drawn from particular examples, superficially 
viewed, a thorough examination of the subject will evince 
that the art of war is both comprehensive and complicated; 
that it demands much previous study ^ and that the pos- 



380 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

session of it in its most improved and perfect state is al- 
ways of great moment to the security of a nation." 

The subject was however postponed from time to time, 
till March, 1802, when a bill was passed establishing the 
Military Academy. It was at first on a small scale, and its 
course of instruction meager and deficient. It gradually 
became enlarged, but lingered along, with no great im- 
provement, till 1817, when Capt. Patridge was dismissed 
from the superintendency, and Col. Thayer put in charge. 
From this period we date the commencement of the suc- 
cess and reputation which the Military Academy has since 
enjoyed. 

This institution, as now organized, consists of one cadet 
from each congressional district, and a few at large, making 
an average of two hundred and thirty-seven. The course 
of instruction is four years, after which time the cadet is 
sent to his regiment or corps, with higher rank if there are 
vacancies, but if there are no vacancies, he goes as a cadet, 
with the brevet rank of the next higher grade. 

The examination for admission to the institution is a 
very limited one, being confined to the elementary branches 
of an English education. 

The annual course at the academy is divided into two 
distinct periods, the first extending from June till Septem- 
ber, and the second from September to the following June. 
During the first period, the cadets leave their barracks and 
encamp in tents, and are made subject to the police and 
discipline of an army in time of war. In addition to the 
thorough and severe course of practical exercises and 
drills in the different arms during these three summer 
months of each year, they are made to perform the same 
tours of guard-duty, night and day, as is required of the 
common soldier in time of actual war. This continues till 
the first of September of each year, when the cadets re- 
turn to their barracks, and for the remaining nine months 



MILITARY EDUCATION. 381 

devote themselves to the prescribed course of scientific and 
military studies, intermixed with military exercises and 
practical operations in the laboratory and on the field. 

To test the progress of the cadets in their studies, 
there are held semi-annual public examinations. These 
examinations are strict and severe, and all who fail to 
come up to the fixed standard are obliged to withdraw 
from the institution, to allow some one else from the 
same district to make the trial. 

During their course of studies the cadets, as warrant- 
offkers of the army, draw pay barely sufficient to defray 
their necessary expenses. The allowance to each is 
twenty-six dollars per month, but none of this is paid to 
the cadet, but is applied to the purchase of books, fuel, 
lights, clothing, board, &c. 

This institution furnishes each year to the army about 
forty subaltern officers, thoroughly instructed in all the 
theoretical and practical duties of their profession. After 
completing this course, the cadet is usually promoted 
from the grade of warrant-officer to that of a commis- 
sioned officer, and is immediately put on duty with his 
regiment or corps. 

This system of appointment to the army has produced 
the most satisfactory results, and has received the com- 
mendation of our best military men, and the approbation 
of all our presidents and most able statesmen. Never- 
theless, it has occasionally met with strong opposition ; 
this opposition springing in part from a want of proper 
information respecting the character and working of the 
system, and in part from the combined efforts of those 
who from negligence or incapacity have failed to pass 
their examinations for promotion, and of those who, from 
a conscious want of qualifications or merit, feel assured 
that they cannot obtain commissions in the army so long 
as this system of merit, as fixed by examination, shall 



382 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

exist. Hence the effort to destroy the Military Academy, 
and to throw the army entirely open to political appoint- 
ment. 

Several legislative bodies, acting under these combined 
influences, have passed resolutions, giving various objec- 
tions to the Military Academy, and recommending that it 
be abolished. The objections made by the legislatures 
of Tennessee, Ohio, Connecticut, New^ Hampshire, and 
Maine, are mostly founded on false information, and may 
be readily answered by reference to the official records 
of the War-office. But it is not the present object to en- 
ter into a general discussion of the charges against that 
institution, except so far as they are connected with the 
importance of military education, and the rules of military 
appointment and promotion. 

It has been alleged by many of the opponents of the 
West Point Academy, that military instruction is of little 
or no advantage to a general ; — that in the wars of Napo- 
leon, and in the American Revolution, and the American 
war of 1812, armies were generally led to victory by 
' men without a military education, and unacquainted with 
military science ; — and that in the event of another war 
in this country, we must seek our generals in the ranks 
of civil life, rather than among the graduates of our Mil- 
itary Academy. 

The objection here made to military education will 
hold with equal force against education in any other pro- 
fession. We sometimes find men who have become emi- 
nent in the pulpit and at the bar, or in medicine and the 
sciences, without ever having enjoyed the advantages of 
an education in academic or collegiate halls, and perhaps 
even v/ithout that preliminary instruction usually deemed 
necessary for professional pursuits. Shall we therefore 
abolish all our colleges, theological seminaries, schools 
of law and medicine, our academies and primary schools, 



MILITARY EDUCATION. 383 

and seek for our professional men among the uneducated 
and the ignorant ? If professional ignorance be a recom- 
mendation in our generals, why not also in our lawyers 
and our surgeons ? If wc.deem professional instruction 
requisite for the care of our individual property and 
health, shall we require less for guarding the honor and 
safety of pur country, the reputation of our arms, and the 
lives of thousands of our citizens ? 

But in reality, were not these men to whom we have 
alluded eminent in their several professions in spite of^ 
rather than hy means of their want of a professional edu- 
cation ? And have not such men, feeling the disadvan- 
tages under which they were forced to labor, been almost 
without exception the advocates of education in others ? 

But is it true that most of the generals of distinction 
in the more recent wars were men destitute of military 
education, — men who rose from the ranks to the pinnacle 
of military glory, through the .combined influence of ig- 
norance of military science and contempt for military in- 
struction ? Let us glance at the lives of the most distin- 
guished of the generals of the French Revolution, for 
these are the men to whom reference is continually made 
to prove that the Military Academy is an unnecessary 
and useless institution, the best generals being invariably 
found in the ranks of an army, and not in the ranks of 
military schools. Facts may serve to convince, where 
reasoning is of no avail. 

Napoleon himself was a pupil of the military schools 
of Brienne and Paris, and had all the advantages of the 
best military and scientific instruction given in France. 

Dessaix was a pupil of the military school of Effiat, 
with all the advantages which wealth and nobility could 
procure. Davoust was a pupil of the military school of 
Auxerre, and a fellow-pupil with Napoleon in the military 
school of Paris. Kleber was educated at the military 



384 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

school of Bavaria. Eugene Beauhamais was a pupil of 
St. Germain-en-Loye, and had for his military instructor 
the great captain of the age. His whole life was devoted 
to the military art. Berthier* and Marmont were both 
sons of officers, and, being early intended for the army, 
they received military educations. Lecourbe had also 
the advantages of a military education before entering the 
army. Pichegru and Duroc were pupils of the military 
school of Brienne. Drouet was a pupil of the artillery 
school. Foy was first educated in the college of Sois- 
sons, and afterwards in the military schools of La Fere 
and Chalons. Carnot, called the " Organizer of French 
victory," received a good early education, and was also a 
pupil of the engineer school of Mezieres. 

Several of the distinguished French generals at first re- 
ceived good scientific and literary educations in the col- 
leges of France, and then acquired their military instruc- 
tion in the subordinate grades of the army ; and by this 
means, before their promotion to responsible offices, ac- 
quired a thorough practical instruction, founded on a basis 
of a thorough preliminary education. Such was Suchet, 
a pupil of the college of Lisle-Barbe ; Lannes, a pupil of 
the college of Lectoure ; and Mortier, who was most care- 
fully educated at Cambrai ; Lefebvre and Murat were 
both educated for the church, though the latter profited but 
little by his instruction ; Moreau and Joubert were educa- 
ted for the bar ; Massena was not a college graduate, but 
he received a good preliminary education, and for several 
years before he entered the army as an officer, he had en- 
joyed all the advantages afforded by leisure and affluent 
circumstances ; Ney, though poor, received a good prelim- 
inary education, and entered a notary's office to study a 
profession. Hoche was destitute of the advantages of 
early education, but, anxious to supply this deficiency, he 
early distinguished himself by his efforts to procure books, 



MILITARY EDUCATION. 385 

and by his extraordinary devotion to military studies. By 
several years devoted in this way to professional studies 
and the practical duties of a subordinate grade in the army, 
Hoche acquired a military knowledge which early distin- 
guished him among the generals of the French Revolution. 
Soult and Gouvion-Saint-Cyr, being of parents in limited 
circumstances, had not the advantages of extensive educa- 
tion, but close and diligent application, an ardent ambition, 
and strong and powerful intellect, combined with long 
years of service in the practical operations of the field, at 
length enabled these men to overcome all obstacles, and 
force their way to the higher walks of their professions. 
But both knew from experience the advantages of military 
instruction, and the importance of professional education 
in the army, and they have consequently both been the 
warmest friends and strongest advocates of the military 
schools of France. 

The Polytechnic School was established too late to fur- 
nish officers for any of the earlier wars of Napoleon ; but 
in his last campaigns he began to reap the advantages of 
an institution which had been under his fostering care, and 
Bertrand, Dode, Duponthon, Haxo, Rogniat, Fleury, Va- 
laze, Gourgaud, Chamberry, and a host of other distin- 
guished young generals, fully justified the praises which 
the emperor lavished on his "^ poulet aux mifs d'or^'' — the 
hen that laid him golden eggs ! 

In our own revolutionary war. Generals Washington, 
Hamilton, Gates, Schuyler, Knox, Alexander, (Lord Stir- 
ling,) the two Clintons, the Lees, and others, were men of 
fine education, and a part of them of high literary and 
scientific attainments ; Washington, Gates, Charles Lee, 
the Clintons, and some others, had considerable military 
experience even before the war : nevertheless, so desti- 
tute was the army, generally, of military science, that the 
government was under the necessity of seeking it in 

QO 
60 



386 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

foreigners — in the La Fayettes, the Kosciuskos, the Steu- 
bens, the De Kalbs, the Pulaskis, the Duportails — ^who 
were immediately promoted to the highest ranks in our 
army. In fact the officers of our scientific corps were 
then nearly all foreigners. 

But, say the opponents of the Academy, military know- 
ledge and education are not the only requisites for military 
success ; youthful enterprise and efficiency are far more 
important than a mere acquaintance with military science 
and the military art : long service in garrison, combined 
with the indolent habits acquired by officers of a peace- 
establishment, so deadens the enterprise of the older offi- 
cers of the army, that it must inevitably result, in case of 
war, that military energy and efficiency will be derived 
from the ranks of civil life. 

We are not disposed to question the importance of 
youthful energy in the commander of an army, and we 
readily admit that while seeking to secure to our service 
a due degree of military knowledge, we should also be 
very careful not to destroy its influence by loading it down 
with the dead weights of effete seniority. But we do 
question the wisdom of the means proposed for supplying 
our army with this desired efficiency. Minds stored with 
vast funds of professional knowledge, and the rich lore of 
past histor)^ ; judgments ripened by long study and expe- 
rience ; with passions extinguished, or at least softened 
by the mellowing influence of age — these may be best 
suited for judges and statesmen, for here there is time for 
deliberation, for the slow and mature judgment of years. 
But for a general in the field, other qualities are also re- 
quired. Not only is military knowledge requisite for di- 
recting the blow, but he must also have the military ener- 
gy necessary for striking that blow, and the military ac- 
tivity necessary for parrying the attacks of the enemy. A 
rapid coup d^ceil^ prompt decision, active movements, are 



MILITARY EDUCATION. 387 

as indispensable as sound judgment ; for the general must 
see, and decide, and act, all in the same instant. Accord- 
ingly we find that most great generals of ancient and mod- 
ern times have gained their laurels while still young. 

Philip of Macedon ascended the throne at the age of 
twenty-two, and soon distinguished himself in his wars 
with the neighboring states. At the age of forty-five he 
had conquered all Greece. He died at forty-seven. 

Alexander the Great had defeated the celebrated The- 
ban band at the battle of Cheronea, and gained a military 
reputation at the age of eighteen. He ascended the throne 
of his father Philip before twenty, and at twenty-five had 
reached the zenith of his military glory, having already 
conquered the world. He died before the age of thirty- 
..wo. 

Julius Caesar commanded the fleet sent to blockade 
Alitylene, whore he greatly distinguished himself before 
:he age of twenty-two. He soon after held the important 
offices of tribune, quaestor, and edile. He had completed 
his first war in Spain, and was made consul at Rome be- 
fore the age of forty. He twice crossed the Rhine, and 
conquered all Gaul, and had twice passed over to Britain, 
before the age of forty-five ; at fifty-two he had won the 
field of Pharsalia, and attained the supreme power. He 
died in the fifty-sixth year of his age, the victor of five 
hundred battles, and the conqueror of a thousand cities. 

Hannibal joined the Carthaginian army in Spain at 
twenty-two, and was made commander-in-chief at twenty- 
six. Victorious in Spain and France, he crossed the Alps 
and won the battle of Cannae before the age of thirty-one. 

Scipio Africanus, (the elder,) at the age of sixteen dis- 
tinguished himself at the battle of Ticinus ; at twenty was 
made edile, and soon after pro-consul in Spain ; at 
twenty-nine he won the great battle of Zama, and closed 
his military career. Scipio Africanus (the younger) also 



388 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

distinguished himself in early life ; at the age of thirty- 
six he had conquered the Carthaginian armies and com- 
pleted the destruction of Carthage. 

Gengis-Khan succeeded to the domain of his father at 
the age of thirteen, and almost immediately raised an army 
of thirty thousand men, with which he defeated a numer- 
ous force of rebels, who had thought to take advantage of 
his extreme youth to withdraw from his dominion. He 
soon acquired a military reputation by numerous conquests, 
and before the age of forty had made himself emperor of 
Mogul. 

Charlemagne was crowned king at twenty-six, con- 
quered Aquitania at twenty-eight, made himself master of 
France and the greater part of Germany at twenty-nine, 
placed on his brows the iron crown of Italy at thirty-two, 
and conquered Spain at thirty-six. 

Gonsalvo de Cordova, the " great captain," entered the 
army at fifteen, and before the age of seventeen had ac- 
quired a brilliant military reputation, and was knighted by 
the king himself on the field of battle ; at forty-one he 
was promoted over the heads of older veterans and made 
commander-in-chief of the army in Italy. 

Henry IV. of France was placed at the head of the Hu- 
guenot army at the age of sixteen, at nineteen he became 
king of Navarre ; at forty he had overthrown all his ene- 
mies, placed himself on the throne of France, and become 
the founder of a new dynasty. 

Monte cuculi, at the age of thirty-one, with two thousand 
horse, attacked ten thousand Swedes and captured all their 
baggage and artillery ; at thirty-two he gained the victory 
of Triebel, at forty-nine defeated the Swedes and saved 
Denmark, and at fifty-three defeated the Turks at the great 
battle of St. Gothard. In his campaigns against the 
French at a later age, he made it his chief merit, "not that 
he conquered, but that he was not conquered." 



MILITARY EDUCATION. 389 

Saxe entered the army at the early age of twelve, and 
soon obtained the command of a regiment of horse ; at 
twenty-four he became marechaUde-camp, at forty-four mar- 
shal of France, and at forty-nine gained the celebrated 
victory of Fontenoy. He died at the age of fifty-four. 

Vauban entered the army of Condc as a cadet at the 
age of seventeen, at twenty was made a lieutenant, at 
twenty-four he commanded two companies, at forty-one 
was a brigadier, at forty-three a marechal-de'Camp, and at 
forty-five commissaire-general of all the fortifications of 
France. At the age of twenty-five he had himself con- 
ducted several sieges, and had assisted at many others. 

Turenne entered the army before the age of fourteen ; 
he served one year as a volunteer, four years as a captain, 
four years as a colonel, three years as a major-general, 
five years as a lieutenant-general, and became a marshal 
of France at thirty-two. He had won all his military re- 
putation by the age of forty. 

Prince Maurice commanded an army at the age of six- 
teen, and acquired his military reputation in very early 
life. He died at fifty-eight. 

The great Conde immortalized his name at the battle 
of Rocroi, in which, at the age of twenty-two, he defeated 
the Spaniards. He had won all his great military fame 
before the age of twenty-five. 

Prince Eugene of Savoy was a colonel at twenty-one, 
a lieutenant-field-marshal at twenty-four, and soon after, a 
general-field-marshal. He gained the battle of Zenta at 
thirty-four, and of Blenheim at forty-one. At the opening 
of the war of 1733, he again appeared at the head of the 
army at the advanced age of sixty-nine, but having lost 
the vigor and fire of youth, he effected nothing of im- 
portance. 

Peter the Great of Russia was proclaimed czar at ten 
years of age ; at twenty he organized a large army and 
33* 



390 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

built several ships ; at twenty-four he fought the Turks 
and captured Asoph ; at twenty-eight he made war with 
Sweden ; at thirty he entered Moscow in triumph after 
the victory of Embach, and the capture of Noteburg and 
Marienburg ; at thirty-one he began the city of St. Pe- 
tersburg ; at thirty-nine he was defeated by the Turks and 
forced to ransom himself and army. His latter years were 
mostly devoted to civil and maritime affairs. He died at 
the age of fifty-five. 

Charles the XH. of Sweden ascended the throne at 
the age of fifteen, completed his first successful campaign 
against Denmark at eighteen, overthrew eighty thousand 
Russians at Narva before nineteen, conquered Poland and 
Saxony at twenty-four, and died at thirty-six. 

Frederick the Great of Prussia ascended the throne at 
twenty-eight, and almost immediately entered on that ca- 
reer of military glory which has immortalized his name. 
He established his reputation in the first Silesian war, 
which he terminated at the age of thirty. The second Si- 
lesian war was terminated at thirty-three ; and at forty- 
three, with a population of five millions, he successfully 
opposed a league of more than one hundred millions of 
people. 

Prince Henry of Prussia served his first campaign as 
colonel of a regiment at sixteen ; at the age of thirty-one 
he decided the victory of Prague, and the same year was 
promoted to the command of a separate army. The mili- 
tary reputation he acquired in the Seven Years' War was 
second only to that of Frederick. 

Cortes had effected the conquest of Mexico, and com- 
pleted his military career, at the age of thirty-six. 

Sandoval, the most eminent of his great captains, died 
at the age of thirty-one. He had earned his great renown, 
and closed his military achievements, before the age of 
twenty-five. 



iMlLITARY EDUCATION. 391 

• 

Pizarro completed the conquest of Peru at thirty-five, 
and died about forty. 

Lord Clive began his military career at twenty-two, and 
had reached the zenith of his military fame at thirty-five ; 
he was raised to the peerage at thirty-six, and died at fifty. 

Hastings began his military service at about twenty-five, 
and became governor of Bengal at forty. 

Napoleon was made a lieutenant at seventeen, a captain 
at twenty, chef-de-hataillon at twenty-four, general of bri- 
gade at twenty-five, and commander-in-chief of the army 
of Italy at twenty-six. All his most distinguished gener- 
als were, like him, young men, and they seconded him in 
his several campaigns with all the energy and activity of 
youthful valor and enthusiasm. 

Dessaix entered the army at fifteen ; at the opening of 
the war he quickly passed through the lower grades, and 
became a general of brigade before the age of twenty-five, 
and a general of division at twenty-six ; he died before the 
age of thirty -two, with a reputation second only to that of 
Napoleon. 

Kleber did not enter the army till later in life, but he 
quickly passed through the subordinate grades, and was 
made a general of brigade at thirty-eight, a general of di- 
vision at forty, and general-in-chief of an army at forty- 
one : he died at forty-six. On his death, and in Napoleon's 
absence, Menau, aged and inefiicient, succeeded by right 
of seniority to the command of the army of Egypt. Its 
utter ruin was the almost immediate consequence. 

Massena first entered the army at seventeen, but soon 
married a rich wife, and retired to civil life. He returned 
to the army at the opening of the revolution, and in two 
years, before the age of thirty-five, was promoted to the 
rank of general of division. He immediately acquired that 
high reputation which he sustained through a long career 
of military glory. 



392 MILITARY ART AND^SCIENCE. 

Soult became a sub-lieutenant at twenty-two, a cap- 
tain at twenty-four ; the following year he passed through 
the several grades of chef-de-hataillon^ colonel, and gen- 
eral of brigade, and became general of division at twenty- 
nine. 

Davoust was a sub-lieutenant at seventeen, a general of 
brigade at twenty-three, and general of division at twenty- 
five. 

Eugene Beauharnais entered the army at a very early 
age. He became chef-de-hataillon at nineteen, colonel at 
twenty-one, general of brigade at twenty-three, and Vice- 
roy of Italy at twenty-five. He soon proved himself one 
of Napoleon's ablest generals. At twenty-eight he com- 
manded the army of Italy, and at thirty-one gained great 
glory in the Russian campaign, at the head of the fourth 
corps d^armee, 

Gouvion-Saint-Cyr entered the army at the beginning 
of the Revolution, and passing rapidly through the lower 
grades, became a general of brigade at twenty-nine, and a 
general of division at thirty. 

Suchet became a chef-de-hataillon at twenty, general of 
brigade at twenty-five, major-general of Brune's army at 
twenty-seven, and general of division and of a corps d'armee 
at twenty-eight. 

Oudinot became a captain at twenty-three, chef-de-ha- 
taillon at twenty-four, general of brigade at twenty-five, 
and general of division at twenty-eight. 

Ney was a captain at twenty-three, adjutant-general at 
twenty-six, general of brigade at twenty-seven, and gen- 
eral of division at twenty -nine. 

Lannes was a colonel at twenty-seven, general of bri- 
gade at twenty-eight, and very soon after general of di- 
vision. 

Joubert became adjutant-general at twenty-five, general 
of brigade at twenty-six, general of division at twenty- 



MILITARY EDUCATION. 393 

eight, and general-in-chief of the army of Italy at twenty- 
nine. He died at thirty. 

Victor was a chef-de-bataillon at twenty-seven, general 
of brigade at twenty-nine, and general of division at thirty- 
two. 

Murat was a lieutenant at twenty, and passing rapidly 
through the lower grades, he became a general of brigade 
at twenty-five, and a general of division at twenty-seven. 

Mortier was a captain at twenty-three, adjutant-general 
at twenty-five, general of brigade at thirty, and general of 
division at thirty-one. 

Macdonald was a colonel at twenty-seven, a general of 
brigade at twenty-seven, and a general of division at thirty. 

Marmont was a captain at twenty-one, chef-de-bataillon 
at twenty-two, general of brigade at twenty-four, inspector- 
general at twenty-seven, and general-in-chief of an army 
at thirty-two. 

Bernadotte was a colonel at twenty-eight, general of 
brigade at twenty-nine, and general of division at thirty. 

Lefebvre was made a captain at the organization of the 
army in 1793 ; he became a general of brigade at thirty- 
eight, and general of division at thirty-nine. 

Bessieres entered the army at twenty-six, became a 
colonel at thirty, general of brigade at thirty-two, and gen- 
eral of division at thirty-four. He died at forty-seven. 

Duroc was a captain at twenty-three, chef-de-bataillon 
at twenty-six, colonel and chef-de-brigade at twenty-seven, 
and general of division at thirty. He died at forty-one. 

This list might be still further extended with the same 
results, but names enough have been given to show that 
the generals who assisted Napoleon in his immortal cam- 
paigns were all, with scarcely an exception, young men, 
still burning with the fires of youthful ardor and enthusi- 
asm. The grade of marshal was not created till after Na- 
poleon became emperor. On ascending the throne of the 



394 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

empire, he nominated to this rank eighteen of the most 
distinguished generals of France. Some of these were 
generals of the earlier wars of the Revolution, and had 
never served under him. Others were younger men, sev- 
eral being only thirty-four, thirty-five, and thirty-six years 
of age. The mean age of all was forty-four. He after- 
wards made seven more marshals, whose mean age was 
forty-three. These appointments, however, were regard- 
ed as rewards ioxpast services, rather than as a grade from 
which service was expected, for several of the older mar- 
shals were never called into the field after their promo- 
tion. 

Having noticed the ages of the principal generals who 
commanded in the armies of Napoleon, let us look for a 
moment at those who opposed him. In the campaign of 
1796 the enemy's forces were directed by Beaulieu, then 
nearly eighty years of age ; Wurmser, also an octogena- 
rian, and Alvinzi, then over seventy : these had all three 
distinguished themselves in earlier life, but had now lost 
that youthful energy and activity so essential for a mili- 
tary commander. 

In the campaign of 1800 the general-in-chief of the Aus- 
trian forces was Melas, an old general, who had served 
some fifty years in the army ; he had distinguished him- 
self so long ago as the Seven Years' War, but he had 
now become timid and inefficient, age having destroyed 
his energy. 

In the campaign of 1805 the French were opposed by 
Kutusof, then sixty, and Mack, then fifty-three ; the plan 
of operations was drawn up by still more aged generals 
of the Aulic council. 

In the campaign of 1806 the French were opposed by 
the Duke of Brunswick, then seventy-one, Hohenlohe, 
then sixty, and Mollendorf, Kleist, and Massenbach, old 
generals, who had served under the great Frederick, — 



MILITARY EDUCATION. 395 

men, says Jomini, " exhumed from the Seven Years' War," 
— " whose facuhies were frozen by age," — "who had been 
buried for the last ten years in a lethargic sleep." 

In the campaign of 1807 the French were opposed by 
Kamenski, then eighty years of age, Benningsen, then six- 
ty, and Buxhowden, then fifty-six. The Allies now be- 
gan to profit by their experience, and in 1809 the Austrian 
army was led by the young, active, skilful, and energetic 
Archduke Charles ; and this campaign, although the com- 
mander-in-chief was somewhat fettered by the foolish 
projects of the old generals of the Aulic council, and 
thwarted by the disobedience of his brother, was never- 
theless the most glorious in the Austrian annals of the 
wars of the Revolution. 

At the opening of the campaign of 1812 the Emperor 
Alexander, young, (only thirty-five,) active, intelligent, and 
ambitious, had remodelled his army, and infused into it his 
own energy and enthusiastic love of glory. He was him- 
self at its head, and directed its operations. Kutusof was 
for a short time the nominal commander-in-chief, and ex- 
hibited an activity unusual at his age, but he was sur- 
rounded by younger generals — Barclay-de-Tolley, and 
Miloradowich, then forty -nine, Wintzengerode, then forty- 
three, Schouvalof, then thirty-five, and the Archduke Con- 
stantine, then thirty-three, — generals who, at the heads of 
their corps, and under the young emperor and his able 
staff of young officers, in the two succeeding campaigns, 
rolled back the waves of French conquest, and finally 
overthrew the French empire. Wellington, who led the 
English in these campaigns, was of the same age as Na- 
poleon, and had been educated at the same time with him 
in the military schools of France. The Austrians were 
led by Schwartzenburg, then only about thirty, and the 
Prussians by Yorck, Bulow, and Bliicher. The last of 
these was then well advanced in life, but all his movements 



396 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

being directed by younger men, — Schamliorst and Gneise- 
nau, — his operations partook of the energy of his able 
chiefs of staff. 

In the campaign of 1815, Napoleon was opposed by the 
combinations of Wellington and Gneisenau, both younger 
men than most of his own generals, who, it is well known, 
exhibited, in this campaign, less than in former ones, the 
ardent energy and restless activity which had character- 
ized their younger days. Never were Napoleon's plans 
better conceived, never did his troops fight with greater 
bravery ; but the dilatory movements of his generals en- 
abled his active enemies to parry the blow intended for 
their destruction. 

In the American war of 1812, we pursued the same 
course as Austria, Prussia, and Russia, in their earlier 
contests with Napoleon, i. e., to supply our armies with 
generals, we dug up the Beaulieus, the Wurmsers, the 
Alvinzis, the Melases, the Macks, the Brunswicks, and the 
Kamenskis of our revolutionary war ; but after we had 
suffered sufficiently from the Hulls, the Armstrongs, the 
Winchesters, the Dearborns, the Wilkinsons, the Hamp- 
tons, and other veterans of the Revolution, we also changed 
our policy, and permitted younger men — the Jacksons, the 
Harrisons, the Browns, the McReas, the Scotts,* the 
Ripleys, the AVoods, the M' Combs, the Wools, and the 
Millers — to lead our forces to victory and to glory. In 
the event of another war, with any nation capable of op- 
posing to us any thing like a powerful resistance, shall 
we again exhume the veterans of former days, and again 
place at the head of our armies respectable and aged in- 
efficiency ; or shall we seek out youthful enterprise and 
activity combined with military science and instruction ? 
The results of the war, the honor of the country, the glor) 

* Scott had acquired his military reputation, a!^d attained the rank 
of major-general at twenty-eight. 



MILITARY EDUCATION. 397 

of our arms, depend, in a great measure, upon the answer 
that will be given to this question. 

But it may be asked, how are we to secure this combi- 
nation of military instruction and military energy ; how 
are we to fill the higher grades of our army with young 
and active men possessing due military instruction and 
talent ? The question is not a difficult one, and our gov- 
ernment can easily attain the desired object, if it will only 
set at work honestly, disregarding all party prejudices 
and the mercenary and selfish interests of its own mem- 
bers and advisers. Other governments have pointed out 
to us the way. It is this : let merit be the main test for 
all appointments and promotions in the army. Let one or 
more of the subordinate grades be thrown open to the 
youth of the whole country, without distinction as to 
birth, or wealth, or politics ; let them be kept on proba- 
tion ir this subordinate grade, and be thoroughly instructed 
in all that relates to the military profession ; after strict 
examination let them be promoted to the vacancies in the 
higher grades as rapidly as they shall show themselves 
qualified for the duties of those grades, merit and services 
being here as elsewhere the only tests. 

The first part of this rule is already accomplished by 
the Military Academy. One young man is selected from 
each congressional district, on an average, once in about 
two years, the selection being made by the representative 
of the district ; these young men are made warrant officers 
in the army, and sent to a military post for instruction ; 
frequent and strict examinations are instituted to deter- 
mine their capacity and fitness for military service ; after 
a probation of a certain length of time, the best are select- 
ed for commission in the army, relative rank and appoint- 
ments to corps being made strictly with reference to 
merit ; birth, wealth, influence of political friends — all ex- 
traneous circumstances being excluded from considera 

34 



398 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

tion. What can be more truly and thoroughly democratic 
than this ? What scheme can be better devised to supply 
our army with good officers, and to exclude from the mili- 
tary establishment the corrupting influence of party poli- 
tics, and to prevent commissions in the army from being 
given to " the sons of v^ealthy and influential men, to the 
almost total exclusion of the sons of the poor and less in- 
fluential men, regardless alike of qualifications and of 
merit ?" 

Unfortunately for the army and for the country this sys- 
tem ends here, and all further advancement is made by 
mere seniority, or by executive favoritism, the claims of 
merit having but little or no further influence. Indeed, 
executive patronage is not unfrequently permitted to en- 
croach even upon these salutary rules of appointment, and 
to place relatives and political friends into the higher 
ranks of commissioned officers directly from civil life, 
" regardless alike of qualifications and of merit," while 
numbers " of sons of the poor and less influential men," 
who have served a probation of four or five years in military 
studies and exercises, and have proved themselves, in some 
thirty examinations made by competent boards of military 
officers, to be most eminently qualified for commissions, 
are passed by in utter neglect ! Our army is much more 
open to this kind of favoritism and political partiality, than 
that of almost any of the governments of Europe, which 
we have been accustomed to regard as aristocratic and 
wholly unfriendly to real merit. 

In the Prussian service, in time of peace, the govern- 
ment can appoint no one, even to the subordinate grade 
of ensign, till he has followed the courses of instruction 
of the division or brigade-school of his arm, and has 
passed a satisfactory examination. And, " no ensign can 
be promoted to a higher grade till after his promotion has 
been agreed to by the superior board or commission of 



MILITARY EDUCATION. 399 

examiners at Berlin, and his name has been placed on the 
list of those whose knowledge and acquirements (connais- 
sances) render them qualified (aptes) for the responsible 
duties of their profession. The nomination to the grade 
of second-lieutenant is not, even after all these conditions 
are fulfilled, left to the choice of the government. When 
a vacancy occurs in this grade, the subaltern officers pre- 
sent to the commandant of the regiment a list of three 
ensigns who have completed their course of study ; the 
commandant, after taking the advice of the superior offi- 
cers of the regiment, nominates the most meritorious of 
these three to the king, who makes the appointment." 
The government can appoint to the engineers and artillery 
only those who have been instructed as elives in the 
Berlin school of cadets and the school of artillery and en- 
gineers, and these appointments must be made in the 
order in which the pupils have passed their final exami- 
nation. In these corps the lieutenants and second cap- 
tains can be promoted to a higher grade only after they 
have passed a satisfactory examination. No political in- 
fluence, nor even royal partiality, can interfere with this 
rule. 

Even in the arbitrary monarchies of Austria and Rus- 
sia it is deemed necessary to subject all military appoint- 
ments and promotions, in the peace establishments, to 
certain fixed rules. In the Austrian army all sub-lieuten- 
ants must be taken from the military schools, or the spe- 
cially-instructed corps of cadets and imperial guards ; from 
this grade to that of captain all promotions are made by 
the commandants of regiments and corps on the advice of 
the other superior officers. Above the grade of captain 
all nominations for promotion are made to the emperor by 
the Aulic Council, in the order of seniority of rank, except 
the claims of superior merit interfere. " In the Russian 
army," says Haillot, " no one, not even a prince of the im- 



400 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

perial family, can reach the grade of officer till he has 
satisfactorily passed his several examinations, or finished 
the severe novitiate to which the cadets in the corps are 
subjected." Promotion below the grade of colonel is made 
partly by seniority, and partly by merit ; above that grade, 
by selection alone. 

In the British service, rank in the line of the army is 
obtained by purchase, and the higher grades are in this 
way filled with young men of energy and enterprise ; but 
this efficiency is gained by injustice to the poor man, who 
is without the means of purchasing rank. In some re- 
spects it is preferable to our ruinous system of exclusive 
seniority and executive favoritism, but far more objection- 
able than that based on merit. Wellington has recently 
said that the system of exclusive seniority would soon ut- 
terly destroy the efficiency of the army, by preventing 
young men from reaching the higher grades. *' At first," 
says an officer of some distinction in the British navy, in 
speaking of promotions in that arm of service, " it certain- 
ly looks very hard to see old stagers grumbling away their 
existence in disappointed hopes ; yet there can be little 
doubt that the navy, and, of course, the country at large, 
are essentially better served by the present system of em- 
ploying active, young, and cheerful-minded officers, than 
they ever could be by any imaginable system by seniority. 
It must not be forgotten, indeed, that at a certain stage of 
the profession, the arrangement by which officers are pro- 
moted in turn is already made the rule, and has long been 
so : but, by a wise regulation, it does not come into oper- 
ation before the rank of post-captain be attained. Ante- 
cedent to this point, there must occur ample opportunities 
of weeding out those persons, who, if the rule of mere se- 
niority were adopted, would exceedingly embarrass the 
navy list." We fully agree with this writer respecting the 
evils of a system of exclusive seniority, but not respecting 



MILITARY EDUCATION. 401 

the best means of remedying these evils. In England, where 
the wealthy and aristocratic classes govern the state, they 
may very well prefer a system of military appointment 
and promotion based exclusively on wealth and political 
influence ; but in this country we are taught to consider 
merit as a claim much higher than wealth, or rank, or 
privilege. 

The various changes in the rules of appointment and 
promotion in the French service, and the various results 
of these changes, both on the character of the army and 
the welfare of the state, are so instructive that we regret 
that our limits will not allow us to enter into a full dis- 
cussion of them. We can give only a very brief outline. 

Previous to the Revolution, military appointment and 
promotion were w^holly subject to the rules of nobility, 
certain grades in the army belonging of right to certain 
grades of the noblesse ; merit and service being excluded 
from consideration. But the constituent assembly changed 
this order of things, and established the rule that three- 
fourths of the sub-lieutenants be appointed by selection, 
after a concours, and the other quarter be appointed from 
the sub-officers, alternately by seniority and selection, 
without concours ; the captains and lieutenants by se- 
niority ; the colonels and lieutenant-colonels two-thirds 
by seniority and one-third by selection ; marechaux-de- 
camp and lieutenant-generals one-half by seniority and 
one-half by selection. In 1793 the grades were still fur- 
ther opened to selection, and in the turbulent times that 
followed, a part of them were even thrown open to elec- 
tion by the soldiers. But in 1795 the combined system 
of merit and seniority, with certain improvements, was 
restored. In 1796 and the wars that followed, merit was 
the only qualification required, and Bonaparte, Moreau, 
and other young generals were actually placed in com- 
mand of their seniors in rank. Military talent and mil- 

34* 



402 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

itary services, not rank, were the recognised claims for 
promotion, the baptism of blood, as it was called, having 
equalized all grades. Bonaparte, in leaving Egypt, paid 
no attention to seniority of rank, but gave the command 
to Kleber, who was then only a general of brigade, while 
Menou was a general of division. Everybody knows 
that on the death of Kleber, General Menou succeeded 
in the command ; and that Egypt, saved by the selection 
of Kleber, was lost by the seniority of Menou. 

Napoleon formed rules for promotion, both for peace 
and war, based on merit. His peace regulations were 
much the same as the system of 1795 ; his field regula- 
tions, however, from the circumstances of the times, were 
almost the only ones used. The following extract from 
the Reglement de Campagne of 1809, (title XX.,) gives 
the spirit of this system : — " The next day after an action 
the generals of brigade will present to the generals of 
division the names of all such as have distinguished 
themselves in a particular manner ; the generals of di- 
vision will immediately report these to the commander- 
in-chief, and also the names of the generals and superior 
officers whose conduct has contributed most to secure 
success, so that the general-in-chief may immediately in- 
form his majesty." 

On the restoration of the Bourbons there were also re- 
stored many of the ancient privileges and claims of rank 
by the officers of the maison militaire du roi, and court fa- 
voritism was substituted for merit and service. But the 
revolution of 1830 produced a different order of things. 
" The laws now regulate military promotion ; the king can 
appoint or promote only in conformity to legal prescrip- 
tions ; and even in the exercise of this prerogative, he is 
wise enough to restrain himself by certain fixed rules, 
which protect him from intrigues, and from the obsessions 
of persons of influence, and of party politicians." Would 



MILITARY EDUCATION. 403 

that the same could always be said of the executive of this 
country in making appointments and promotions in the 
army. 

The existing laws and regulations of the French service 
diifer slightly for different corps, but the general rule is 
as follows : No one can be appointed to the grade of offi- 
cer in the army who has not graduated at one of the mili- 
tary schools, or has not served at least two years as a sub- 
officer in a corps d^armee. In time of peace, no one can be 
promoted to the rank of lieutenant, captain, or major, {chef- 
d^escadron and chef-de-hataillon,) till he has served two 
years in the next lower grade ; no one can be made lieu- 
tenant-colonel till he has served four years, nor be made 
colonel till he has served three years, in the next lower 
grade ; no one can be made marechal-de-camp, lieutenant- 
general, or marshal of France, till he has served two years 
in the next lower grade. These numbers are all dimin- 
ished one half in time of war. For the grades of first- 
lieutenant and captain, two-thirds of the promotions are 
by seniority, and one-third by selection ; for the cJief-de- 
hataillon and chef-d^escadron^ one-half by seniority and 
one-half by selection ; for all the other grades by selection 
only. In time of war, one-half of the promotions to the 
grades of first-lieutenant and captain are filled by selec- 
tion, and all the promotions to other grades in this way. 
For promotion by selection, a list of the authorized candi- 
dates for each grade is made out every year by inspectors, 
and boards of examiners appointed ad hoc, and the name, 
qualifications, and particular claim are given of each offi- 
cer admitted to the concours. The recommendations of 
these inspectors and examiners are almost invariably fol- 
lowed by the government in its selections. This com- 
bined system of seniority and merit secures a gradual pro- 
motion to all, and at the same time enables officers of great 
talents and acquirements to attain the higher grades while 



404 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

Still young and efficient. Merit need not, therefore, al- 
ways linger in the subaltern grades, and be held subordi- 
nate to ignorance and stupidity, merely because they hap- 
pen to be endowed with the privileges of seniority. More- 
over, government is precluded from thrusting its own fa- 
vorites into the higher grades, and placing them over the 
heads of abler and better men. 

If such a system of appointment were introduced into 
our army, and fixed by legal enactments, and no one were 
allowed to receive a commission till he had either distin- 
guished himself in the field, or had passed an examination 
before a board of competent officers, we are confident that 
better selections would be made in the appointments from 
civil life than have been within the last ten years by the 
present system of political influence. It would scarcely 
be possible to make worse selections.* And if the com- 

* To show the working of this system of political appointments, we 
would call attention to a single fact. On the formation of an additional 
regiment of dragoons in 1836, thirty of its officers were appointed from 
civil life, and only four from the graduates of the Military Academy. 
Of those appointed to that regiment from civil life, twenty-two have 
already been dismissed or resigned, (most of the latter to save them- 
selves from being dismissed,) and only eight of the whole thirty political 
appointments are now left, their places having been mainly supplied by 
graduates of the Military Academy. 

In case of another increase of our military establishment, what course 
will our government pursue ? Will it again pass by the meritorious young 
officers of our army, — graduates of the Military Academy, — who have 
spent ten or twelve of the best years of their life in qualifying themselves 
for the higher duties of their profession, and place over their heads ci- 
vilians of less education and inferior character — men totally ignorant of 
military duties, mere pothouse pohticians, and the base hirelings of party, 
— those who screech the loudest in favor of party measures, and de- 
grade themselves the most in order to serve party ends ? — and by thus 
devoting the army, like the custom-house and post-office, to political 
purposes, will it seek to increase that vast patronage of the executive 
which is already debasing individual morality, and destroying the na- 



MILITARY EDUCATION. 405 

bined system of seniority and examination were pursued 
in promoting the subalterns already in service, it certainly 
would produce less injustice, and give greater efficiency 
to the army, than the present one of exclusive seniority 
and brevet rank, obtained through intrigue and political 
influence, or high military appointments bestowed as a re- 
ward for dirty and corrupt party services. As a military 
maxim, secure efficiency^ hy limiting the privileges of rank ; 
exclude favoritism, hy giving the power of selection to boards 
of competent officers, totally independent of party politics. 
Such a system has been for some time pursued in the med- 
ical department of our army ; it has produced the most 
satisfactory results ; stupidity, ignorance, and aged ineffi- 
ciency have been overslaughed, and will soon entirely dis- 
appear from that corps ; they have been replaced by young 
men of activity, talent, character, intelligence, and great 
professional skill. Is it less important to have competent 
military officers to command where the lives of thousands, 
the honor of our flag, the safety of the country depend upon 
their judgment and conduct, than it is to have competent 
surgeons to attend the sick and the wounded ? 

We wish to call particular attention to this subject. It 
deserves attention at all times, but at the present moment 
it more especially demands a close and candid considera- 
tion. The higher grades of our peace establishment are 
now filled with men so far advanced in life that, in case 
of an increase of the army, many of them must imdoubt- 
edly be either passed over, or put on a retired list. Soon- 
er or later some change of this kind will undoubtedly be 
made. It is demanded by the good of service, even in 
time of peace ; and in time of war, it will be absolutely 

tional character? Should any administration of the government bo so 
unmindful of the interests and honor of the country as to again pursue 
such a course, it is to be hoped that the sword of political justice will 
uot long slumber in its scabbard. 



406 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

necessary to the success of our arms.* But the great 
danger is that the change may be made for the worse — 
that all the appointments and promotions to the higher 
grades will be made through political influence, thus con- 
verting the army and navy into political engines. Let 
proper measures be taken to prevent so dangerous a re- 
sult ; let executive patronage in the army be limited by 
wholesome laws, like those in France and Prussia ; and 
let military merit and services, as determined by boards 
of competent military officers, be the only recognised 
claims to appointment and promotion, thus giving to the 
poor and meritorious at least an equal chance with the 
man of wealth and the base hireling of party. In actual 
service the system of exclusive seniority cannot exist ; it 
would deaden and paralyze all our energies. Taking ad- 
vantage of this, politicians will drive us to the opposite 
extreme, unless the executive authority be limited by 
wholesome laws, based on the just principles of merit and 
sei'vice. 

But the importance of maintaining in our military or- 
ganization a suitable system of military instruction is not 
confined to the exigencies of our actual condition. It 
mainly rests upon the absolute necessity of having in the 
country a body of men who shall devote themselves to 
the cultivation of military science, so as to be able to com- 
pete with the military science of the transatlantic powers. 
It is not to be expected that our citizen soldiery, however 
intelligent, patriotic, and brave they may be, can make 

* Even at the present moment, in ordering troops to Texas, where 
immediate and active service is anticipated, it is found necessary to 
break up regiments and send only the young and efficient officers 
into the field, leaving most of the higher officers behind vs^ith mere 
nominal commands. Very many of the officers now in Texas are 
acting in capacities far above their nominal grades, but without receiv- 
ing the rank, pay, and emoluments due to their services. 



MILITARY EDUCATION. 407 

any very great progress in military studies. They have 
neither the time nor opportunities for such pursuits, and if 
they can acquire a practical acquaintance with elementary 
tactics — the mere alphabet of the military art — it is as 
much as can reasonably be expected of them. As a gen- 
eral rule, the militia are individually more capable and in- 
telligent than the men who compose a regular army. But 
they must of necessity be inferior in practical professional 
knowledge. 

Technical education is necessary in every pursuit of 
life. It is possible that the lawyer may succeed in some 
particular cases without a knowledge of law, but he will 
probably have few clients if he remain ignorant of the 
laws and precedents that govern the courts. The un- 
learned chemist may succeed in performing some single 
experiment, but his progress will be slow and uncertain if 
he neglect to make himself familiar with the experiments 
and discoveries of his predecessors. 

Learning, when applied to agriculture, raises it from a 
mere mechanical drudgery to the dignity of a science. By 
analyzing the composition of the soil we cultivate, we learn 
its capacity for improvement, and gain the power to stimu- 
late the earth to the most bountiful production. How dif- 
ferent the results attending the labors of the intelligent 
agriculturist, guided by the lamp of learning, from those 
of the ignorant drudge who follows the barren formula of 
traditional precepts ! As applied to manufactures and the 
mechanical arts, learning develops new powers of labor, 
and new facilities for subsistence and enjoyment. Personal 
comforts of every kind are greatly increased, and placed 
within the reach of the humbler classes ; while at the same 
time the " appliances of art are made to minister to the 
demands of elegant taste, and a higher moral culture." 
As applied to commerce, it not only greatly increases the 
facilities for the more general diffusion of civilization and 



408 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

knowledge, but is also vastly influential in harmonizing 
the conflicting interests of nations. 

Nor is learning less humanizing and pacific in its in- 
fluence when applied to the military art. " During the 
dark ages which followed the wreck of the Roman power, 
the military science by which that power had been reared, 
was lost with other branches of learning. When learning 
revived, the military art revived with it, and contributed 
not a little to the restoration of the empire of mind over 
that of brute force. Then, too, every great discovery in 
the art of war has a life-saving and peace-promoting in- 
fluence. The effects of the invention of gunpowder are 
a familiar proof of this remark ; and the same principle 
applies to the discoveries of modern times. By perfecting 
ourselves in military science, paradoxical as it may seem, 
we are therefore assisting in the diffusion of peace, and 
hastening on the approach of that period when swords 
shall be beaten into ploughshares and spears into pruning- 
hooks." 



EXPLANATION OF PLATES. 

Figs. 1, 2, 3. — Used to illustrate the strategic relations of the 
armies A and B. 

Fig. 4. — Line of operations directed against the extremity of the 
enemy's line of defence, as was done by Napoleon in the 
Marengo campaign. 

Fig. 5. — Napoleon's plan of campaign in 1800, for the army of the 
Rhine, and the army of reserve. 

Fig. 6 shows the plan adopted by Napoleon in the campaign of 
1800, to preserve his communications. 

Fig. 7 illustrates the same thing in the campaign of 1806. 

Fig. 8. — Interior and central line of operations. 

Fig. 9 represents a camp of a grand division of kn army. The 
distance from the front row of tents to the hne of camp- 
guards should be from 350 to 400 feet ; thence to the line 
of posts, from 150 to 200 feet ; thence to the line of sen- 
tinels, from 100 to 200 feet. In many cases, the line of 
posts between the camp-guards and sentinels may be dis- 
pensed with. The distance between battalions will be 
from 50 to 100 feet ; and the same between squadrons 
and batteries. 

Fig. 10. — Details of encampment for a battalion of infantry. The 
width of company streets will depend upon the strength 
of a company, and will be so arranged that the front of 
the camp shall not exceed the length of the battalion, 
when drawn up in line of battle. This width will be from 
50 to 100 feet. The distance between the tents of each 
row will be 2 or 3 feet ; the distance between the tents of 
one company and those of another, from 4 to 6 feet. 

Fig. 11 is the camp of a squadron of cavalry. A single company 
encamping alone, would be arranged in the same way as 
an entire squadron. The horses are picketed in two lines 
parallel to the tents, and at a distance from them of about 
12 feet. The forage is placed between the tents. A squad- 
ron of two companies will occupy a front of about 180 
feet. The fires, or company kitchens, should be 50 ox 60 
feet in rear of the non-commissioned officers' tents* 
35 



410 MILITARY ART AISD SCIENCE. 

Fig. 12 is the camp of two batteries of foot artiller}', or two com- 
panies of foot engineers. 

[The plan of encampment for artillery, as given in the 
" Instruction of U. S. Field Artiller}^, horse and foot," may 
be employed where a single batter^' encamps by itself, or 
where only the skeleton of companies is maintained ; but 
it will be found exceedingly inconvenient, where a full 
batter^", with a large train, encamps on the same line with 
other troops. The plan w^e have given is that which is era - 
ployed in most European services.] 
Fig. 13. — In this plan for momited artilier)^ and engineers, the fires 
are so an-anged as to expose the ammmiition as little as 
possible to fhe sparks from the kitchens. 
Fig. 14. — Simple parallel order of battle. 

15. — Parallel order, with a crochet on the flank, 

16. — Parallel order, reinforced on a wing. 

17. — ^Parallel order, reinforced on the centre. 

18. — Simple oblique order. 

19. — Obhque order, reinforced on the assailing wing. 

20. — Perpendicular order. 

21. — Concave order. 

22. — Convex order. 

23. — Order by echelon on a wing. 

24. — Order by echelon on the centre. 

25. — Combined order of attack. 

26. — Formation of infantry by two deployed lines. 

27, 28. — Arrangements corresponding to depth of column. 

29. — Formation by squares. 

30. — Mixed formation of three battalions. 

31. — Deep formation of heavy columns. 

32. — Formation in columns by brigade. 

33. — Formation of two brigades of cavalry, by the mixed 
system. 

34.— Passage of the Sound by the British fleet, m 1807. 

35. — Attack on Copenhagen. 

36. — Attack on Algiers. 

37. — Attack on San Juan d'UUoa. 

38. — Attack on St. Jean d'Acre. 

39. — Plan of a regular bastion ed front of a fortification. 

40. — Section of do. do. 

41. — Tenaillons. 



EXPLANATION OF PLATES. 411 

Fig. 42. — Demi-tenaillons, with a bonnet. 
43. — A horn-work. 
44. — A crown-work. 
45. — A redan. 
46. — A lunette. 
47. — A mitre or priest-cap. 
48. — A bastioned fort. 

49. — Vertical section of a field intrenchment. 
50. — Simple sap. 
5L — Flying sap. 
52. — Full sap. 

53. — Crater of a military mine. 
54. — Plan of the attack of a regular bastioned work. 



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